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Abstract
This dissertation is premised upon a simple assumption: it is not possible to fully grasp how 
the security sector works until we understand interagency relations. The ‘interagency’ is the 
area where different security organisations interact in the pursuit of maintaining security. 
This topic throws up a number of questions, such as how do security groups interrelate and 
why do they behave the way they do? In the literature on Indonesia many sources take the 
view that relations between security actors, especially the police and the Indonesian 
military, are unclear and contested. This thesis finds the opposite. By pursuing a local level 
case study of the relationships between security organisations in Yogyakarta, this thesis 
argues that most security relationships in this case study are premised on generally well 
defined boundaries of jurisdiction. Most importantly, the dominant form of behaviour is not 
hostility or competition but rather collaboration.
This dissertation employs policing theory on networked security as the most appropriate 
paradigm to model security relations within the case study site. Policing is a dynamic task, 
involving not only the uniformed state police but a diverse range of government and non­
government actors. This framework aptly fits the situation in Indonesia where we find 
various central and regional government agencies and commercial and civil society 
organisations deploying within the sector. Examples include the national police, territorial 
units o f  the Indonesian army, the civil service police o f  regional government, non-police 
civil service investigators, private security companies, neighbourhood watch groups, 
Islamic vigilantes, and political party militias among others.
The Indonesian police, however, are at the centre o f  this security network, they lead, 
support and lend their authority to other actors. The superiority of the Indonesian police 
becomes the core reason why collaboration takes place within the network. Other security 
organisations feel they need to access the formal authority and special powers of the police. 
This system has created something of a security leviathan. My research from Yogyakarta 
suggests the Indonesian police have emerged as the primary agent within the local security 
sphere.
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Thesis Introduction
Security problem s cannot be tackljed] by single agencies. Joint efforts, inter-agency cooperation, 
and coordination are [of] param ount im portance.1
It is im perative that we quench the thirst for understanding how the many actors involved in 
national security deal with matters that cross functional and departm ental boundaries.2
Security is not the product of a single agency working alone. In Indonesia, as in other 
countries, a multiplicity of local, national, regional, state, non-state, commercial, and 
volunteer organisations are involved in the production of internal security. The above 
quotations draw our attention to the fact that research on the security sector is not complete 
until we have developed an understanding of how different security organisations interact. 
In Indonesia, this debate has begun in earnest. Relations between the police and the military 
have become an especially prevalent topic in security sector reform debate during the years 
after the fall of the New Order.3 Yet what is missing from this debate is an analysis of what 
relationships look like at the local level, in particular what conditions dictate whether 
security organisations compete, collaborate or simply refuse to deal with one another? This 
is the gap this thesis aims to fill.
The central objective of this thesis is to define and explain which organisations are involved 
in regional security management within a local level case study. My task is to probe to what 
extent there are poor relations and ill-defined boundaries of jurisdiction, as implied by
1 Kusnanto Anggoro, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Convergence and Divergence in the Formulation o f  
National Security Bill in Indonesia (Jakarta: Propatria, 2008), 27
2 Michael Welken, ‘Educating National Security Leaders for Working in the Interagency Process.’ In: 
Gabriella Marcella (ed.), Affairs o f  State: The Interagency and National Security (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2008) 447.
1 See for example the compilations o f articles in: Hari Prihatono and Anak Agung Banyu Perwita (ed.) 
Mencari Format Komprehensif Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Negara (Jakarta: Propatria, 2006) as well 
as A1 Araf and Anton Aliabas (ed.), TNI-Polri di Masa Perubahan Politik, 2nd Edition (Bandung: Institut 
Teknologi Bandung, 2008). Also see: Hari Prihatono, Jessica Evangeline and Lis Gindarsah (ed.), Proses 
Penataan Regulasi Keamanan Nasional. Keamanan Nasional: Kebutuhan Membangun Perspektif Integratif 
Versus Pembiaran politik dan Kebijakan (Jakarta: Propatria Institute, 2006). Anggoro, Bridge Over Troubled 
Water (2008). International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy (20 December
2004), Kusnanto Anggoro and Anak Agung Banyu Perwita (ed.), Rekam Jejak Proses SSR Indonesia 2000- 
2005 (Jakarta: Propatria, 2006).
much of the literature on Indonesian security. My central findings indicate that, contrary to 
dominant perceptions, there are well defined divisions of labour between security actors. 
There is also ample evidence to show that cooperation is the main pattern of relations. 
Within this system the Indonesian police occupy a dominant position. For a mix of 
historical, legal and normative reasons, the Indonesian police have become the central 
security actor within my case study site and other security organisations depend upon the 
police.
Like much of Indonesia’s contemporary political landscape, current debates about security 
relations lie in a chain of events which originated with the fall o f  the New Order. The Asian 
financial crisis which struck Indonesia in 1997 gave birth to a broad range of eventually 
fatal challenges to the Suharto administration. Pressure from the international financial 
community and from domestic political forces coupled with a division in elite support for 
the president and mobilisation of anti-regime masses, eventually forced the resignation of 
Suharto in May 1998.4 The downfall of the president was only one manifestation of broad 
demands for democratic reform (or reformasi) voiced at the time. Another popular cause 
was the termination of a praetorian, interventionist role for the military within society.5 In 
response, the Indonesian military in 1998 drafted a program of reforms designed to placate 
civilian demands.6 As part of this policy, the armed forces willingly dismantled some of the 
most important sources of its power.7 One of these reforms was the separation o f  the 
Indonesian police from the military. Since 1960 the Indonesian police (.Kepolisian Republik 
Indonesia or Polri) had been part of the Indonesian Armed Forces {Angkatan Bersenjata
o  • • •  • • •Republik Indonesia or ABRI). The military’s decision in April 1999 to divide the two 
apparatuses, opened important questions as to where future jurisdictional boundaries would
4 Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Regime Change and Resistance in Indonesia (California: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 202-238.
5 Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 164- 
166. For studies o f the Indonesian military and its role in supporting the regime prior to 1998 see: Richard 
Tanter, ‘The Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence and Security Agencies in Indonesia.’ In, State and Civil 
Society in Indonesia, Arief Budiman (ed.). Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No.22 (1990). Robert Lowry,
The Armed Forces o f Indonesia (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1996), 181-220. Honna, Military 
Politics and Democratization, 8-52.
6 Marcus Mietzner, “The Politics o f  Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism 
and Institutional Resistance.” Policy Studies, No.23, East-West Center (Washington 2006), 11-12.
7 ‘Komitmen ABRI Menyelamatkan Bangsa dan Negara’, Editorial o f Armed Forces Commander Wiranto, 
Kompas 10 March 1999
8 Awaloedin Djamin, Menuju Polri M andiriyang Profesional (Jakarta: Yayasan Tenaga Kerja, 1999), 44-45.
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lie between an independent Polri and the Indonesian Defence Force (renamed the Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia or TNI).9
While the military initiated the institutional separation of the armed forces and the police, 
the Indonesian parliament completed the process but, at the same time, left unanswered 
specific questions over when and how the TNI and Polri can cooperate. In 2000 Indonesia’s 
then supreme law making council, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) formally made the Indonesian police an independent 
body under the command of the president. The MPR charged the police with “upholding 
law, security and public order” while making the Indonesian military responsible for 
“external defence” and upholding the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.” 10 
Critically absent from these decrees was a definition over when the police responsibility for 
security may give way to the military’s responsibility for maintaining state integrity, and 
the circumstances under which the two forces may render assistance to one another. 
Subsequent parliamentary legislation on the armed forces and the police in 2002 and 2004 
failed to rectify these problems."
The absence o f  legal direction over how the police and military can cooperate has 
stimulated debate in Indonesia over whether the state should reform security policy and 
legislation to redress this perceived problem. In a typical statement of the issue, Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar makes clear she believes lack of clarity in the regulatory framework has 
inflamed hostile relations between Indonesia’s security forces:
The sudden separation o f  the TNI and Polri .. .  created various problems in the field.
The existence o f ‘grey areas’, w here there can be found overlapping responsibilities or 
an absence o f  clarity about authority between TNI and Polri, was at the beginning not 
sufficiently anticipated by policym akers. .. .  This thing does not only trigger conflict
9 ‘Polisi Mulai resmi berpisah dari ABRI’, Kompas 3 April 1999.
10 Republik Indonesia: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Ketetapan MPR VI/2000 tentang Pemisahan 
Tentara Nasional Indonesia dari Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia and Ketetapan MPR VII/2000 tentang 
Peran Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Peran Kepolisian Republik Indonesia Pasal 2 (2) and Bab II, Pasal 6 
( 1).
11 ICG, Rethinking Internal Security Strategy, 10-12.
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between TNI and Polri in the field, but also com plicates the handling o f  various 
security problem s in Indonesia.12
Although Fortuna Anwar wrote in 2004 at a time much closer to the turbulence of 
reformasi, the same concerns have not dissipated today. For example, Theo L. Sambuaga 
the former head o f  Commission I (the parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing 
state defence issues), in an academic publication of the think-tank Propatria wrote in 2008:
Regulation and a clear legal um brella concerning the T N I’s Assistance role [to Polri] 
would be really helpful for TNI and Polri, up to now it turns out that many things 
between them have been shrouded in doubt, mutual waiting, anxiety about 
overstepping authority and breaking hum an rights principles, even up to mutual 
suspicion and clashes in the field, when facing the challenges o f  their roles, 
disturbances and threats in the field, oftentim es these things constitute a grey area .13
According to these two sources, one an academic the other a policymaker, the absence o f  
legal provisions to guide interagency cooperation as well as perceived lack o f  clarity in 
jurisdictional boundaries contributes to antagonistic relations between Polri and TNI.
Other Indonesian commentators and policymakers have made similar observations. Yuddy 
Chrisnandi, another former member of Commission I argued the military’s role in securing 
the integrity and unity of the state is inseparably intertwined with the police responsibility 
for upholding security and order within society. Bearing this in mind, Chrisnandi declares:
Looking at the functions and tasks o f  TNI and Polri which alm ost “clash” , its already 
appropriate for us to re-exam ine the benefits and the risks o f  the separation o f  these 
two institutions. If  this separation is indeed positive on the one side, a negative aspect 
on another side - in the form o f  the occurrence o f  overlapping authority in the 
execution o f  security and order within the state - should be m inim alised.14
Such views - overlapping authority, poor cooperation, hostile relations - are widely 
expressed within the academic literature. Sukardi Rinakit for example has claimed: “the 
military also involves itself in a non-defence role by continuing to intervene in the affairs of
12 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Karakter TNI-Polri Pada Masa Transisi”, in Relasi TNI dan Polri dalam 
Penanganan Keamanan Dalam Negri (2000-2004), edited by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian 
Politik LI PI, 2004) 20-21.
13 Theo L. Sambuaga, ‘Reformasi Sektor Keamanan.’ In: TNI-Polri di Masa Perubahan Politik, 19.
14 Yuddy Chrisnandi, ‘Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Negara Perlu Regulasi Politik yang Akomodatif.’ In: 
Prihatono and Banyu Perwita, Mencari Format Komprehensif, 187-188
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the police despite the stipulation in TAP MPR No.VI/MPR/2000 that their duties are 
separate.”15 Leonard C. Sebastian repeats similar observations when claiming: “though not 
having control over anti-terrorism operations, the TNI still has major responsibilities for 
domestic security” and “until the police develop the capacity to fulfil its internal security 
responsibilities, the logic o f  employing the TNI for contingencies related to a new security 
environment where counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency are pre-eminent is difficult to 
fault.”16 Defence commentator Edy Prasetyono similarly suggests: “the arrangement of 
authority in administering national security is still very unclear and even mutually 
overlapping. This confusion is born because o f  several factors... [such as among other 
factors] the function and role of TNI and POLRI which can still be interpreted openly, 
mainly concerning the meaning o f ‘internal security.’”17 Likewise Damien Kingsbury has 
stated: “Polri’s separation from the military was intended to ‘civilianise’ security operations 
and reduce the TNI’s overt role in ensuring internal order. Yet, paradoxically what actually 
occurred was that the TNI’s function changed hardly at all, while the numbers and role of 
Polri... escalated quite significantly.” 18 Arguably the view expressed by these 
commentators has today evolved to become the conventional wisdom. Almost without 
exception, the discourse on interagency security relations in Indonesia is dominated by 
assumptions that relations are bad, cooperation is problematic and boundaries of 
jurisdiction are grey and overlapping.
This discourse is not without policy consequences. Since 2005 the Indonesian Department 
o f  Defence has attempted to propose an overarching bill for the coordination o f  national 
security (the RUU Kamnas). This effort to craft a new institutional framework for security 
management has both stimulated and fed Off academic debates over security reform.19 
Civilian, academic contributors to this debate have long proposed redefining boundaries 
between the national security elements, creating new modalities for cooperation, building 
unified governance arrangements at the national level and many other initiatives. The
15 Sukardi Rinakit, The Indonesian Military after the New Order (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005), 217.
16 Leonard C. Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use o f Military Force (Singapore: Institute o f  
Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 157, 382.
17 Edy Prasetyono, ‘Keamanan Nasional: Tataran Kewenangan, Penggunaan Instrumen Keamanan, dan 
Keamanan Manusia.’ International Working Paper Series, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (May
2005). See also: Anggoro, Bridge Over Troubled Water, I.
IS Damien Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 135.
19 For a discussion o f  the history o f this episode see: Anggoro, Bridge Over Troubled Water (2008).
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overwhelming impression that has emerged from this debate is that Indonesia’s security
• 90management system is broken and needs to be fixed.
Yet for all the discussion of problematic relations, this perception does not fit the dominant 
picture of security in Indonesia that has emerged over the last half decade. Despite the dark 
concerns which hung over the nation in the late nineteen nineties, by 2009 it was apparent 
that Indonesia is remarkably stable and secure. This idea is one that has been growing 
among Indonesian commentators for some time. As put by Douglas Ramage and Andrew 
MacIntyre in a 2008 policy paper:
We need to start thinking o f  [Indonesia] as a norm al country, grappling with many o f 
the same challenges as other large, stable, m iddle-incom e developing dem ocracies... 
Indonesia today is a stable, com petitive dem ocracy ... It is no longer in a state o f  
profound flux and turm oil.21
Such revisionist analysis proposes that the fears about instability which flowered during the 
turbulence of Indonesia’s early transition period are, with the benefit of hindsight, 
exaggerated. This analysis emerged particularly prominently in media coverage of 
Indonesia’s 2009 national elections. The occurrence of these elections more or less ten
years after reformasi, was an auspicious invitation to reflect on the state of modern
22 • • • • Indonesia." At the time many non-specialist commentators, like the journalist Peter
Hartcher who wrote for the Sydney Morning Herald, insightfully juxtaposed the woes of
Thailand in 2009 with the stable progress occurring in Indonesia.
20 For some o f the most important contributions to this debate please see the published works referenced in 
footnote three.
21 Andrew MacIntyre and Douglas Ramage, ‘Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country: Implications for 
Australia.’ Australian Strategic Policy Institute Paper, (May 2008), 3.
22 I make the argument that Indonesia’s election in 2009 proceeded peacefully and that this has helped to form 
confidence in Indonesia’s overall stability. I do however concede one large caveat to this analysis. In July 
2009 days before the presidential poll, terrorist bombings shockingly erupted in Jakarta. Nevertheless, after 
this incident the Indonesian police demonstrated their capacity to disrupt Islamic extremists by mounting a 
successful crackdown. I argue these events ironically demonstrate the maturity and capacity o f  modern 
Indonesia to handle its security problems. On the general absence o f  violence during the election see: Michael 
Buehler, ‘Suicide and progress in modem Nusantara.’ Inside Indonesia No.97, (July-September 2009). For 
July 2009 terrorist attacks see: ‘Bom Marriot-Ritz Carlton: Polisi Telah Identifikasi Pelaku’, Media Indonesia,
17 July 2009. For the arrests o f  terrorists some weeks after the bombing see: ‘Rumah di Bekasi Diintai Sejak 
10 Hari Lalu’, Media Indonesia, 8 Augustus 2009 and ‘Polisi Baku Tembak dengan Teroris’, Media 
Indonesia 7 Augustus 2009.
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[After 1998] Indonesia's prospects seemed to go from bad to w orse .... If  Thailand 
seemed to represent sunrise in South-East Asia, Indonesia appeared to be the region's 
nightfall. Today [2009] we see an extraordinary role reversal. Thailand is now [the] 
w reck.23
While good relations between security institutions are not necessarily a predicate of 
stability, neither are they irrelevant to the equation. The capable performance o f  the 
security sector is one component of stability. Today Indonesia is demonstrably effective in 
maintaining its own security. With the passage of time, it has become apparent that the 
perceptions o f  a poorly functioning security sector, undermined by bad security force 
relations, overlapping boundaries of jurisdiction and hostility between the police and 
military was a picture that fitted more appropriately with the chaos of the early transition 
period. As with the general revisions taking place concerning Indonesia’s overall health and 
stability, it is perhaps time to revisit the conventional wisdom concerning interagency 
security relations. The Indonesian security sector reform literature, which argues for 
nothing less than a wholesale reappraisal of the entire institutional framework of security 
management, is perhaps therefore leaping to conclusions. The gap between the claims of 
the literature and the stable security situation in Indonesia in the last half of the two 
thousands, at least is an invitation for further research.
Preparing the Groundwork for this Study
As alluded to, the literature on security sector reform in Indonesia is growing. One of the 
most articulate discussions of this topic however, remains an early report from the 
International Crisis Group: ‘Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy.’ This policy 
discussion paper lays out with analytical sharpness the alleged problems in Indonesia’s 
security management and founds its claims on rich empirical data. In December 2004 the
23 ‘Thailand turns into Indonesia and Vice Versa’, Sydney Morning Herald 12 May 2009. For other 
international press coverage which carried the same theme, see ‘Yudhyono credited with Indonesia’s 
stability.’ Euronews, 8 July 2009. Available from <http://www.euronews.net/2009/07/08/vudhoyono- 
credited-with-indonesia-s-stability/ >, accessed 12 August 2009. ‘Indonesia heads to polls, clinging to 
newfound stability’, Worldfocus.com, 8 July 2009. <http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/07/Q8/indonesia-heads- 
to-polls-clinging-to-newfound-stability/6205/>, accessed 12 August 2009.
ICG very succinctly listed what it saw as the main obstacles to a functioning security 
sector:
A m ajor challenge facing Indonesia's new president, Soesilo Bam bang Yudhoyono, is 
reform  o f  the internal security sec to r... M ajor problem s include:
• unclear institutional division o f  labour, particularly between the police and the 
m ilita ry ...;
• contradictory or am biguously worded legislation on some aspects o f  internal 
security and no legislation at all on others;
•  lack o f  accountability o f  the security services;
•  inadequate oversight o f  operations; and
• no strategic direction.
One o f  the thorniest issues is the precise division o f  labour between the police and 
m ilitary. Formal responsibility for internal security has rightly been allocated to the 
police but there are "grey areas"... Intelligence is another difficult a rea ... The 
intelligence functions o f  the police, m ilitary, and National Intelligence Agency (BIN) 
overlap, and coordination is not sm ooth.24
In short, the ICG argued the problems were far reaching. The ICG proposed there was 
contestation between the police and the military over their roles. Unclear legislation 
exacerbated the problem by failing to clarify how Polri and TNI can cooperate and, so the
• • •  • •  •ICG says by confusingly extending each institution a role in internal security." The 
agencies also lack accountability to government and coordination (especially in intelligence 
sharing) is poor. These claims, as explained above, are representative o f  a broad cross- 
section of writing.
What stands out most prominently from the ICG’s argument, and almost all other works on 
Indonesian security reform, is that the analysis is founded upon a review of strategic policy­
making at the level of the central government. Thus the paper refers to topics like the 
formulation o f  legislation, the macro-handling of terrorism policy, the strategic disposition 
of  military forces and the like." As such, Rethinking Internal Security Strategy illustrates 
one of the core weaknesses in the contemporary debate. To date, there has been an almost 
complete absence of qualitative local case studies which test the claims of the literature
4 International Crisis Group, Rethinking Internal Security, 1.
25 International Crisis Group, Rethinking Internal Security, 9.
2,1 International Crisis Group, Rethinking Internal Security, 5-13.
against the situation on the ground. This constitutes a major gap in existing research and is 
something I wish to fill with my thesis.
The narrowing of existing debate to the realm of macro-policy, carries with it analytical 
dangers. With much of the literature making negative assessments about interagency 
relations, the absence of detailed local case studies means some of these claims rest on 
shaky grounds. To take the ICG report as the example again, the ICG stated:
The military is fulfilling a variety o f  police functions... [TNI] is also often used to 
assist with law and order tasks, especially for m ajor events like nationwide elections.
For exam ple, 35,000 troops were deployed to help the police secure the second round 
o f  the presidential elections in Septem ber 2004. As capacity is strengthened, 
responsibility for this kind o f  task should be transferred to the police. But the bulk o f  
the m ilitary's internal security com m itm ent, som e 180,000 troops, is the army 
territorial com m and, the structure that parallels civilian adm inistration down to the 
village level. Every day, in m ost parts o f  the country, the territorial units are doing 
work that should gradually be transferred to the police.27
Two things are problematic with this statement. In the example of election security, the 
ICG arguably misinterpreted the chain of command in that combined operation. In reality, 
police headquarters took full command of  Operasi Mantap Brata XII (the code-name for 
the election security operation of 2004). The tens o f  thousands of TNI forces who 
supported the operation were placed under police command.28 Responsibility was therefore 
fully assumed by the police. Secondly, the ICG’s claim concerning the territorial command 
is very contentious. In my research, I find that the territorial command in Yogyakarta has 
probably been inactive in almost all significant local security tasks since 2000 and there is 
good reason to suppose the situation in other parts of Indonesia is the same as well.
While the above is merely one quotation, it does however illustrate the danger of taking a 
wide-angle view of this topic and making broad judgments that are not supported with in- 
depth empirically based case studies. Given the negative assumptions that most observers
27 International Crisis Group, Rethinking Internal Security, 8.
28 ‘61.682 Personel TNI Dikerahkan Amankan Pemilu 2004’ Detik.com, February 2004. Accessible from 
Indonesian Defence Department website: <http://www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name= 
News&file=article&sid=5407 >, last accessed 12 September 2009. 28. Adrianus Meliala, Evaluation o f  Police 
Role in the 2004 General Elections (Jakarta: Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, 2005), 14, 18.
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have about relations in the Indonesian security sector, by only executing strategic 
overviews of the topic we risk creating stilted analyses.
A small number of scholars have however attempted to explore police-military relations in 
Indonesia in a local, operational context. The best of this research comes from an edited 
compilation: Relasi TNI dan Polri dalam Penanganan Keamanan Dalam Negeri (2000- 
2004). In this manuscript Ikrar Nusa Bhakti brought together a number of different case 
studies of conflict management in the post-reformasi era. In this compilation there are 
studies of Polri-TNI operations in Ambon, Poso, North Maluku and of maritime security in 
Batam.
If we take case studies of the ‘hottest’ conflict zones, Ambon, North Maluku and Poso, the 
researchers argued the initial police and military response was riven with problems -  
unclear chains of command, conflicting doctrine, indiscipline and occasional fights between 
the security forces. Yet this is not the entire story either. The authors point out that the 
worst of these problems took place in the tumultuous period from 1999 to 2001. After 2001 
relations and command and control between the forces in these areas improved 
substantially.
In Sri Yunuarti’s case study of the Ambon, the police and military handling of the conflict 
started poorly but improved with time. Polri and TNI originally responded to outbreaks of 
violence in 1999 by individually deploying their own forces. These forces operated 
separately, took sides in the conflict and occasionally clashed with one another. Worsening 
violence caused the President in June 2000 to declare a state o f  civil emergency in Maluku 
and the neighbouring province o f  North Maluku. As part of this decision the central 
government gave the ranking military territorial commanders in Maluku and North Maluku 
the operational command of all Polri and TNI forces in their provinces. As Yunuarti 
suggests in her study, this arrangement operated well until 2003, when the central
90government lifted the civil emergency."
29 Sri Yunuarti, ‘Relasi TNI-Polri dalam Penanganan Konflik Komunal di Maluku Tengah dan Ambon: 1999- 
2004.’ In: Nusa Bhakti, Relasi TN/ dan Polri, 66-71, 72-75, 79-80.
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According to Moch.Nurhasim’s research on North Maluku the management of the conflict 
there was even less violent than in Ambon. Part o f  this difference was due to the 
composition of local religious groups but another difference was in the handling of the 
emergency. In North Maluku the interim governor during and after 1999 was a military 
general. This officer was able to use his powers as governor, ranking army officer and later 
as controller of the civil emergency, to place full command over security operations 
(including police forces) into the hands of the province’s TNI commander.30
In Poso however, where there never was a declared state of emergency, military and police 
forces encountered similar confusion over which force should assume command. 
Disagreement over command and control arrangements resulted in localized TNI and Polri 
forces deploying their personnel separately and ineffectually from 1999 until 2001. The 
situation changed at the beginning of 2002 when the central government approved an 
operation engineered by the provincial police command, ‘Operasi Sintuwu Maroso’ which 
placed the central Sulawesi police headquarters in full command of all police and military
T 1
forces in Poso. After this decision relations and coordination markedly improved. Thus 
the pattern of events in each o f  these case studies was poor inter-agency handling during 
the immediate years after reformasi, followed by intervention from Jakarta and a gradual 
improvement in joint command and control.
While these case studies are useful analyses of police-military relations in conflict zones, 
there are two significant issues which cast doubt on their reliability for generalising about 
interagency security relations today: the first problem is the change induced by the passage 
of time, the second problem relates to the mismatch between comparing ‘normal Indonesia’ 
with relations in extraordinary conflict zones. In the conflict case studies much of  the 
evidence for the worst relations emerged from the turbulent 1999-2001 period. This was a 
time when security forces themselves were undergoing dramatic internal reforms, when the 
police were being separated in stages from the armed forces and the Indonesian military 
was relinquishing numerous capabilities of its own for control over society. The immediate
30 Moch. Nurhasim, ‘Penanganan Konflik di Maluku Utara.’ In: Nusa Bhakti, Relasi TNI dan Polri, 90-94, 
100-103.
31 M.Hamdan Basyar, ‘Relasi TNI-Polri dalam Penanganan Konflik Komunal di Poso.’ In: Nusa Bhakti, 
Relasi TN/ dan Polri, 137-138.
post-reformasi period was a time of disorder for much of Indonesia and TNI and Polri were 
not immune. By contrast, the years after 2001 demonstrated improving relations, as chains 
of command were established and the scale of the violence diminished. Arguably the most 
powerful impressions of TNI and Polri’s interagency failures emerge from these conflict 
zones and the crisis of the early post-reformasi years. These failings should be seen in the 
context of the institutional difficulties facing Polri and TNI at that time. When using 
conflict zones to formulate our impression of security force relations in Indonesia today, we 
must also recall that these case studies are all former conflict zones now, and no longer 
provide a reliable insight into contemporary security handling. Moreover, conflict zones 
are by definition extraordinary case studies. They tell us little about security management in 
the vast parts of Indonesia which have remained crisis free. To obtain a view of inter­
agency relations as they are under ordinary conditions, then obviously we need case studies 
of “ordinary”, stable parts of Indonesia.
The limited number and comparability of case studies of local security management are not 
the only gaps within the literature. Thus far discussion of security sector reform in 
Indonesia has only considered the problem of interagency relations as it concerns the police 
and the military. Yet when we descend to the sub-national level a myriad of potential actors 
emerges - both within the state and outside the state - which can contribute to security. The 
failure of most existing writings to factor non-police and non-military organisations into 
their analysis also constitutes a gap within our knowledge.
Some commentators have identified certain groupings, like the civil service police of 
regional government {polisi pamong praja or Pol.PP) and newly empowered gangster 
organisations, as a growing influence on the regional security landscape. Stein Kristiansen 
and Lambang Trijono argue that the 1999 decentralisation reforms, and the enhanced 
regulatory powers these laws gave to local governments, have propelled the growth of 
regional law enforcement agencies. Kristiansen and Trijono give a bleak assessment of 
these organisations and imply that they undermine a coordinated application of the law:
'2 David Jansen, ‘Relations among Security and Law Enforcement Institutions in Indonesia.’ Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2008), 448-449.
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Increasing crime and social disorder and the claim ed weak role o f  the national police 
are used as argum ents for building up local police units. Likewise, argum ents are put 
forth that the num erous new local laws and regulations and escalating need to develop 
local revenue increase the need for local law enforcem ent m echanism s. Consequently, 
the Satpol PP units [civil service police] have been rapidly expanding under the 
authority o f  the bupati. These are param ilitary groups o f  several hundred men in each 
d istric t... Their mandate is am biguous and their funding and rules o f  operation lack 
transparency. They certainly contribute to strengthening the pow er o f  the district 
adm inistration, especially the bupati, and may be used for security im provem ent and 
law enforcem ent. Alarm ingly, they seem to be growing stronger, and they seem to be 
out o f  reach o f  dem ocratic control. They could well be used for private business 
interests, repression, and devious political e n d s .33
In his research on gangs in post-reformasi Indonesia, Ian Wilson has argued that the 
fragmentation of Indonesia’s centralised state after 1998 created space for violent, civilian 
security groups to expand. In the process, some gangs have entrenched themselves and 
developed powerful networks of patronage. According to Wilson the durability of these 
groupings and their legitimacy within society, places the state (and its security apparatus) as 
merely one among a number o f  entities that may lay claim to the ‘legitimate’ use of 
violence:
A lthough incidents o f  state-sponsored violence have declined since the collapse o f  the 
New O rder in 1998 ... the decline has been accom panied by an upsurge in violence, 
coercion, and extortion carried out by param ilitary, criminal, and vigilante groups that 
are not dependent upon state patronage. The fragm entation o f  the centralized state and 
the resulting rivalry between groups seeking econom ic and political pow er at the 
national level and control over resources at the local level have both been central 
factors in this proliferation o f  violent thuggery ... This case study o f  Indonesia has 
broader im plications as it takes problem atic one o f  the m ost basic assum ptions 
regarding the state, nam ely, that it has an internal m onopoly over the “ legitim ate” 
production o f  violence and security. As I will show, the increasing privatization o f  
violence that has occurred in post-N ew  O rder Indonesia dem onstrates that the state 
does not possess a monopoly over violence, either its production or its “ legitim ate” 
u se ... The state now finds itse lf as one o f  a m ultiplicity o f  social and political forces 
em ploying and laying claim  to legitim acy in the use o f  violence and coercion.34
33 Stein Kristiansen, Lambang Trijono, ‘Authority and Law Enforcement: Local Government Reforms and 
Security Systems in Indonesia.’ Contemporary Southeast Asia, No.2 (August 2005), 253. See also: Jansen, 
‘Relations among Security and Law Enforcement Institutions’ (2008), and Leo Schmit, ‘Decentralisation and 
Legal Reform in Indonesia.’ In: Indonesia: Law and Society, Tim Lindsey (ed.), 2nd Edition (Annandale, 
NSW: Federation Press 2008), 180-181.
34 Ian Wilson, ‘Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours o f Organized Violence in Post-New Order 
Indonesia.’ Critical Asian Studies, Vol.38, No.2 (2006), 266-267. See also: Loren Ryter, ‘Pemuda Pancasila: 
The Last Loyalist Freemen o f  Suharto’s Order?’ In: Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, Benedict 
Anderson (ed.), (Ithaca NY: Cornell University, 2001). Stein Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in 
Indonesia: the case o f Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat.’ Sojourn Vol. 18. No. 1 (2003). International 
Crisis Group, Report: The Perils o f Private Security in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (7
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Such research has encouraged me to broaden the terms of my analysis beyond the primary 
instruments of state security - Polri and the TNI - which have been the almost exclusive 
concern of scholars to date, to consider the many other state and non-state organisations 
which can be involved in security at the sub-national level. An in-depth regional case study 
is aptly suited to drawing out the richness and complexity of the relationships between the 
(potentially) many actors involved in local security.
Theoretical Framework: the Usefulness of Studies o f ‘Networked Security’
If we accept that the appropriate starting point for my local case study analysis is to cast the 
empirical net broadly and include a multiplicity of actors which may play a role within the 
security sector, then an appropriate theoretical framework needs to be found. Scholarly 
literature to date has done little to explore how transitional, developing democracies 
manage security under conditions where there are multiple security organisations involved 
in the sector with overlapping mandates.
I propose that the debate on ‘security networks’ or ‘networked policing’ from the study of 
policing in the developed world, offers a suitable framework for modelling security 
relationships in my case study site. The empirical research of this dissertation indicates that 
the Indonesian police have become supremely powerful within regional security. As 
literature on networked security investigates interagency relations from the perspective of 
the police, the choice of this school is appropriate. Secondly, some sources within the 
networked security literature lay out plausible explanations for why state police forces can 
assume central roles within security networks. This branch of the security networks 
literature therefore has high value for explaining the relationships within my case study site.
November 2003). Loren Ryter, ‘Reformasi Gangsters’ Inside Indonesia, N o.82 (Apr-Jun. 2005). Ian Wilson, 
‘The Rise and Fall o f  a Gangster’, Inside Indonesia, No.93 (Aug-Oct. 2008).
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One of the core propositions of networked policing theorists is the argument that security 
management cannot be interpreted as the act of a single institution - such as the state police 
- working in isolation. Rather security is produced by networks of multiple organisations, 
mutually engaged in the production of security. A typical example o f  these claims is 
contained in the following quotation:
It is well known that policing is conducted by public, private, and other 'nonstate' 
agencies ... The acceleration of this trend in recent decades has led to a tendency for 
liberal states to abandon some of their monopoly claims over security governance.
With state police experiencing a crisis of public legitimacy... and a growing number of 
groups mobilising nonstate security providers, the question of how best to direct the 
process of policing in the 'common interest' has come to occupy both governmental 
and scholarly thought.35
Alternately as put by two other networked policing theorists:
What do we mean by nodes and networks? It is not always the case that distinct 
providers of policing and security, or ‘nodes’ come together in the form of networks.
The degree to which nodes co-operate, share resources, develop trusting relationships 
or more generally align interests is an empirical matter to be verified... in general 
terms networks are characterised by interdependence between organisations, 
continuing interactions between network members... it is not just the public police or 
other state organisations that play an active role in establishing the[se] kinds of 
networks... Rather a plethora of other state institutions, private actors and community 
groups are active [in participating in security networks].36
Therefore the dominant concept among these writers is that security is channelled through
• • 'K! •loosely organised networks; networks are decentred and deterritorialised agglomerations, 
which consist of a plurality of autonomous state, private and civilian security entities, each 
of which contributes to the production of security.
35 Michael Kempa and Les Johnston, ‘Challenges and prospects for the development o f  inclusive plural 
policing in Britain: overcoming political and conceptual obstacles.’ Australian and New Zealand Journal o f  
Criminology Vol.38 No.2 (August 2005), 181. See also: Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing, Governing 
Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice (Routledge: New York and London, 2003), 146-148.
36 Jenny Fleming and Jennifer Wood (ed.), Fighting Crime Together: the Challenges o f  Policing and Security 
Networks (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006), 2-3, 256. See also: Jennifer Wood and Clifford Shearing, Imagining 
Security (Devon, UK: Willan Publishing, 2007), 13. Ian Loader, ‘Plural Policing and Democratic 
Governance.’ Social Legal Studies Vol.9 (2000).
7 Writers o f networked security often employ the terminology o f ‘deterritorialisation.’ This encapsulates the 
notion that policing has taken on an international dynamic, with growing cooperation and involvement by 
foreign police institutions in domestic security affairs. 1 footnote this concept only briefly to provide 
background information. The intrusion o f international forces is not really present in my local level case 
study. Benoit Dupont, ‘Security in the Age o f  Networks.’ Policing & Society, Vol. 14, No. 1, (March 2004), 
80-81.
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Many of the writers who debate networked security situate their theories in a trend of 
declining state-based policing. Such writers suggest that the public, uniformed police (and 
the state which employs them) no longer can be considered to hold a monopoly over the 
security. Supposedly, state police have been eclipsed by the rise of private security 
agencies, civil society groups, and other security actors. Thus within the literature we find 
numerous claims like the following quotation:
We are living in the midst of a potentially far-reaching transformation in the means by 
which order and security are maintained in liberal democratic societies, one that is 
giving rise to the fragmentation and diversification of policing provision, and ushering 
in a plethora of agencies and agents... What we might call a shift from police to 
policing has seen the sovereign state - hitherto considered focal to both provision and 
accountability in this field - reconfigured as but one node of a broader, more diverse 
‘network of power.38
Garland was influential in setting the scene for the networked security literature. In the 
nineteen nineties he argued that the modern state (referring to his study in the United 
Kingdom) can no longer be considered ‘sovereign’ over the provision of security.
The perceived normality of high crime rates, together with the widely acknowledged 
limitations of criminal justice agencies, have begun to erode one of the foundational
myths of modem societies: namely, the myth that the sovereign state is capable of
i 39providing security, law and order, and crime control within its territorial boundaries.
The supposed erosion of the monopoly of state public police over policing which Garland 
identifies, has been interpreted by scholars of networked policing as synonymous with the 
rise o f other centres of security. As mentioned by Loader and Walker:
The state has... come to cede authority over what has for the better part of two 
centuries been viewed as one of its constitutive functions -  the enforcement of law and 
the maintenance of order. State power is being relinquished... ‘outwards’ to 
burgeoning commercial markets in policing and security; ‘downwards’ to private
’8 lan Loader, ‘Plural Policing and Democratic Governance’, 323-324. See also: Julie Berg, ‘Plural Policing in 
Cape Town: Recent Trends and Challenges to Oversight.’ Paper, Centre for Criminology, University o f Cape 
Town (July 2007), 1. Johnston and Shearing, Governing Security, 147-148, 160. Wood and Shearing, 
Imagining Security, 12-27. Clifford Shearing and Jennifer Wood, ‘Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the 
New ‘Denizens’.’ Journal o f  Law and Society, Vol.30, No.3 (September 2003), 401-403.
David Garland, ‘The Limits o f the Sovereign State: Strategies o f  Crime Control in Contemporary Society.’
The British Journal o f  Criminology Vol.36, No.4, (Autumn 1996), 448.
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organizations and municipal authorities, and to ‘responsibilized’ consum ers and
citizens; and ‘upw ards’ to new sites o f  international police cooperation and
transnational policing fo rm s... while the state rem ains a significant player in the
delivery and regulation o f  policing, it is no longer the only or even, arguably, the
principal institutional actor involved in offering guarantees o f  security to its citizens,
but increasingly finds itself (and its agents) as one am ong a multiplicity o f  policing
c  40forms.
Scholars of networked policing situate the cause of this trend in a combination of 
phenomena, from the neo-liberal ‘hollowing out of the state’, to the globalisation o f  human 
interactions. As described by Benoit Dupont:
In phase with m odem  theories that chart the decline o f  vertical hierarchical social 
structures and the concom itant rise o f  horizontal networks ... a num ber o f 
com m entators are reconceptualizing our ways o f  thinking about policing and 
security ... the factors at the origins o f  such profound changes are many and closely 
interlaced, m aking it hard, if  not impossible, to isolate or to place them  in a neat chain 
o f  causality. Yet a consensus seem s to exist concerning the im portance o f  these factors 
in explaining the trend tow ard a more decentralized, horizontal, networked society.
The exponential developm ent o f  information and com m unication technologies around 
the globe h as ... been instrumental in the collapse o f  all sorts o f  barriers that previously 
corseted institu tions... A nother essential factor has been the effort by the state to 
rationalize its activities in the wake o f  the financial crisis experienced in the 1970s... 
Except in a num ber o f  countries where the state jealously retained its strength, no 
determ inism  appeared to limit the types o f  agents involved in the devolution o f  
responsibilities, and private actors becam e free to cooperate and com pete with public 
entities.41
Thus Dupont postulates that a networked style of security is at least partly produced by 
deregulation strategies of state governments and trends toward a more interconnected 
global society.
While not wishing to second-guess the objectivity of scholars o f  networked security, it is 
relevant to acknowledge that the most important contributors to this theory originate from 
countries of the former British Commonwealth: like Canada, the United Kingdom,
40 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, ‘Policing as a Public Good: Reconstituting the Connections between Policing 
and the State.’ Theoretical Criminology, Vol.5, N o.9 (2001), 10. See also: Mark Beeson, Private Policing 
(Devon, UK: Willan Publishing, 2002). Although Beeson does not use a networked concept in his analysis his 
work is inspirational for the study o f networked policing. His book is a comprehensive review o f  the many 
state and non-state actors involved in policing in the United Kingdom.
41 Dupont, ‘Security in the Age o f Networks’, 77-78.
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Australia and South Africa.42 These scholars, like Clifford Shearing and Jennifer Wood, 
pose their research as contributions to broad, universal policing and governance theory. Yet 
the majority of their work actually derives from research in their own countries. The fact 
that established theorists o f  networked policing do not bracket their arguments as confined 
primarily to the Anglo-Saxon world is a flaw noted by other contributors to the area.43 This 
potential flaw opens an opportunity for this thesis. Using the example o f  a post­
authoritarian, developing country in Southeast Asia, this dissertation is able to describe 
how security management has evolved in a different, context dependent way in this section 
of the world.
Quite aside from contextual differences, it is also debatable as to whether scholars of 
networked security have correctly judged the decline of state police, or whether merely the 
perspective of scholars themselves has broadened in new directions o f  analysis. Put simply, 
scholars may have merely discovered that security entities other than state police exist. The 
novelty of this finding may have led contemporary theorists of policing to exaggerate the 
decline of the police, in much the same way that the globalisation thesis of the nineteen 
nineties exaggerated the declining importance o f  the nation-state. Revisionist scholars of 
policing like Adam Crawford, have critiqued networked policing on this basis:
There is much value in defining governance as ‘the property o f  networks rather than as 
the product o f  any single centre o f  action’... M oreover, there is considerable m erit in 
not according conceptual priority to the state in order to highlight the range o f  
governmental nodes that exist and the relationships between th em ... It is this challenge 
that I wish to explore in the context o f  security and policing. In so doing, I believe it 
would be foolish to ‘throw out the sta te’ with the governance or governm entality ...
42 Those that can be described as the most important contributors to this school o f  thought are Benoit Dupont, 
Clifford Shearing, Jennifer Wood and to a lesser extent Ian Loader. Dupont is based in Canada, Clifford 
Shearing has executed research in both Australia and South Africa, Jennifer Wood is an Australian 
criminologist, while Ian Loader is based in the United Kingdom. For classic examples o f  their writing please 
see: Dupont, ‘Security in the Age o f Networks’ (2004), Johnston and Shearing, Governing Security, (2003), 
Shearing and Wood, ‘Democracy, and the New ‘Denizens’ (2003), Loader, ‘Plural Policing and Democratic 
Governance’ (2000).
43 In fact, one scholar o f policing from continental Europe, Jerome Ferret argues that scholars o f networked 
security follow in traditions o f  Anglo-Saxon thinking. So Ferret argues, Anglo-Saxon theories o f governance 
euphemise the role o f the state in security. This writer argues that in his own native France, municipal and 
central state authorities have important arbitrating functions in security provision. Jerome Ferret, ‘The State, 
Policing and “Old Continental Europe”: Managing the Local/National Tension.’ Policing and Society, V ol.14, 
N o.l (March 2004), 50.
bath water. As Bayley has rightly warned, we should not get carried away with ‘a 
giddy sense at the m om ent am ong many intellectuals that the state is passe’.44
As such Crawford proposes that the role of the police within security networks is 
something which should be born out by empirical analysis. According to Crawford, the 
implicit assumption of mainstream networked security theory that the state police are in 
decline, in some instances could be premature.
While one could easily criticise the usefulness of networked security theory for Indonesia, 
given that this branch o f  scholarship derives from studies of policing in developed post­
industrialised countries, I argue the value of this literature is not in its explanatory power, 
but its conceptual relevance.45 The model depicts a style of security management that 
arguably occurs at the regional level in Indonesia. As will be discussed over chapters two to 
six, in my regional case study we see there is a cluster of decentralised, autonomous 
security entities which originate both within the state and civil society as well as the for- 
profit sector, which all collectively contribute to security. It is appropriate to conceive of 
this complex landscape functioning like a network. Therefore the primary value of the 
networked model is that it creates a viable theoretical prism from which to interpret security 
management at the regional level in Indonesia; rather than being the product of a single 
agency or centre o f  power, there is cooperation and interactions between multiple, 
autonomous nodes of security. This thesis therefore aims to take up Fleming, Wood, 
Johnston and Shearing’s challenge of conducting an empirical inquiry into the exact nature 
of networked relations within a case study in Indonesia.46
44 Crawford’s most influential work for my topic is not exclusively an article on policing and security. 
Instead, Crawford packages the article in question as a work o f ‘post-regulatory theory’. Crawford makes his 
arguments on regulatory theory, however, by examining law enforcement practices. His article is therefore 
inspiring for its contribution to our understanding o f  the police, in particular his argument that unique powers 
elevate the police to a special role in security networks. Adam Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the 
Post-Regulatory State: Steering, rowing and anchoring the provision o f policing and security.’ Theoretical 
Criminology, Vol. 10 (2006), 458.
43 Though one can argue that the ‘hollowing out o f  the state’ thesis and neo-liberalisation is equally relevant 
for Indonesia. In 1998 Indonesia experienced its own crisis o f governance with the end o f a centralised, 
repressive state that was replaced by a competitive, elite brokered system. The political liberalisation coupled 
with decentralisation have, as Ian Wilson and Kristiansen and Trijono pointed out, created many rival centres 
o f  power at the regional level. Although the causes for the ‘hollowing out o f the state’ in Indonesia may not 
be the same as in developed countries arguably the effects may be.
46 Fleming and Wood, Fighting Crime Together, 2-3. Johnston and Shearing, Governing Security, 146-147.
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One of the major criticisms of the way in which the literature has articulated the networked 
security model is that authors side step the issue o f  power relationships within networks by 
declaring that such an issue is one for “empirical inquiry.” Yet much of the literature 
explicitly proposes state police forces are in decline. Crawford contends that by doing so, 
contemporary scholars have underestimated the role o f  the public police within security 
networks:
W ithout w ishing to discount the im portance o f  regulation beyond governm ent, I have 
sought to highlight the danger o f  running away with the sense that the state as a 
conceptual entity and em pirical reality is becom ing redundant...In  many tangible 
ways, the state retains an anchoring role in the provision o f  security even with regard 
to much private governance. In the field o f  policing, it rem ains not only a resource o f  
last resort, when all else fails, but also one that is sym bolically and culturally distinct.47
Crawford’s research suggests the state police in the United Kingdom remain a centralising, 
dominant actor within security, as a consequence of unique powers which make the police a 
distinct actor. Crawford proposes we think of networked security in a different way. Unlike 
the networked policing theorists who argue state police should not be considered as greater 
or less than any other security organisation, Crawford argues the state police maintain a 
special role in security networks. For ease of understanding, he provides the reader with the 
metaphor o f  an anchor. The powers of the state police act as an anchoring influence, a point 
of reference for the activities of other independent security entities (or the metaphorical 
boats):
Reflecting upon this question o f  the position occupied by the state in determ ining and 
providing security, Loader and W alker... have usefully deployed the concept o f  
‘anchored pluralism ’. W hile they use the term in a norm ative sense to explore the role 
that the state should play as the anchor o f  collective security provision, I think it quite 
usefully describes distinct attributes o f  the state in regulation and governance... we can 
identify a num ber o f  w ays in which state ordering and regulation as anchoring is 
exceptional:
• in its sym bolic pow er and cultural authority;
• in its legitimacy claim s and public perceptions o f  its legitimacy;
• as a distinctive (tactical) resource and source o f  inform ation through which 
interests are pursued;
• in its residual position as a back-up o f  last resort with regard to other forms 
o f  control.48
47 Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State’, 471.
48 Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State’, 459-458.
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Inspired by Crawford’s argument, I seek to explore the power relationships within the 
security network in my Indonesian case study site. What I seek to do is to apply Crawford’s 
basic argument on the special characteristics of state power in governance and ask whether 
the Indonesian police within the network of security in my case study site also exercise 
forms of authority which make them a distinct actor.
Thus, the value of the networked security literature to my research ultimately lies in the 
explanatory power of Crawford’s dissenting view to it. Crawford proposes a rational 
argument for why the state police can emerge as a centralising actor within coordinated 
security networks. This is because the police have unique powers which no other security 
actor possesses. Other junior parties desire or need to engage the police in order to perform 
their functions. As will become clear in the chapters that follow, this neatly describes the 
relationships which emerge in my Indonesian case study.
Research Aims, Questions and Methodology
The aim of this study is to explain how security organisations interact at the regional level 
in Indonesia. In achieving this objective I set out to define the principal state and non-state 
security actors within my case study site, identify what their functions are and determine 
whether interactions between the various security groupings are negative or counter­
productive towards maintaining security and disorganised, or contested, as so much of the 
literature on Indonesian security implies. Having identified the nature of relations within 
the case study, this thesis will explore causes for why the network is constituted as it is.
Specifically I propose to answer the following questions: what organisations are involved 
in security management and what are their core tasks? Is there a precise division of labour 
or are there overlapping functions as the Indonesian studies literature suggests? What 
evidence is there for cooperation, conflict or hostility? Which of these behaviours 
predominates and why? Are there centres of power or groupings that are essential to the
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functioning of the network and if so why? Finally, does the composition of the security 
network within the case study reveal anything distinct about the practice of security 
management in Indonesia?
The methodology employed to answer these questions is an in-depth analysis of a regional 
case study site, the Special Province of Yogyakarta and specifically three of its five 
districts: Sleman, the city of Yogyakarta and Bantul. Fieldwork for this study took place 
between April 2007 and December 2008. Due to limitations of time and resources the 
purpose of this research is not to provide the basis for comparative generalisations about 
security relations in other parts of Indonesia. Instead, its purpose is to expose the distinctive 
relationships which occur within the case study location. This is not to preclude the 
possibility that findings from this research can be applied to other parts of Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, this dissertation offers conclusions which are primarily intended to explain 
the dynamics found within the case study site.
This research considers only the relationship between security groups. I define a security 
group as any state agency which has a responsibility for physically enforcing law and order 
and those non-state groupings which help to enforce law and order. Although it is tempting 
to describe these organisations as purely ‘police’ or ‘law enforcement’ agents, I find this 
terminology reductionary. As the previous discussion suggests, in democratising states like 
Indonesia, many military forces remain focused on domestic security. It is confusing to 
describe militaries as agents of Taw enforcement’ since their strategy, doctrine and internal 
philosophy are much different to those of the police. I prefer therefore to describe all the 
groupings I include in this study by referring to them with the more flexible appellation of 
‘security’ groups.
The reason for including state law enforcement/security agencies in this study is obvious, 
but the reason for including non-state groupings which help state agencies is more obtuse, 
but no less important. In Indonesia there are is a multiplicity of groups which are involved 
in providing security services and have normative (even legal) legitimacy to do so. These
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include: the neighbourhood watch49 (or ronda siskamling as it is known), commercial 
security providers, party security task forces, arguably even Muslim vigilante groups. 
Although some of these elements have a dark reputation, they are nevertheless part of the 
enforcement regime. My intention therefore is to cast the net widely and include within this 
study any grouping which makes some kind of claim to uphold security. For a “grouping” 
to be considered a group however, it must be a collective, it must possess some kind of 
leadership and it must be sustainable (i.e. exist over time). Therefore I do not include within 
this research violent mobs, individuals, criminal gangs or other entities which would fail 
the above definition.
There are two predominant data sources for this research: interviews and documents. When 
performing fieldwork I relied heavily on the “snowball method” of data collection. The fact 
that prior studies of local security relationships in Indonesia are very rare meant that I had 
few comparisons to guide my research methodology. Therefore I improvised a great deal. I 
used the existing literature to identify likely targets of my research, such as the civil service 
police, the commercial security industry and so on. I then sought out interviews with 
personnel within these groups who would be able to provide me with information on their 
operations, structure and external relationships. The more I came into contact with police, 
regional government bureaucrats and others in the field, the more I learned. The more 1 
learned, the more I sharpened my research and exploited new directions. Large, complex 
organisations like the police and regional government posed particular problems. In these 
cases I benefited greatly from organising initial interviews and repeat interviews with 
individual operational (and sometimes non-operational) commanders and asking for basic 
information on what they did. Much fieldwork time was spent in merely learning “who 
does what.” This signals another valuable contribution that my thesis is able to make to the 
Indonesian security literature. To date there has been a dearth of rich empirical data on 
what security actors (like the police, Pol.PP, etc.) actually do in their ordinary, regional
49 Neighbourhood watch is a shorthand term familiar to Anglo-Saxon countries. While the concept is similar 
in Indonesia, neighbourhood watch groups operate as nightly patrols. The terms will be henceforth used 
interchangeably.
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commands.30 A valuable part of my research therefore has been to acquire some of this 
information.
As alluded to above there was not a clear roadmap for the accumulation of data, but 1 did 
have three broad objectives. Firstly, to identify a representative sample of the security 
organisations within my case study site. Secondly, to determine what they do to support 
security and thirdly, to determine what their external relations were. Following this 
approach I carried out 217 interviews. Another valuable data source which helped me to 
obtain a picture o f  the ordinary functioning o f  these organisations were documents, such as: 
yearly accountability reports, budget papers, personnel lists, operations orders and other 
miscellaneous written reports. Most of these documents originated from Polri and the 
regional government civil service police, the most important security organisations within 
the security network. A final and highly useful source was the minutes (notulen) of  regional 
government security committees, in particular the Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah.
A final statement needs to be made on the difficulty of conducting this research. As a 
foreign researcher undertaking analysis into the Indonesian security sector, I am surprised 
at the generous access Indonesian government officials extended to me. I do not deny 
however that this research was hard. Much of my success in obtaining data has been due to 
persistence, luck and the helpfulness o f  some (a minority) of my interviewees. 
Nevertheless, the institutions and people I approached denied far more of my requests than 
they granted. Much of  the analysis I present is pieced together from multiple sources that 
provide glimpses into the world of security in Indonesia. Therefore I present my data as the 
best approximate snapshot that I could make of the network of security within my case 
study site, under the circumstances.
50 Taking as an example the literature on Polri, there are numerous sources which discuss aspects o f policing 
in Indonesia (such as the perceived obstacles to police reform or community oriented policing). But there are 
pitifully few sources which give us basic information about the police institution itself - its size, budget, 
programs, personnel, sub-commands, doctrine, activities, etc. One o f  the very rare exceptions is the ICG 
report, Indonesia: National Police Reform (20 February 2001). However, this source is not only dated and 
brief, but also presents its research as a strategic overview o f  the police without describing the details o f how 
regional commands operate.
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As will be discussed further in chapter three, the selection of Yogyakarta as my case study 
site was heavily influenced by practical factors. 1 had lived in Yogyakarta for some time in 
2006 and developed relationships with people there at that time. Some of these people, like 
NGO workers and academics, became the initial contacts who helped me when I began 
research proper in 2007. Another powerful inducement to selecting Yogyakarta is the 
intellectual character of the province. As a centre of tertiary education, Yogyakarta is much 
more open to foreign researchers than the rest of Indonesia. Given the controversial nature 
of my research this proved to be a huge strategic benefit.
Summarising the Argument
The core argument of this thesis is that in Yogyakarta, there is a security network consisting 
of many different state and non-state security organisations. To take one side of this 
network, the state-based part, the state security apparatus is a non-unitary entity, which 
possesses many autonomous organisations from both central and regional government. 
Central government security organisations which operate at the regional level include the 
Indonesian police and the territorial forces of the Indonesian army. Regional government 
also has its own law enforcement task forces (the Pol.PP). My research also brings to light 
the roles played by small, sectorally specific law enforcement actors like immigration 
officers, tax inspectors, forestry police and transport officers to name a few. Outside the 
state there is also a booming commercial security industry, multiple volunteer security 
organisations (like the ronda siskamling) and even quasi-criminal groupings like Islamic 
vigilantes. The Indonesian national police however are the central element of this network. 
The reason for this ascendancy is simple. Almost all other security actors, whether they are 
a state security organisation (like the TNI or Pol.PP) or whether they operate outside the 
state (such as a commercial security company) need or feel they need police support, in 
order to function.
The ascendancy of the police in networked security has come about through an interplay of 
at least three factors. The first is the demilitarisation of security and the decentralisation of
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government after the fall of Suharto. As will be discussed in chapter two, in the 
authoritarian New Order period the state handled security problems through centralising 
security functions in the armed forces (especially the army) and by giving the armed forces 
(especially the army) a strong role in the centralised, hierarchical government. Reformasi 
however dismantled this system. Military reforms have deprived the TNI of a practical role 
in day-to-day security. Regional government has been decentralised and its law 
enforcement powers enhanced, yet the central government still maintains control over the 
security and defence functions of the state. The disempowerment of the military and the 
under-empowerment of regional government has left the police as the supreme provider of 
state security services in the regions.
The second reason for the ascendancy of the police in the regional security network is that 
Polri has continued some aspects of its former strategies o f  social control begun in the 
Suharto era. During the Suharto era the police were responsible for regulating, observing 
and supervising certain groupings within society which could potentially constitute rival 
centres of authority to the state. Examples o f  these groups include the commercial security 
industry and volunteer security groups in Indonesian civil society, such as the ronda 
siskamling. As will be discussed in chapters five and six, Polri continued and intensified 
these strategies of control in the post-reformasi era. This strategy positions the police above 
these parts of the network. In chapter four we will also see how Polri’s historical 
supervisory functions over non-police parts of the state law enforcement apparatus (the 
non-police criminal investigators, penyidik pegawai negeri sipil or PPNS) has also 
continued after the Suharto period.
The third reason for the superior position of the police draws upon the modelling of the 
networked policing literature. As I alluded above, dissenting contributors to networked 
policing theory have argued that the importance of the uniformed police in networks 
derives from certain attributes that are unique to the police: their ‘symbolic power’, 
‘perceptions of [police] authority [within society]’, the police’s own tactical resources (such 
as powers of arrest), the usefulness of the police as a source of back-up to other actors and 
so on. In my case study, the Indonesian police also possess such unique powers and other 
actors seek to access these powers to augment their own capabilities. Therefore while there
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may be a multi-actor security network within my case study site, my analysis indicates the 
non-Polri actors believe their ability to conduct their activities depends upon them 
maintaining a relationship with the police.
This dissertation also argues that far from there being blurred lines of jurisdiction as the 
Indonesian security literature would lead us to believe, there is an absence of contestation 
over divisions of labour. We see this division most clearly in the state security sector. 
Security sector reform has deprived the TNI of  the ability to operate in day-to-day security 
management. Decentralisation has allowed regional governments to draft their own 
misdemeanour offences for responsibilities which fall under their authority (such as 
business licensing). There are also numerous non-police investigators responsible for 
upholding statutes in their own areas of sectoral responsibility (such as tax inspectors or 
immigration agents). Yet none of these agencies duplicate the criminal law enforcement 
and repressive security powers of the police. In the non-state sector, Polri’s regulatory 
powers over civilian security elements (such as the commercial security industry) combined 
with the desire of many groupings to obtain police support, ensure that there is little 
contestation between formal police roles and the activities of most non-state security 
groups.
The final argument of this dissertation is that contrary to the existing literature on security 
relations in Indonesia, in my study there is much greater evidence for collaboration than 
hostility, competition or any other forms of negative behaviour identified by the Indonesian 
studies literature. Cooperation is in fact the default setting for security relations. Chapters 
three, four, five and six make this case by examining the ways in which state security 
organisations interact, and by then reviewing the relationships of non-government security 
actors with the police.
Thus to return to Crawford’s metaphor of the ‘police as an anchor’, while the metaphor is 
not strictly inaccurate, this visualisation does not entirely describe the nuances at play in 
my case study site. Crawford’s argument implies that the powers o f  the state police can 
function as a ‘back-up’ of last resort or are symbolically powerful or are perceived as 
legitimate in the eyes o f  other actors. These attributes are certainly present in the case of the
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Indonesian police. But in Indonesia the position of the police as the centre of the network is 
even stronger -  making other organisations more acutely dependent on Polri than merely 
being “anchored” by it. Polri has the power to directly regulate and supervise some parts of 
the sector -  one example being the commercial security industry. In other cases the 
normative and legal supremacy that the police have in enforcing security and criminal law 
forces other actors to work with or underneath the influence of Polri. An example of this 
can be seen in the relationships between the regional commands of the police and their 
counterparts among the territorial units of the Indonesian army. At other times, the 
Indonesian police provide crucial support to the work of other security actors. An example 
of this is the police relationship with the law enforcement units of regional government. In 
this relationship the Indonesian police offer their superior repressive powers and certain 
special services -  like powers of criminal investigation -  to the operations conducted by 
regional government.
However, although the Indonesian police in the case study may occupy a dominant position 
at the centre of the security network, this is not synonymous with complete police control 
over the network. There is little evidence to suggest Polri attempts to use its superior 
position to monopolise the sector. Other actors instead seek out police support either as a 
condition of operation within the sector or because they feel they need police support to 
operate. Consequently, the police participate in security networks, lending police authority 
and resources without necessarily attempting to overtly control other security organisations.
If Crawford’s metaphor to describe state police powers is an anchor, the analogy that may 
be appropriate to describe the role of the police in the security network in Yogyakarta is 
that of the relations between a Board of Directors and corporate management. Although the 
Board is not involved in the day-to-day details of running a company, management 
nevertheless need the acquiescence and involvement of the board to perform their activities. 
So it is in Yogyakarta. A diverse set of security actors need the statutory power and 
involvement of the national police to perform their activities.
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Organisation of the Thesis
Turning to review the design o f  this dissertation, chapter one constitutes a historical review 
of the two most important security organisations in the case study site: the Indonesian 
police and the Pol.PP of regional government. The first part of this chapter provides an 
explanation for how the Indonesian military’s position of dominance in local security 
affairs has been transferred to Polri. During the Suharto era the Indonesian army dominated 
the police within the armed forces structure as well as local governance more broadly. 
Using elite interviews and documentary evidence I explain how the environment of crisis 
brought on by the reformasi period pushed the military to separate from Polri in a rushed 
and unplanned fashion. This process led to parliamentary debates in 2000 on security sector 
reform. The resulting parliamentary statutes define the current responsibilities of Polri and 
the TNI. I argue this process has had profound implications for security management in 
Indonesia today. Although the Indonesian parliament has not elucidated the boundary 
between the authority of Polri and TNI, analysts have underestimated the powerful 
normative intentions within Indonesian security legislation that defines what security forces 
should and should not do. Effectively, the military have been stripped of the ability to 
operate independently in the area o f  domestic security. This leaves the police as the 
supreme authority in internal security management. I go to some lengths in this chapter to 
demonstrate that the TNI seems to comply with this division of responsibility. I do this in 
order to challenge the arguably still strong impression that the TNI remains active in 
internal security. Finally, chapter one also provides a history of regional government 
powers over law enforcement. This section serves the twin purpose of filling a substantial 
gap in the area studies literature as well as demonstrating that although regional 
government law enforcement capacities have grown with decentralisation, regional 
government is still not able to duplicate the power of the police.
Chapter two introduces my case study site. In this chapter I provide a discussion of case 
study research and an overview o f Yogyakarta. I also provide my reasons for choosing this 
region. I review the security situation there and I provide an overview of the major 
government security actors within Yogyakarta. In brief, I argue that the rich, qualitative
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data that emerges from a single case study makes this form of research valuable, even for 
its purely empirical benefits. 1 also argue that, should we wish to, Yogyakarta also has a fair 
degree of general i sabi 1 ity when it comes to predicting trends in other parts of Indonesia. 
This argument is based in part on the jurisdictions o f  the state security actors in 
Yogyakarta, which are likely to be similar in other parts of the country. After laying out this 
case we then move on to an examination of the region of Yogyakarta, and its main social, 
economic, political and security features. The largest section of this chapter however, 
provides a description o f  state security organisations and their activities, size and authority. 
This section shows just how well defined the boundaries of jurisdiction are between state 
security actors.
In chapter three and four I continue the analysis begun in chapter two, but specifically 
move on to examine the relationships between state security bureaucracies. Chapter three 
begins this discussion and introduces the data which shows that collaboration is the 
dominant form of interaction. Chapter three demonstrates the importance o f  joint security 
committees for bringing together the principal state agencies involved in local security. The 
evidence within this chapter begins my reassessment of the negative perceptions towards 
inter-agency security relationships in Indonesia by showing how agencies like the police, 
regional government and the military can voluntarily meet in specific forums (such as the 
regional leaders conference, the regional intelligence community meeting and others) to 
discuss security, share intelligence and coordinate security operations. Within these 
meetings regional government plays a surprisingly important role. It is the initiator of 
security forums, but the effectiveness of these meetings depends upon the powers of the 
police. Chapter four continues the argument by demonstrating how government security 
actors inter-relate beyond security forums through cross-institutional financing and joint 
operations.
Chapter five moves beyond the state sector and introduce the relationships of non-state 
security actors with the police. In this chapter we see how consumers o f  commercial 
security (such as hotels, shopping malls, etc.) and providers of commercial security (such as 
private security companies) each rely on police support. Consumers of security utilise the 
police because police powers add strength to the consumer’s own in-house arrangements.
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Providers of security, companies are obliged by regulation to operate beneath police 
supervision. The relationships between consumers and providers of security and the police 
show an interesting interplay between conditions which are specific to Indonesia and other 
behaviours which derive from policing in general. Indonesia’s historical style of security 
management has empowered Polri to supervise and regulate private providers of security; 
this situation constitutes something special to Indonesia. On the other hand, the effort by 
consumers of security to obtain access to police authority is something often noted in the 
general policing literature. These interactions are also apparent in my Indonesian case 
study. Both of these factors impart a superior position to the police in their relations with 
the commercial security sector.
Chapter six continues the argument of chapter five by examining the many volunteer 
security groups which exist within Yogyakarta. In this chapter we find there is an inner ring 
of organisations which maintain a very close relationship with Polri, such as Indonesia’s 
neighbourhood watch and the new community-oriented policing forums. The police 
directly regulate and supervise these organisations in the field. Next we examine some 
groupings which exist outside direct police sponsorship -  the security units of the village 
and the security taskforces of political parties. Although not owing direct allegiance to the 
police, these groups nevertheless acknowledge the normative superiority of Polri within the 
sector, and seek out relations with the police. We end the chapter by examining one set of 
actors which has an adversarial relationship with Polri -  Islamic vigilantes. As we shall see 
however, though vigilantes challenge the police, they also seek to engage it, and they 
moderate their behaviour to avoid direct conflict with the police. I argue that these 
behaviours demonstrate that volunteer security groupings actively seek out police power to 
add weight and legitimacy to their own activities, making Polri a necessary hierarchical 
superior.
The relationships that are discussed in chapter six, like those of chapter five, show the 
similarities and the differences between policing in Indonesia and other countries. The 
Indonesian police are the centre of the security network not only because they possess 
special powers common to all police forces, such as the legitimate use of repressive force, 
symbolic authority, superior knowledge on crime and security. Polri is also central to the
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security network in Yogyakarta because of the unique approach to internal security in 
Indonesia. This approach entails the police continuing the strategies of surveillance and 
supervision over rival policing actors which began during the Suharto era. These factors, 
combined with the withdrawal o f  the military from security management after 1998 and the 
only marginal increase in regional government law enforcement powers, have left Polri the 
dominant actor in regional security management.
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Chapter 1: A Historical Analysis o f  the Rise of the National Police and Regional
Government in Security Management and the Decline of the Indonesian Military
This chapter provides a historical discussion of the legal and political events at the national 
level which have shaped the current division of roles between security organisations in my 
case study site. This chapter charts the institutional histories o f  the two most important 
security organisations which have emerged in Yogyakarta: the Indonesian police and the 
law enforcement apparatus of regional government, the Polisi Pamong Praja (Pol.PP). 
Three reasons justify this historical analysis. By examining the evolution of these 
institutions we gain an understanding o f  the legal-regulatory parameters which now define 
the present day roles of Polri and the Pol.PP in Yogyakarta. Secondly, by studying the 
separation of the police from the military and how roles became divided between them, we 
gain an understanding o f  how the TNI have been deprived of a role in day-to-day internal 
security in post-reformasi Indonesia. A final reason for including a history of Polri and the 
civil service police is the simple paucity of research on either of these institutions in the 
English language literature.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains why the Indonesian 
army was so powerful in regional affairs during the Suharto era. In this section we examine 
the control exercised by the army territorial command over regional governments during 
the New Order. The demilitarisation of  regional government in the early reformasi period 
constitutes a powerful explanation for why military influence appears to have declined so 
sharply today; a reality which is apparent in Yogyakarta. Yet the demilitarisation of 
regional government constitutes only a partial explanation of this phenomenon. The other 
part of the equation has been the separation o f  Polri from the armed forces. Prior to their 
separation, the army dominated the police within the ABRI structure. The institutional 
separation of the two forces put an end to this relationship. While previous commentators 
have already shown the dilutory effect decentralisation had on the power of the army, the
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literature has not yet explored how significant the separation of Polri was for the decline in 
the military’s influence. This is the task of section two.
Section two gives a detailed discussion of the importance of Polri’s separation from ABRI 
and the redistribution of power between them. As discussed in the introduction there is a 
dominant, if not hegemonic, set of assumptions that the separation process did not define 
clear boundaries between the police and the military, and sufficient foundations for 
interagency cooperation are lacking. A parallel concern is the strongly held belief that 
security reforms have not withdrawn the military from domestic security. I argue these 
views should be revisited.
Through a historical analysis I argue that the separation of Polri from TNI has resulted in an 
almost complete removal of the military from the world of active, day-to-day security. The 
separation process was put on the ABRI agenda during the crisis of reformasi. Although the 
process was rushed, the defence and police leadership produced some very important policy 
on structural separation and protocols for police-military cooperation. Although some 
scholars argue the Indonesian government should codify regulations for interagency 
cooperation, I argue that the police and military today still retain from the pre-separation 
period very important agreements over Polri-TNI joint operations.
As section two describes, the most meaningful part of the separation process was the 
parliamentary debate over Polri-TNI reform in 2000. This debate created the contemporary 
role descriptions of the police and the military. Although scholars are correct to argue that 
parliamentary statutes should define more clearly how and when the military can be 
involved in domestic security, I argue that we have underestimated the powerful normative 
intent within Indonesia’s security laws. These laws dictate that the police is the primary 
instrument of domestic security and the military is not permitted to involve itself in this 
area without political approval. In order to fully comprehend the significance o f  the implied 
intent within Indonesia’s security laws, I go on to discuss in lengthy detail how the defence 
leadership respects the normative legal constraints placed upon it. I do this in order to 
respond to the still arguably strong assumption that the military remains involved in
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domestic security. This argument functions as a convincing explanation for my findings 
that territorial units in Yogyakarta are largely uninvolved in day-to-day security affairs.
Section three provides an overview of the Polisi Pamong Praja. Although the lineage of  the 
Pol.PP extends at least until the early years of the Indonesian Republic, for many decades 
the civil service police have been an under-resourced, feeble part of state law enforcement. 
Until the transition period, the Pol.PP were retained at the lower levels of the civilian 
administration. With decentralisation, the provincial and in particular district governments 
were given grander regulatory powers. With the granting o f  these powers, the districts and 
provinces also obtained control over the Pol.PP and began using these officers more 
efficiently. The distribution of space in this chapter largely reflects the distribution of 
power between Polri and regional government. The law enforcement capability of regional 
governments place them in a poor second place to the police. Nevertheless, in my case 
study site today, decentralisation has made regional government the second most important 
source of law enforcement behind the police.
New Order Security Institutions: the Dominance of the Army over Regional Governance 
and the Police
The militarisation and demilitarisation o f  regional government
The purpose of this section is to provide background information on the enormous 
influence of the Indonesian army at the regional level during the Suharto era. This section 
serves to juxtapose the restricted capabilities o f  regional government and the police prior to 
1999, versus the flowering of their enforcement powers after democratisation. Previously, 
local security was dominated by the army. This was not only because the army was able to 
strategically control Polri, but also because the army dominated regional governance. The 
Indonesian military has been identified as one of the three pillars of the Suharto
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administration. The military sat alongside the Golkar party and the state bureaucracy.1 Yet 
the powers o f  the territorial army structure suggest that, in the New Order apparatus, the 
army played a type of Soviet commissar role at the regional level: it watched over the other 
instruments of the regime.
The Indonesian army’s territorial command has been a feature of some interest in studies of 
Indonesia. Despite considerable discussion of the influence that the territorial command 
(Komando Teritorial or Koter) bequeaths to the military, there are surprisingly few studies 
of what the Koter actually does, either during or after the New Order. Robert Lowry has 
provided a detailed structural overview of the allocation of units in the Komando Teritorial 
during the late New Order period.2 Nevertheless, his study was not able to provide 
qualitative analysis of how the command intervened in regional affairs at the meso or micro 
level. In 2006 Leonard Sebastian expanded upon Lowry’s early research o f  the military.3 
Yet the strength of Sebastian’s work lies in its description of the strategic defence potential 
o f the territorial structure, and how territorial units functioned in high-conflict areas like 
East Timor. Marcus Mietzner added to the literature a book chapter on army territorial 
relations with local governments. Despite its promising title, Mietzner’s analysis is largely 
one o f  TNI policy and national political debate about the territorial command rather than a 
substantial work about regional territorial activities.4
Large questions therefore remain, how did the army territorial command operate during the 
New Order in the “ordinary”, stable parts o f  Indonesia and how did reformasi change the 
system? A recent PhD dissertation by Jonni Mahroza does much to fill this gap.5 Mahroza 
is an Indonesian army officer who executed a local level case study on the withdrawal of 
the army from regional politics in East Java, between 1998 and 2003. Although local
1 Hermawan Sulistyo, ‘Electoral Politics in Indonesia: A Hard Way to Democracy.’ In: Electoral Politics in 
Southeast & East Asia, Aurel Croissant (ed.), (Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Office for Regional Co­
operation in Southeast Asia, 2002), 84.
2 Lowry, Armed Forces o f  Indonesia, 66-76.
3 Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology, 69-77, 123-152, 177-216.
4 Marcus Mietzner, ‘Business as Usual? The Indonesian Armed Forces and Local Politics in the Post-Soeharto 
Era.’ In: Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds.), Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation 
and Democratisation, (Singapore: Research School o f Pacific and Asian Studies/Institute o f Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2003).
5 Jonni Mahroza, ‘A Local Perspective on Military Withdrawal from Politics in Indonesia: East Java 1998- 
2003.’ Doctoral Dissertation, Flinders University (August 2006).
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security management was not a primary focus of Mahroza’s research, Mahroza’s study is 
instructive. Mahroza’s thesis details how the military’s control functions over society and 
local politics decisively evaporated in the early reform period.
In order to understand how the military could exercise control over regional governance it 
is necessary first to understand how the military is structured at the regional level. The 
army territorial structure is based upon the doctrine of Total People’s Defence. This 
doctrine dates back to Indonesia’s war of independence. The army disperses a large part of 
its manpower in regional units that broadly parallel the civilian government. The purpose of 
these units is ostensibly to prepare Indonesia to mount guerrilla resistance against external 
invasion but also disposes the military in such a way that it can intervene in local affairs 
ubiquitously across the archipelago. Referring to Annex A, we can see that the military has 
a supra-provincial command, the KODAM, a regional command, the KOREM, a district 
command, the KODIM and a sub-district command, the KORAMIL (and within the 
Koramil there are non-commissioned officers or Babinsa allocated to villages). The 
majority of a Kodam’s personnel are troops organised in regular units. These regular units 
do not specifically perform territorial functions. According to Mahroza territorial personnel 
only operate in the headquarters detachment at each level of the command. Numbers of 
territorial soldiers may range from around 300 personnel in the headquarters of Kodam V 
Brawijaya (East Java Kodam) to four or so in an average Koramil in East Java. The daily 
work of these territorial forces was to research, analyse and “develop” local conditions for 
national defence. Despite this erstwhile intention, in the New Order the Koter evolved into 
the regime’s primary instrument of social control.6
The most prominent tool in the armoury of territorial commands during the New Order was 
Kopkamtib (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban or Restoration Command for 
Security and Order). Although this was a national body, it was organised at the regional 
level under the command of the territorial military leadership. In 1988 Kopkamtib was 
reformed under the title Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinisasi Pemantapan Stabilitas dan 
Ketahanan Nasional or National Coordinating Body for National Stability and Resilience), 
though its functions remained unchanged. At the Kodam level and the Kodim level the
6 Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 51-52.
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body was named Bakorstanasda. The Kodam’s Bakorstanasda had an intelligence gathering 
capability and the “right to arrest anyone suspected of being a disturbance to social and 
political stability.” These intelligence gathering and interrogation powers were immensely 
useful in elevating the regional army commands to a position of superiority in regional 
security. In practice, Bakorstanasda was organised as a committee attached to the regional 
government. Although the Bakorstanasda had a broad membership (including regional 
government heads, the chairman of the regional parliaments, regional district commanders, 
police chiefs and chairs of district courts), army territorial officers led the committee. The 
Bakorstansda broadly interpreted its mandate for combating threats to ‘national stability.’ 
According to Mahroza, the Bakorstanasda regularly intervened in mediating labour 
disputes, land conflict, and other social disputes, as well as supervising regime enemies, 
like suspected communists.7
Within the regional governments there was also another military dominated committee, the 
Wansospolda (Dewan Sosial Politik Daerah or Regional Political and Social Council or 
sospol). These offices coordinated military personnel assigned to be civil servants in 
regional government bureaucracy and military members of regional executive governments
• • • R •and legislative assemblies. The sospol office had highly important functions in 
investigating and black-listing perceived opponents of the regime. After 1990 for example, 
the president introduced a special screening test (called the Litsus) to vet the backgrounds 
of all bureaucrats and elected officials. The district or sub-provincial Koter administered 
the Litsus. Failure to pass the Litsus was a career death sentence for state officials.9 Aside 
from acting as a communication hub for territorial commanders (both in collecting data 
from regional governments and for disseminating information on military policies) the 
sospol offices were also active externally. They supervised and shaped the programs of 
political parties and social organisations.10
A final aspect of the territorial command’s influence was the direct secondment of active 
army officers to key posts in regional government, a practice known as kekaryaan. At the
7 Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 54-55, 126-127.
8 Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 55.
9 Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 55.
10 Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 56-57.
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executive level of regional government, the army simply inserted a large number of its 
personnel into the positions of provincial governor and head of district (Bupati/Walikota). 
As late as 1999, army officers occupied fifteen of Indonesia’s twenty seven governorships 
and took control of 119 of 329 districts." Kekaryaan practices also extended to the lower 
regional bureaucracy. According to Mahroza, each bureau (or Dinas) head at the district 
level was open to military occupation. The military most commonly took over the 
Chairmanship of the Sospol office (Kansospol), the Regional Civil Defence office (Mawil 
Hansip), Market Chief (Kepala Pasar), Bus Station Chief (Kepala Terminal), Director of 
Regional Telecommunications (Dinashub) and often all the other most influential bureaus. 
The Kansospol and Mawil Hansip aligned with the military’s security functions, other 
positions however provided military officers with access to extra-budgetary finances.12 In 
the regional parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) ABRI took an 
automatic 20% of all seats. The armed forces also heavily dominated the structure of the 
regime party, Golkar. Associations of ex-military officers, associations of military families 
as well as military members themselves often controlled regional Golkar caucuses. Thus for 
example until 1998, retired military officers led thirty two of thirty seven Golkar fractions 
in East Java’s district parliaments.
The maintenance of all o f  these instruments and practices enabled local military forces an 
extraordinary degree of control over regional affairs during the New Order. Mahroza’s case 
study from East Java, gives us new insight into the depth and breadth o f  military control 
functions during the Suharto era. It would even suggest we should recategorise the old 
‘three pillars’ claim, that the New Order state was dependent on a triumvirate of forces 
consisting of Golkar, the bureaucracy and the military. Within this triad the military had 
important control functions even over the other two elements. Yet if the military footprint 
over regional affairs during the New Order was very large, equally large has been the 
decline in its power since 1998.
11 This situation was much worse prior to civilianising reforms in the 1980s. In 1980, 70% o f  Governors, 56% 
o f Bupatis and 33% o f Mayors were all active army officers. Rinakit, Indonesian Military after the New 
Order, 151. Nugroho Notosusanto (ed.), Pejuang dan Prajurit, Konsepsi dan Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI ( 
Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1984), 378-379.
12 Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 56.
13 Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 58-59.
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Internal military reforms ushered in after reformasi have dismantled the Koter’s 
interventionist capabilities; the only remnant which exists today is the army territorial 
command itself. In 1999 the sospol offices were retracted back into the body of the 
territorial command, renamed Komsos and integrated into territorial intelligence offices.14 
The supervisory role of the sospol office over society was removed and the new komsos 
office was remade as the secretariat for the TNI fraction in local parliaments. In 2004 the 
komsos office was completely eliminated when the military’s guaranteed seats in 
parliament were removed.15 The removal o f  the sospol offices also automatically stopped 
the army from screening members of the bureaucracy, regional government leaders and 
parliamentarians.16 Bakorstanasda was formally terminated in 2000 by Presidential Decree 
No.38/2000. 17 The formal, legal liquidation of Bakorstansda was a huge blow to military 
power. In the Suharto era not only were these forums active in managing local problems, 
the Bakorstanasda also stored information on dissidents, suspected troublemakers and other 
intelligence vital to the Suharto regime. All this disappeared in 1998-2000. On 15 February 
1999, the commander in chief of the armed forces, General Wiranto promulgated 
Kep/03/P/II/1999 on the withdrawal of all active military officers from the civilian 
bureaucracy. By mid-August 2000 there were no active military officers in regional 
government in East Java. Yet as Mahroza points out in 1997, thirty three of thirty seven 
district governments had been led by military officers not including the hundreds of 
lucrative bureau headships below them.18 In 2000, the military surrendered numerous social 
programs to civilian ministries which previously were administered by territorial 
commands, the national foster parent movement, the agricultural promotion project, and 
twelve other such programs were transferred to regional governments.19 Finally, in 1999 the
14 Overnight many sospol personnel became redundant. According to Mahroza’s source in Kodam V in East 
Java, around 300 former sospol personnel had to be reintegrated in their territorial HQs without jobs.
Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 122.
15 Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 122-123
16 Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 124-125
17 Though apparently Bakorstansda committees in East Java had been ineffective at least since May 1998 
when they failed to curb mob attacks on Chinese and widespread Ninja assassinations o f witches. Litsus tests 
were not applied in the 1999 general election, marking the end o f  their utilisation. Mahroza, ‘Military 
Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 125-126.
18 Military officers were given three choices: retire early, rejoin their units, or transfer to become civilians. 
Many of the regional Bupatis chose to retire while almost all o f the military officers serving in regional 
government bureaucracies chose to rejoin the army. Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 128.
19 Mietzner, ‘Business as Usual,’ 251.
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military’s guaranteed seats in local government assemblies were reduced from twenty to 
ten, before being completely removed by 2004.20
What Mahroza’s dissertation shows therefore is how the army’s instruments o f  power at the 
regional level unravelled during the post-reformasi era. In effect, the armed forces’ internal 
reforms led to the demilitarisation of regional governance. The termination o f  these 
mechanisms can serve to explain why, although the military remains physically present in 
its territorial structure today, this structure is incapable of coordinating regional security 
affairs as it did in the past. My case study in Yogyakarta shows this phenomenon. This 
analysis is important when we consider the calls of reformist intellectuals, who have 
recommended the wholesale dismissal of the territorial command.21 Mahroza’s research 
reminds us that the influence of the territorial command is not founded, a priori, in the 
existence of the territorial army structure, but rather through a combination of 
governmental structures and practices territorial officers once administered for the benefit 
of the army and the Suharto regime. As Mahroza elucidates, when these instruments and 
practices were pared back and then removed after 1998, the military’s capacity to influence 
regional affairs has likewise shrivelled.
Nevertheless the withdrawal o f  the military from regional government does not necessarily 
prove that present day territorial forces have no internal security role. The following section 
will explore this issue. I argue that one outcome of the separation of Polri from TNI has 
been the reallocation of all day-to-day security powers to the police. It is therefore the 
combined effect of the demilitarisation of regional government and the separation of the 
police that has rendered the modern territorial army as something Of a dormant, winter 
grapevine; physically surviving but bearing no security fruit.
20 Prior to 1999, the chairmanships o f  East Java DPRDs almost always were occupied by a military officer. 
After 1999 there was not a single DPRD in East Java that chose a military officer as chairman. Apparently the 
ABRI fractions themselves also declined in quality. Before 1999, military headquarters had mostly sent out 
Lt.Colonels to sit in DPRDs. After 1999 military headquarters mostly assigned Captains and Majors, and after 
2001 even sent 1st Lieutenants. This decline in quality and experience matched the declining fortunes o f the 
military itself in regional affairs. Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 131-132.
21 Mietzner, ‘The Politics o f  Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia’, 61.
41
History o f  the Indonesian Police (1946 -  1998)
While the Indonesian police were subordinated to the military in the early years of the 
Suharto regime, Polri initially began on a very different path. In the years after 1950 during 
the early Republican period, the Indonesian National Police were a civilian force organised 
under the office of the Prime Minister.22 During its early history the police fiercely 
defended its civilian credentials and institutional independence. In fact, in 1959 the 
country’s first Police Chief (Kepala Polri or Kapolri), Soekanto, chose to resign rather than 
support the inclusion of the police in ABRI. Although in 1960 Polri did formally become 
one of ABRI’s four services, the national police managed to maintain its independence as a 
separate Ministry within the Defence and Security portfolio.23 Thus for the duration of the 
so-called “Old Order” (1949-1965) Polri remained a civilian force run separately to the 
military.
With the end of the Sukarno era, the Suharto administration consolidated its grip over 
ABRI and began a process that would see the police gradually subordinated to the military. 
In 1967, the Chief of Police and the other heads of the armed forces lost their ministerial 
status and became responsible to the Minister of Defence and Security, who at that time 
was Suharto. Suharto’s reorganisation of ABRI in turn initiated a gradual depletion of 
police capabilities: police recruits were subject to a compulsory military curriculum while 
the armed forces headquarters discriminated against the police in the ABRI budget. As 
evidence of this by the early nineteen eighties the police to population ratio dropped from 
1:500 in 1967 to 1:1200, three times the international standard minimum.24 While various
• * i * _i * * 25efforts were made to rehabilitate police performance during the eighties and nineties 
Suharto era politics did not allow the armed forces to treat the cause o f  Polri’s problems -  
its subordination to the military.
22 Djamin, Menuju Polri Mandiri, 40.
23 Djamin, Menuju Polri Mandiri, 41-42.
24 Djamin, Menuju Polri Mandiri, 44-45.
25 See: Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Sejarah Kepolisian di Indonesia (Jakarta: Mabes Polri, 
1999), p.222-246.
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While it is common knowledge that the police were an inferior service arm of ABRI, there 
is little empirical data which illustrates precisely what this system entailed for the 
Indonesian police. Partly this is a function of the difficulties of conducting research during 
the New Order. The post-1998 period has not dramatically changed the shortage of material
9Aon the police. Since 1998 most histories of Polri have been written by the police itself.“ 
These official narratives are often reluctant to speak frankly about the police experience 
under ABRI. In fact, this is politically understandable. The military is still a working 
partner of Polri today. Any official police claims which reflect poorly on the military 
leadership during the Suharto period would probably have a negative effect on current 
working relations. For this reason, as well as the dry general style of official sources, police 
historical narratives tend to be rather stale and matter-of-fact. The lack of critical histories 
on the Indonesian police is indeed a weakness in the literature and points to opportunities 
for future research.
Nevertheless police sources interviewed for this dissertation have been willing to discuss - 
anonymously - their experiences of Polri’s subordination to the senior ABRI service, the 
army. It must be recalled that these sources are police officers, and their testimony is
• 97  • • •
therefore biased.^ While bearing these weaknesses in mind, their information is related to 
provide some background on how inter-service relations operated within ABRI. The 
testimony of my interviewees underlines the irony o f  the post-1998 period: Polri’s 
importance in domestic security has lept ahead of the army.
• • 98 •According to one, middle ranking Assistant Police Commissioner interviewed in 
Yogyakarta, the first and most psychologically impressive aspect of police subordination 
during the Suharto era came from the armed forces training curriculum. Officer candidates
~5 See for example: Wik Djatmika Dibawah panji-panji Tribrata (Jakarta Selatan: PTIK Press, 2006).
Untung S. Rajab, Kedudukan dan Fungsi Polisi Republik Indonesia dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan : 
Berdasarkan UUD 1945 (Bandung: Utomo, 2003), N.B. Untung Rajab is a police general. Mabes 
Polri, Sejarah Kepolisian Indonesia (1999). Awaloeddin Djamin & Yayasan Brata Bhakti, Sejarah 
Perkembangan Kepolisian di Indonesia : Dari Zaman Kuno sampai Sekarang (Jakarta: Yayasan Brata Bhakti 
Polri 2007), N.B. Awaloeddin is a former Chief o f  Police.
27 My sources certainly make clear their resentment o f the police’s junior status in the armed forces. Ideally, it 
would be desirable to obtain accounts from long-serving army territorial troops on their attitudes to the police. 
Despite efforts in this direction, in conducting this research I was unable to find any serving or former 
military personnel who were willing to share their views on the record.
28 Equivalent to an Army Lieutenant Colonel.
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for the police trained together with officer candidates for the army, the air force and the 
navy at the national Armed Forces Academy. During their time at the academy, officer 
cadets (as well as the non-commissioned police recruits who trained at the various Police 
Schools around Indonesia) were drilled in the belief that the armed services were not equal 
members of the same family. Rather, there was a hierarchy. The army was the senior, most 
prestigious service, followed by the air force and the navy. At the bottom was the police,
9Q • • • •the ‘anak bungsu’ or most junior child. After graduation, police personnel carried this 
mindset with them into their careers.
According to a different informant the army’s discrimination against the police was an 
institutional problem that took on the status of unofficial ABRI standing policy. The army 
deliberately gave the police only a small percentage of the budget it actually needed,30 the 
army weakened police influence on ABRI policymaking and occasionally army officers 
exerted pressure on the police to bend criminal law to serve the interests of army officers. 
In the early nineteen nineties this now senior police general served as the aide-de camp of 
the then Kapolri, Kunarto. Through his access to the highest levels o f  the police 
headquarters this source was, so he says, able to see much of the macro-relationship 
between Polri and the ABRI leadership, even though he was at the time only a Major.
My informant illustrated his claims about the domination of the army with a number of 
colourful anecdotes, the most interesting of which concerns the strangulation of  funding to 
the police. The example par excellence was the 1992 Indonesian general election. In 
planning the security for this election the then ABRI leadership allocated a budget of 
Rp.150 billion for the whole operation. The ABRI leadership divided the election security 
into two parts, pengamanan tertutup (or closed security) and pengamanan terbuka (or open
29 This hierarchy was described to me less as a part o f the formal curriculum and more as a part o f  the culture 
o f education within the Academy. Interview: Anonymous police source 14 April 2008.
30 It is difficult to cross-reference this data with budget figures from ABRI since little detail o f  the police 
budget line is publicly available. However based on the available open source data, the police budget in 1994 
was around US$ 56 million, which accounted for about 30% o f the ABRI budget. This figure represented 
substantial underinvestment in the police portfolio. After successive increases since 1999, the police budget 
has increased, reaching Rp.24.9 trillion in 2009. By comparison the Department o f  Defence acquired Rp.33.7 
trillion in the same year. On the basis o f  a rough comparison, Polri’s budget now represents 70% o f national 
defence spending, a very substantial increase. For 1994 data see: Adrianus Meliala, ‘Sensitive Policing: 
Indonesia’s Case.’ PhD dissertation, University o f Queensland (June 2004), 18. For 2009 budget data see: 
‘Menhan Kecewa Anggaran Dephan’, Matanews.com, 16 June 2009.
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security). The army performed the closed security part of the operation, which involved 
espionage, monitoring the activities of party masses and the like. The open security side of 
the operation was performed by the police, this consisted of: guarding party rallies, 
deploying personnel to secure voting places and other activities done in view of the public. 
Clearly then the police would have had the biggest share of the security burden. However, 
in the division of funding, the army allocated only Rp.8 billion to Polri. This amount was 
sufficient only for the meal and personnel costs of the police and their civilian auxiliaries 
(Kamra) for one day before and up to one day after the election - despite the fact that the 
campaign proper took place over two months.
My informant also claims that the army deliberately hindered the police from contributing 
to ABRI policy. This can be seen from the number of Polri’s senior officers who entered 
the ABRI leadership. Up to 1995, the army possessed over 300 generals. Polri on the other 
hand had only sixty six. O f these sixty six, apparently only four were capable of 
contributing to ABRI policy. O f the four police generals the Kapolri was the most 
influential. He was followed by the Assistant for Security and Social Order (.Askamtibmas) 
to the Chief of the Armed Forces, followed by a Polri representative in the Armed Forces 
Academy and one other officer (whose position was not explained). Polri’s other sixty two 
generals stationed in the regions and were thus outside the inner-ABRI circle. If we cross- 
reference my informant’s testimony with other data it appears this account is reliable. 
‘Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite’ from the journal Indonesia (1992), indicates 
that the only leadership positions held by the police in the ABRI high command in Jakarta 
was the Kapolri as a service chief, and the Assistant for Security and Social Order.31 Aside 
from these posts, the police were virtually unrepresented in the ABRI leadership. Based 
upon this maldistribution among the general staff my source thus claims “our [Polri’s] 
voice could never get inside [ABRI policymaking].”
The ABRI leadership also exerted acute psychological influence over middle ranking 
officers by using military intelligence for intimidation. In ABRI, military intelligence held 
the power to destroy officer’s careers. While my interviewee did not claim police were the 
only victims of ABRI’s pressures for conformity he did suggest police officers were very
31 Editors, ‘Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite.’ Indonesia, No.53 (April 1992), p. 106.
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vulnerable. In the Suharto era, every candidate for the rank o f  Colonel (or the service 
equivalent in the navy and air force) had to pass a background check before promotion was 
granted. The armed forces strategic intelligence body, BAIS, performed this task. BAIS had 
only one police representative -  attached to the Secretariat. Most BAIS personnel were 
instead drawn from the army. In the course o f  administering background checks if BAIS 
could not verify the “patriotism” o f  a candidate, the officer was placed on a black list and 
was never able to be promoted. The source implied that BAIS was allowed to continuously 
revisit these patriotism assessments over the course o f  a senior officer’s career. Officers 
who underwent the experience were forever, so my informant says, “afraid o f  BAIS.”
Police fear o f  senior elements in the army also manifested itself in the reluctance o f  police 
officers to investigate acts o f  military-backed criminality. Providing an example, my 
informant explained that one o f  his appointments after leaving police headquarters was to 
head up the detective unit in one o f  the district police commands in Jakarta. One time his 
detectives captured a suspect attempting to smuggle electronic products through Tanjung 
Priok port. The suspect was detained and his goods confiscated. During the investigation 
BAIS contacted my informant by telephone and explained that the criminal in fact belonged 
to BAIS as did his contraband goods. BAIS instructed my informant to release the 
smuggler and the goods immediately, which he did. My source explained that there were no 
sanctions or punishments or official response implied if police failed to comply. Obedience 
was expected. In a hierarchical system such as ABRI, the army maintained dominance over 
the police through this “mindset” and “culture o f  fear.” The army intimidated the police and
• • • • • individual officers were afraid to challenge the army -  individually or institutionally.
If  we accept these testimonies at face value, the army victimised and dominated Polri. 
Although the police had potentially important roles to play in upholding criminal law and 
public order, Polri was a subordinated part o f  the armed forces and was deliberately kept 
below capacity. It is a great historical irony then that the police have become the main 
provider o f  internal security in the post-Suharto era. Few parts o f  the academic literature 
have dwelt on the origins o f  this historical irony. The story o f  how the police changed from 
the weakest part o f  the armed forces to become the most powerful security actor in
32 Interview, anonymous source from police headquarters, 5 September 2008.
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Indonesia is intimately linked with the legal process surrounding the separation o f  Polri 
from the TNI.
The Separation o f  the National Police from the Armed Forces 
The internal process within ABRI
Analysing the separation o f  the police from the armed forces is difficult. There are few 
sources (either primary or secondary) that discuss the event. This is due to the fact that 
police-military separation was but one part o f  a much larger package o f  military reforms 
ushered in during the early reform period. Most observers have focused on the overall 
package. In retrospect however, the separation o f  the police from the military is arguably 
one o f  the most important aspects o f  Indonesia’s military reform agenda; the division o f  
roles which came about as a result o f  this separation, defines how Indonesia manages 
internal security today. The separation process arguably, therefore, deserves much greater 
attention.
The separation occurred in two distinct phases, with the first initiated by ABRI. This phase 
consisted o f  dividing Polri from the armed forces and repositioning the police under the 
Ministry o f  Defence. This stage occurred during 1998 to 2000. The next phase occurred in 
2000 when Indonesia’s supreme law-making body, the MPR, stepped in to provide the 
legal basis for the complete independence o f  the police, as well as drafting the current 
functions o f  the police and the military.
The historical forces unleashed by the toppling o f  Suharto was the main impetus behind the 
separation o f  Polri from ABRI. Attendant with demands for reformasi, mainstream 
Indonesia also rejected the smothering, repressive influence o f  the armed forces on society. 
The military, as Mietzner and others have explained, responded by introducing a program
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o f  reforms dubbed the ‘New Paradigm.’ The military intended that the New Paradigm 
would placate civilian reformers while preserving the autonomy o f  the military from 
absolute democratic control.34 One item which the military came to offer was the separation 
o f  the police. Ironically, in a decision which has led to a dramatic expansion o f  police 
powers and capabilities at the expense o f  the defence forces, no one -  not the executive 
government, the military leadership or senior police commanders themselves -  ever really 
thought about how this process would unfold. As the idea o f  separation was supported by 
Indonesian society and the police and was considered an easy way for the military high 
command to demonstrate their reformist credentials, this particular reform was considered 
uncontroversial. Its significance can now only be realised with hindsight.
From the early nineteen nineties we can see there was a growing constituency o f  elites 
within civil society that supported the division o f  Polri and ABRI. Although this 
constituency was ineffective in initiating the desired change, their voices illustrate that 
within Indonesian society there was a general mood in favour o f  separation. In 1995, the 
year o f  Polri’s fiftieth birthday, several prominent intellectuals and editorialists aired their 
support for separation in the Indonesian press. Among them were criminologists, lecturers 
at the Indonesian police’s Institution o f  Higher Learning in Criminology (PTIK), politicians
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on the parliament’s defence and security committee and lawyers. From their statements 
we can see the issue o f  removing the police from military control was an incipient part o f  
the debate about police reform, even before the end o f  the Suharto government. Although 
there may have been voices o f  dissent, the staunch opposition o f  the president and the 
military establishment stifled any hope o f  a policy shift.36
33 Mietzner, ‘Politics o f  Military Reform’, 11-12. See also: Rinakit, Military after the New Order, 100-115. 
Sebastian, Realpolitik, 329-337.
Rinakit, Indonesian Military after the New Order, 100.
°  See for example the view s o f  PTIK lecturer S.W. Sarwono, ‘ Idealnya di Bawah Dephankam’, Merdeka, 1 
July 1995. A lso see: panel interview o f  criminal law expert Dr. Sahetapy, crim inologist M.W. Kusumah, 
NGO activist U.D. Irawan, and parliamentary members o f  Committee 1 on defence, A. Sazili and Zamharir. 
‘Pisahkan Polisi dari A BR I’ Media Indonesia, 1 July 1995. A lso see: ‘Saatnya Polisi Diberi otonomi dalam  
jalankan tugas penyidik.’ Harian Terbit, 1 July 1995. In: Kunarto, Merenungi Kritik Terhadap Polri: Baku I 
(Jakarta: PT. Cipta Manunggal, 1995).
36 See: ‘Pak Harto: POLRI dan ABRI Tidak Terpisahkan’ Media Indonesia, 3 July 1995. In: Kunarto, 
Merenungi Kritik Terhadap Polri, 1995.
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In 1997 though, the Indonesian government made a concession to reform demands. In its
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last year the Suharto administration passed Indonesia’s first ever law on the police. The 
Indonesian government declared its reason for creating the bill was the ‘complexity o f  the 
police role’, which required a special law. The 1997 Police Law did not however effect 
great change. The law’s greatest contribution was to define the roles, structure and 
responsibilities o f  the police in a more detailed way than previous legislation had. The 
police however remained a part o f  the ABRI command structure.38 One could however 
view this primitive attempt at police reform as a response to the general dissatisfaction with 
Polri’s performance, but one that fit within the constraints o f  the Suharto dictatorship. 
Therefore the last years o f  the Suharto era quietly presaged the beginnings o f  the later 
separation process. The subdued airings o f  discontent and the 1997 law on the police 
counted for little in comparison to the changes that occurred in 1998.
With the end o f  the New Order in May 1998, a new discussion arose among elite 
commentators and the press arguing again in favour o f  a separation. Many crises and 
political changes were occurring in Indonesia at the time, thus the discussion did not 
dominate the news cycle. But the issue nevertheless did arise in public debates. Around the 
anniversary o f  Polri (the Hari Bhayangkara on 1 July) a number o f  editorials came out in 
the press putting the case for separation. Using just one regional newspaper as an example, 
Kedaulatan Rakyat o f  Yogyakarta on 2 July 1998 ran commentary by academic observers 
criticising the military’s interventionist role in society and calling for an independent
• I Q  . # . .
police. At the same time in Jakarta, the University o f  Indonesia ran a seminar series 
“Police and Community in the Democratic Era.” One o f  the central calls o f  this seminar 
was for the police to be separated from the armed forces.40 As former Deputy Chief o f  
Police Adang Daradjatun has claimed, another source o f  support for Polri at that time were 
a series o f  seminars and workshops held independently in universities around Indonesia 
during 1998. During the course o f  my interview with Adang, the former general produced a
37 Undang-Undang N o.28 Tahun 1997 tentang Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia. Reproduced in: Mayor 
Jenderal Polisi Momo Kelana (ed.), Memahami Undang-Undang Kepolisian (Jakarta: PTIK 1998).
'8 Penjelasan UU 28/2007, ‘Urnum’, p.22-23.
39 ‘Mangayubagya 52 Tahun Polri: Makin Profesional Jika Pisah Dari ABR I’, Kedaulatan Rakyat, 2 July 
1998.
40 ‘Mangayubagya 52 Tahun Polri: Mengayomi Rakyat dan Membunuh Musuh’, Kedaulatan Rakyat, 3 July 
1998.
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document from his personal files listing the names o f  a series o f  sociologists and 
criminologists who in 1998, were active in pushing the argument for the separation o f  the 
police. Thus very early in the crisis atmosphere o f  1998, debate arose over the future o f  
Polri.41 This public constituency in favour o f  separation was an important factor in the 
thinking o f  policymakers. As 1 shall discuss, key informants within the police and the 
military believe that public pressure was a big factor in ABRI’s eventual decision to 
separate Polri.
Not long after the Suharto regime collapsed, the police and the ABRI high command began 
to revisit questions about the status of  the police and various teams and officers set to work 
on the issue. In the course o f  this research I have sought out the testimony o f  three 
important interviewees, who were each directly involved in the decision making o f  the 
armed forces at the time o f  the separation. These interviewees were then Major General 
Agus Widjojo (who in 1998 was head o f  ABRI Strategic Policy and Planning), then 
Brigadier General Farouk Muhammed (a police general on secondment in 1998 to the 
Department o f  Defence as the head o f  Organisasi Tata Laksana Kerja, or the Organisation 
for Arranging Implementation o f  Work) and finally then Police Major General, Adang 
Daradjatun (who in 1998 was the head o f  the Planning and Development division o f  the 
Indonesian police). 42 Their knowledge provides a valuable, first-hand account o f  how the 
separation came about.
Prior to the formal separation o f  the police in April 1999, the police informants claim there 
was little preparation. Agus Widjojo disagrees. According to Widjojo:
41 Interview, former Deputy C hief o f  Police, Adang Daradjatun 12 September 2008. Also: Mabes Polri Staf 
Perencanaan Dan Anggaran, Dafitar Referensi: Bahan Masukan Untuk Rapat Pembahasan konsepsi tentang 
Kedudukan Polri di ABRI, Kolum 1 (1999).
42 The reason why each o f  these interviewees are valuable sources o f  information is because in early 1999 
each former officer headed up a working group (kelompok kerja or Pokja) in their respective environments 
with the mission o f  preparing the police for eventual autonomy from ABRI. In weighing up their relative 
influence, the officer who is most responsible for managing the separation reform, and its internal logistical 
and other implications, was Adang Daradjatun. The pokja under Farouk Muhammad was responsible for 
preparing the legal/doctrinal aspects o f  the separation for the D efence Department. It is unknown what role, if  
any, Agus W idjojo’s team played but both o f  the police interviewees cite him as, at the least, an important 
source o f  moral support within ABRI for their work. Interview with former head o f  territorial forces Lt.Gen 
(ret.) Agus Widjojo, 29 April 2008. Interview with former Police Maj.Gen (ret.) Farouk Muhammad. 10 
September 2008. Interview, Daradjatun, Sept.2008.
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Actually there already was staged preparation beforehand, finally this m oved toward 
separation. This was known as the doctrine o f  ‘putting the police first’ 
(mengedepankan Polri). Therefore this doctrine meant that w hile Polri w as still under 
ABRI, but in policy [im plem entation on the ground] the p olice w ould be put first... this 
had existed for a long tim e ... probably since the tim e o f  Panglim a Faisal Tanjung [in 
the early n ineties]...43
When cross-checked with the police informants, Adang and Farouk do not disagree with 
Widjojo’s proposition, but only say that any policy to put forward Polri as the main 
instrument o f  security as some kind o f  prelude to a separation, only existed at the level o f  
policy and was never translated into reality. Adang for example says there was no planning 
at all within ABRI before 1997 for a separation:
not at that tim e [before 1998]. Indeed at that tim e the m omentum which gave us [the 
police] the bravery to state ‘w e want to depart from A B R I’, in my opinion, that was the 
mom entum  o f  history. W hen 1 was asked by the Kapolri about my attitude in facing  
this reform, I didn’t know but I directly grabbed it [the opportunity] and said, ‘w e must 
break from the ranks o f  A B R I.’ Therefore it was the m om entum  o f  history.
In responding to Widjojo statements concerning a policy to mengedepankan Polri, 
Adang claimed:
If speaking about written doctrine then indeed there w a s ...  thus before 1997 there were 
writings to that effect... But because the political situation did not make it possible, 
consequently nothing becam e o f  it. [W e the police] w eren ’t brave then as w e are 
n o w ... but the thinking w as there.44
In explaining the difference between Widjojo’s account and that o f  my police informants I 
assume that the police informants, being more intimately linked with developments in Polri 
are more reliable. Nevertheless it is apparent that in the years prior to the fall o f  Suharto 
there was discourse within the services about what Polri’s role should be. This situation 
reflects the voices o f  a number within civil society who desired the police not to be part o f  
the armed forces. But in terms o f  substantive planning or concrete policy for an eventual 
separation o f  the forces, prior to 1998 there was probably none.
43
44
Interview, Widjojo, April 2008.
Farouk Muhammad’s account agrees with that o f  Adang. Interview, Daradjatun, September 2008.
Interview, Farouk Muhammad, September 2008.
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The absence o f  planning prior to 1998, stresses the significance o f  reformasi and precisely 
how much this event motivated the armed forces leadership to embrace reform, including to 
the status o f  the police. Both Agus Widjojo and Adang Daradjatun attribute the events o f
1998 to providing the momentum for the separation o f  the police. As Widjojo says:
1 think that force [reformasi! was enough to convince anyone that indeed w e [the 
military] had reached the [appropriate] tim e to separate Polri from the TNI... Because 
at the tim e o f  reformasi, attacks and calum ny were directed at the military in an 
insistent fashion. C onsequently the military at that tim e was disem powered. And this 
encouraged the ABRI leadership to think that the tim e had com e to accept the reality o f  
separating the police from A B R I...45
Thus for the military, relinquishing the police was one o f  the concrete, uncontroversial 
policies they could make to demonstrate to the Indonesian people that they were sincere 
about changing their repressive, praetorian role. For this reason, the separation o f  the police 
from the ABRI command structure became one o f  the fourteen policy objectives o f  the 
military’s overall reform program.46 At the time, so it seems there was little future planning 
within ABRI as to what impact a separation o f  structures would have on the division o f  
roles between an independent Polri and the post-ABRI military. The principle o f  an 
independent police force was, it seems, adopted without controversy. When I asked 
Widjojo about opposition within ABRI to separation with the police, he responded:
If w e talk about the separation o f  Polri from ABRI itself, indeed it w asn ’t too strong 
the opposition [within the armed forces]. B ecause from within Polri itse lf there already 
w as a strong push for separating them selves from A BR I... w hilst from within ABRI, 
because it was only structural separation and did not influence the authority o f  ABR I, 
actually the opposition w as not too strong. It was different i f  compared to the 
opposition towards internal reforms within ABRI itse lf w hich then changed to becom e  
TNI ...
In hindsight it seems incredulous that the military would agree to relinquish control 
over the police when, by doing so, the military may lose strategic control over 
internal security to an independent Polri. I asked Widjojo whether the ABRI high 
command consciously considered this risk. He responded:
45 Interview, Widjojo, April 2008. A lso Interview, Daradjatun, September 2008.
46 ‘Komitmen ABRI Menyelamatkan Bangsa dan Negara’, editorial article by then Panglima Wiranto, 
Kompas 10 March 1999.
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Y es, at the end o f  it, it was learning by doing [com m ent in English]. And up until now  
the grey areas have not yet been resolved. A nd...w e have to struggle with this, the 
military, the police, the politician [com m ent in English].77
Widjojo’ key comment is “ learning by doing”, or we can suppose improvising and adapting 
to a fluid situation. Rather than analysing with the benefit o f  hindsight, this issue needs to 
be seen through the lens o f  the times. Under enormous pressure during a period o f  crisis, 
ABRI struggled to pioneer internal reforms. The separation o f  the police was one attractive 
reform article that was simple to execute and carried high visibility. There was public 
appeal for the idea, and the policy was welcomed by the police. As we shall see from the 
following discussion on the MPR debates, the TNI itself still believed at this time that 
during the transitional phase the military would continue to be involved in internal security 
missions for some time. Indeed given the general weakness o f  the police, the eruption o f  
various conflicts around Indonesia and A B RI’s own immense influence up to 1998, 
probably few army officers in 1998 could have conceived o f  a future where the military 
was not involved in domestic security affairs. In retrospect we may therefore speculate that 
the military’s initially sanguine attitude to the separation o f  the police may have 
unintentionally created a monster. This monster now dominates internal security at the 
military’s expense.
It is difficult to isolate precisely when the decision was taken to separate the police. Both 
Adang Daradjatun and Farouk Muhammed state that the key decision was made in early 
1999.48 Based on an internal police policy document given to me by Daradjatun it seems 
Polri and the Defence Department had a timeline for the separation. The document claims 
that the period from October 1998 to 31 March 1999 had been used to prepare the National 
Police to exit ABRI.49 Regardless as to when the decision was made, it transpired that on 1
47 As we will go on to discuss, the “grey area” Agus Widjojo refers to is the absence o f  legal principles that 
clearly delineate responsibilities between Polri and TNI in internal security. This is made worse, Widjojo 
suggests, by a culture within TNI which still claim s ownership over internal security. But as I argue w e  
observers o f  Indonesia must not confuse a lack o f  definitional clarity in law with contestation over roles on 
the ground. As Widjojo h im self pointed out in our interview, the military in the regions are today not involved 
in security management in any practical sense. Interview, Widjojo, April 2008.
4X Interview, Farouk Muhammed, September 2008. Interview, Daradjatun, September 2008.
40 Asrena Kapolri Mayor Jenderal Adang Daradjatun [on behalf of] Departmen Pertahanan Markas Besar 
Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia: Proses Reformasi Menuju Polri yang Profesional (12 Desember 
1999), p. 12.
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The partial separation from the armed forces in April 1999 propelled momentous internal 
changes in the police, but o f  most concern to this research is an important debate within the 
Defence Department over the future position o f  Polri and how police and TNI elements 
could support each other in a post-ABRI future. What this debate shows is that in 1999 
there was some - arguably not enough - thinking in defence circles as to what the police 
should ultimately become and what implications this had for the Indonesian military.51
The first debate within the Department o f  Defence concerned where the police should exist 
institutionally post-separation. In December 1999 the head o f  the police working group 
{pokja), Adang Daradjatun gave an address to the minister o f  defence and security (who in 
December 1999 was Juwono Sudarsono) on the progress o f  reforms in the Indonesian 
police and future directions for Polri. At this event Daradjatun produced three models for 
the future. One model was for the police to continue under the command o f  the Department 
o f  Defence. Another was for the police to be fully separated from the defence portfolio and 
placed under the minister o f  the interior. The final option, and the one Polri unsurprisingly 
supported, was for the police to be placed under the direct control o f  the President as an 
autonomous state agency.52 While the argument was not resolved here, Adang’s pokja 
stipulated that it continued to plan for an eventual complete separation with the defence and 
security ministry for “at the latest”, January 2001.53 From other sources it seems that this 
policy was the plan o f  the defence ministry all along. According to the long-time Minister 
o f  Defence Juwono Sudarsono, his department had decided in 1999 to remove the police 
from their control. However Sudarsono testifies that his preferred plan was for the police to 
become a part o f  the Ministry o f  the Interior.54 Thus even before parliament began to reflect 
on this issue, police headquarters and the Defence Department had agreed to make Polri
April 1999, the Indonesian police were removed from the armed forces and placed
(tem porarily) under the command o f  the Department o f Defence.50
50 ‘Polisi resmi mulai pisah dari A BR I’, Kompas 3 April 2000.
51 Proses Reformasi, pg.13.
52 Proses Reformasi, pg.9-10.
53 Proses Reformasi, p. 13.
54 Interview with Minister o f  Defence, April 27, 2008.
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totally separate from the defence portfolio, even though they had different views as to 
where Polri should ultimately end up.
During this period o f  flux when the police were not a part o f  the armed forces but had not 
yet left the Defence Department, doctrine did come to exist which regulated TNI assistance 
to the police; while this doctrine has almost certainly been superseded today it is a very 
important aspect o f  this analysis. Such old protocols demonstrate that the Indonesian 
government has thought about how to manage cooperation between the two most important 
parts o f  the national security apparatus. The essence o f  this old doctrine has also been 
carried on into the management o f  security in contemporary Indonesia - and the case study 
site o f  my research.
The document is an executive order o f  the Minister o f  Defence and Security titled ‘The 
Proper Method o f  Assistance o f  TNI Force Elements to Polri’ dated August 1999.55 This 
doctrine was part o f  a packet o f  regulations that originated from Farouk M uhammed’s 
working group in the Defence Department that was preparing Polri for complete 
separation.56 The document is no longer legally binding for the police, though it may still 
have some legal impact on the TNI. The document does not create a division o f  roles 
between Polri and the TNI but it does show that the police and the military did have a very 
clear set o f  ideas - to the point o f  being articulated in regulation - governing how the 
military could support the police. Looking at Annex B we can see that the defence minister 
gave very clear guidelines to uniform personnel. In the document we can see:
1. the criteria o f  threat that could prompt a police request for military assistance;
2. procedure for the police in making the request o f  assistance to TNI territorial 
forces;
3. who in the police can make such requests;
4. principles for how such military forces are to be utilised -  under direct police 
command (Bawah Kendali Operasi or BKO as it is termed);
55 Departmen Pertahanan Kemanan Indonesia: Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan /  Panglima TNI - Surat 
Keputusan N o. 920/M /VI 1/1999 tentang Tata Cara Bantuan Perkuatan Unsur TNI kepada Polri (2 August
1999).
56 Interview Farouk Muhammed, September 2008.
55
5. command and control arrangements for the joint force effort;
6. procedures for communication between the forces;
7. logistical arrangements and so on.
What is apparent then is that the defence leadership believed that if the military was to 
assist Polri in its duties under non-emergency conditions, such arrangements would have to 
be official, they would be decided on the basis o f  the police’s evaluation o f  the situation, 
the police would be in control o f  the military assistance force and the assistance would be 
terminated when the police had reasserted their control over the given security threat. 
Recalling that some commentators, like the ICG, have criticised Indonesia for failing to 
create modalities governing TNI-Polri joint operations, documents such as this in fact show
S7there was bureaucratic consensus about joint operations. While the document no longer 
binds Polri today, as we shall see in following chapters, the essence o f  this doctrine lives on 
in the way joint operations are practiced in my case study site. The principles o f  BKO, 
official letters o f  request, logistical support and so on still exists.
While from the beginning, the ABRI leadership desired to fully separate Polri from the 
defence community, the Defence Department did not have the legal authority to overturn 
parliamentary statutes such as the 1997 Police Law, which clearly placed the police within 
the Defence and Security Ministry.58 Therefore although the TN I’s own new paradigm 
pushed the police onto the national reform agenda, ultimately it was the Indonesian 
parliament which was responsible for the final position that Polri has today.
57 ICG, Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security, I.
In public addresses on the day o f  the police anniversary in April 1999 the then D efence and Security 
Minister Wiranto, made these sentiments well known. In interviews with one o f  Wiranto’s successors, 
Juwono Sudarsono, the minister indicated that during his first term as defence minister in 2000, it still 
continued to be the intention o f  the department to eventually release the police from the portfolio at som e 
future date. The department’s preferred model however was and is for Polri to be placed under the control o f  
another ministry. Departmen Pertahanan, Proses Reformasi Menuju Polri yang Profesional, p. 12. ‘Polisi 
Resmi Mulai Pisah dari ABRI: Stop Gaya Militer’, Kompas 3 April 1999. Interview, Minister o f  Defence, 27 
April 2008. Presentation, Minister o f  Defence, Australian National University, 27 March 2008.
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Full autonomy fo r the Indonesian Police -  the contributions o f the MPR
The final part o f  the separation was the removal o f  Polri from the Department o f  Defence 
and the repositioning o f  the police as an autonomous agency under the president. However, 
the question o f  where the Indonesian police should ultimately end up begged another 
important question: what roles should an autonomous police force perform in post-New 
Order Indonesia and how should the police divide their duties with the military? In the year 
2000, Indonesia’s then supreme law making council, the Majelis Permusyawarakatan 
Rakyat attempted to address these questions.59 What the MPR achieved was to establish a 
powerful normative directive for the substance o f  later parliamentary laws on defence and 
the police in 2002. This contribution was historically significant.
The MPR legislated on Polri and the TNI in its August 2000 session and produced two 
separate decrees, Decree VI on the ‘Separation o f  the Indonesian Defence Force from the 
National Police’ and Decree VII on ‘The Role o f  the Indonesian Defence Force and the 
National Police.’ These two decrees [reproduced at Annex C] were born out o f  the work o f  
one o f  three Ad-Hoc committees set up under the Badan Pekerja (or Working Group) o f  
the MPR.60 O f  most interest to this research is the work o f  Ad Hoc Committee II. Among a
59 In 2000 the MPR had the status o f  a supra-parliamentary body which could change the Indonesian 
constitution and interpret the constitution through the MPR’s own judgem ents {Ketetapan MPR or Tap MPR). 
In 2003 the MPR unilaterally chose to relinquish these powers. At the time the MPR revisited the legality o f  
all its previous recommendations. On the subject o f  TAP MPR VI and VII/2000, on Polri and the TNI, the 
MPR ruled these decrees will remain valid until the passage o f  parliamentary laws regarding the voting rights 
o f  soldiers and police. This has not yet occurred. This leaves one to assume, constitutionally, that TAP VI and 
VII remain in force. N evertheless the substance o f  much o f  the MPR’s intent in TAP VI and VII 2000 has 
already been embodied in two laws from 2002 on national defence and the national police. Republik 
Indonesia: Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Indonesia 1/2003, Pasal 4.
60 The Badan Pekerja was established after the MPR’s 1999 session to continue unfinished business from that 
meeting. During the 1999 session o f  the MPR there were approximately eleven issues which were not able to 
be “accommodated” during the scheduled sitting period. These eleven issues were handed to Badan Pekerja to 
debate. The job  o f  the Badan Pekerja steering comm ittee was to take these eleven issues and propose draft 
decrees and constitutional amendments on them, to be forwarded for general debate in the August 2000 MPR  
session. To do this, the steering committee was divided into three ad hoc committees. Ad Hoc Committee I 
was tasked with discussing proposed amendments to the Indonesian constitution. Ad Hoc comm ittee II was 
made responsible for discussing proposed decrees while Ad Hoc Committee III was tasked with discussing  
the MPR’s sitting agenda and budget. MPR, Risalah Rapat Ke-4 Badan Pekerja (25 Novem ber 1999), p .l 1. At 
this time these comm ittees were com posed almost exclusively o f  politicians -  Ad Hoc Committee II was 
made up o f  45 members who were also representatives o f  the DPR plus 8 non-elected representatives; three
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number o f  other draft decrees, Ad-Hoc Committee II was tasked with drafting a decree for 
“the role o f  the TNI in the Life o f  the State (Peran TNI dalam Kehidupan Kenegaraan) ”6] 
Over the course o f  the committee’s discussions this request would transform into Decrees 
VI and VII passed in 2000.
What makes Ad Hoc Committee II’s work on the TNI and Polri most interesting is that 
originally, the Indonesian police was not thought relevant to the draft decree under 
consideration. The Badan Pekerja originally handed Committee II the task o f  discussing 
“the role o f  the TNI in the life o f  the state.” Until late February 2000 the committee was 
busy discussing other parts o f  their agenda and did not directly debate the future o f  the 
military. On February 21 2000, Committee II began discussions on the TNI. Spontaneously 
within that meeting, the committee began to consider the need for reforms to both the TNI 
and the police. At that session the speaker desired to hear from an academic, Dr. Sacipto 
Rahardjo, a person noted for his expertise on the police. Complaints arose from the floor, 
notably the Deputy Speaker and members o f  Golkar, doubting the wisdom o f  including the 
police in the committee’s work. Ironically, the loudest voice urging Ad Hoc Committee II 
to make a ruling on Polri and the TNI came from the military’s own fractional 
representatives. One o f  them stated:
There is a problem for the TNI which is linked with Polri, sir. W e can take the exam ple 
concerning what is the role o f  the TNI and what is the role o f  Polri? Until now , there 
hasn’t been any agreem ent. Whether the TNI is for defence only and the police [are 
reserved only] for security. A lso  still there are many differences o f  o p in io n .... [this 
topic] cannot be divided one by one.63
The committee leadership henceforth decided to proceed with discussions on both Polri and 
the TNI.64 The point however is there was no deliberate intention at the beginning for the 
MPR to legislate on the police. Rather, the M PR’s decrees on the police came about a by­
product o f  reflections on how to reform the state’s defence functions.
from the TNI-Polri Fraction and 5 Functional Group representatives. MPR, Risalah Rapat Ke-5 Badan 
Pekerja (6 March 2000), p.5.
61 MPR, Risalah Rapat K.e-4 Badan Pekerja, p.2.
<’“ Risalah Rapat Ke-24 Pah II, Point. 73: Interruption by Golkar Fraction Drs. M. Yamin Tawary, p.22.
63 Risalah Rapat Ke-24 Pah II, Point.74 Interruption TNI/Polri Fraction: Budi Harsono, p.22.
64 Risalah Rapat Ke-24 Pah II, Point.75 M eeting Leader: Rambe Kamarulzaman, p.23.
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As with most MPR decrees, the Ketetapan that emerged from the 2000 session are not 
detailed or very specific. This has been the cause o f  some discussion. The ICG for one has 
questioned the vagueness o f  Decrees VI and VII, saying:
MPR D ecree V I/2000 on the Separation o f  the TNI and the Police o f  the Republic o f  
Indonesia mandates separation o f  the tw o bodies. Without attempting to define 
"defence" or "security", it clearly sp ecifies that the role o f  the military is defence, and 
the role o f  the police is maintenance o f  security, but it requires them to cooperate with  
and assist each other... MPR Decree V I1/2000 . . .  repeats that the military is an 
instrument o f  the state w hose primary role is d efen ce but adds that its principal task is 
to uphold national sovereignty, defend the boundaries o f  the Unitary Republic o f  
Indonesia, and "protect all Indonesians from threats and disturbances to the unity o f  the 
people and the country". This clearly im plies an internal security function.65
The ICG draws attention to the absence o f  precise definitions in some o f  the M PR’s key 
terms that describe the intended roles o f  the TNI and Polri. While it is true that these 
decrees are vague, the ICG infers that lack o f  clarity is identical with an intention by the 
MPR to retain domestic security responsibilities for the military. I argue however that the 
M PR’s intention was the precise opposite. Although this argument may seem convoluted, it 
is actually quite important. In the absence o f  judicial rulings, the intention o f  the drafters 
becomes the only guideline for how law should be interpreted. The notes o f  Ad-Hoc 
Committee II suggest that the drafters o f  TAP VI and VII believed it is inappropriate for the 
TNI to manage domestic security.
The consistent, consensus view within Ad Hoc Committee II was that the Indonesian 
military should be responsible for “defence” (a concept that includes upholding the 
‘sovereignty and territorial integrity o f  the Indonesian Republic’) while Polri should be 
responsible for “security” . But, as the ICG calls to our attention what these terms mean is 
not a mere exercise in semantics, but is critical to understanding what the Indonesian 
government expects its security services to do. Indeed there was strenuous debate on these 
very points within Committee II. What eventually emerged was a broad consensus that, for 
the Indonesian police, “security” was assumed to mean threats from within the state (in the 
Indonesian language this terminology is often referred to as “keamanan dan ketertiban 
m a sy a ra k a tsecurity and public order or its Indonesian acronym “Kamtibmas”). For the
65 ICG, Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security, p. 10.
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TNI “defence” -  and ‘upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity o f  the state’ -  was 
assumed to mean threats from outside the state. This becomes clear when we trace the 
debate.
Originally the TNI fraction on Ad Hoc Committee II was the most assertive in arguing for a 
wide interpretation o f  the proposed roles for the military. When the committee leadership 
opened the floor for opening addresses o f  the fractional representatives at the committee’s 
first hearing in February 2000, the political party representatives did not even mention the 
proposed decree on the TNI. The military’s fraction did, however. The TNI speaker argued:
TNI constitutes one o f  the nation’s com ponents which ow ns a defence and security  
function for overcom ing threats w hich em erge from developm ents in the strategic 
environm ent... with the jurisdiction o f  Polri in the area o f  security, this does not mean 
that TNI is freed from affairs related to K AM DAG RI [internal security] in certain 
conditions where the sovereignty o f  the state is threatened then TNI, in line with valid  
regulations... w ill appear for upholding sovereignty once again.66
Thus the military, from the very beginning opened the debate with a call for the TNI to 
maintain a strong presence in internal security. As the debate unfolded, the committee 
ultimately came to reject the TNI fraction’s views. At the stage o f  the First hearing 
however, the committee members were uncommitted on the future o f  TNI and Polri. 
Instead most o f  the debate was handed over to invited experts.
Interestingly at the first hearing stage, the calls o f  the military fraction to give the TNI a 
wide role in internal security were dealt a blow by someone within their own ranks -  the 
Chief o f  Staff for Territorial Affairs, Lt.Gen. Agus Widjojo; who appeared on behalf o f  the 
Panglima. Being by far the most erudite contributor to any o f  these debates Widjojo had a 
simple formula for how the MPR should separate functions between the police and defence 
forces. Widjojo argued, all disturbances o f  security within the state are violations o f  law, 
and should be dealt with by the police, while all threats that emerge from outside the 
country are matters o f  defence and should be dealt with by the military. On this basis 
internal security should be purely a police function. The only grey area would arise when
66 Risalah Rapat ke-25 Pah 11 (22 February 2000) Part 24. Speaker for the TNI/Polri Fraction: Mayjen TNI. 
Tayo Tarmadi p.21, 26.
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the police are incapable o f  handling a particular security problem. Then the question should 
become which authority should be allowed to declare a state o f  martial law -  a regional 
police commander, the regional head o f  government or someone else.67 While Widjojo did 
not propose any answers to these questions (and nor did the committee eventually consider 
them) Widjojo began the debate by clearly supporting the transfer o f  routine internal 
security functions to Polri.
Although the first hearing was just an airing o f  opinions and no consensus was reached, 
some o f  the ideas did penetrate the thinking o f  the committee. In its next update to the 
Badan Pekerja on March 6 2000, Ad Hoc Committee II decided that the repositioning o f  the 
National Police should be considered by the MPR in the August session. Secondly, 
Committee II decided: “the role o f  TNI/Polri needs to be divided, TNI has the task o f
z :o
protecting the sovereignty o f  the State, whilst Polri is in the kamtibmas sector.” Thus 
from the early stages o f  its deliberations there was a hardening o f  some assumptions within 
Ad Hoc Committee II about Polri and the TN I’s future functions. It seems that the 
committee came around to the idea relatively early that internal security matters or 
“kamtibmas” should be a matter reserved for the police.
During June 2000, Committee II finalised its draft decree on Polri and the TNI. On 5 June 
the Decree Formulation Team for TNI/Polri69 had already written up a draft decree on the 
TNI much o f  which was identical to what would later be passed by the MPR proper in 
August. Under the first draft, the team declared that the TNI, as the state’s primary tool o f  
defence, would be tasked with upholding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 
explanation, the chief o f  the drafting team stated “Now, TNI as a state defence tool has the 
main task o f  protecting all o f  the nation... from threats by other nations or states... 
therefore, in this passage the clarification o f  the Defence Force’s role is that it is mainly for 
facing external nations and states and other countries.”70 This proposition set off  a round o f
67 Risalah Rapat Ke-27 Badan Pekerja MPR Lanjutan (25 February 2000) Nara Sumber Kaster TNI: Agus 
W idjoyo. Pg 38.
68 Risalah Rapat Ke-5 Badan Pekerja MPR (6 March 2000), Kesimpulan Sementara PAH II, point 3. pg 19.
69 Ad Hoc Committee II created Draft Decree Teams (sub-com m ittees) to work on the language o f  its eleven  
draft decrees. These draft teams met outside the formal session times and forwarded their work for general 
debate within comm ittee. Their individual work is not recorded in the com m ittee’s meeting notes.
70 Risalah Rapat Ke-54 Badan Pekerja MPR (5 June), pg 3.
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debate. Some speakers favoured extracting the military from domestic security.71 Other 
speakers requested that the TNI be allowed to deploy in internal security operations under 
certain, emergency circumstances.72 A related, but different issue was whether the MPR 
should draft detailed decrees on military and police tasks and how the two forces could 
cooperate, or whether the MPR should make general statements o f  intent and pass the task
71
o f  filling in the detail to parliament. There were speakers for and against the argument. 
One o f  the Golkar members however, neatly summed up the problem at hand: the 
committee did not wish to create wording which defined the military out o f  all internal 
security problems (he gave an example o f  circumstances in which foreign powers may 
sponsor secessionist movements within Indonesia). On the other hand the committee did 
not wish to grant a domestic security responsibility which the TNI could manipulate.74 
Over the next several days o f  drafting, the committee came to accept this argument as the 
consensus view.
Over the next several meetings in early June, the argument as to whether the military 
should continue to maintain a role in internal security was abandoned, even by the military 
fractional representatives. Instead the military representatives turned the debate into one o f  
how the military should support the police during times o f  security crisis.7^  The committee 
even dismissed a compromise proposal by the military fraction to create specific clauses 
that would allow the military to assist Polri in emergency situations. A member o f  the 
decree drafting team - somewhat exasperatedly - responded to the TNI fraction by 
reminding them that in the Suharto era the defence-security functions (HANKAM NAS) of  
the military and the public-order and security functions (KAMTIBMAS) o f  the police had
71 I. Gde Subidya from PDIP, Risalah Rapat Ke-55 Badan Pekerja MPR (6 June 2000), Para.8, p.4
72 Speaker for the Golkar fraction, Immanuel Bluger. Risalah Rapat Ke-54 Badan Pekerja, Para.22, p. 12.
73 Speaker for PDIP Potsdam Hutasoit stated for exam ple his belief that the Decrees should not be written too 
strictly since it would be hard to amend in future. The TNI fraction strongly agreed with the argument. Golkar 
speaker Hajriyanto Thohari on the other hand, argued that given the importance o f  the issues at hand, it was 
best for the MPR to be very specific in its wording and intent. Risalah Rapat Ke-54 Badan Pekerja MPR (5 
June 2000), Para. 16 and 38, p.8, 16.
74 Speaker for the Functional Groups, Hamim Thohari, Risalah Rapat Ke-54 Badan Pekerja MPR (5 June
2000), Para. 18, p . l l .
75 One o f  the T N I’ speakers said thus: “about the problem o f  how to involve the TNI for assisting Polri, this 
becom es a problem which is really crucial now, the police want to be independent, indeed, but what about 
five years into the future... it’s possible they aren’t capable o f  doing that now, consequently the involvement 
o f  the TNI in overcoming problems within the state will becom e very necessary, [consider the] problems o f  
Poso, Ambon, and the lik e ...” Risalah Rapat Ke-57 Badan Pekerja MPR (8 June) Budi Harsono, point 55, 
Pg-18.
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been mixed in one institution, in a way that confused both. For that reason the committee 
decided to divide Polri and the TNI, giving the police responsibility for security and the 
TNI responsibility for defence. But:
in matters o f  defence and security and where they have a link in the prevention [o f  
threats to them], the Indonesian D efence Forces is able to cooperate and mutually 
assist the p o lice ... then concerning the sp ecifics o f  the TNI/Polri role what is intended 
with this decree w ill be regulated further in parliamentary law [U ndang-Undang].76
Thus what appears evident from these discussions is that Committee II did have a clear set 
o f  ideas on what the intended roles o f  the military and police should be: domestic security 
and external defence respectively. Although the committee realised that there may be a 
medium-term role for the TNI in assisting the police, they considered the job o f  the MPR 
terminated at permitting the two to cooperate -  further refinement o f  security assistance 
was a matter they intended to pass to the parliament. Nevertheless, we can interpret from 
the discussions that the committee did wish to limit the military’s internal security role to 
only one o f  support to the police. The committee did not intend, as the ICG stated, to allow 
the “territorial integrity and national sovereignty” clause to become a mandate for the 
military to operate within the realm o f  internal security. Arguably then, there is a strong 
normative, implied meaning within the M PR ’s decrees. The intention o f  the drafters was to 
remove from the military the capacity to administer domestic security as part o f  their 
normal activities. This responsibility was intended to be the domain o f  the police.
Repositioning Polri: national or regional police force?
Discussion o f  military and police roles was only one o f  the topics that occupied the drafting 
committee. Their conversations strayed over a wide variety o f  subjects, from cultural 
change within the forces to voting rights for TNI/Polri personnel. One o f  the other 
substantive issues which entered debate was where to place the military and the police after 
their final separation. For the TNI this issue was resolved without significant dissent, the
76 Risalah Rapat Ke-57 Badan Pekerja MPR, Speaker F-PDIP Permadi, p.19-20.
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commander o f  the military was placed under the control o f  the president.77 In regards to the 
police, the issue became one o f  intractable disagreement.
The heart o f  the debate was whether the police should be placed under the command o f  the 
president as an autonomous national agency or whether the police should be put under the 
control o f  the minister o f  the interior. The argument was intense. Those who supported the 
latter option stressed that if the police became subordinate to the interior minister, Polri 
would fall under the command o f  regional heads o f  government. This would force Polri to 
more closely integrate with the community and enhance democratic governance over the 
police. One member o f  the committee for example, stated such a proposal would assist the 
regional autonomy reforms passed in 1999:
If w e see our interests to the future, with the existence o f  regional autonomy and later 
[in a future scenario] where the police are placed underneath the Ministry o f  the 
Interior... the police in the regions w ill serve the regional governm ents, this w ill assist 
the governors.78
Other committee members viewed the same scenario differently. They claimed that such a 
policy would endanger sound governance over the security sector because, so it was 
believed, regional politicians would manipulate and politicise the police.79 This argument 
must be placed against the backdrop o f  the times. In 2000 Indonesia was beginning its 
experiment with democracy. The capacity o f  newly empowered, regional politicians to 
exercise competent control over a security apparatus like Polri was a legitimate question.
Debate dragged on through two meetings without resolution. These events were 
extraordinary given the consensus style o f  the meeting discussions. Eventually on 8 June 
2000 the committee leadership decided to pass the issue to the committee’s fractions to
77 To be correct, there was not as much debate over the future position o f  the TNI as there was over the police, 
but there was debate on governance arrangements for the TNI too. This did not occur over substantive issues 
however. There was general agreement that the president should exercise control over the military through the 
Panglima. However, committee members resisted the idea that the president could appoint and sack the head 
o f  the military independently. This debate was resolved by requiring the president to obtain the approval o f  
parliament on the tenure o f  the Panglima. Risalah Rapat Ke-54 Badan Pekerja MPR, 5 June 2000.
78 Risalah Rapat Ke-56 Badan Pekerja MPR (7 June 2000), Dr.Mochtar Naim (F-PBB), part,16.p.6.
79 Risalah Rapat Ke-56 Badan Pekerja MPR, H.Mutammimul Ula (Reform Party), article 28.p.9.
64
OA
resolve outside o f  formal meeting times. Over the next several weeks Ad Hoc committee
II moved on to other issues. The committee’s fractions reported back on 27 June 2000 that 
they were not able to achieve consensus. At a special drafting session held by Ad Hoc 
Committee II in the city o f  Bandung in mid-June the leadership o f  the parliamentary 
fractions (the direct superiors o f  the parliamentarians in the Ad Hoc Committee) had to be 
invited to achieve a final resolution. The contents o f  this Bandung meeting do not appear in 
Committee II’s notes. Instead it is only reported back that a decision was made at the
01
Bandung meetings that the best place for Polri was underneath the president. It can only 
be said therefore that back room debates among parliamentary leaders determined the 
eventual outcome o f  Indonesia’s current system o f  policing.82
Although the M PR’s debate over the position o f  the police has largely been forgotten by 
history, this argument over where to place Polri was highly consequential. The decision to 
reposition Polri as an autonomous agency underneath the head o f  state was, in effect, a 
conservative transition. The police institution was retained in more or less the same form 
and merely transferred from the minister o f  defence to the president. This decision has, 
however, sealed Polri’s rise as the most powerful security institution in Indonesia. The 
above debate was the closest that Indonesia came during reformasi to passing substantial
Ol
law enforcement powers to the regional governments. Though one could seriously argue 
whether transferring the police to the Ministry o f  the Interior would have constitutionally
80 Ad Hoc IPs leadership passed the debate over the future status o f  the police to the Formulating Team for 
Polri and the TNI. M eeting 57, Article 60. p.20
81 The Formulating Team stated that the parliamentary fractional leaders had decided that Polri should be 
under the office o f  the president. This ended the debate over whether Polri should be a national or a regional 
force. The Decree Formulation Team then proposed four models for how the Kapolri should be appointed. 
Through the progress o f  the meeting it was decided that the head o f  the force w ould be appointed by the 
president, with the agreement o f  the parliament, and a special police board would be set up to advise the 
president on police policy and the appointment/dismissal o f  the senior police commander. Meeting 63, 27 
June 2000, article 2. p.2.
82 Unfortunately I have not succeeded in tracking down the parliamentary leaders o f  the day for confirming 
the events o f  these meetings. I flag this issue as one that would benefit from future research.
83 My thanks to Dr. Michael M alley (a specialist on decentralisation reforms in Indonesia) for confirming this 
point. There was however, a som ewhat well known cabinet debate in 1999 in which B.J. Habibie considered 
remaking Polri as a provincially based force. In this meeting, the president was eventually convinced not to 
proceed with the idea. However it must be recalled that in 1997 the Indonesian parliament drafted a law 
explicitly declaring the police were a national force and part o f  ABRI. As Habibie never pushed his idea into 
a formal bill-drafting stage, the president did not alone have sufficient executive power to rescind a 
parliamentary law. The MPR did. I argue then that the event which requires most attention is the debate 
within the MPR. Interview, Farouk Muhammad, September 2008.
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had the intended consequence o f ‘regionalising’ the police, the M PR’s edicts did however 
settle the landscape in favour o f  the centre.
In effect there are three ubiquitous, hegemonic institutions that can claim to perform a 
security mission at the regional level: Polri, regional governments and the TNI. As has been 
argued and as I will continue below, military reform has rendered the TNI largely unable to 
operate in day-to-day security matters. As I will argue below, regional autonomy reforms in
1999 bolstered the law enforcement capabilities o f  district governments, but their powers 
are still much weaker than those o f  the police. By virtue o f  the fact that its closest 
competitor organisations are incapable o f  duplicating its functions, Polri has been handed 
the status o f  lead agency in internal security management. In this regard the M PR ’s 
decision takes on a new light. The MPR inadvertently allowed the creation o f  a centralised, 
security leviathan, with integrated units that stretch from the national level right down to 
the village. This leviathan is now answerable only to the president and its own hierarchy 
and has the lead role in security management across the length and breadth o f  the 
archipelago.84
Conclusions about the separation process
Looking back at all the data presented above we can come to a final set o f  conclusions 
about the meaning o f  the separation o f  the police and the Indonesian military. Separating
84 As a footnote to this issue, in a journal article published in Contemporary Southeast Asia, I attributed the 
credit for the final separation o f  Polri to President Abdurrahman Wahid. In July 2000 Wahid promulgated an 
executive order putting the police underneath his own command. According to Farouk Muhammad, this order 
was legally invalid (because the president does not have executive authority to defeat a higher law) and in any 
case was superseded by the decision o f  the MPR in August 2000. In the same article I made the argument that 
Indonesia’s security laws are not clear on the issue o f  Polri/TNI roles and cooperation. On reflection this 
argument is only true in part. Indonesia’s security laws are indeed not very detailed. Yet at the time (not 
having access to the MPR’s meeting notes) I overlooked the powerful normative, implicit message in the 
M PR’s decrees to restrict TNI involvem ent in internal security. I also overlooked the fact Indonesia’s security 
laws also have strong political checks which solidify the role o f  the president in approving TNI deployments. 
As I w ill argue this executive authority, acts as a type o f  barrier that prevents TNI from independently 
managing dom estic security. I take the opportunity in this thesis to correct my previous arguments. Interview, 
Farouk, September 2008. Republik Indonesia: Keputusan Presiden 89/2000 tentang Kedudukan Kepolisian 
Republik Indonesia, July 2000. The article referred to: David Jansen ‘Relations among Security and Law 
Enforcement Institutions.’ Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 30, N o. 3 (2008), pp. 429 -54 .
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Polri from the armed forces unleashed powerful questions: which actor should perform 
what mission? Where should the police end up? How should Indonesia’s two principal 
security forces cooperate? Although the M PR’s drafting committee may not have provided 
detailed answers to all o f  these questions, it did answer the most critical aspects and 
provided powerful, normative guidance for the remainder. The MPR divided the two 
institutions and clearly determined that the police would remain a national body, directly 
responsible to the head o f  state. The MPR also indicated a clear intent to make the 
Indonesian police the primary force in security management within the state, while on the 
other hand the MPR redefined the job description o f  the TNI as external defence. Though 
the MPR did not define its intent in as many words, there is nevertheless a very strong, 
normative implied message to that effect. This message was one which directed and limited 
the Indonesian parliament when passing more detailed statutes on defence, the police and 
TNI in 2002 and 2004. On the question o f  cooperation the Defence Department did have an 
idea, which was transformed into doctrine, as to how the Indonesian police could call upon 
military assistance for managing internal security. Such assistance could be provided to the 
police, under police control and at police request.
The post-2000 period: laws on National Defence, Defence Forces and the Police
There are at least two possible rebuttals to the above arguments. The MPR may have 
implied its intent in 2000 but the Indonesian parliament has subsequently passed its own 
security statutes. Is it not possible that these security laws could have carved out a bigger 
role for the TNI in domestic security?85 Secondly, even if law defines jurisdiction between 
Polri and the TNI, it is commonly assumed that regional military forces are highly 
autonomous from central control. Is it not possible that defence forces in the regions merely 
ignore Jakarta’s intentions and act as a law unto themselves?86 These two propositions are 
worth consideration but I maintain it is difficult to sustain them.
s> The ICG imply that this was an intent o f  the military when drafting the controversial TNI Law in 2004.
ICG, Rethinking Internal Security Strategy, 11-12.
S(> Leonard Sebastian, among others, has implied as much when for example he says: “TNI headquarters’ 
control over troops in the field remains extraordinarily weak.” Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology, 336.
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Taking Indonesia’s post-2000 laws on the military - Law 3/2002 on National Defence and 
Law 34/2004 on the TNI - while these laws expand upon the M PR’s decrees, they do not 
contradict the MPR either. The Defence Law o f  2002 for example, aside from repeating the 
M PR’s declaration that the Indonesian military has a role in defending the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity o f  the Indonesian Republic, also states:
The Indonesian D efence Force has the task o f  executing state defence policy for :
a. D efending sovereignty and territorial integrity;
b. Protecting the dignity and safety o f  the nation;
c. Executing Military Operations other than War.87
By itself the above quotation may imply a role in internal security, especially the vague 
concept o f  ‘military operations other than war.’ But in the same law however, the 
parliament also declared:
The state defence system  when facing non-military threats places governm ent 
institutions outside the defence sector as the main elem ent, sufficient with the shape 
and character o f  the threat which is faced.88
What the parliament intended therefore was for security problems with a non-military 
character to be handled by other state agencies. On its surface this provision would limit the 
TN I’s ability to handle non-military threats within the state.
Arguably though, the following piece o f  legislation, the TNI Law o f  2004 clearly strayed 
from the intentions o f  the M PR ’s decrees. Under its provisions:
[the] TNI, as a tool o f  state defence, functions as;
a. an instrument o f  prevention [penangkal] towards every type o f  military threat and 
armed threat from outside and within the state towards the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and safety o f  the nation;
b. an instrument o f  response [penindak] towards every type o f  threat as intended in 
section 1(a) above; and
87 Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang 3/2002 tentang Pertahanan Negara, Pasal 10 (3).
88 UU 3/2002, Pasal 7 (3).
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c. an instrument o f  recovery [pemulih] towards the state’s security condition which is 
disrupted as a consequence o f  a security instability.89
Under this law, the Indonesian parliament arguably embellished upon the intentions o f  the 
MPR and the 2002 defence law, by defining all armed threats (both state and non-state) that 
originate from within the borders o f  Indonesia or outside o f  it, as threats which fall under 
the jurisdiction o f  the TNI. By the literal letter o f  the law, this statute does expand the role 
o f  the TNI to explicitly include security responsibilities within the state. Under this law it is 
indeed legitimate for the Indonesian military to handle internal security threats o f  an armed 
or military type. This edict is not inconsistent with the letter o f  the M PR’s decrees but it 
does embellish, if not challenge, the normative spirit.
We cannot terminate the analysis here though and assume that the TNI have resurrected a 
role in internal security, as parliamentary statutes do place severe restrictions on how 
military force can be employed. In the same 2004 law, the Indonesian parliament declared 
that only the president has the authority to operationally deploy TNI forces. To do this the 
president requires the approval o f  parliament.90 The consequence o f  this principle is that no 
uniformed officer in the defence forces has the actual authority to use force without 
government approval. Decisions to deploy military personnel in security operations are 
exceedingly rare in contemporary Indonesia. Indeed we find only a handful o f  examples 
where this has occurred after 2000: one example being the state o f  civil emergency 
declared over North Maluku and Maluku in 2001-2003 and the state o f  military and civil 
emergency declared in Aceh in 2000 and 2003.91 By contrast the Indonesian police have 
been granted permanent discretionary power to handle security everywhere, at all times.
8<) Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang 34/2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Pasal 6.
90 UU 34/2004, Pasal 17-18.
01 See: Keputusan Presiden Nomor 88/2000 tentang Keadaan Darurat Sipil di Propinsi Maluku dan Propinsi 
Maluku Utara. For Aceh see: Keputusan Presiden Nom or 28/2003 tentang Pernyataan Keadaan Bahaya 
dengan Tingkatan Keadaan Darurat Militer di Aceh. According to Indonesian internal security laws,
Indonesia has a four staged security posture (which the president may declare either in one locality or 
nationally): normal conditions, civil emergency, military emergency and all out war. Each stage triggers a 
different command hierarchy for threat management. Under normal conditions the police form the first line o f  
response to any instability with the military lending assistance as needed; under a civil emergency the 
regional head o f  government takes charge supported by the security forces; under a military emergency the 
military takes control o f  all o f  the government apparatus in the area/s o f  the emergency; w hile in a war 
situation the president assumes command o f  the war effort, exercising his or her orders through the head o f  
the military (Panglima). States o f  emergency however are very rare.Undang-undang Nomor 23/1959 tentang 
Keadaan Bahaya and Lembaran Undang-undang Nom or 52/1960.
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Therefore no parliamentary statute since 2000 has attempted to contradict the intentions o f  
the MPR; the Indonesian military is still not capable on its own volition o f  executing 
internal security functions, this decision is a prerogative o f  the president. Whenever the 
president does not authorise such force, the police remain the primary manager o f  domestic 
security.
Discussion o f  law and political intent runs into complications when we consider the 
problems o f  governance in Indonesia; it is possible that the military - or parts thereof - may 
choose to ignore the intent o f  the central government. Scholars have long described the 
Indonesian military as being highly autonomous from civilian politicians. “ It is reasonable 
to speculate that if the military does not accept civilian supremacy then they may not accept 
boundaries on their operational freedom. The evidence suggests however that the TN I’s 
own interpretation o f  its role is in line with security legislation.
The highest authority on defence force policy whom I have interviewed is the former 
minister o f  defence, Juwono Sudarsono and the minister clearly believes that his former 
department’s interpretation o f  the military’s lawful role is one that virtually rules out a 
practical, day-to-day role in internal security. When discussing the meaning o f  the M PR ’s 
decrees for his department the minister has claimed:
the w ording o f  TA P MPR 6 and 7 w as unfortunate because it gave the im pression that 
these tw o things, defence and security, were totally separate... “pertahanan” as only  
defence [that is] external threat and “keamanan” was mainly -  not only -  dom estic  
security. So w e talked about “keamaman kecir [sm all security], with a sm all k, that is 
the p olice function including dalam negeri [security within the state] within the rubric 
o f  security, what w e call now  hom eland security, which is kamtibmas, which is public 
order and security, penegakkan hukum, the rule o f  law, and perlindungan masyarakat, 
protecting society. This is the accepted version o f  what constitutes dom estic security. 
Within this the TNI was out o f  bounds, in formal terms. I w ould have preferred Tap 6 
and 7 to say the main task o f  dom estic security w as done by the police, and the main 
task o f  external defence w as done by the military but that these tw o w ould overlap in 
certain grey areas... to say pertahanan hanya ini [defence is only this], is com pletely  
unrealistic. But, that w as part o f  the political correctness o f  the tim e ... keamanan kecil 
itu contrast dengan keamanan besar, keamanan besar is kedaulatan, keutuhan wilayah 
[small security i f  contrasted with big security, big security is sovereignty and territorial 
integrity] - this is the big definition... So the TNI has this largely external survival 
guarantor o f  security [role] . ..  kalau ada terorisme itu masalah polisi dan masuk
1)2 Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology, 365. Mietzner, ‘Politics o f  Military Reform’, 63.
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pengadilan [but] ada masalah survival of the state /th is is for the TNiy. [ if  there is 
terrorism, that is a police problem and it goes to the courts, but if  the problem is one o f  
survival o f  the state (that is one for TN I)].93
What we see in this quotation is the Defence Department’s assumption that the Indonesian 
parliament has - incorrectly so the minister thinks - limited the military to a role o f  guarding 
the survival o f  the state. Everything short o f  this constitutes “keamanan kecir  or a problem 
which should be handled by the police. The Minister reinforces these ideas once again 
when discussing how the police and the military cooperate today:
there is, there is an understanding, what w e call BK O, bawah kendali operasi, 
particularly in what w e call keadaan tertib sipil [orderly civil conditions], that includes 
Papua, A ceh. What w e have now  in formal legal terms is the rules o f  engagem ent o f  
BK.O, bawah kendali operasi, the Governor, the Bupati and the police would m ainly be 
in charge, in com m and o f  security. Sewaktu-waktu di bawah kendali tentara bisa 
masuk. [from tim e to tim e, underneath [the civil power] the defence forces can 
participate]...[in  response to the question o f  the interviewer: Tetapi di bawah 
pengendalian polisi? [but under the com m and o f  the p o lic e ? ] .. .Ya. Di bawah 
pengendalian polisi [yes, underneath police com m an d ]... But it really depends on  
which province, which township, whether things can work that w ay.94
Again the minister’s statement supports the assumption that the military’s New Order 
mandate for internal security has now been removed and passed to the police. The military 
can support the police, but they do so under police command, in line with the original 
doctrine passed in 1999.
The minister is a political appointee who under Indonesia’s criticised defence laws does not 
actually command the military; one could argue that the minister cannot speak for 
uniformed defence personnel. It is possible that their view o f  TNI involvement in internal 
security is different. If  we cross reference the minister’s opinion with former army generals 
such as Agus Widjojo who as the Chief o f  Staff for the Territorial Command in 2000 
negotiated reforms to territorial activities. Widjojo’s view o f  the TN I’s current role in 
internal security accords with that o f  the minister.
At the tim e I becam e the K ASTER [C h ief o f  S ta ff for Territorial A ffairs], at the tim e  
there em erged the N ew  Paradigm part 2. I desired to place TNI underneath dem ocratic
93 Interview, Minister o f  D efence Prof. Juwono Sudarsono, 27 May 2008.
94 Interview, Juwono Sudarsono, May 2008.
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principles. TNI can be placed wherever, in whatever capacity in whatever form, that is 
all valid. So long as it is consistent with law. Because law gives the function of defence 
to the TNI... But [in what we do] we must continuously defend 
[,mempertanggungjawabkan] that this is a defence function. But if not, then it is not 
valid. Except if a region is declared to be in a state of military or civil emergency...
Now we see, actually in times of peace, the territorial command, babinsa, koramil and 
kodim, do not have any authority whatsoever in the regions. They do not capture 
thieves, they don’t reconnoitre subversives, they cannot mobilise the local population 
for implementing government programs. There isn’t any authority for that. They do not 
function in intelligence, and what they do also doesn’t connect with the statements of 
state officials, “TNI in the regions acts as intelligence agents” - how? Statements like 
that are bom from the pride of the old era, today they [territorial TNI forces] can’t do 
anything, it’s a waste of resources,95
Thus the judgement o f  the military’s former highest ranking territorial officer is that the 
Indonesian armed forces in the regions may not perform security operations, unless under 
conditions o f  national emergency. While observers have claimed the military still has an 
unreformed mindset in which many officers conceive o f  themselves as guardians o f  internal 
security,96 this should not be taken to imply the military actually believes they may act as 
they wish in support o f  internal security objectives. The testimony o f  Juwono Sudarsono 
and Agus Widjojo suggest the TNI does not consider it lawful for their personnel to 
conduct repressive activities without political approval.
It must be conceded however that Widjojo was an architect o f  the military’s reform 
process, it is entirely possible therefore that his testimony is biased. Yet when we examine 
how the military responds to security crises in Indonesia today, Widjojo’s opinion is not at 
all different to that o f  the current Indonesian military leadership. Take for example some of  
the most recent incidences o f  political violence in Indonesia: attacks by the Papuan
Q7
Liberation Organisation in the aftermath o f  Indonesia’s 2009 legislative elections. In this 
episode an armed, self-avowed separatist movement launched violent attacks to disrupt a
Interview, Widjojo, April 2008.
96 Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology, 378-379, 380.
97 According to media reports, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) launched coordinated attacks in 
Jayapura, Abepura and other places in Papua around 8 April 2009. These actions were timed to coincide with 
the 2009 legislative elections. The attacks were small in scale and, i f  anything, illustrate the weakness o f  the 
OPM rather than its strength. Nevertheless a sub-district police station was attacked, the Rectory o f  
Cenderawasih University in Jayapura was burned down, five non-Papuan transmigrants were stabbed, a 
tanker carrying fuel was set alight and bombs set o ff  in the border area with Papua N ew  Guinea. ‘ Aksi 
Serangan dan Peledakan di Papua M enjelang Pemilu’, ‘Polsek Abepura Diserang’, ‘Rektorat Uncen 
Terbakar’, ‘Bandara Udara Sentani Tetap Siaga I’, ‘Widodo: Tindak Tegas Pelakunya’, Sinar Indonesia Baru,
10 April 2009.
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peaceful, democratic election. Surely such an incident, which gives the military ample 
propaganda ammunition on an issue deeply sensitive for the TNI, would be enough to push 
the military into a repressive crackdown? Yet despite the military being offered such an 
open invitation to discharge an internal security operation, the military leadership did not 
exploit the opportunity. When asked by the press, according to the Chief o f  the Defence 
Force Djoko Santoso, the TNI handed the entire episode over to the police:
W e [TNI] prioritise [mengedepankan] the use o f  soft power. Y es, certainly the 
response w ill be in line with the appropriate legal corridor, that is police action ... N o  
there w ill not be [military operations -  in response to the question o f  a journalist, 
“w o n ’t there be a military operation for capturing the suspects?]98
The most logical conclusion to make o f  the Panglima’s response is to view it in light o f  the 
evidence already presented. The Indonesian military leadership did not order their forces in 
Papua to respond with force because TNI was not permitted to do so. TNI operations are 
constrained under a definition o f  security which delegates internal security responsibilities 
to the police unless the president and parliament instruct otherwise.
Yet my line o f  argumentation has thus far leant heavily upon official attitudes from 
policymakers in Jakarta. It is plausible to suppose that far away from the central military 
leadership, disobedient parts o f  the territorial command may act like a law unto themselves 
in the regions. This illustrates the value o f  performing local level case studies.
In my research on how the police and the TNI behave in Yogyakarta, I found that the 
defence leadership’s interpretation o f  the role o f  the military in day-to-day internal security 
is understood and applied by TNI in the regions. In an interview with officers o f  the 
Yogyakarta Military Resort Command (Korem) 072 Pamungkas it was apparent that the 
army territorial personnel in my case study site did not believe they possess a mandate to 
enforce security. At one very strained meeting, three low middle-ranking officers, the head 
o f  intelligence for the Korem, the head o f  operations and the head o f  territorial forces, gave 
formal, on-the-record responses in an interview. At this meeting, I put a simple, direct
1)8 Panglima TNI Djoko Santoso quoted in ‘Panglima TNI: Tak Ada Operasi Militer’, Detiknews.com, 9 April 
2009. Available from: < http://ww w.detiknew s.eom /read/2009/04/09/l 80442/1113370/10/panglima-tni-tak- 
ada-operasi-militer> Accessed 10 July 2009.
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question to the officers: could the Korem deploy its personnel to manage day-to-day 
security problems? The officers replied they could not. Authority to deploy their personnel 
comes from their senior regional commander (the Pangdam), who could only release 
personnel for routine security operations based upon a written request received from the 
regional police command. Such personnel are placed under police command for the 
duration o f  an agreed operation." These are the exact BKO principles described previously.
I have located no evidence in any o f  the other interviews or documentary research I have 
done in Yogyakarta which would suggest this Korem is at all active in internal security; the 
exceptions to this conclusion are intelligence gathering and providing support to the police. 
We therefore see a continuity in the testimony o f  elite policymakers at the national level 
and subordinate officers at the operational level. These sources agree with one another that 
it is illegitimate for TNI forces to conduct repressive security operations without permission 
from civilian powers.
I am however aware o f  the difficulty o f  extrapolating broad conclusions from a single case 
study, the statements o f  officers in one Korem in Yogyakarta are unlikely to convince 
sceptical observers about trends in the rest o f  Indonesia. The last best method o f  
confirmation is to use Indonesia’s online regional media to substantiate my premise that the
• • • inoIndonesian military is not actively involved in day-to-day security. It is conceded this is
an imperfect form o f  research. It is difficult to find Indonesian regional media which have
websites which support this kind data gathering. But with the tools I have available I have
searched the online archives o f  three regional newspapers: the Tribun Timur (a Kompas
Group affiliated newspaper from South Sulawesi), the Tribun Kaltim (another Kompas
Group newspaper for Eastern Kalimantan) and the Lampung Post (affiliated with Media
Indonesia Group). Searching through their online databases for as long as there are records,
I collected articles which contained the keywords “TNI” and “Operasi” . I read through the
results to identify local news stories which would indicate TNI territorial commands were
independently deploying their troops in internal security operations in the areas covered by
99 Interview: Kasi Intelijen Mayor Suwarno, Kasi Teritorial Mayor Jawa Heru dan Kasi Operasi Nurodin, 
Korem 072, 30 June 2008.
100 As I explain in chapter two, I originally planned to execute comparative studies in other parts o f  Indonesia. 
A comparative studies would have helped to strengthen my core findings. Unfortunately time and money was 
scarce. Performing a comprehensive, single case study was the best I could reasonably achieve.
74
the newspapers. From the information available not a single story emerged which shows a 
military led, internal security operation.101 It stands to reason that if the Indonesian defence 
force was active in enforcing domestic security, there would be at least a handful of  
examples in these regional media. Yet not a single story existed to support that assumption. 
Therefore if we can extrapolate a conclusion from this evidence, regional TNI forces in 
these random areas o f  Indonesia have it seems followed the wishes o f  the civilian 
government and returned to their barracks.
I have made this analysis in painstaking detail for a very important reason: I argue that 
studies o f  security in Indonesia remain dominated by studies o f  the military, and this
scholarly tendency needs to be reassessed. There are good reasons why Indonesian area
i • • • • • 10'? • studies have historically allocated so much attention to the military. For thirty two years
the military was the repressive arm o f  the Suharto dictatorship and enjoyed a privileged role
in society because o f  it. The turbulence o f  the early post-reformasi period invited a number
o f  provocative questions as to what extent the TNI could continue to be a state within a
state. Yet such questions are arguably out o f  place in the Indonesia o f  today. The greatest
asset the TNI possessed which rendered a privileged status to the military was its role in
intervening in Indonesian society for security purposes. This section has laid out the
argument for why this power no longer exists. Any suggestion that the Indonesian military
101 In the case o f  the Lampung Post, fifteen articles came up over the period August 2004 -  July 2009. Three 
were stories o f  local TNI activities, and one o f  these concerned a combined operation held by military police 
with Polri to search for illegal weapons (N .B  the Post website only provides key word searches o f  the entire 
content o f  its archives). In the case of Tribun Kaltim, ten articles came up, regrettably only over the very short 
time period o f  October 2008 -  March 2009 (presumably the Tribun does not electronically archive its news). 
There were three stories o f  local TNI activities, the only one o f  note concerned the deployment o f  four army 
battalions to the border areas o f  Kalimantan. Finally the Tribun Timur provided 114 hits over a time frame o f  
at least February 2009 to August 2006. Summaries o f  about eighty stories were available from the Tribun 
website. O f these eighty stories, at least tw elve were local news. O f these tw elve, four could not be verified  
(as the web links were inactive), and eight others did not provide any information on TNI internal security 
operations. Many o f  these articles had to be searched from old cache pages filed on the internet. For 
verification purposes, I have retained records o f  these searches.
102 In purely quantitative terms there is a significantly greater degree o f  interest in studies o f  the Indonesian 
military as opposed to the police. In Annex D, I have reproduced som e o f  the results o f  my database searches 
o f  existing material on studies o f  security in Indonesia. Depending by which measure w e use, Annex D 
show s there are between three and two times more manuscripts on the Indonesian military than on the 
Indonesian police. These, however, are merely quantitative results. In qualitative terms the difference is 
incomparable. Most books on the Indonesian police (both in Indonesian and English) com e from either 
Indonesian police headquarters or from the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia. They are written 
by a small group o f  elites (many being former Indonesian police officers) mostly for policy purposes and 
appeal to a narrow audience. By comparison, there is a rich literature o f  scholarly, policy and other analyses 
on the Indonesian military, not directly dependent on the funding o f  NGOs or the Indonesian state.
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is systematically, continuously intervening in internal security across the length and breadth 
o f  contemporary Indonesia in operations o f  its own making, is without basis in evidence.
This is not to overlook the possibility that evidence may arise in future which casts doubt 
upon my argument. Perhaps in isolated parts o f  Indonesia or particular regions there are 
local TNI forces performing active security operations. Future case studies o f  local security 
would do much to develop this picture. I would caution us though to place any future 
research in context. Today there are mountains o f  evidence to show the National Police are 
in both policy and practice, the primary internal security organisation in Indonesia. It 
therefore begs a question: why do scholars still talk so much about the military, which does 
so little, while the Indonesian police, which does so much, is comparatively overlooked?
My argument thus far reveals an important reality about security in Indonesia today: the 
star o f  the Indonesian military has fallen and the star o f  the police has risen. The MPR 
achieved an important historical feat in 2000. By separating the police from the Department 
o f  Defence and making Polri an autonomous national agency, the MPR made the police the 
most powerful and important security actor in Indonesia. The weight o f  all the evidence o f  
the next five chapters supports this argument.
Decentralisation and the Empowerment o f  the Polisi Pamong Praia
After such a lengthy discussion o f  the police-military separation process we finally come to 
the other important part o f  the picture, the implications o f  the 1999 decentralisation reforms 
for regional security. Although regional government (pemerintah daerah or pemda) have 
been involved in law enforcement for a long time, for the most part it was weak and 
ineffective. Decentralisation did not significantly expand the enforcement powers of 
regional governments, but it did strengthen their enforcement capacity. This has lead to a 
dramatic increase in the effectiveness and efficiency o f  sub-national policing.
76
When we discuss law enforcement in a regional government context we refer to units 
known as the Polisi Pamong Praja (Pol.PP or civil service police). The Pol.PP are 
uniformed enforcement personnel who are responsible for executing sub-national 
government ordinances. The actual investigation o f  regulatory violation is performed by 
personnel known as Penyidik Pegawai Negri Sipil (or civil service investigators, PPNS). 
PPNS are bureaucrats who are licensed to investigate and charge people with violations o f  
specific sectoral laws. They exist in the regional government environment but are also 
found in many different sectors in the Indonesian state -  like the Immigration Service, the 
Tax Office and forestry agencies to name a few. The story o f  regional government policing 
is a story o f  how decentralisation reforms have taken this weak and overlooked part o f  the 
regional government apparatus and turned them into one o f  the most important elements o f  
regional security.
What follows is a historical account o f  the civil service police, from their pre-independence 
origins through to their final evolution in the Suharto era. We then look at how the 
decentralisation reforms o f  1999 strengthened the enforcement capabilities o f  regional 
government, particularly by transferring Pol.PP personnel from the sub-district to the 
district level o f  government. Finally we examine how these legal changes led to increased 
activities on the part o f  regional government policing agencies in Yogyakarta after 1999.
The Civil Service Police in the pre-independence, post-independence and Suharto 
eras
The Polisi Pamong Praja have a long history, albeit as an only minor part o f  the
government apparatus. Their origins predate the Indonesian Republic and go back to the
bailluw o f  the Dutch East India Company and much later, to the various police units o f  the
• 1Dutch colonial government. The Special Province o f  Yogyakarta was the first province 
to revive these security units in 1948, during the disorganisation o f  the revolutionary
l(b Eric M.F. Dajoh and Suwiryo Ismail, Polisi Pamong Praja: Hari Ini dan Esok (Jakarta: Kantor Kentraman 
dan Ketertiban Pemerintah DKI Jakarta, 1997) 5-6.
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period. After the establishment o f  the Indonesian Republic, the interior minister in 1950 
mandated the creation o f  “Kesatuan Polisi Pamong Praja” for every sub-dictrict 
(Kecamatan or Kapanewon at that time) in the territory o f  Madura and Java. At this time 
such units were limited to a maximum o f  eleven personnel consisting o f  one chief, five 
police agents and five support personnel. In the year 1960 the then minister o f  the interior 
and regional autonomy expanded the Polisi Pamong Praja, permitting provincial 
governments outside Java and Madura to form their own Kesatuan.]04 From its inception to 
the present, the purpose o f  the civil service police has remained essentially the same: to 
enforce regional government ordinances relating to “public order” (ketertiban umum). 
Regional governments have historically exercised these powers through regulating things 
such as the use o f  public and private spaces (like the construction o f  buildings) and 
eliminating vice (like prostitution and the trade in illegal alcohol).105
When Indonesia first experimented with decentralisation in 1974, the civil service police 
obtained formal legitimacy but certain features o f  the law hindered the Pol.PP from 
implementing their mandate -  o f  particular note was the relegation o f  the civil service 
police to the sub-district. The 1974 law on decentralisation formally granted regional heads 
o f  government (in the provinces and districts) the responsibility for managing the public 
order and tranquillity o f  their territories.106 The central government did not follow this 
statute with promised peraturan pemerintah (or central government regulations) which 
would have provided guidance on jurisdiction and clarified the division o f  responsibilities 
between the civil service police and Polri.107
Perhaps the greatest weakness with the 1974 legislation for the civil service police was that 
it continued the relegation o f  the Pol.PP to the sub-district level o f  government. As some 
o f  my interviewees revealed, this decision to retain the Pol.PP at the sub-district level was a 
major strategic limitation on their effectiveness. In the Indonesian governmental system the 
sub-district is a purely functional part o f  the bureaucratic administration. The sub-district is
104 Dajoh and Ismail, Polisi Pamong Praja, 7.
105 Dajoh and Ismail, Hari Ini dan Esok, 5 -7
106 Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang 5/1974 tentang Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan di Daerah, Pasal 81.
107 UU 5/1974, Pasal 81, 86. A lso Dajoh and Ismail, Polisi Pamong Praja, pp. 7 -1 0 , 2 5 -2 6
108 UU N o.5/1974, Pasal 86.
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a bureaucracy which acts as the district government’s service point for a number o f  
villages. The kecamatan answers directly to the head o f  the district. The fact that the civil 
service police were split up among the kecamatan meant that their productivity was entirely 
dependent on the direction o f  the head o f  the sub-district (the Camat). There was minimal 
oversight from the district governments and the system was prone to corruption and 
administrative failures. To use a simple illustration, former chiefs o f  the kecamatan Pol.PP 
in the city o f  Yogyakarta have told me that they did not even bother to attempt to process 
violations o f  local government ordinances {peraturan daerah or perda) legally -  since they 
did not have administrative relations with the court system. Instead they mostly handled 
violations o f  perda through discussion, and at times intimidation.109 One o f  my 
interviewees claimed that, prior to 1999 the Pol.PP had been considered one o f  the 
“dumping grounds” o f  the public service, where uneducated, rough bureaucrats could be 
deposited. He implied that, because the Pol.PP had few legal resources at the time, force 
had been one o f  their primary instruments.110
Finally, the civil service police had always been a small, under resourced part o f  regional 
government. Even in the self-proclaimed largest Pol.PP force in Indonesia - the Capital 
City Province o f  Jakarta - the numbers o f  personnel were tiny. In 1995 there were only 753 
civil service police for the entire city, giving Jakarta a Pol.PP to population ratio o f  
1:13,750.'11 For much o f  Indonesia’s history therefore the Pol.PP has been a small and 
impotent part o f  the local government apparatus.
Indonesia’s ‘big bang’ decentralisation reforms o f  1999 did two things which strengthened 
the capacity o f  regional government to enforce ordinances: the reforms changed the 
position o f  the civil service police in the government apparatus while granting much 
broader powers to provincial and especially district administrations. The first o f  these 
changes came about through Article 120 o f  Law No. 22/1999 which gave districts and
109 Interview, Kepala Bagian Tata Usaha, Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta and former Kepala (Mantri) 
Kesatuan Polisi Pamong Praja Kecamantan, Murtihardjo, 16 April 2008. Interview, Kepala Seksi 
Pengendalian Operasi Dinas Ketertiban Kota and former Kepala (Mantri) Kesatuan Polisi Pamong Praja 
Kecamatan Norwidi, 9 April 2008.
110 Interview with Kepala Kantor Pol.PP and former Kepala (Mantri) Kesatuan Polisi Pamong Praja 
Kecamatan, Kabupaten Bantul, R.M. Kandiawan, 29 October 2007
111 Dajoh and Ismail, Polisi Pamong Praja, p. 38
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provinces the authority to operate their own Pol.PP detachments. This gave regional heads 
o f  government greater opportunities to fully utilize the Pol.PP as regional law enforcers.112 
The second factor was the way in which the decentralisation program enhanced regional 
government itself. This influence was subtle but powerful. One o f  the heads o f  the Pol.PP 
offices in Yogyakarta, whose period as a Pol.PP agent spans both the pre and post 1999 era, 
argues that the net effect o f  all the powers that decentralisation handed to district 
governments was to “strengthen the voice o f  the Bupati.” 113 He argues because 
decentralisation gave district governments great powers over a wide variety o f  policy areas 
- from service delivery to public works - the districts became a lot bolder in making 
regulations and setting policy. As regional government became more active in setting 
policy it needed also to become more active in enforcing its ordinances.114 In turn, this 
entailed a stronger Pol.PP and PPNS.
Thus, while provincial and district leaders have great autonomy for setting policy and are 
now able to field large, specialised regulatory agencies, the decentralisation laws did not 
actually change regional government’s powers o f  law enforcement. Governors and district 
heads still continue to be responsible for ‘upholding public order’, just as they were under 
the 1974 law.115 Today, as in the past, regional governments have applied the normative 
definition o f  public order to mean tackling vice and enforcing licensing regulations. So 
although the 1999 decentralisation laws did not add powers to local governments, what the 
laws served to do was to open the opportunity for regional government to become much 
more active in making and upholding local laws.
It is clear that local government enforcement in my case study site dramatically increased in 
the years after 1999. Using the city district o f  Yogyakarta as the first example, prior to 
1999, there were fourteen local ordinances in the city o f  Yogyakarta which carried some 
form o f  penalty. These fourteen regulations had been accumulated over almost half a 
century o f  the city’s existence. After 1999 the number o f  laws which carried some form o f
112 Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang 22/1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, pasal 120. This law has been 
renewed with Undang-Undang 32/2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, Pasal 148.
113 Interview, Kandiawan, October 2007.
114 Kristiansen and Trijono, ‘Local Government Reforms in Indonesia’, 251.
115 U U /22 1999, Pasal 43, (f).
80
sanction skyrocketed, with the government passing thirty six new ordinances between 1999 
and 2008.1,6 Similarly, the productivity o f  the civil service in upholding these laws also 
increased dramatically. In the period from March 1998 to April 1999 for example - two 
years before the formation o f  this district’s special enforcement agency, the Dinas 
Ketertiban (or Public Order Bureau) - there were 1 16 activities involving investigations by 
PPNS o f  the city district. Over the same period in 1999/2000 that number was 197. In 2002, 
the year after the formation o f  the Dinas Ketertiban, there were 1523 investigations by 
PPNS, increasing to 1585 in 2003, 2096 in 2004, 2842 in 2005 and 1592 in 2006.117 Taking 
the district o f  Bantul as the second example, after 1998 the district government in Bantul 
dramatically stepped up law enforcement. Only three perda existed before 2000 which were 
enforced by the PPNS o f  that kabupaten. After 2000 a total o f  thirty one Perda were created 
which carry some form o f  penalty.118 At the provincial level meanwhile, since 1999 the 
government has added fourteen new misdemeanour offences to its list o f  ordinances, 
compared to the eight existing offences prior to 1999.119
We can see therefore that a revolution in regulation has been taking place at the sub­
national level. Large areas o f  social life previously untouched by government control, or 
otherwise imperfectly supervised are now being increasingly regulated by the provincial 
and especially the district governments. To give an idea o f  the scope o f  these regulations, 
the city o f  Yogyakarta has fifty two criminal ordinances, twenty relate to the collection o f  
revenue, twenty four others concern the licensing o f  particular types o f  enterprise or 
activity (such as licensing construction, regulating street trading and public parking, etc.), 
while other miscellaneous statutes control the sale o f  alcohol, govern water quality and 
regulate registration on the civil list (catatan sipil), among other things. Clearly this 
explosion in regulatory activity indicates just how aggressively regional governments have
11(1 Dinas Ketertiban Kotamadya Yogyakarta: Daftar Isi Peraturan Daerah Kota Yogyakarta yang Mengandung 
Sanksi Pidana (undated but collected April 2008).
117 Bagian Hukum Kotamadya Yogyakarta: ‘Rekapitulasi Hasil Operasi Terpadu PPNS Kota Yogyakarta: 
Bulan April 1998 S.D. Maret 1999 Tahun Anggaran 1998/1999’ & ‘Rekapitulasi Hasil Operasi Terpadu 
PPNS Kota Yogyakarta: Bulan April 1990 S.D. Maret 2000 Tahun Anggaran 1999/2000’. Dinas Ketertiban 
Kotamadya Yogyakarta: ‘Hasil Kegiatan Penegakan [sic] Perda Kota Yogyakarta Tahun 2002, 2003, 2004,
2005, 2006 .’
IIS Kantor Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja Kabupaten Bantul: Daftar Perda Yang Menjadi Dasar Hukum Dalam 
Penegakan Peraturan Daerah Seksi Gakda Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja (2007).
119 Dinas Ketertiban Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta: Perda-Perda Propinsi DIY (February 2008).
120 Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakakarta: Daftar Peraturan yang Mengandung Sanksi (2008?)
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begun to impose their mandate for public order. In the post-reformasi period this trend has 
elevated regional government to be perhaps the second greatest source o f  law enforcement 
after the Indonesian police.
Yet despite the flowering o f  regional regulation, local government ordinances carry much 
less weight than offences under the national criminal code. Under Indonesia’s regional 
autonomy law, local government regulations which carry a sanction and which invoke the 
regional government mandate for “public order”, have the status o f  a misdemeanour (or 
tindak pidana ringan). A misdemeanour carries a maximum punishment o f  six months 
imprisonment or Rp.50 million fine (approximately US$5,500).121 Thus the law 
enforcement powers o f  the regional governments are not approximate to the criminal 
statutes o f  the central government. The districts and provinces are therefore incapable o f  
duplicating the powers o f  the police.
The weak position o f  regional government law enforcement is further complicated by the 
fact that a number o f  offences (especially related to vice) also fall within the responsibility 
o f  the Indonesian police. Polri’s area o f  criminal investigative authority is determined by
• • • 199the Indonesian criminal code, the KUHP (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana). 
Within the KUHP there are a number o f  sections which deal with particular classes o f  vice, 
like prostitution and “ indecent behaviour” {perbuatan cabul). Local government ordinances
19^  •are not permitted to contradict the national laws. Perda also cannot supererogate vice 
crimes within the KUHP. An example o f  this is gambling, which is classed as a pure crime 
to be investigated by the police.124 Prostitution and ‘indecent behaviour’ on the other hand 
are complex issues. The KUHP does not forbid prostitution but it does forbid ‘pimping’ or 
deriving “profit from the immoral acts o f  women.” The KUHP also forbids the running o f
19S
brothels. As I will discuss in chapter four, prostitution in public places is dealt with in
121 UU 32/2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, Pasal 143(2).
122 The KUHP constitutes Indonesia’s first and most comprehensive crimes statute. Under the principles o f  
Indonesian jurisprudence the powers, investigation procedure and trial procedure for the police, prosecutors 
and law courts is based on a separate law, Undang-Undang 8/1981 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana (or the 
KUHAP). Other miscellaneous laws (such as Law N o.22/1997 on Narcotics) also separately delegate 
responsibilities to the police for distinct classes o f  crime.
123 UU 32/2004, Pasal 136 (2).
1-4 Republik Indonesia: Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP), Pasal 303.
125 KUHP, Pasal 296, 506.
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Yogyakarta under perda. In offences such as prostitution, where the police are responsible 
for part o f  an offence and local government is responsible for another aspect o f  the same 
offence, generally my research finds the avoidance o f  duplicated authorities.126 A large 
number o f  miscellaneous vice crimes also enter the KUHP like holding rowdy public 
events without police permission or impersonating a medical professional, among other 
unusual crimes. Yet a number o f  other vice crimes are not dealt with by the national 
criminal code, one prominent example being the illegal alcohol trade, which in Yogyakarta 
is controlled by local laws. Thus peraturan dearah on public order generally operate in the 
area where the national criminal code does not.
In summary, although the powers o f  local government over ‘public order’ have long been 
recognised in Indonesian law, it is only with the passage o f  the 1999 decentralisation 
statutes that the central government has encouraged the regions to exploit their limited 
policing powers. Although regional governments remain confined to policing relatively 
minor areas like licensing and vice, we can nevertheless detect a major increase in 
enforcement activity in Yogyakarta after the passage o f  the regional autonomy laws. It is 
safe to assume that other regions probably experienced much similar changes. This 
indicates that regional government does occupy a small but important position within sub­
national policing networks.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided an historical discussion o f  the national legal and political events 
which contributed to the current division o f  roles between the police, military and regional 
government. The post-1999 period has witnessed the rise o f  the Indonesian police and to a 
lesser extent the rise o f  regional government as important security players. The
12(1 In the case o f  the city o f  Yogyakarta for example, I find that the district police and the district Pol.PP hold 
combined operations in which police pool their authority to enter private places (suspected brothels), while  
the Pol.PP apply their perda granted powers to arrest suspects in public places. Field Observation, Combined 
Operation between Dinas Ketertiban, City o f  Yogyakarta and police o f  Poltabes Kota Yogyakarta, 25 July 
2007.
127 KUHP, Pasal 510 and 512a. See also the broader section on Pelanggaran Ketertiban Umum, Bab.II.
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demilitarisation o f  regional government in the early reformasi period constitutes a powerful 
explanation for why the role o f  the once significant Indonesian military appears to have 
declined sharply in domestic security. Yet the demilitarisation o f  regional government 
constitutes only a partial explanation o f  the shifting distribution o f  power. The other part o f  
the equation has been the separation o f  Polri from the armed forces. Prior to the separation, 
the army exercised suzerainty over the police. The institutional separation put an end to this 
relationship o f  domination.
Despite strong perceptions to the contrary 1 argue that the separation o f  Polri from TNI has 
resulted in an almost complete removal o f  the military from the world o f  active, day-to-day 
security. The separation process was put on the ABRI agenda during the crisis o f  reformasi. 
Although the process was rushed, the defence and police leadership produced some very 
important policy on structural separation and protocols for police-military cooperation. 
Although some scholars argue the Indonesian government should codify regulations for 
interagency cooperation, I argue that the police and military today still retain very 
important agreements over Polri-TNI joint operations from the pre-separation period.
The most meaningful part o f  the separation process was the debate in the MPR over 
Polri/TNI reform in 2000. This debate, and the security statutes which emanated from it, 
created the contemporary roles o f  the police and the military. These laws dictate that the 
police is the primary instrument o f  domestic security and the military is not permitted to 
involve itself in this area without political approval. The defence leadership respects these 
normative legal constraints. The net consequence o f  these policies has been the 
empowerment o f  the police within domestic security at the expense o f  the military.
Section three provided an overview o f  the Pol.PP. Although the lineage o f  the Pol.PP 
extends at least until the early years o f  the Indonesian Republic, for many decades the civil 
service police were an under-resourced, feeble part o f  the law enforcement apparatus. Until 
the transition period, the Pol.PP were retained at the lower levels o f  the civilian 
administration. With decentralisation, the provincial and in particular district governments, 
were given grander regulatory powers. With the granting o f  these powers, the districts and 
provinces also obtained control over the Pol.PP and began using these instruments more
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efficiently. Nevertheless the law enforcement capability o f  regional governments place 
them in a poor second place to the police. In the case study site today however, 
decentralisation has made regional government the second most important source o f  law 
enforcement behind Polri.
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Chapter 2: Introducing the Yogyakarta Case Study Site
This chapter introduces the case study site. Part o f  its purpose is to argue that a single, 
regional case study can make important contributions to studies o f  networked security in 
Indonesia. In making this case, 1 will explain how Yogyakarta was selected for this 
research. 1 will then describe the value o f  case study methodology for answering my 
original questions and consider potential objections to the relevance o f  Yogyakarta, as a 
case study site, for interpreting security trends in broader Indonesia. In brief, I argue that 
the rich, qualitative data that emerges from a single case study project makes this form o f  
research both justifiable and valuable, even for its purely empirical benefits. I argue that the 
case study site does have a good degree o f  generalisability for trends in other parts o f  
Indonesia. This is based in part on the jurisdictions o f  the state security actors found within 
the study site. After laying out this case we then move on to an examination o f  the region o f  
Yogyakarta, looking at its main social, economic, political and security features.
The largest part o f  this chapter however, consists o f  an analysis o f  the major public security 
organisations in the Yogyakarta region: their size, jurisdiction and a broad overview o f  their 
activities. The intention here is to peel back the onion once again, moving down from the 
level o f  Yogyakarta as a single unit to reveal the main elements o f  the regional security 
network as individual actors. In this chapter, I only consider state security organisations. 
My justification for doing so is that these governmental actors are large and complex in 
their own right. As such, the government security organisations deserve the longest 
introduction. Non-state security groupings (such as commercial security companies or 
neighbourhood watch groups) tend to be smaller, single issue organisations, and easier to 
describe. Therefore I postpone a discussion o f  these groupings until their respective 
chapters, five and six.
The amount o f  space devoted to each o f  the state security organisations below is 
proportional to their importance in regional security. I examine first the provincial police 
command (Polda DIY) and its sub-units. I then evaluate regional government law
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enforcement agencies. Regional government possesses both generalist enforcement 
agencies for upholding ordinances (civil service police) as well as certain specialist 
agencies (such as the regional Forestry and Transportation Bureaus). I then look at the 
miscellaneous cluster o f  national government organisations which play small, sectorally 
specific roles in law enforcement. The agencies I include in this research are the 
Yogyakarta army territorial command and national Tax and Immigration Offices. It is 
important to point out that this list is not intended to be exhaustive. There are several state 
agencies involved in regional policing which have not been included in this study due to 
obstacles encountered in research. 1 What this research aims to do is to provide the most 
comprehensive analysis o f  the many groupings involved in the regional security network, 
under the conditions encountered.
The data presented in this chapter leads to two main conclusions. Firstly, a single 
qualitative, in-depth, case study o f  Yogyakarta is valuable. This is not only because such 
research provides new empirical data for studies o f  security in Indonesia but also because 
the results are potentially generalisable. Secondly, when compared to the functions and 
powers o f  other state security agencies, the Indonesian police clearly emerges as a 
metaphorical giant among the pygmies.
1 There are at least another three public agencies which perform som e kind o f  policing function that I was not 
able to include in this study -  the State Prosecutors (or Kejaksaan), the Customs Service (or Bea Cukai), and 
the Indonesian Railways Corporation (w ho administer special rail police). When I requested data from these 
bureaucracies I encountered som e o f  the common obstacles o f  field research. To illustrate I explain using the 
example o f  the Kejaksaan. The Indonesian state prosecutors are actually able to investigate corruption 
through a com plex loophole in Indonesian anti-corruption laws [UU N o .3 1/1999 tentang Pemberantasan 
Tindak Pidana Korupsi and its antecedent UU N o.20 2001, see ‘Untuk Korupsi: KUHAP Perlu Diterobos’, 
Kompas 15 December 2003]. I approached the provincial state prosecutors (or Kejaksaan Tinggi) with an 
interview request on this topic. Although having both national and regional government research permission 
the Kejaksaan Tinggi decided that it was necessary for me to obtain the direct permission o f  the Attorney 
General (Kejaksaan Agung). The red tape and waiting time involved in this process rendered the requirement 
simply im possible. This type o f  response was common, but thankfully not universal, during my research. In 
any case, simple practical problems such as this have meant that it has not been possible to provide a holistic 
overview o f  all policing/security actors in the case study. Instead what I have attempted is to analyse a 
representative sample o f  security organisations.
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Yogyakarta as a Case Study and Its Contribution to the Study o f  Security Networks in 
Indonesia
I originally did not conceive o f  Yogyakarta as an ideal setting for the study o f  security 
cooperation. In fact 1 originally chose it for precisely the opposite reason. Nevertheless I 
believe I can make a defensible argument that Yogyakarta does have value for 
understanding security management in Indonesia. I believe we can extrapolate broad 
conclusions about how security networks may operate elsewhere in Indonesia on the basis 
o f  my findings from Yogyakarta. I must stress ,however, that the primary intention o f  this 
dissertation is to execute a detailed, qualitative analysis o f  a single case study. Ultimately I 
justify this dissertation for its qualitative richness rather than the capacity to generalise my 
findings.
I picked Yogyakarta initially on the basis o f  a hypothesis that proved to be incorrect. As 
explained in the introduction, existing literature on security management in Indonesia 
emphasises the dysfunctionality o f  the sector. This same literature shaped the direction of 
my pre-fieldwork research. Before initiating field research, I developed the hypothesis that 
relations among public security institutions in Indonesia must be poor. I therefore saw 
Yogyakarta as an ideal environment for testing this hypothesis through the ‘falsification 
principle.’ Originally I chose Yogyakarta because it was an area with a small economy and 
a stable security environment. Both these factors at first glance suggest that there are not 
much external stimuli in the security environment which would cause security actors to 
compete (either for direct material benefit or for expanding their area o f  professional 
responsibility through ‘turf wars’). 2 The almost universally negative conclusions o f  the
' We will find that, with som e exception in chapters four and five, I do not make references to the influence o f  
corruption or the black economy on relations between security actors. Although I originally intended to 
include this topic in my research, what seem ed easy in the safe confines o f  my office proved hard in practice. 
In reality 1 found little evidence that the black econom y is a source o f  competition between security actors in 
Yogyakarta. I have found evidence to suggest corruption can prevent cooperation, yet illegal rackets do not 
appear to be causes o f  actual conflict. One hypothetical reason for this finding, at least according to one o f  my 
journalist contacts, is that the police and TNI in Yogyakarta have mutually divided certain territories, thus 
avoiding competition over ownership o f  protection rackets. Yet this same journalist also described how  
difficult it is to research corruption. This source even conceded he had no reliable proof for his claim
existing literature led to my original thinking. On this basis I assumed that if relations 
between security forces were bad in Yogyakarta then this was likely to be the case in other 
parts o f  Indonesia. As it turned out, this hypothesis proved wrong. On the contrary, 
institutional cooperation and divisions o f  labour between security actors were relatively 
positive. Part o f  the aim o f  this thesis therefore is to explain why my original hypothesis 
was wrong while reflecting on the other significant finding o f  my research, namely that the 
Indonesian police is dominant in the sector.
An initial criticism of  a dissertation o f  this kind may be to question the value o f  a single, 
regional case study. I argue that the empirical benefit o f  accumulating original, pioneering 
knowledge from research o f  this kind, is justification enough o f  its value. According to 
such an argument the value o f  single case study research lies in its ability to produce 
qualitatively rich data that exposes the complexity o f  the issues that lie within the case. 
What is important according to this proposition is the case study itself, rather than its 
potential for generalisability: “ In [the] qualitative case study, we seek greater understanding
o f  X, [“X” represents the topic o f  the case study research] its embeddedness and interaction
• i • • 'l within its contexts.”
There is, however, vigorous debate within academia as to what the true value o f  case study 
research is. Others make the argument that the primary intent o f  case study research should 
be to produce conclusions which hold comparative relevance across a given field o f  
research.4 This assumption is however, contestable. Bent Flyvbjerg has made a very
[Interview, freelance local journalist Puguh Windawaran, 21 May 2007]. Herein lies the nub o f  the problem. 
Although I spoke with a number o f  informants who made accusations o f  police corruption (such as: former 
boss gangster “Gun Jack”, Interviewed 19 July 2007, and civil society activist Muh Zuhdan, Interviewed 9 
May 2008) all but a few spoke in vague generalities and could only share hearsay evidence. In my experience 
corruption in the security sector is very difficult to research and even harder to prove with any reliability. I 
made a pragmatic decision therefore to not pursue this line o f  inquiry. I have incorporated evidence o f  
corruption where I collect it (e.g. in chapter six in the section on youth gangs). I have asked about corruption 
where appropriate (e.g. in chapter five concerning the payments made by hotels, etc. to the police). I have not, 
however, made corruption a specific focus o f  this dissertation since 1. I have not com e across much evidence 
to show that it meaningfully impacts security relations (where I find the data I discuss it) and 2. I made a 
pragmatic judgem ent it was best to spend my time searching for data I had a good chance o f  obtaining (on 
joint operations, etc.) than on data I might never get due to its extreme sensitivity.
' Robert E. Stake, The Art o f Case Study Research (Sage Publications: 1995), p. 16.
4 John Gerring ‘What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
98, No. 2, (May, 2004), p. 341-354. Gerring’s argument is much more com plex than I explain, but his 
working definition o f  case study research does assume that there is an intention to infer information “across
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passionate defence o f  case studies in general and single case studies in particular. Although 
his argument is too detailed to reproduce here, in opening his defence he argues that 
context-independent facts (or the realm o f  analytical theory so he deems it) can only bring 
the student to a beginner’s level o f  knowledge on any given subject. But context-dependent 
knowledge and experience (such as that found from the analysis o f  case-studies) produces a 
much higher level o f  understanding^ Flyvbjerg reproduces an eloquent statement from Hans 
Eysenck to illustrate his meaning: “ sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and 
look carefully at individual cases— not in the hope o f  proving anything, but rather in the 
hope o f  learning something!”6 Therefore, my first justification for executing this single case 
study is because it is a powerful way for us to form original knowledge about the practice 
o f  security management at the sub-national level. Such information is difficult to duplicate 
in shorter periods o f  fieldwork in multiple places.
Quite apart, however, from the solely academic justifications for the selection o f  the case 
study site, there were also simple, practical reasons that determined Yogyakarta would be 
the site o f  my research. A dominant consideration was simply time. This research began in 
May 2007 and terminated in December 2008. In total, 15 months was spent in the field. 1 
made a conservative but realistic assessment half-way into the research task that it would be 
impractical to consider incorporating additional, comparative case studies into the 
dissertation. This had been my original goal, but given the time necessary to process 
official permission, build contacts, relocate my office and do other things, comparative
units” or infer generalisable conclusions across the topic. A s such he does lay out the premise o f  som e within 
academia that case study research must have comparative usefulness.
5 As he puts it: “For researchers, the closeness o f the case study to real-life situations and its multiple wealth 
of details are important in two respects. First, it is important for the development o f a nuanced view of reality, 
including the view that human behavior cannot be meaningfully understood as simply the nde governed acts 
found at the lowest levels o f the learning process and in much theory... If researchers wish to develop their 
own skills to a high level, then concrete, context-dependent experience is just as central for them as to 
professionals learning any other specific skills. Concrete experiences can be achieved via continued 
proximity to the studied reality and via feedback from those under study... The second main point in 
connection with the learning process is that there does not and probably cannot exist predictive theory in 
social science. Social science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory and, thus, 
has in the final instance nothing else to offer than concrete, context-dependent knowledge. And the case study 
is especially well suited to produce this knowledge. ” W hile I am not certain 1 share Flyberg’s pessimism  
about predictive theory within the social sciences, I do support his argument for the qualitative value o f  case 
study research. See: Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research.’ Qualitative 
Inquiry, Vol. 12, N o.2 (April 2006), 223.
6 H.J. Eysenck, ‘Introduction.’ In: H. J. Eysenck (Ed.), Case Studies in Behaviour Therapy (London: 
Routledge, 1976), p. 1-15. Reproduced in: Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings’, 224.
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cases became impractical. My original selection o f  Yogyakarta was also based upon 
personal reasons. I completed six months o f  language training in Yogyakarta during the last 
half o f  2006. This period enabled me to build contacts with people in the non-government 
sector and the academic world. These people became my initial contacts when I began my 
research proper in 2007.
There are also unique comparative advantages to doing research in Yogyakarta. As will be 
discussed below Yogyakarta is a university city. As such it is relatively open to researchers 
in general and foreign researchers in particular. Every year, literally thousands o f  
Indonesian social science students in Yogyakarta undertake their final year undergraduate 
research project, or skripsi as it is termed. Many choose topics on governance related areas. 
Because o f  this, the Yogyakarta regional bureaucracy is accustomed to receiving students 
armed with letters o f  recommendation, much like I. In a country such as Indonesia with a 
highly bureaucratic culture o f  administration and recalling that this topic is one that is 
sensitive for the Indonesian state, Yogyakarta’s added advantage in being an environment 
where officials were accustomed to academic research became another argument in its 
favour. Thus for practical reasons, Yogyakarta became the location o f  choice for this 
research. When judging the academic value o f  my thesis therefore we must weigh up any 
doubts we may have over the comparative usefulness o f  the case study against the value o f  
the original data. In the final calculation I argue it is better for the research to be completed 
in qualitative depth rather than not to have been done at all.
Is Yogyakarta an Abnormal Region?
While the strength o f  this research lies foremost in its analysis o f  the relations within the 
case study, I also argue that findings from Yogyakarta can be useful for deriving 
conclusions about networked security in other parts o f  Indonesia. If we could construct an 
artificial “average” province in a country as diverse as Indonesia, then Yogyakarta would 
not be that far outside the average, at least in statistical terms. In making this argument I am
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cognisant o f  common perceptions that Yogyakarta is an exceptional province due to unique 
aspects o f  its culture and politics.7 The thesis does have merit when we consider the role o f  
the sultan in local politics and other topics. I propose, however, when it comes to security 
management, there is much more that is “average” about Yogyakarta than exceptional.
There is a common perception in Indonesia that Yogyakarta is an exceptionally peaceful 
region. Comparative crime data from police headquarters (Markas Besar or Mabes Polri) 
though calls the view into question. The data in Annex E shows that during 2003-2006, 
Yogyakarta had the twentieth highest rate o f  reported crime (per head o f  population) among 
Indonesia’s thirty one provinces. This puts Yogyakarta in the middle third o f  Indonesia’s 
provinces, at the bottom o f  the middle but in the middle nevertheless. Yogyakarta also has, 
unexpectedly, the second highest rate o f  crime among the provinces o f  Java. While there 
are weaknesses with these statistics,8 these reported rates o f  crime are the most reliable 
comparative measure o f  the condition o f  insecurity across Indonesia. This data set does 
demonstrate that Yogyakarta is not an insecurity-free utopia.
Another argument for the exceptionality o f  Yogyakarta concern special features o f  the 
province’s governance and culture. As Sutoro Eko argues, there are three features o f  
Yogyakarta which make it different to all other parts o f  Indonesia: its unusual system o f  
land title, its high Javanese culture and its hereditary governorship.9 All three issues are 
linked with the special role o f  the sultan/governor o f  Yogyakarta. The present province o f  
Yogyakarta consists o f  two kingdoms o f  the Dutch colonial era -  the small princedom the 
Kadipaten o f  Pakualaman and its suzerain, the Kasultanan o f Yogyakarta. During the 
revolutionary period, these royal households agreed to enter into the contemporary state o f  
Indonesia. As recognition o f  their patriotism (and uniqueness) the Indonesian government
7 Despite the iconoclastic title, the follow ing text does an excellent job o f  discussing the special features o f  
Yogyakarta and presenting them as issues for political reform: Abdur Rozaki and Titok Hariyanto (ed), 
Membongkar Mitos Keistimewaan Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2003), see especially Pendahuluan 
p .1-12.
8 Firstly, this data set does not distinguish between types o f  crime. Kalimantan Timur for exam ple may have a 
lot o f  violent crime hidden in its figures, w hile Yogyakarta may have more light offences like theft. Secondly, 
these figures depend upon the w illingness o f  citizens to report crime. So, it may be that citizens in Jakarta for 
example are more w illing to report crime than citizens in Aceh. Although these factors temper accuracy o f  
this data, this source is still one o f  the only pieces o f  comparative data on crime trends across Indonesia.
9 By mention o f  land title, Sutoro refers to the fact that much o f  Yogyakarta’s land is actually owned by the 
sultan. Sutoro Eko ‘Membuat Keistimewaan Lebih Istimewa.Tn: Rozaki and Hariyanto, Membongkar Mitos 
Keistimewaan Yogyakarta, XXV.
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has passed a series o f  laws granting hereditary executive leadership to the families o f  the 
sultan o f  Yogyakarta and Paku Alam. Since the early period o f  the Indonesian republic 
therefore, the sultans o f  Yogyakarta (Sri Sultan IX and X) have assumed the office o f  
governor.10 Underpinning the political reality that the sultan occupies both a royal post as 
well as that o f  the head o f  regional government, is a very strong cultural reverence that the 
original residents o f  Yogyakarta have for the sultan. It is usual for the sultan’s decisions to 
be received without question. In effect, it is the sultan who sets Yogyakarta apart from the 
rest o f  Indonesia.
Although the sultan/governor has powerful normative authority, we must question to what 
extent such authority makes security management in Yogyakarta different to the rest o f  
Indonesia. I argue the sultan has limited influence on the security landscape. In formal 
political terms, the sultan’s powers as governor are no different to the rest o f  Indonesia’s 
other thirty two provincial heads. In terms o f  his normative powers, the sultan usually 
exercises his special moral authority only in the resolution o f  conflict. The most famous 
example o f  this comes from the rioting which shook Indonesia during the fall o f  President 
Suharto. While the nearby city o f  Solo suffered severe rampages, in May 1998 the sultan 
appealed to massive numbers o f  protestors taking to the streets o f  Yogyakarta and asked 
them to avoid violence. For the most part, Yogyakartans obeyed.11 Despite this 
extraordinary influence any conflict must be very serious, protracted and intractable for the 
sultan to be moved to intervene. Such examples o f  direct appeals by the sultan are very 
rare. No such action took place during my time in Yogyakarta. For every incident in which 
the sultan chooses to take part there are uninterrupted years where demonstrations, strikes, 
murders, robberies and other routine problems occur without his intervention. It is the 
management o f  security that takes place around the ordinary, day-to-day, week-to-week
1(1 Rozaki and Hariyanto, Membongkar Mitos, 26-28. Further clarified in UU 5/1974 and UU 22/1999  
penjelasan pasal 122. Though somewhat controversially U U .N o.32/2004, pasal 226 provides that Yogyakarta 
will be treated like any other province, meaning its hereditary governorship would end with the sultan’s last 
term as governor. In 2009, largely for political reasons, the president decided to extend the sultan’s term as 
governor. In any case this incompatability between Yogyakarta’s hereditary royalty and Indonesia’s modern 
democracy will probably be resolved sooner or later. ‘Sultan Tak Permasalahkan Perpanjangan Jabatan 
Gubernur’, Detiknews.com, 6 October 2008.
11 See for example: Wasi Ismoyo, S.P. Sumitro, Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono X: Bersikap bukan karena 
Ambisi (Yogyakarta: B igraf Publishing, 1998).
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calendar that is o f  most interest to this research. During such times the sultan does not take 
direct interest.
There are also some features o f  security management in Yogyakarta which are very likely 
to be similar to security management in the rest o f  Indonesia. One o f  the core findings o f  
this research is that there is a relatively clear division o f  labour between government 
security actors. This division o f  labour is dependent upon boundaries imposed by law and 
regulation which it can be argued is applicable across Indonesia, not just in Yogyakarta. 
The most generalisable set o f  security actors are the national government institutions which 
operate in the regions. The police, the TNI, the immigration service, the customs office, the 
state prosecutors, tax inspectors etc. are all highly centralised institutions operating on 
national laws and doctrine which are determined by their respective headquarters in Jakarta 
and by the Indonesian government. As such, many aspects o f  the work practices o f  these 
institutions in Yogyakarta are likely to be present beyond the case study as well. But such 
standardisation is not uniformly true o f  all actors. Regional autonomy empowers provincial
and district governments to draft their own policies in key domains. Even so, national laws
12and regulations establish the limits o f  regional government’s law enforcement powers. 
Thus the national legal parameters on the behaviour o f  law enforcement organisations 
within regional government, is the same across Indonesia. Even if we selectively refer to 
some o f  the non-government security elements - like the commercial security sector, 
community oriented policing forums, and the ronda siskamling - chapters five and six 
demonstrate that the police regulate and supervise each o f  these groupings. This police 
management strategy is likely to be applied outside the territory o f  Polda DIY, as it is 
determined by policy established in national police headquarters.
While it is acknowledged that further comparative research is required to determine the 
relevance o f  my findings for other regions in Indonesia, I can make a defensible argument 
that patterns o f  security management in Yogyakarta are probably not exceptional when
12 UU N o.32/2004, Pasal 13, huruf c. governs the rights o f  regional governments to draft public order 
ordinances. Peraturan Pemerintah N o .32/2004 Pedoman Polisi Pamong Praja, Bab. Ill, Pasal 5 governs the 
authorities o f  the Pol.PP. Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 6/2003 tentang Pedoman Operasional 
Penyidik Pegawai Negri Sipil Daerah dalam rangka Penegakkan Peraturan Daerah (and 7, 8, 9 o f  the same 
year concerning smaller operational details), governs the conduct o f  PPNS in regional government.
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compared to a hypothetical mean average. Crime trends and the activities o f  state security 
institutions are likely to be similar in Yogyakarta to other regions o f  Indonesia. While 
Yogyakarta does have an exceptional form of  government and culture, it is far from certain 
that these factors wield significant influence on the regional security landscape.
A Description o f  Yogyakarta and its Security Environment
Having examined the rationale behind the selection o f  the case study site and possible 
questions over the usefulness o f  data from Yogyakarta, we now turn to an overview o f  the 
case study site itself. Geographically, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY) is located on the 
southern coast o f  Java island. Its land borders are met on all sides by its larger neighbour, 
Central Java Province [see map at Annex F]. In terms o f  both population size and land area, 
Yogyakarta is the smallest province in Indonesia. The province’s 3,185 square kilometres 
o f  territory is roughly equivalent to one and a quarter times the size o f  Luxembourg. The 
province is split up into five districts, the capital city district (Kotamadya or Kota) o f  
Yogyakarta which is exclusively urban and developed. Part o f  the urban sprawl o f  
Yogyakarta city spills over into its two neighbouring districts Bantul in the south and 
Sleman in the north. Because these districts are closest to the capital city, Sleman and 
Bantul are partly urbanised but also have large belts o f  rural farmlands in their northern and 
southern extremities. O f  the two Sleman is the most developed. Bantul and Sleman are 
bordered by two very rural Kabupatens (districts) Gunung Kidul and Kulon Progo. Gunung 
Kidul is the largest o f  Yogyakarta’s districts, with 46% o f  DIY’s land area, followed by 
Kulon Progo with 18.4%, Sleman 18%, Bantul 15% and the city o f  Yogyakarta with 1%.13 
It should be noted that the districts o f  Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul do not feature 
prominently in this research, precisely because they are very isolated.14
13 Badan Pusat Statistik: Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta Dalam Angka 2006/2007 (Katalog BPS: 1403.34), 3-5.
14 The seats o f  government in Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul are remote and ill-serviced by roads 
infrastructure. It was unproductive therefore for me to do detailed research in the regions o f  these two 
districts. Left alone this judgement may open my research to the criticism that it is heavily weighted towards 
an analysis o f  security in the urban centres o f  Yogyakarta. To address this potential weakness I dropped my 
analysis down one level and also examined policing in four rural sub-districts in Sleman and Bantul which
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The population o f  Yogyakarta is also small and is concentrated in urban centres rather than 
villages. According to data from 2005, the population o f  DIY was 3.281 million, o f  this 
figure around 59.1% were classified as living in urban areas while 40.89% lived in rural 
areas. This trend is generally born out in the three districts that are the focus o f  this study, 
each o f  which has a high population density per square kilometre o f  land area.15
Socially, Yogyakarta is in some ways the Boston o f  Indonesia -  it is a region that on the 
one hand has a bad reputation for poverty but on the other has a good reputation for tertiary 
education services and tourism. There are some forty universities that operate in 
Yogyakarta (most o f  them in Sleman), including prestigious institutions like Gadjah Mada 
University, which is ranked among the top four universities in Indonesia.16 Despite 
perceptions that Yogyakarta is underdeveloped in comparison with other provinces, DIY 
has a deceptively high rate o f  workforce participation; 66% o f  the population over fifteen 
years was in employment in 2006.17 In line with its profile as a university town an 
unsurprisingly large number o f  people over the age o f  15, 12.4%, were still obtaining an 
education in 2006.18 Despite the balance o f  Yogyakarta’s population living in urban 
centres, an indicator o f  the under-performance o f  the region’s economy is the fact that 37% 
o f  the workforce, the largest share, was still occupied in the agricultural sector. The other 
big employers, the retail and restaurant sector as well as the non-financial services industry 
absorbed a further 22% and 14.9% respectively o f  the Yogyakartan workforce.19 Taking 
this information we can basically depict the province as looking in economic-demographic 
terms like a fried egg -  there is a large, non-industrial, services based city in the middle of
were within my reach. That method o f  focusing on the security o f  rural sub-districts rather than rural districts 
does not answer the problem entirely but it does answer the problem in part, and was within my means.
15 BPS, Yogya dalam Angka, ‘Kepadatan Penduduk’, pg.73. The city o f  Yogyakarta has the highest people to 
land ratio, with 12,939 people per kilometre. Sleman com es in second with 1756 people per km. For Bantul 
statistics were not available (ow ing to the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake) but it is unlikely to be very different 
to Sleman.
16 Edisi Khusus Perguruan Tinggi/lnfografik, Majalah Tempo, edisi 20 Mei 2007.
17 Which was equal to the national average. See: Badan Pusat Statistik. [National] Population and 
Employment by Type o f  Activity (August 2008 column) <http://www.bps.go.id/sector/em ploy/table 1 ,shtml>. 
Last accessed: March 2009.
18 BPS, Yogya Dalam Angka, ‘Penduduk dan Tenaga Kerja’ 61-62.
19 This compares to around 40% o f  the Indonesian national workforce em ployed in agriculture and fisheries 
industries and about 21% o f  the national workforce employed in the non-financial services industry. Badan 
Pusat Statistik: Population 15 Years o f  A ge and Over Who Worked by Main Industry (see August 2008 
column) < http://www.bps.go.id/sector/em ploy/table2.shtm l>. Last accessed: March 2009.
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the province (the yoke). This urban zone is ringed to its north, south, east and west by 
agrarian country-side that is still based on a farming economy (the egg white). Given the 
concentration o f  the workforce in the agriculture and services sector we can see the reality 
that the population o f  Yogyakarta is in general, poor.
The relatively underdeveloped state o f  the region’s economy can also be seen when looking 
at gross regional domestic product (GRDP). In the year 2006, Yogyakarta’s GRDP sat at 
Rp 29.4 trillion. In per capita terms this translated to Rp 8.6 million per head o f  population, 
about half the national average in real terms.20 By sector, the non-financial services 
industry (of which the majority comes from public sector services) and the hotel and 
restaurant industry were the largest contributors to economic activity (making up 20% and 
19% o f  GRDP respectively) while agriculture provided 15.5% o f  GRDP in 2006. The 
manufacturing sector, the transport/communication sector and the construction sector were 
smaller contributors, making up 13.8%, 10% and 9% respectively. By district Sleman, 
followed by the city o f  Yogyakarta and then Bantul were the largest contributors to regional 
growth.21 What we can conclude from these figures again is the under-development o f  the 
region; the Yogyakarta economy is based mostly on primary and tertiary industry.
Turning to consider the security profile o f  Yogyakarta, when assessing the scale o f  threats 
to regional security we can divide this topic into actual security threats versus potential 
security threats. If we consider actual security threats then Yogyakarta, like most o f  the rest 
o f  Indonesia is reasonably stable. The province’s primary actual threat is standard crime 
(robbery, theft, etc.). But the region’s underdevelopment, combined with the political 
agitation that comes with being a university city, make for a complex set o f  potential 
security threats.
20 This data is tabulated in 2006 prices. Considered from the perspective o f  constant prices (base year 2000), 
GRDP in the year 2000 was R p4,318,350 per capita while in 2006, GRDP per capita was 5,174,000. This 
makes for a growth rate o f  14% over the period. In other words, there was not a significant improvement in 
provincial econom ic performance versus population size over the period. Yogyakarta’s GRDP per capita in 
2006 was about half the 2006 Indonesian average o f  Rp.8.3 million (in constant 2000 prices). BPS, Yogya 
Dalam Angka, 502-503. Indonesia: BPS website, < http://www.bps.go.id/sector/population/tables.shtml>. Last 
accessed: 3 March 2009.
21 Sleman, Yogyakarta city and Bantul produced 30%, 27% and 20% o f  GRDP (in 2000 constant prices) 
respectively: BPS, Yogya Dalam Angka, 508-527.
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Considering Yogyakarta’s actual security problems, crime trends in the region tend to be 
weighted towards crimes against property. Based on the statistics o f  the regional police 
command, Polda DIY, during 2002 to June 2007 there were 1809 reported incidences o f  
serious theft {pencurian dengan pemberatan) and 2713 reported motor vehicle thefts. This 
trend is probably linked to the transient population o f  students, who are anecdotally both 
the source and the victims o f  such crimes.22 Despite the frequency o f  lighter offences 
Yogyakarta also experiences its own share o f  violent crime; in the same period there were 
528 reported cases o f  violent robbery {pencurian dengan kekerasan), 215 cases o f  serious 
assault (penganiyaan berat) and sixty reported murders. There is also a very prevalent trend 
towards vice crimes, in particular those involving narcotics. While Yogyakarta is not 
considered a central point for the production o f  drugs (or illegal alcohol for that matter) the 
large university population makes Yogyakarta a big retail market for such contraband.24 
What these trends tell us is that the university population probably makes certain types o f  
crime swell, such as property theft and the narcotics trade. With these exceptions, 
Yogyakarta suffers much the same crime problems as the rest o f  Indonesia.
Turning to Yogyakarta’s potential security threats, many o f  these are linked to 
Yogyakarta’s profile as a place o f  intellectual ferment. The most direct example o f  
Yogyakarta’s potential for security problems are the frequency o f  demonstrations. In 
interviews with heads o f  sub-district police commands in the centre o f  the city, they claim 
that virtually once every week, they will be forced to deploy some o f  their troops to patrol a
25 • • •demonstration. I can support these statements with my own anecdotal experience during 
my time in Yogyakarta. Although most demonstrations are small and peaceful, 
Yogyakarta’s students are very active in taking their protests to the streets. These 
behaviours become a potential security concern for the police.
22 Interview, Kepala Unit Reserse Kriminal A.T.S Gultom, Polsek Depok Barat, 19 May 2008. This detective 
heads up the criminal investigative division o f  the police sub-district covering the largest number o f  campuses 
in Yogyakarta. Depok has the highest rates o f  crime in Yogyakarta.
23 Polda D IY : Data Kasus Tindak Pidana yang Menonjol per kasus (2002 to June 2007).
Interview: Aryoko Priyatno, Kepala Badan Narkotika Propinsi DIY, 24 October 2008.
25 Interview, Kapolsek Danurejan, AKP Sigit Haryadi 3 July 2008. Interview, Kapolsek Gedong Tengan, AKP 
Pumomo 3 June 2008. As an aside, AKP Purnomo once revealed to me that his former job had been as the 
head o f  a Polsek in South Kalimantan province. I asked him what the biggest difference was between policing  
there and in Yogyakarta. The Kapolsek smiled and told me, “the demonstrations - i f  over there w e may have 
one a year. If over here [Yogyakarta city] w e get one every w eek.”
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The same intellectual ferment which produces student activism also fuels groups on the 
extremes o f  politics. There is a very active socialist left movement in Yogyakarta. In fact, 
Yogyakarta was formerly the ideological birthplace o f  Indonesia’s first Marxist party o f  the 
reformasi era, the Partai Rakyat Demokratik,26 Quite aside from the issue o f  whether 
socialist ideas are a justifiable “threat” or not, Indonesia does have a deep-seated suspicion 
o f  communism. The activities o f  the far left therefore remain a concern for the security
97apparatus. From the polar opposite end o f  the spectrum, Yogyakarta has a strong, 
conservative Islamist community. Abu Bakar Basyir’s former organisation, the Majelis
Mujahadin Indonesia (MMI), has located its national headquarters in Yogyakarta since
• 282000 (though in reality MMI numbers are small and only sufficient to run the secretariat). 
Similarly the former leader o f  Laskar Jihad, Jafar Umar Thalib, also lives and operates a 
pesantren in Yogyakarta. Besides these external newcomers, Yogyakarta’s own 
fundamentalist Islamic community has created regional vigilante groups -  the Gerakan 
Anti-Maksiat (or GAM) and the Front Jihad Indonesia (FJI). Ironically then, powerful 
symbolic representatives o f  both the far left and the far right mingle in the one place. I do 
not judge whether such groups pose a real threat to stability in Indonesia (though the 
fundamentalist groups do have a reputation for local vigilantism). The important thing is 
that the Indonesian state apparatus considers these extreme movements to be a concern. 
Their activities therefore draw the constant attention o f  the public intelligence agencies, as 
we will see in chapter three. Thus Yogyakarta’s university sector and the intellectual 
ferment which goes with it, has spillover effects onto the security environment.
Finally there are certain historical groupings which continue to pose concerns for security 
in the region, albeit on a minor scale. In the days o f  the New Order, poverty and the 
province’s educational character, made Yogyakarta a natural source o f  gang-related crime
26 Website: International Institute o f  Social History, Partai Rakyat Demokratik (Indonesia) 
Archives.<http://www.iisg.nl/archives/en/files/p/10863977full.php#bioghist > Accessed: 3 February 2009.
27 In the year 2007, the police were still counting communists and family members o f  communists involved in 
the 1965 coup attempt. In the city o f  Yogyakarta for example, police intelligence indicates there are 0 ‘Group 
A ’ communists, 490 ‘Group B ’ communists and 3412 ‘Group C .’ Poltabes Yogyakarta: ‘Laporan Kesatuan 
Dalam Rangka Wasrik Itwasda Polda D IY ’ August 2007, 12.
28 That information was given to me as common knowledge by a number o f  individuals in Yogyakarta. But 
for external confirmation see: Michael S. Moore, ‘Talking to Jihadis’, Spiegel Online International 01 May
2006.< http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,391716-2,00.htm l> Accessed: 3 February 2009.
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9Q • •and resistance to the Suharto regime. Under the pressure o f  the regime Indonesia’s New
in
Order parties, PPP and PDI, sought the protection o f  youth gangs and gangsters. Chapter 
six shows how the turmoil o f  the reformasi period opened opportunities for these gangs (or 
preman politik) to become influential. Since the early two thousands, these gangs have 
largely disappeared. But the poverty and the ideology (as either secular-nationalist gangs or 
Islamist gangs) which brought their members together have not dissipated. The floating 
mass o f  poor, idle youth in Yogyakarta still poses an ever present risk o f  being mobilised 
for violence.31 Therefore, although Yogyakarta’s actual security problems are not very 
great, we should realise there is a complex array o f  potential threats, from violent student 
activists, to Marxist movements, fundamentalist Muslims and political violence.
Profiling State Security Organisations
Having provided this overview o f  the security landscape, we now turn to look at the main 
public security organisations in Yogyakarta. I intend to postpone discussion o f  the various 
civil-society and commercial security groups until chapters five and six. Over the next 
section I will provide an overview o f  the provincial police command (Polisi Daerah 
Istimewa Yogyakarta or Polda DIY), the policing elements o f  the provincial and the district 
governments (the Pol.PP and the PPNS), the Indonesian arm y’s territorial command in 
Yogyakarta and some o f  the miscellaneous law enforcement actors that fall under the 
regional government umbrella (such as the Forestry Police and the PPNS o f  the Transport 
Office) as well as national government law enforcement that operate in the region (such as
29 The Petrus extermination operation actually began in Yogyakarta in 1983. Barker, ‘State o f  Fear’, 17.
30 Interview: Ghodi Nurhamidi, Wakil Sekretaris Gerakan Pemuda Kabah (GPK) dan Pemimpin Gerakan 
Anti-Maksiat, 29 September 2007. Interview: Harist, Pemimpin GPK Cabang Kota, 26 September 2007.
31 A valid question to ask here is what about gangsterism o f  the ordinary, nihilistic kind? The ingredients 
certainly exist in Yogyakarta; there is poverty among idle youth and ethnic enclaves o f  newcom ers 
(pendatang). Yet in my research I find little evidence for the type o f  organised gangsterism o f  the Betawi 
Brotherhood or Pemuda Pancasila type. According to my interviews with ex-gangsters, the police have 
eradicated the old preman groups (and according to som e ex-gangsters, the police have subsumed their 
extortive practices -  Interview, Gunn Jack, 19 July 2007). Why criminal gangs have not resurrected in a 
different form is a subject for speculation. Perhaps the dem ise o f  the old political preman groups so 
disorganised the preman system that it has been unable to form under a new centre o f  gravity? In any case 
gangsters (rather than gangs) still exist in Yogyakarta, but they are pure criminals. People such as this are 
marginal to my research, dangerous and generally do not wish to be found.
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the PPNS o f  the immigration service and the Taxation office). As far as possible we will 
attempt to construct a picture o f  these agencies, looking at their size, daily activities and 
jurisdiction.
Polda Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Polda DIY)
The history o f  the Indonesian police in chapter one shows how the autonomy and powers o f  
the police have grown. By providing here a more detailed profile o f  the structure o f  the 
police in the case study site, we not only obtain a picture o f  what the police actually do, but 
also o f  how superior their authority is in comparison to other security organisations.
In terms o f  size, Polda DIY is comparatively small but the structure, roles and operations o f  
the command follow a centralised standard established by Indonesian police headquarters. 
All Indonesian provincial police commands are classified into several types: A l ,  B1 and 
B2. These classifications are dependent upon the population size, geography and the ratio 
o f  crime o f  the given command area. The classification type will affect the seniority o f  the 
commander and the number o f  personnel, sub-departments and resources o f  the Polda. 
Polda DIY is a Type B2 Polda (the smallest) and is led by a police Brigadier General (or 
one star general). The breakdown o f  the Indonesian police at the regional level follows 
exactly the structure o f  regional government. So for each o f  Indonesia’s thirty three 
provinces there is a Polda, for each o f  the districts there is a Polisi Resort (or POLRES) and 
for each sub-district there is a Polisi Sektor (or POLSEK). The strategy for determining the 
size o f  the Polda (population, geography and crime index) is also applied to determining the 
size o f  the Polres. On this basis Polda DIY has one largish A2 Poltabes (Polisi Kota 
Besar) for the city o f  Yogyakarta, two medium sized BI Polres for the relatively urbanised
32 This hierarchical breakdown is, to som e extent, also mirrored by other national government bodies, like 
Indonesian army territorial units and the state prosecutors and law courts.
'3 SKEP Kapolri: 7/1/2005 (Perubahan atas Keputusan Kapolri No.Pol.: KEP/54/X/2002 17 Oktober 2002  
tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Satuan-Satuan Organisasi pada Tingkat Kepolisian Negara Republik 
Indonesia Daerah (Polda). Mulyana, Laporan Hasil Penelitian: Telaah Tiplogi Polres Berdasarkan 
Karakteristik dan Perkembangan Wilayah (Universitas Padjadjaran, Sept.2007), p. 13.
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districts o f  Bantul and Sleman and two smallish B2 Polres for the rural districts o f  Kulon 
Progo and Gunung Kidul.34
Looking at the size o f  Polda DIY, in the year 2006 the command possessed 9534 (actual) 
police personnel (including 474 public servants).33 This gives the command a police to 
population ratio o f  1:344, high by Indonesian standards. This figure is only slightly down 
below the headquarters recommended minimum o f  10,274 personnel. Following on from 
the guidelines established by national headquarters Polda DIY is organised into a provincial 
police command consisting o f  sixteen logistics, planning and support detachments, seven 
operational units and five sub-commands. In December 2006, 6922 police - almost all o f  
Polda DIY - served in the five Polres o f  Yogyakarta.36
Within the regional police structure the most important part o f  Polri is the district 
command, the Polres. The Polres acts as the bridge between the purely functional part o f  
the regional police - the Polsek - and the higher planning/strategic part: the Polda. In 
Indonesian police terms a Polres is termed as the Komando Satuan Dasar (or Basic Unit o f  
Command); this means that the Polres has substantial autonomy to plan its own programs 
and mount its own operations. Every year, the Polda allocates a yearly budget to the Polres 
to dispose o f  in accordance with the plans o f  the Polres leadership.37 This may seem like a
'4 Poltabes (Polisi Kota Besar) denotes a special district level command for the capital city o f  the province. 
See: Polda DIY Website. <http://www.iogia.polri.go.id/index.php?menu=profile&sub=struktur >, last 
accessed: 30 October 2009.
35 Polda DIY: Data Kuat Pers Menerut DSP dan RIIL Polda D.I. Yogyakarta S/D  Akhir Desember 2006.
'6 As will be described in the next section the Polres are the most active operational part o f  the police
command. The major purpose o f  the regional headquarters is to support, fund and coordinate the various 
Polres. Having said this there is a surprisingly large number o f  operational (or non-support) police that 
actually work in the Polda, 2612 in all. But many o f  these police are specialists, who handle more complex  
and unusual tasks not performed by the Polres. For example, o f  this 2612 operational troops in Polda DIY, 
1714 o f  them are Brimob (Brigad Mobil) -  the paramilitary w ing o f  the police. Brimob are purely a reserve 
strike force and are not often directly deployed in day-to-day policing. Another example o f  the exceptionalism  
o f  the provincial commands is the fact that the Polda maintains a special anti-terrorist investigative 
detachment (Densus 88) as part o f  its detective directorate. So w hile the Polda does indeed do a small amount 
o f  operational police work, this represents a minor part o f  its entire workload. And even most o f  this small 
percentage o f  operational work is specialist in nature. Polda DIY: Data Kuat Pers Menerut DSP dan RIIL 
Polda D.I. Yogyakarta S/D  Akhir Desember 2006. ‘Bagian Hubungan Tata Cara Kerja Polda D IY ’ from 
SKEP Kapolri 54/X /2002, 17 October 2002.
’7 In the financial year 2007 around 64% o f  the yearly Polda DIY budget was allocated to the Polres’. In all, 
the 2007 budget o f  Polda DIY was Rp. 366 billion ($U S 33,272,727) and o f  this, Rp. 196.5 billion were 
allocated to the Polres. These figures however include Rp.60.4 billion spent on the acquisition and 
maintenance o f  capital works and equipment in the Polres (and these decisions are actually made at the level 
o f  the Polda). So in reality the Polres get about 46% o f  the Polda’s budget to spend on their own though this
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fairly unimaginative policy, but for the Indonesian police this has marked a huge change 
(and indeed this is one o f  the more visible policies to come from Polri’s reform agenda). 
During the ABRI days, the Polres depended on direct, periodic allocations o f  money from
38the Polda. Often the allocations were unreliable and sometimes did not arrive at all. But 
today the Polres can plan their activities on the basis o f  one large annual budget paid at the 
beginning o f  the financial year. The Polres is also autonomous in an operational sense. For 
example each Polres has the authority to mount its own special operations. To take the 
Poltabes39 command in Yogyakarta city as our example. In 2007, Poltabes scheduled 
around 30 operations for the entire calendar year. Nine o f  these operations were actioned by 
the provincial police headquarters, four were actioned by police headquarters in Jakarta. 
The majority however, seventeen in all, were planned and executed by Poltabes alone.40 
What this information shows is the autonomy o f  the Polres: it is equipped with the 
resources and authority to manage its own tasks. Because it acts as the bridge between the 
Polsek and the Polda, the Polres is actually the most important part o f  the police chain o f  
command.
Given that the Polres are more active in conducting the practical duties o f  policing, we now 
turn to look at the structure o f  the Polres. In structural terms the Polres is like a miniature 
Polda, but with slightly fewer support detachments. Taking the Poltabes o f  Yogyakarta as
accounts for the lion’s share o f  the operational budget. Polda DIY, RKA-KL Polda DIY Satker/Per Program
2007.
’8 Interview, Kepala Bagian Operasi Poltabes, 14 April 2008.
'9 For a discussion o f  the Poltabes see footnote 33.
40 To discuss briefly police operations: Polri divides the work o f  its operational units into day-to-day tasks and 
special operations. A police operation entails moving police from day-to-day activities in their individual 
units (intelligence collection or investigation for exam ple) to an operation designed to achieve a specific 
objective over a set time. Every year the Yogyakarta police have a predictable set o f  operations: motor vehicle 
theft operations, violent robbery operations, traffic operations among many others. The purpose o f  the 
operation is to bring down the overall incidence o f  a given crime through intensified law enforcement. Polri 
divides its operations into three types Operasi Terkendali Pusat (actioned by Mabes Polri), Operasi 
Kewilayahan (actioned by the Polda) and Operasi Mandiri (drafted on the initiative o f  the Polres). Given the 
fact that the Polres plan and execute most o f  their operations independently, this again demonstrates the 
critical role o f  the Polres in policing. (Interview: Kepala Bagian Operasi Poltabes Yogya, 12 September 
2008). In 2007 in Polres Sleman for example, there were twenty four such independent operations in one year, 
as compared to six other Operasi Kewilayahan and Operasi Pusat. Interview with Kepala Bagian Operasi, 
Komisaris Polisi Kristiono, Polres Sleman, N ovem ber 1 2007 .For Police doctrine on operations see: Naskah 
Sementara Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Operasi Kepolisian: SKEP Polri: 770/IX /2005. Poltabes DIY: ‘Kalendar 
Pelaksanaan Operasi Kepolisian Tahun 20 0 7 ’.
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the example again,41 in this police command there are fourteen separate detachments [see 
Annex G]. Seven o f  these detachments can be described as support elements.42 These 
support elements back up the work o f  the Poltabes’ seven operational units (or Opsnal in 
Polri terminology)43 and fourteen sub-district police commands 44 To dwell momentarily on 
the Opsnal, these individual units perform the core functions o f  the police. In the Poltabes 
o f  Yogyakarta there is one Satuan Lalu Lintas (Traffic Police Unit), one Satuan 
Pengamanan Obyek Khusus (Vital Object Protection Unit), one Satuan Samapta (Police 
Patrol Unit -  the ordinary ‘grunt’ police), one Satuan Narkoba (Narcotic Investigation 
Unit), one Satuan Reserse Kriminal (Detective Unit), one Satuan Intelijen Kemanan (Police 
Intelligence Unit), and one Satuan Pengamanan Pariwisata (Tourist Police Unit). These 
units perform independent operations on a daily basis, in accordance with their individual 
job descriptions and the yearly plan o f  the Poltabes (or rencana kerja -  work plan).
The Opsnal are also required to participate in special periodic operations. Typically there 
are 20 or more police operations per year lasting from several days up to several months 
and including anything from dozens to thousands o f  personnel. Within Poltabes there are 
1737 police (including 40 public servants), with the district police leadership attaching 807 
personnel to the Poltabes headquarters and 930 personnel to the police substations, the 
Polsek 45 This gives the Poltabes a police to population ratio o f  1:293 (or 1737 to 508,992), 
very high by Indonesian standards and largely due to the fact that this command is based on
41 This dissertation w ill often reference Poltabes as a source o f  information. The police personnel at this 
particular command were the most helpful o f  all those in the case study. Thus the data from this command is 
specially plentiful. N evertheless, because the Indonesian police force is very hierarchical and doctrinaire, 
almost all the data on roles, operations, structure and so forth from the Poltabes o f  Yogyakarta can be applied 
to the other Polres o f  the case study.
42 Following Annex G left to right, these are: BagOps/Bagian Operasi (the Operations section, responsible for 
planning and executing police operations), the Bagian Binamitra (or the ‘Developm ent o f  Partners [o f the 
police]’ section, this group manages police relations with civil society), BagMin/Bagian Administrasi (or 
Administration Section, covering human resources, management o f  training, etc), UR Telematika (the 
telecommunications support group), Unit P3D (the police Provosts), Dokter dan Kesehatan (the medical 
support group) and TAU D  (the Poltabes Secretariat).
43 Operasi dan Pelaksanaan di Lapangan (Operations and Execution in the Field) -  is a police term for the 
‘doers’ or operational elements.
44 The Polsek, as said above is a purely operation unit (or in Polri terms Kesatuan Pelayanan Terdepan -  the 
Primary Forward Service Unit). Depending on the classification o f  its area, a Polsek usually has between 30-
70 personnel, consisting o f  an intelligence unit, a detective unit, a patrol police unit, two 
Polmas/Babinkamtibmas (civil society management police) for every village in the sub-district, and, i f  the 
Polsek is large enough, a traffic police unit.
45 Poltabes ‘Laporan Kesatuan’ (2007), 4.
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the boundaries o f  a small city, Yogyakarta.46 The core idea that we can take away from all 
this data is that the Polres is an important, self-contained unit within the Indonesian police 
hierarchy. It is highly autonomous and has the authority and the resources to manage 
security within its own area o f  operations.47
By referencing the available police documents we can also create a basic picture o f  what 
the Indonesian police actually do in the case study region. It must be said, however, that our 
picture here is an incomplete one. As has already been discussed, researching the 
Indonesian police (or any security agency in Indonesia for that matter) is a difficult task. 
The fact that there are no Freedom o f  Information laws in Indonesia means that individual 
government departments decide themselves what they will and will not, make available to 
the public. Often there is little coordination, even between different parts o f  the same
• • 4 0  #
organisation, as to what should and should not be declassified. Thus it must be said that 
although this dissertation makes certain conclusions about what the police do, the data is 
pieced together from incomplete sources.
In describing what the police do from day-to-day, we need to take one step back and look at 
how they plan their tasks. Polri formulates its organisational goals on the basis o f  five year 
medium term strategic plans, which are translated into detail in one-yearly work plans
4(1 The Poltabes has a smaller police/populations ratio in part because it manages a heavily urbanised capital 
city. In the Indonesian police matrix this factor is significant in determining the overall resources o f  the police  
command. Polres Sleman though was not too far behind. In 2007, it had 2094 personnel (over the 
recommended minimum) giving it a police to population ratio o f  1:447. For Polres Bantul, the number was 
som ewhat lower (fitting its condition as a semi-rural district with a lower rate o f  crime). In January 2007  
Polres Bantul had 1333 police. I am unaware o f  the police to population ratio (there are no BPS or Polri 
statistics for that year). Polres Sleman: Laporan Kesatuan (2007) p.7. For Polres Bantul data is taken from 
Biro Personnel Polda DIY: Data Kuat Pers (Jan.2007).
47 See: Polres Sleman: Rencana Kerja Polres Sleman dan Jajarannya (January 2007). Kebijakan Kapolri 2007, 
Butir 4, p. 14.
48 To digress with just one exam ple o f  this problem, at Polres Sleman I asked and received copies o f  the 
Polres’ Yearly Work Report (renja) but was told that another type o f  report (the Laporan Kesatuan) was 
classified and not open to the public. At the Poltabes o f  Yogyakarta I asked for the Yearly Work Report but 
was told that most o f  the contents were classified, but instead was given the Laporan Kesatuan the document 
which in Polres Sleman, was withheld. There are many other exam ples o f  these kind o f  obstacles. At Polda 
DIY I was denied access to all the previous documents on the basis that they may contain strategic 
information from Indonesian Police Headquarters. At the end o f  the day information o f  any kind is heavily 
controlled by the police. However the most cooperative level o f  the police chain o f  command was the Polres 
(for reasons that can only be guessed at; interestingly, this was true across the government spectrum in the 
case study site, district level units seem ed to be the most helpful).
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(rencana kerja or renja).49 Because the police are a hierarchical, centralised organisation, 
there is a large amount o f  consistency in the objectives and goals o f  different command 
units and different sections - sometimes to the point o f  plagiarism. Generally however, it 
seems that individual commands take the grand, motherhood statements from the strategic 
plans o f  the level above them and, with varying degrees o f  originality, mould it to their area 
o f  responsibility.50 Given that these mission statements are more rhetorical than actual, they 
are not directly useful for demonstrating what the police do. But what these reports do 
underline is the important point that the core operations and tasks o f  the police are probably 
consistent across the organisation. Given that it is difficult to access large numbers o f  
documents, this fact helps us to generalise on the basis o f  the available data.
What is clear is that all police commands that I have examined in the case study site (the 
Polda and the three Polres o f  Bantul, Sleman and Yogyakarta city) divide their activities 
into eight annual programs; five o f  these programs are aimed at the operational 
management o f  security while three involve police support functions. The police group 
their operational tasks into: programs for the development o f  security strategy and public 
order {program pengembangan strategi keamanan dan ketertiban), programs for the 
empowerment o f  security potential {program pemberdayaan potensi keamanan), programs 
for the management o f  social order and general security {program pembinaan kamtibmas) 
and programs for the investigation o f  crime {program penyelidikan dan penyidikan tindak 
pidana). The five operational policing programs follow a tactical philosophy which is often
49 We can assume this is consistent across the police environment. In interviews with ranking officers in the 
provincial police, they acknowledge the existence o f  five yearly planning documents and yearly planning 
documents (called rencana strategis and rencana kerja respectively) which are produced by Mabes Polri and 
Polda DIY. The Polda denied access to these documents. Interview with Karorenbang Nurdjana, 28 August
2007.
50 To take for example the Mabes Polri M ission statement o f  2006, Polri describes having nine core goals: [in 
brief) giving giving protection, guidance and service easily to the community, giving security and order to the 
community, securing transportation, developing community policing, upholding law professionally, 
administering police resources professionally, translating the desires o f  the community for obtaining good  
security in workplaces and living areas, increasing international law enforcement cooperation, and 
formulating a culture o f  obedience to law in Indonesia [Polres Sleman, Rencana Kerja Polres Sleman dan 
Jajarannya Tahun 2007 (Januari 2007), Bab II, 1, huruf b p.7]. The stated mission o f  the Polres o f  Sleman in 
2006 is similar. The mission statement copies word for word four o f  the mission statements from the National 
Police Headquarters and adds five others o f  its own. Interestingly when looking at the Laporan Kesatuan o f  
Poltabes Yogyakarta, which also holds the Poltabes’ m ission statement, their mission statement is word-for- 
word exactly the same as that o f  the neighbouring Polres Sleman. Presumably, the staff in each o f  these areas 
have probably copied this information directly from the work plans o f  the provincial headquarters [but since 
the Polda did not grant me their own rencana kerja, I am unable to verify my suspicion], Poltabes, Laporan 
Kesatuan (2007), 2-3.
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heard within the police environment -  detection, prevention and repression o f  security 
threats (repression here meaning through either physical or legal means). If we were to 
metaphorically put the entire Polri workload into a centrifuge those three things are 
basically what the police do: detect security threats, prevent security threats and repress 
security threats. To continue with the description o f  the other program items, the 
Indonesian police also budget for three support functions: the development o f  human 
resources {program pengembangan sumber daya manusia Polri), the development o f  
material and capital goods {program pengembangan sarana dan prasarana kepolisian) and 
finally a wages and pay scheme (program penyelenggaran kenegaraan dan 
kepemerintahan).51
To give a more detailed description o f  police activities, we now look at each o f  the 
operational programs in detail, starting with the ‘program for the development o f  security 
strategy and public order.’ This agenda is conducted by police intelligence for the purpose
c 'y
o f  pre-empting security threats. In effect the program almost entirely describes the duties
• • • • • • • • • carried out by the Police Intelligence Unit. Police intelligence is responsible for collecting 
data on a variety o f  problems. The Police Intelligence Unit in any Polres is split up into 
(around) six operational sub-units: political affairs, social affairs, economic affairs, security 
(or crime) affairs, a sub-unit for supervising foreigners and a sub-unit for the licensing o f  
weapons and the supervision o f  controlled substances. Intelligence collection in Indonesia 
is people-based, or otherwise known by the term ‘Human Intelligence,’ or HUMINT. Each 
intelligence officer maintains a personal network o f  informants. Informants feed data to 
their police contacts on anything o f  interest to the intelligence officer, like crime, political 
activities, public meetings, demonstrations, religious activities, the prices o f  basic goods, 
industrial disputes and anything which is considered a potential cause o f  instability.54 O f  
course, the type o f  data a police intelligence officer is interested in depends on their sub­
unit; an officer from the Political Affairs sub-unit obviously tries to track intelligence on
51 Polda DIY: RKA-KL Polda 2007. Poltabes Yogyakarta, Laporan Kesatuan, 26-27. Polres Sleman, Rencana 
Kerja 2006, Lampiran, p. 1-2.
52 Interview with Kepala Bagian Operasi, Komisaris Polisi Z.Arifin, Poltabes Yogyakarta, 24 October 2007.
53 Interview with Kepala Satuan Intelijen-Keamanan Poltabes, Kompol Wahayu, 1 October 2007.
4 Although monitoring prices may seem  strange for the police, the intention is to detect usury or speculative 
behaviour over critical items such as rice, cooking oil and other products. The econom ic intelligence sub-unit 
also tracks the health o f  companies that occupy strategic sectors o f  the econom y, union activities and the like. 
Interview, Kepala Unit Ekonomi Poltabes Y.Tarwoco Nugroho, 27 Novem ber 2008.
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political activity, for example.35 Police recruit their informants from a wide variety o f  social 
strata, like criminals, unskilled labourers, business people, in fact anyone who may be a 
point o f  information in the community can be recruited by police intelligence.56
The Intelligence Unit also supervises certain commodities and even, people. Police 
intelligence license and register controlled substances like weapons and explosives. In one 
reflection o f  the obsession o f  the Indonesian police with social control, in Indonesia the 
police must be informed o f  the presence and activities o f  all foreign citizens. In a university 
and tourist city like Yogyakarta this burdensome task is also carried out by the Intelligence 
Unit. Police Intelligence also provides certain forms o f  approval to citizens and 
information. For all public activities, like demonstrations and religious events, Indonesians 
must inform the police beforehand (and obtain a Surat Pemberitahuan)?1 For public 
commercial events, such as concerts or sports tournaments, the police must provide formal 
permission beforehand. The Intelligence Unit also provides criminal record checks (which 
are often an employment pre-requisite). Typically all o f  these services take up a 
disproportionate quantity o f  intelligence manpower. In Polres Sleman for example fifty o f
• j  58the seventy five Intelligence personnel there are involved in processing documents. 
Finally, Police Intelligence also perform the other side o f  the intelligence coin, protecting
55 With Indonesia’s background as a former authoritarian state, intelligence gathering o f  this kind legitimately  
raises questions. In the specific case o f  the Political Intelligence Unit, the kind o f  information they seek  
concerns the strength o f  political movem ents, the identities o f  party officials, monitoring public political 
m eetings, and so forth. In my analysis the state intelligence apparatus seeks such information for two reasons:
1. force o f  habit (it was done for decades under the N ew  Order) 2. the data is still useful today for assessing  
risks to stability by political movem ents (even though the data is not used for regime maintenance as it was 
under the N ew  Order). There is an argument as to whether such activities are appropriate for contemporary 
Indonesia. I consider that debate best left to the Indonesian community. I do not see evidence though which 
leads me to believe the intelligence apparatus gathers such information for benefiting them selves or special 
interests.
56 Police intelligence officers universally tell me that they have no money to pay their informants. When 
asked why som eone would wish to becom e an informant, intelligence officers tell me informants usually do 
so to ‘menjalin hubungan baik’ (maintain good relations) with the police. We can interpret this to mean in one 
sense that som e people may be motivated by the idea that regularly giving information to the police, may 
function as a down payment on future police services. One can imagine that, especially for ex-criminals, 
becoming a trusted confidant o f  police intelligence can function as an insurance policy. I did once ask the 
head o f  intelligence in Polres Sleman whether he is able to intercede on behalf o f  his informants in criminal 
cases. He evaded giving a clear answer but said “ it depends on the informant [and their value].” Interview  
with Kepala Satuan Intelijen-Kemanan Polres Sleman, Kompol Y uswo Hadi, 2 October 2007. Interview, 
Anggota Unit Intelijen Agus Supriyanto and Yunus Supriyono Polsek Tempel, Polres Sleman, 13 Novem ber 
2008.
57 This is provided for in UU N o.2/2002, Pasal 15, Ayat 2, huruf: a, d, e, i.
58 Interview, Kassat Intel Polres Sleman, October 2007.
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classified information. Within the police environment, the intelligence unit manage the 
handling o f  police secret materials. These various tasks -  the monitoring o f  threats, the 
supervision o f  materials and foreigners, providing security information services and 
security approvals to social activities and protecting police information -  all fall under the 
aegis o f  Intelkam Polri.
The police program for ‘Empowering the Security Potential o f  the Community’ describes 
Polri’s efforts to engage civil society. The Bagian/Biro Binamitra or the ‘Development o f  
[Police] Partners’ office performs the majority o f  this program. Binamitra functions as the 
police’s central agency for managing relations with all its partners in civil society. Thus 
Binamitra supervises and trains private security guards and the companies that employ 
them.59 Binamitra also oversee Indonesia’s ubiquitous neighbourhood watch system -  the 
ronda siskamling. Binamitra is responsible for implementing Polri’s most high-profile 
reform plan -  the Community Policing initiative or Perpolisian Basis Masyarakat. Under 
this initiative the police have developed dialogue forums between police and 
representatives o f  the community at the level o f  the village. Binamitra coordinates and 
encourages this initiative. Binamitra also perform the duties o f  maintaining communication 
with core elements o f  civil society, such as schools, trade guilds {paguyuban), attending 
public events, and cooperation with the local government apparatus for the purpose o f  
disseminating police programs.60 Although Binamitra do not carry a prestigious reputation 
within the police environment, their importance in networked security clearly emerges in 
chapters five and six.61
The ‘Program for the Management o f  Social Order and Security’ funds the routine day-to- 
day policing o f  each unit as well as special police operations. Each Opsnal plans a specific 
number o f  operational tasks that they must perform under this program. They then break
59 Referred to as Pengamanan Swakarsa (SA TPA M ) and Badan Jasa Usaha Pengamanan (BUJP) respectively.
60 Poltabes, Laporan Kesatuan, 22.
61 The majority o f  Binamitra’s work is conducted in the Polsek by senior non-com m issioned police once 
referred to as Babinkamtibmas, now known as Polmas (or polisi masyarakat). In the sub-districts there are 
two Polmas per village (o f  the nine Polsek I visited in Polda DIY, the average Polsek has three villages and 
six Polmas). The Binamitra personnel in the Polres/Polda train and encourage the Polmas in the sub-districts, 
while performing more strategic functions (like training Satpam, marketing police programs in schools, 
collecting w eekly reports from the respective Polmas personnel in the Polsek, etc.). In Polres Sleman for 
example, there are ten Binamitra staff, and thirteen in the Polda.
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this down into yearly, monthly, weekly and daily objectives. Each objective is lined up with 
the individual job description o f  the given Opsnal. To give specific examples from each 
Unit; in its yearly plan, the Traffic Police Unit o f  Poltabes planned 6480 four wheel vehicle 
patrols in 2007. The Samapta (Patrol) Unit planned for 9360 individual patrols (either on 
foot or motorised) and guard activities (say o f  a bank or community event) in the same 
year.63 The Tourist Police Unit programmed for sixty escort missions (o f  tourist bus 
convoys for example).64 The Strategic Vital Objects Unit programmed for 2920 activities in 
which stationary guards would be placed in strategic objects (like the provincial Pertamina 
building, electricity sub-stations, etc).63
For reasons o f  space I have been selective in the examples that I have given, but needless to 
say the previous paragraph only captures a small glimpse o f  what the police actually do on 
a daily basis. Every day, reports enter police offices and must be responded to. Every day 
the police show their face in hundreds o f  different patrols and stationary guarding activities. 
Every day there are crimes which must be investigated and every day, hundreds o f  civilians 
apply for driver’s licences and other documents in police offices. It is impossible to depict 
in numbers the hive o f  activity that an average Polres in Yogyakarta becomes on any given 
day. This says nothing o f  what happens during peaks in the cycle when there is a security 
disturbance or operation.
In addition to the day-to-day policing, the other part o f  Polri’s ‘program for the 
management o f  social order and security’ is special operations. Police operations cover a 
broad range o f  objectives: countering terrorism, providing security for major yearly events 
(like Ramadhan and Christmas), managing traffic flows, combating robbery, and many 
operations besides. Depending on the purpose o f  the operation, the duration and scale o f  the 
activity may differ wildly. In public security operations where the objective is to decrease 
threats to the public on a wide scale, the size o f  the operation can be enormous. In the
62 In police thinking, one vehicle performing one patrol in one shift equals one activity. There are two shifts 
every day, which works out to an average o f  four four-wheeled patrols per shift. Poltabes Yogyakarta:
Program Kegiatan Satker/Sub-Satker dan Polsek Jajaran Poltabes Tahun 2007 (10 July 2007), p .l Sub Satker 
Sat Lantas.
Poltabes: Program Kegiatan Satker/Sub-Satker 2007, p.3 Sub Satker Sat Samapta.
64 Poltabes: Program Kegiatan Satker/Sub-Satker 2007, p.2 Satker Sat Pam Wisata.
The police breakdown works as follow s: one guard in one installation for one shift equals one activity. 
Poltabes: Program Kegiatan Satker/Sub-Satker 2007, p.l Sub Satker Sat Pam Obsus.
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security operation that took place during the Islamic holiday o f  Idul Fitri in 2007 
(codenamed “ Ketupat Progo 07”) Poltabes Yogyakarta alone deployed 1,136 o f  its staff 
over fourteen days.66 Meanwhile for operations which are designed to put pressure on a 
particular type o f  crime for a short period, the scale o f  the operation can be much smaller. 
One small, anti-immorality operation (targeting prostitution and other “vices”) in Polres 
Sleman during September 2007 involved only sixty personnel and occurred over a time 
span o f  thirty days.67 As previously mentioned, in the year 2007 Poltabes Yogyakarta 
planned thirty different types o f  operations for that calendar year. O f  these thirty planned
z. o
operations, the Poltabes executed twenty one. The individual Polres conduct the clear 
majority o f  operations. In doing so they can draw upon the resources o f  the entire Polres 
and, if necessary, support personnel from the provincial police headquarters.69
The high tempo o f  activities mean that special police operations can be expensive. The 
single biggest cost items in any operation are personnel expenses (consisting o f  meal 
allowances and out o f  pocket costs) and transport (petrol and maintenance o f  vehicles). The 
police prefer not to discuss these financial matters in detail. In general terms however, one 
Chief o f  Operations (Kasbagop) mentioned that based upon meal allowances o f  Rp. 12,000 
per person, plus other allowances that may be paid to personnel (such as petrol expenses) a 
150 person operation lasting for thirty days can expend Rp.54 million in personnel costs 
alone.70 Unsurprisingly then the whole Program for the Management o f  Security and Public 
Order is Polri’s largest and most expensive security program.
Finally the Program for the Investigation o f  Crime is self-explanatory. The investigation o f  
crimes, and all the attendant functions involved, falls entirely within the tasks o f  the 
Detectives Unit and the Narcotics Unit. These units investigate crime scenes, collect 
evidence and determine if a criminal case can be investigated (this investigation is known 
as penyelidikan in police terminology). The detectives then investigate the case (or conduct
66 Interview, Kabbagop Arifin, Poltabes Yogyakarta, 25 November 2007.
67 Polres Sleman, Perintah Pelaksanaan Operasi “Pekat -  Progo 2007”, Polres Sleman, Prinlak Ops 
14/IX/2007. p. 2 and lampiran, Surat Perintah 395/IX /2007.
68 Though in part this low productivity reflects the gap between what the police plan and what happens in 
reality. At the beginning o f  the financial year the police must anticipate the security threats they may face in 
the year ahead. Some problems may or may not materialise w hile unanticipated problems may occur.
(>) Interview, Kasbagops Polres Sleman, 1 Novem ber 2007.
70 Interview, Kasbagops Polres Sleman, Novem ber 2007.
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a penyidikan) where they interrogate witnesses, seize evidence, detain suspects, and so on.71 
In the year 2007 the Reskrim unit o f  Poltabes programmed for 468 penyelidikan and 420 
finalised cases (or penyerahan berita acara ke penuntut umum -  transfer o f  case file to state
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prosecutors). As it turns out the Poltabes actually investigated 567 cases during 2007. 
The Detectives Unit in an average district police command is usually split up into ten 
separate operational sections, focusing on different varieties o f  crime.74
Experienced Indonesia commentators may very well question the reliability o f  all o f  the 
above data. Police documents provide the basis for almost the entire above picture. 
Recalling the reputation o f  the Indonesian police for corruption and incompetence it is 
reasonable to question whether police documents actually reflect what occurs on the 
ground. The point is valid, but we should be cautious about being so dismissive. Regional 
police commands are subject to internal and external scrutiny. There is a central auditing 
agency in Mabes Polri, the Inspektorat Pengawasan Umum (Irwasum). Complimenting the 
work o f  Irwasum are regional police auditors under the authority o f  the Polda, the 
Inspektorat Pengawasan Daerah (Itwasda). Aside from being financial auditors these 
agencies also audit the conduct o f  regional police work programs. Every year teams of  
Irwasum investigators descend on the regional police commands, penetrating selectively 
down to the Polres level and checking what the Polres and Polda say they plan to do (in
• • • 75their renja) versus what they actually do (recorded in daily work orders or hasil kegiatan). 
Beside Polri’s internal auditors the police, like every other Indonesian government agency,
71 Narcotics detectives however differ somewhat from this template. Their modus operandi (at least at the 
level o f  the Polres) is much less focused on reactive investigation. Instead they perform a lot o f  entrapment 
type operations, where they attempt to catch drug users and drug dealers with police infiltrators. Interview, 
Kepala Satuan Narkoba Poltabes, Andy Traspoetra, 25 September 2007.
72 Poltabes Yogyakarta: Program Kegiatan Satker/Sub-Satker dan Polsek Jajaran Poltabes Tahun 2007 (10  
July 2007), p.4-5 Sub Satker Reskrim
73 In the year 2006 the detectives received 675 cases, investigated 567 and passed 438 to the state prosecutors, 
providing a resolution rate o f  64%. Poltabes Yogyakarta: Laporan Akuntibilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah 
(Januari sampai dengan Desember 2007), (January 6, 2008), p.8-9. Poltabes, Laporan Kesatuan, 15.
74 There are one or more units that operate in the field (who arrest suspects, gather evidence from crime 
scenes and so on). There is one unit for providing ‘Special Service’ on sensitive crim es -  such as sexual 
assault and family violence. Another unit is devoted to econom ic crimes like fraud and money laundering, 
w hile another unit examines ‘Certain [read serious] Crimes’ like illegal logging (or crimes on a large scale), 
another unit provides investigation support to Penyidik Pegawai Negri Sipil, another unit is involved in 
identifying victim s and perpetrators. The remaining units are involved in the investigation o f  corruption and 
ordinary crimes (like automobile theft). Satuan Reskrim, Polres Sleman: Struktur Organisasi 2007.
75 For a description o f  the functions and authority o f  police internal investigators see: Republik Indonesia: 
Peraturan Kepala Kepolisian 1/2008 Penyelenggaraan Pengawasan Dan Pemeriksaan Umum Serta 
Perbendaharaan Di Lingkungan Kepolisian Negara RI.
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are subject to the forensic audits o f  the Indonesian national auditing agency -  the Badan 
Pengawasan Keuangan (BPK). While none o f  these processes can guarantee the accuracy 
o f  Polri documentation, they do create pressure on individual police leaders to refrain from 
falsifying documents. It is reasonable to say then that, on the balance o f  probabilities, most 
o f  what we find in papers such as those referenced above, is likely to be accurate.
A final issue to raise in this section is the police budget. It difficult to solicit data from the 
police about their finances. From the data I managed to collect, it appears police budgets 
are sufficient to cover operating expenses but part o f  the reason for this is that the 
leadership cannibalises other programs to fund essential expenditure. Most o f  my 
information for this conclusion comes from Polsek commanders who are relatively more 
willing to discuss these issues than their more senior colleagues, probably because the 
Polsek is such a junior part o f  the police hierarchy. In one meeting I had with Polsek 
commander Juwono [not his real name] from the Poltabes area, the commander painted a 
very bleak picture o f  their resourcing situation. Every year Juwono’s Polsek receives a 
fixed budget, which is the same for all Polsek, whether the area is crime intensive or quiet. 
Judging by the budget o f  a neighbouring Polsek, Gondomanan, the yearly operational 
budget for a Polsek in the Poltabes area is about Rp.36 million (US$4000).76 According to 
Juwono this budget is never sufficient. For example, Juwono’s Polsek receives a fixed 
allocation o f  200 litres o f  petrol every month. Yet his minimum requirements for monthly 
vehicle patrols require 300 litres. By the same token Juwono’s Polsek is funded for 
investigating three criminal cases every year. In practice, the Polsek can however
• 77investigate ten to twenty criminal cases every month. When asked as to how the Polsek
761 have taken budget data from a neighbouring Polsek in order to conceal the identity o f  my informant. 
Comparative research indicates other Polseks in this district receive the same allocations. Polsek 
Gondomanan, Poltabes Yogyakarta: Rencana Kegiatan Polsek Tahun 2008 dan Rincian Anggaran Belanja 13 
March 2008.
77 Mabes Polri sets a pre-determined budget for every criminal case. Investigations are categorised as ‘light’ 
or ringan (e.g. slander), ‘medium’ or sedang and ‘heavy’ or berat (e.g. murder). In 2008 the cost o f  a heavy 
criminal case was Rp.14 million, a medium case Rp.8 million and a light case Rp.5 million. Detectives units 
receive quotas o f  cases which affect their budgets. Narcotics investigations are always budgeted as heavy 
cases. Satuan Reskrim at the Polres receive a pre-fixed quota o f  light, medium and heavy cases. Polseks on 
the other hand are given funding for only three light cases every year. This funding is meant to cover a range 
o f  items: confiscating evidence, crime scene investigation, transporting w itnesses and so on. From my 
observations most o f  the investigator’s money is spent on administration (fuel costs, printing, stationery, and 
the like). Presumably such low overheads mean that Rp.15 million is more than sufficient for three light 
cases. The problem is it that it has to be. A Polsek can investigate dozens o f  cases every year. A lso the rare
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covers the financial shortfall, Juwono stated he “maximilises the loyalty” o f  his personnel 
[i.e. his personnel can, for example, pay their own petrol expenses]. After pushing the 
question from different angles, Juwono denied that his Polsek would either receive 
“donations” from the community or special grants from the Poltabes command. His 
argument that the loyalty o f  his personnel is a remedy to his Polsek’s financial shortfalls is,
• • 78however, very unconvincing.
Speaking with other Polsek commanders, I gained the impression that one o f  the legitimate 
tactics available to the police to cover budget shortfalls is to triage expenditure. In a 
neighbouring Polsek to Juwono’s, a second Polsek commander, Slamet [not his real name] 
related that he encounters the same problems as my previous interviewee. Slamet’s method 
o f  dealing with shortfalls was to cut money from non-essential programs, like the 
community policing program or the renovation o f  his Polsek building, to cover the essential 
activities, like criminal investigation. This tactic in principle constitutes financial 
malpractice. I asked the respondent whether his activities raised problems with his 
superiors in Poltabes headquarters. He responded “yes -  but don’t forget Poltabes has the 
same problems we do, just on a bigger scale.”79 Based on his responses I would suggest 
that police budgeting is highly elastic. Police will reduce non-critical outputs in order to 
cover their most important activities due to structural deficiencies in their funding.
A final point to note on Polri expenditure is that police resources over the last decade have 
expanded exponentially. This situation is a reflection o f  not only Polri’s growing 
importance, but the severe neglect o f  the police during the ABRI period. I mentioned 
previously that a significant police reform has been the granting o f  budgetary autonomy to 
the lowest commands o f  the police. Yet this policy has been made possible only by the
high end costs o f  an investigation (such as transporting a w itness from outside the province, let alone forensic 
testing) can blow great holes in a Polsek’s budget. Interview, anonymous police interviewee, 2 July 2008.
78 As an aside, I left the interview with Juwono feeling at least som ewhat sympathetic for his situation. As I 
departed the building however, I happened to notice an immaculately washed car parked on his Polsek’s 
parade ground. Given its prominent position I assume the car belonged to Juwono, though I may be wrong. 
The car was a late 90 ’s model Honda civ ic with expensively customised features. By Indonesian standards the 
car was far more luxurious than what can be afforded on a civil servant’s wage. Such sights are not 
uncommon outside police stations, giving rise to legitimate suspicions that police are benefiting from 
corruption. The juxtaposition between what I heard in the interview versus what I saw, im plies w e should be 
circumspect about police protestations o f  destitution. Interview, Kapolsek “Juwono”, 2 July 2008.
79 Interview, Kapolsek Slamet, 14 July 2008.
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dramatic enhancement o f  Polri’s own percentage o f  the state budget. In the year 2000 Polri 
was granted a budget o f  Rp.I trillion. In the year 2008 this had expanded to Rp.21 trillion, 
an increase o f  2000%. In 1998, national police manpower was only 180,000 personnel. By
orv
2008 the number o f  police had grown to 380,000. Such increases have substantially 
enhanced the capabilities o f  police in the regions, albeit from a low base and with still 
significant capability lags. While my research is not able to comment on the role o f  
corruption in supplementing official police budgets, the substantial growth o f  police 
resources indicates that Polri is becoming increasingly self-reliant.
Regional government: Pol.PP and the PPNS
We now turn to examine the second most active policing agency in the case study region: 
regional government. Regional government has a large, emerging role in law enforcement 
in Yogyakarta. Regional government connects to the security network in two ways. It can 
be viewed as a unitary actor through its executive leadership. It also operates through 
autonomous sub-units which individually connect to the network. As a unitary actor, 
regional government executive heads directly engage with other elements o f  the security 
apparatus (like Polri and TNI) through regional leaders’ conferences. This type o f  
engagement will be discussed further in chapter three. Underneath the top-level o f  the 
provincial and district governments, there are a number o f  specialised agencies that perform 
specific law enforcement activities and generalist meta-departments that uphold a wide 
variety o f  local government ordinances. The specialist agencies examined in this research 
are the Dinas Perhubungan (Transport Bureau) o f  the districts and the Dinas Kehutanan 
(Forestry Management Bureau) o f  the provincial government.81 The most active
80 Interview, anonymous source in Police Headquarters, 5 September 2008.
81 Under the terms o f  Indonesia’s decentralisation program certain non-core functions were handed over to the 
regions to administer. Am ong these are the delivery o f  government services (such as education and health) 
and certain regulatory functions (like the exam ples here, transportation and forest exploitation). Although 
there are national departments o f  transportation and forests, regional government directs the regional offices 
o f  these departments and the delivery o f  their core-fiinctions. This relationship is not uncontested -  as Luke 
Arnold points out, since the early two thousands the national government has re-centralised many o f  the 
permission processes in the forestry sector. I, however, do not explore this centre/regions power struggle in 
my dissertation. Rather I only look at the networked character o f  law enforcement by regional government 
agencies. Luke Arnold, ‘Deforestation in Decentralisation Indonesia: What’s Law got to do with it?’ Law, 
Environment and Development Journal, 4 /2  (2000), 82, 87.
enforcement agency, however, are the various Dinas Ketertiban (Public Order Bureaus) o f  
the province and the districts. We will therefore examine the Public Order agencies first 
and then review the Forestry and Transport Bureaus.
Public Order Bureaus generally consist o f  two different types o f  enforcement personnel, 
each having different powers. These are the civil service police or Pol.PP (the repressive 
arm) and the PPNS civil service investigators (the investigative/enforcement arm). The 
central government mandates the authority o f  both o f  these types o f  personnel. The central 
government empowers the Pol.PP to take “repressive” non-legal action against citizens or 
organisations believed to be violating local government law. In elucidating this power, we 
can use the example o f  illegal constructions. In such cases the Pol.PP typically take on the 
duty o f  physically evicting the inhabitants o f  illegal structures and then executing 
dismantlement. The PPNS on the other hand are civil servants who have been licensed to 
investigate violations o f  sectoral laws. They are a kind o f  non-police detective. Indonesian 
law recognises two types o f  investigators: police investigators and PPNS.84 PPNS have 
responsibilities for conducting criminal investigations in their own sector o f  expertise. Thus 
in the forestry environment there are PPNS for enforcing forestry law, while in the tax 
office there are PPNS for investigating taxation violations. Individual statutes define the 
responsibilities o f  PPNS, but in general PPNS have the same powers as police detectives: to
oc 9
call witnesses, seize evidence, interrogate a suspect, and so forth. Historically Polri have
supervised all PPNS in the Indonesian bureaucracy. This supervisory function has been
enforced even to the point where police detectives are obliged to manually check PPNS
0£ • • •
investigations before the case files are sent to the public prosecutor. This situation is 
beginning to change today.87 During the time o f  my research, all PPNS I encountered in
82 PP 32/2004, Pasal 5.
83 ‘Warga Parangtritis Pasrah Rumahnya Digusur’ Detik.com, 13 Novem ber 2006.
S4 Republik Indonesia: Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana (1981), Pasal 6.
85 Republik Indonesia: Keputusan Menteri Kehakiman Republik Indonesia N o. M -04-PW -07-03/1984 tentang 
W ewenang PPNS, Pasal 2.
86 Republik Indonesia: Fatwa Mahkamah Agung N o. KM A /l 14/1 V /l 990
87 A number o f  laws, like the Capital Market Supervisory Act, have liberated som e PPNS from police 
supervision. PPNS in the Capital Market Supervisory Agency for example now deal with courts and public 
prosecutors directly [Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang 8/1995 tentang Pasar Modal, pasal 101, Ayat 6] 
This is the cause o f  some concern in Mabes Polri. One o f  my senior informants in the Mabes Polri Legal 
Division looks askance at this trend, believing that it erodes Polri’s superiority in law enforcement. Some 
efforts have been made in the Mabes Polri Legal Division to draft a new law to solidify Polri’s power to 
supervise all PPNS (as well as civil society groups, private security guards and special police). Today the
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Yogyakarta in the Tax Office, the immigration service, the Forestry Office and regional
government still operated under old laws in which they depended upon police approval to
• 88conclude criminal investigations.
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The district public order agencies have minor organisational differences and significant 
differences o f  resources, but structurally they are very similar. The Dinas Ketertiban o f  
Yogyakarta city is divided into three components: a Pol.PP element that consists o f  sixteen 
headquarters staff, twenty six permanent polisi pamong praja and 192 contract workers 
(serving in the capacity o f  Pol.PP). There is one other division for PPNS, with twenty eight 
personnel and one other support unit o f  eighteen administrative personnel.90 The Kabupaten 
o f  Bantul organises its Office o f  Public Order in much the same way; it has fifty seven 
personnel in the Pol.PP section, twelve personnel in the PPNS section and eighteen 
personnel split up into an administrative working group.91 Compared to the district police, 
these law enforcement agencies are tiny. The entire Pol.PP force in Bantul for example, 
exceeds no more than 20% o f  the district police command. The Dinas Polisi Pamong Praja 
dan Ketertiban Masyarakat o f  Sleman is slightly different. Although this bureau carries out
• • Q?law enforcement functions it also has other, non-related units. Unlike Bantul and the city 
o f  Yogyakarta, Sleman does not put all its civil service investigators in one office. Rather, 
this district has around fifty PPNS o f  which only half have current licenses, and all are 
split up in their areas o f  speciality; so for example, the Transport Office has five PPNS, the
Police Law gives Polri these rights, but my source in Mabes feels the Police Law is too weak and easily  
forgotten by parliamentarians and other bureaucracies. Ironically though my informant faces the greatest 
apathy, not from outside the police, but from within Polri itself. The most senior officers in the National 
Police have (perhaps due to a lack o f  insight) been com pletely oblivious to the central coordinating role o f  
Polri in law enforcement. To date, despite pressure from M abes’ own legal division, the senior police 
leadership have seen no reason to push parliament to strengthen Polri’s supervisory powers. Interview, senior 
officer in Mabes Polri Legal D ivision, 29 May 2008.
88 Keputusan Mendagri 6/2003. Under Pasal 6, the PPNS in the pemda are still required to pass their 
investigations to the prosecutors through the police.
89 The Indonesian bureaucracy establishes a hierarchy between, in descending order: Badan (A gency), Divisi 
(division), Direktorat (directorate), Biro (branch), Dinas (bureau), Kantor (office). A dinas has more 
personnel and higher ranking leaders than a kantor, and so on. In Yogyakarta, the provincial government, the 
Yogyakarta city district and Sleman have Dinas Ketertiban, w hile Bantul has a smaller Kantor Ketertiban.
90 Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta: Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah Tahun 2006, 
Lampiran 10.
91 Interview, Jadi Bayu Broto (Kep. Seksi Pengamanan) and Wahyu Priyanto (Kep. Seksi Penegakkan Perda), 
Kantor Satpol.PP Kabupaten Bantul, 7 N ovem ber 2008.
92 Such as a firefighters unit and the O ffice o f  National Unity, Sport and Youth (Kesatuan Bangsa, Pemuda 
dan Olahraga).
93 The inactive PPNS are bureaucrats whose investigative licenses have expired.
Public Works Office has one, and so on.94 The task o f  the PPNS section in Sleman’s Public 
Order Bureau is to bring these external personnel together for enforcement operations. 
There were also seventy two Pol.PP in Sleman in the year 2007.95
The budgets o f  the different bureaus show that while they may look similar, they do not 
necessarily enjoy similar capabilities. In the year 2006 the city o f  Yogyakarta’s Dinas 
Ketertiban had a yearly budget o f  Rp.8.3 billion. 96 The 2007 budget o f  Sleman’s Dinas 
Ketertiban was over Rp.2.3 billion.97 In 2007, the substantially smaller Office o f  Public 
Order in Bantul received only Rp.877 million.98 While the resource base o f  the district law 
enforcement agencies may be vastly different, their activities though are very similar.
The three district agencies in this study break their yearly activities down into four core 
items: training and development, operations for enforcing public order (or operasi pro- 
represif), investigations, passive guarding/patrolling, and pressing charges for violations o f  
local ordinances (or operasi pro-yustisi). The first program constitutes an administrative 
support function, the following two programs are executed by the Pol.PP and the final 
program is the responsibility o f  PPNS.
The Pol.PP are responsible for physically executing the pro-represif activities. Common 
targets o f  the Pol.PP are pedagang kaki lima (PKL or street sellers),99 dismantling 
unregulated advertising,100 demolishing illegal buildings, conducting raids against vice like 
the illegal alcohol trade (minuman keras or miras) and trade in pornography or contraband
94 Interview, Kepala Seksi Penegakkan Perda (Dinas Polisi Pamong Praja Kabupaten Sleman), Joko 
Marhaendarto, 2 August 2007. Interview, Kepala Seksi Lalu Lintas (Dinas Kimpraswilhub Kabupaten 
Sleman), Sulton Fatoni, 10 Novem ber 2008.
95 Kabupaten Sleman: Dinas Polisi Pamong Praja dan Ketertiban Masyarakat, Uraian Tugas Personil Tahun
2007.
96 The city’s public order budget is divided into Rp.5.1 billion for w ages and administration and Rp.3.6 billion  
for law enforcement operations. The latter figure contains a special appropriation o f  Rp.1.2 billion for the
2006 mayoral elections, a once five yearly event. Dinas Ketertiban, Laporan Akuntabilitas, 2.
97 Kabupaten Sleman: Dinas Polisi Pamong Praja dan Ketertiban Masyarakat, Rencana Kerja Tahunan 2007.
98 Kabupaten Bantul: Ringkasan Dokumen Pelaksanaan Perubahan Anggaran Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah 
-  Kantor Satpol PP (September 2007).
99 District governments consider PKL as som ething o f  a nuisance insofar that they establish itinerant 
businesses in public and private spaces. The districts wage a constant battle to control their numbers and 
prevent them disturbing traffic.
I<)0 Street marketing (with flags, posters and the like) -  which is quite popular in Indonesia -  is a source o f  
revenue for the districts. The districts o f  Yogyakarta therefore forbid untaxed advertisements.
media, inspecting premises which are strictly regulated such as night clubs and boarding 
houses,101 checking markets/retail traders for out o f  date or misrepresented products,102 
removing street people and beggars, providing public enlightenment {penyuluhan) about 
public order (among schools, neighbourhood watch groups and others), policing littering 
and public dumping.103 The Pol.PP usually conduct these activities during regular patrols 
and through planned operations. Planned operations are held frequently against the vice 
industries. The Pol.PP also have permanent responsibilities as district government security 
guards. In each o f  the districts, the public order bureaus allocate large sections o f  each shift 
to guarding district government offices, district parliaments and other district assets. To 
give some idea o f  the size o f  these activities in the year 2006, the Dinas Ketertiban o f  
Yogyakarta city planned 130 anti-vice operations. Some o f  these operations were small, 
involving single units o f  Pol.PP (or regu o f  only eleven personnel) patrolling 
independently. Other operations were large, planned affairs undertaken jointly with the 
district police command, employing several regu o f  both police and Pol.PP, involving more 
than forty personnel with multiple police and Pol.PP vehicles, hitting pre-arranged, pre­
reconnoitred targets. Typically these large operations take place four to five times a month 
and spike during Ramadhan.104 Thus in each o f  the districts the Pol.PP detachments 
perform most o f  the physical policing work, including the patrolling, guarding and the 
execution o f  operations.
The PPNS on the other hand, exclusively perform investigative tasks. It is more difficult to 
depict the work o f  these personnel. They do not program regular activities, rather the 
burden o f  their investigative work follows the pace o f  operations set by the Pol.PP. The 
PPNS participate in Pol.PP operations, assuming the duty o f  charging the suspects who are
101 Operators o f  such businesses are often obliged to observe strict conditions. Owners o f  boarding houses for 
example must ensure they only offer single sex accommodation, that their customers do not use drugs or 
engage in immoral behaviour, among other standards. Kota Yogyakarta: Peraturan Daerah N o.4/2003  
Penyelenggaran Pondokan, Pasal 6, 8.
102 This may sound unimportant but in the local context upholding food quality is quite significant. In a 
Muslim country like Indonesia the sale o f  products marketed as halal must be enforced with strict standards. 
The natural concerns o f  M uslims towards the purity o f  their foods is made worse by the unscrupulousness o f  
som e market traders, who have been known to adulterate their products (I have been told one anecdote by a 
Pol.PP leader who claimed som e butchers inject water into their products during Ramadhan, since the water 
increases the weight and hence the price.). Interview, Kandiawan, 10 April 2008.
103 Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta, Seksi Pengendalian Operasi: Rencana Kegiatan Pengendalian Operasi 
(2007), p.3-5.
11)4 Interview, Norwidi, 23 October 2007.
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rounded up. In the city o f  Yogyakarta and Bantul, PPNS also coordinate their own snap 
inspections and raids on licensed premises. I participated in several o f  these patrols and 
witnessed them inspecting a number o f  building sites and businesses, and catching several 
people who had failed to obtain official permission.105 Aside from their own patrols and 
supporting Pol.PP operations, the PPNS also have the responsibility o f  acting as the 
regional government’s prosecutor in court. In the city o f  Yogyakarta this means at least 
twice every week the PPNS must attend court to prosecute public order offences.106 In 
Bantul this happens only once or twice a month, as their workload is much smaller.107 In 
Sleman, the circumstances are different. In this district, the PPNS tend to hold periodic 
operations referred to as operasi yustisi. The Dinas Ketertiban o f  Sleman will coordinate 
sting type operations -  targeting for example, vehicle worthiness -  in which, the PPNS, the 
district prosecutors and the district judges will hold ad hoc court sessions at a site where 
suspects are arrested.108 As an indication o f  their workload, the PPNS o f  Bantul pressed 
charges against 125 people from January to September 2008 (though it is not certain how 
many were actually sentenced in court).109 In 2006 the city o f  Yogyakarta submitted 1017 
cases to court.110 In both examples, most o f  those charged violated building laws.
What emerges from the above discussion is a picture o f  a relatively significant source o f  
regulation that is growing in influence and capacity. Clearly the small size and statutory 
powers o f  district Pol.PP and PPNS place them in a much junior role to that o f  the National 
Police. Nevertheless, to the extent it is able, district government in Yogyakarta is clearly 
flexing its ability to enforce order within its territory. The growth o f  Pol.PP and PPNS at
105 Field Observation with the Seksi Penegakkan Perda, Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta, 4 July 2007.
10(1 Interview: Senior member o f  Seksi Penegakkan Perda (Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakakarta) 16 April 
2008.
107 Kabupaten Bantul, Kantor Satpol.PP: Jadwal Kegiatan Operasional Seksi Penegakkan Perda 2008.
108 In this example, vehicle inspection raids, PPNS from the district transport bureau, with the district 
prosecutors, police and judges would set up a mobile court and roadside sw eep operation at certain 
intersections; investigating, arresting, charging and trying the accused at the roadside. I did not succeed in 
obtaining data on the frequency o f  these type operations. This was due to a lack o f  cooperation on the part o f  
the head o f  the Sleman Bureau o f  Public Order. My sense however is that the enforcement o f  regional 
ordinances in this particular Kabupaten is weak (due in part to poor leadership from the agency) and I would 
wager that these operasipro-yustisi are probably infrequent. Interview, Kepala Seksi Lalu Lintas Sulton 
Fatoni, 2008.
109 Dinas Ketertiban Sleman: Rekap Laporan Pelanggaran Perda Seksi Penegakan Perda Kantor Satuan Pol.PP 
(10 October 2008).
110 Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta: Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah (2006), ‘Hasil 
Kegiatan Penegakan Perda.’
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the district level indicates a new locus o f  law enforcement power evolving in line with 
decentralisation. While as will be discussed in chapters three and four, the Pol.PP and 
PPNS still require police support to discharge their missions, as a distinct, autonomous 
security organisation, district law enforcement agencies occupy an important role within 
networked security arrangements.
The provincial government also has its own civil service police. The terms o f  Indonesia’s 
decentralisation program, however, do not permit provincial Pol.PP and PPNS a 
considerable role in law enforcement. This observation was put to me by several senior 
Pol.PP in the districts. One o f  these informants, the head o f  the Public Order Office o f  
Bantul argued that under regional autonomy reforms, the central government gave the 
power to deliver government services to districts, not provinces. The provinces were given 
largely coordinating powers. In Indonesian thinking, this translates to something that has an 
anthropological and not only legal significance. According to the informant, bupatis are 
seen as owning territory -m ereka  punyai wilayah”) while governors are seen as taking care 
o f  issues which cross district boundaries (“mereka koordinisasi”). As a result, so describes 
the informant, the bupati in contemporary Indonesia is like a little king (“raja keciF). 
Although the provincial government has its own provincial public order ordinances, the 
provincial Pol.PP/PPNS must “knock the door first [to the districts i.e. ask permission]” 
before they can enter the kabupaten jurisdiction.111 This source is o f  course biased, but his 
observation does appear valid when we examine the activities o f  the provincial enforcement 
apparatus.
Although the provincial Dinas Ketentraman dan Ketertiban has quite a number o f  
personnel and many perda to uphold, its activities are quite limited. At the provincial level 
there are 177 Pol.PP and twenty five PPNS.112 The provincial Dinas is responsible for 
enforcing more than twenty three regional regulations and oversees two national laws (on 
the protection o f  consumers and standardised weights and measures). Most o f  the perda
111 My interviewee stressed this point, claiming in his experience, the Yogyakarta provincial government is 
“really, really, really timid (sangat, sangat, sangat, tidak berani)” about operating on district territory without 
the permission o f  the district government. When one considers that the sultan/governor o f  Yogyakarta is 
perhaps the most normatively powerful o f  all Indonesia’s provincial heads, this is a significant finding. 
Interview, Kandiawan, 8 October 2008.
112 Interview, Kepala Bagian Pol.PP, Dinas Ketertiban Propinsi, Nugroho Prasetyo, 26 May 2008.
121
relate to the payment o f  regional fees, such as those for trucking or other transportation 
companies licensed by the provincial government.1 lj To enforce these provincial 
regulations, the provincial public order office must first coordinate and obtain the 
permission o f  the district public order hierarchy. The provincial Dinas Ketertiban remains 
in continuous dialogue with their district counterparts through tri-monthly meetings at 
which they establish consensus to proceed with their operations in the districts.114
Provincial PPNS are most often involved in investigation offences related to weights and 
measures. Provincial PPNS are also involved in supporting - or as they describe it 
“ facilitating” - the enforcement activities o f  their counterparts in the districts.115 In effect, 
for the provincial Public Order Bureau to make itself relevant to the regional law 
enforcement sector, it must hold joint operations with the district PPNS officials. The 
province provides funds for the joint operations, the districts and the province pool their 
personnel and the district Ketertiban offices allow the joint activities to go ahead on their 
territory. As an example, in 2008 the Public Order Office of  Bantul participated in five such 
activities, the last being an anti-prostitution sting.116
For the provincial Pol.PP detachment, their range o f  activities is even more limited. Their 
main task is to guard the governor, the provincial parliament, the provincial bureaucratic 
offices and other provincial government assets. Occasionally, the Pol.PP office attempts to 
monitor, patrol and arrest purveyors o f  the vice trade that takes place between the borders 
o f  Central Java province and DIY. Again however, the provincial Pol.PP is forced to work 
with their counterparts in the districts to do this.117 In interviews with the provincial Pol.PP, 
I received the distinct impression that they conceived o f  their primary function as security 
guards.
113 Dinas Kentremanan dan Ketertiban Propinsi DIY, Daftar Perda Propinsi.
114 Interview, Kepala Bagian Penegakan Perda Gunder Soesino (D inas Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Propinsi), 
26 May 2008.
115 This amounts to subsidising the district activities. Apparently the province does not offer assistance to 
either the city municipality o f  Yogyakarta or the Kabupaten o f  Sleman. The provincial Dinas Ketertiban 
judges these districts to be financially capable o f  managing their own enforcement functions. Support is 
instead channelled to Bantul, Gunung Kidul and Kulon Progo. Interview, Gunder, 26 May 2008.
Il(’ Interview, Kandiawan, 8 October 2008.
117 Interview, Nugroho Prasetyo, May 2008.
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Given these facts I suggest the role o f  the provincial law enforcement apparatus is 
marginal. It has a limited range o f  enforcement functions, even by the low standards o f  the 
districts. The provincial PPNS/Pol.PP must even cooperate with the districts in order to be 
active at all. As such, when talking about regional law enforcement in the case study site, 
the provincial level o f  government is largely disengaged from this sector.
Specialist agencies fo r  regional government policing: Forestry and Transport
Bureaus
Within the regional government administration there are other sectoral agencies involved in 
law enforcement within their respective sectors. This chapter only provides a short 
introduction to two examples o f  these sectoral agencies, the Forestry and Transportation 
Bureaus, while postponing more comprehensive analysis o f  their work until chapter four. 
Sectoral actors like these have only limited mandates, applicable to their specific sector. 
They also have an interesting bifurcated identity. National laws define their tasks and 
authority. Because o f  Indonesia’s decentralisation program, however, these agencies fall 
under the umbrella o f  regional government. As such, it is the regional government whih 
actually directs their work.
The Dinas Kehutanan (Forestry Bureau) exists at both a district and provincial level, but 
the provincial office in Yogyakarta carries out most o f  the guarding activities and has the 
largest security unit. Within the provincial Forestry Office there is a Seksi Pengamanan (or 
security section). In 2008 this section consisted o f  twenty six kepolisian khusus or special 
police and two PPNS. At the time o f  my research, the forestry PPNS no longer held valid 
licenses to investigate forestry crimes.118 The legal powers o f  the forestry police are laid out 
in two laws: Law No.41/1999 on Forestry and Government Regulation No.45/2004 on the
118 In Indonesia there are technically three kinds o f  police: Polri (the national police), Kepolisian Khusus 
(special police) and Satpam (commercial security guards). The special police com e in two varieties, Forestry 
Police (attached to the Forestry O ffice) and Railway Police (operating in the state railway company). For 
personnel data see: Interview, Kepala Seksi Pengamanan, Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Propinsi DIY, 
Tri Basuki, 28 June 2008.
123
Protection o f  Forests. The more detailed government regulation empowers the forestry 
police to guard and patrol state protected forests, collect evidence o f  illegal logging and 
arrest suspects.119 The 1999 law grants PPNS in the forestry environment the right to 
interrogate witnesses, confiscate evidence, request explanations and form a case against a 
suspect for violating forestry law.120 The Forestry Police are in essence the patrol police 
and the detectives o f  the forestry sector.
The forestry police in the provincial office are relatively inactive, due to a lack o f  criminal 
activity, poor resourcing and the nature o f  the local environment. The area o f  protected 
forest in DIY is only 2,312 hectares.121 Thus Yogyakarta’s forests are relatively small 
compared to those in most o f  the rest o f  Indonesia. Secondly, forestry crime is minimal. 
The culprits o f  illegal logging are usually rural dwellers living close to the forests who cut 
down individual trees for personal use.122 Finally, the operational budget o f  the Forestry 
Police in the area is small, only Rp.650 million in 2008. Rp.400 million came from the 
regional government budget (APBD) to finance wages and personnel costs, while Rp.250 
million came from the national government (APBN) forestry department budget, 
specifically for security operations. However this source o f  funds is not always reliable. In 
2007 the allocation was slashed by 70% due to fiscal tightening. As a result the Dinas could
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not afford to run anti-logging operations in 2007. Despite the limitations on its 
effectiveness the provincial forestry police still manage to mount patrols o f  the Yogyakarta 
protected forest area (including permanently manning three picket boxes in three different 
forest locations) and usually coordinate several anti-logging operations every year. I will 
postpone discussion o f  the details o f  Forestry Police operations and relations with Polri 
until chapter four.
119 Republik Indonesia: Peraturan Pemerintah N o.45/2004 tentang Perlindungan Hutan, pasal 36.
120 Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang N o.41/1999 tentang Kehutanan, pasal 77.
121 Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Propinsi, DIY Yogyakarta: Data Luas Hutan Negara Berdasarkan 
Fungsi Hutan Per Kabupaten di Propinsi DIY. Available from: <http://www.dishutbun.pemda- 
diy.go.id/v9/?page=kelolahutan >, last accessed 28 October 2009.
1-2 The first time the Forestry Police noticed sm all-scale illegal industrial logging was in 2007. In this year a 
team o f  people was seen chainsaw felling hundreds o f  logs. Interview, Tri, 2008. Dinas Kehutanan dan 
Perkebunan Propinsi DIY, Rekapitulasi Kerusakan Hutan 2007.
123 Interview, Tri, 2008.
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Within the regional government transportation bureaucracy, district transportation bureaus 
perform more important law enforcement functions compared to their provincial 
counterparts. District Transport Bureaus are responsible for enforcing automobile standards 
for private (non-commercial) vehicles, which are the vast majority o f  vehicles on 
Indonesia’s roads. This is the most important enforcement function carried out by the 
transport offices. Law enforcement is not however an especially important responsibility 
for the transport bureaucracies. Thus in the district o f  Sleman for example, the transport 
office had only five PPNS in 2008, while the city o f  Yogyakarta had around six PPNS.124 
Both o f  these offices execute their enforcement tasks in the form o f  combined operations 
with the police and their district’s civil service police. More o f  the work o f  the Transport 
Bureau will be discussed in chapter four.
In summary if we disaggregate Indonesian regional government and analyse its 
autonomous sub-units, there are multiple agencies which are involved in law enforcement: 
these consist o f  both specialist local policing agencies and sectoral policing actors like the 
Forestry Police and the Transport Bureau. Between these two type o f  agencies the 
specialist, meta-policing bureaus at the district level emerge as the most important. While 
provinces and districts are both involved in law enforcement, Indonesia’s approach to 
decentralisation preferences the districts. The security network becomes even more 
intricate, however, when we factor in the non-Polri security agencies o f  the national 
government.
Central government security and law enforcement actors
Within Yogyakarta there are a number o f  security actors, beside Polri, which fall under the 
umbrella o f  the national government. Although these actors perform relatively minor 
security functions, they are worth analysing. By factoring in these remaining groups the 
true extent o f  the plurality and complexity o f  regional security becomes apparent. Within
124 Interview, M.Moeljanto, Kep.Bag.Teknik Sarana dan Prasarana dari Dinas Perhubungan Kota Yogyakarta,
30 October 2008.
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this latter group we find the territorial units o f  the Indonesian army, the immigration service 
and the regional tax office.
Yogyakarta, like other regions in Indonesia, has its own territorial army unit: Korem 072. 
This army resort command is a sub-part o f  Kodam (or Komando Daerah Militer) IV, which 
covers the region o f  Central Java. Korem 072 has ten sub-units (Kodim), one for each o f  
the districts o f  Yogyakarta province, plus five others for neighbouring districts in Central
pc #
Java. The Korem has one infantry battalion o f  around 500 personnel with an 
indeterminate number o f  troops attached to each Kodim (and the sub-units o f  the Kodim, 
the Koramil, which cover the sub-district level o f  government).
Determining what Yogyakarta army territorial units actually do is not an easy task, “ but 
from the little evidence available I propose they have at least four active functions: training
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for war, supporting the police, performing community service and collecting intelligence. 
This modest set o f  duties generally supports the argument o f  chapter one, that since the 
separation o f  the police from the Indonesian military, the TNI no longer performs the 
internal security functions that it did during the Suharto era.
What is clearly apparent during my one interview with the Korem leadership was the 
dissonance between the common perception o f  the military as a powerful, authoritative 
security entity compared to the limited range o f  functions that territorial forces actually 
perform. My respondents, the Korem head o f  intelligence, head o f  operations and head o f
125 Interview: Kasi Intelijen Mayor Suwarno, Kasi Teritorial Mayor Jawa Heru dan Kasi Operasi Mayor 
Nurodin, Korem 072, 30 June 2008.
126 To give some background on the difficulty o f  dealing with the Indonesian military, I was granted one 
interview with the Yogyakarta Korem in June 2008. It took approximately five months to arrange this 
interview, and multiple layers o f  the military headquarters in Jakarta had to grant their permission. At the end 
o f  this long and bureaucratic process, I was granted an audience with the Korem’s head o f  intelligence, head 
o f  operations and head o f  territorial forces. Much o f  the evidence I refer to in this chapter originates from the 
little information that they gave me during this one rather hostile meeting. At the interview I asked the Korem 
only the questions TNI headquarters had already approved. After the officers terminated this meeting at their 
behest, the Korem refused to have further contact with me. Tw o months later, the Indonesian agency 
responsible for my research (RISTEK), formally demanded a meeting with my Indonesian supervisor (the 
head o f  the Peace and Conflict Studies Centre at Gadjah Mada University). At this meeting, the RISTEK 
executive questioned why UGM sponsored a foreign researcher to delve into Indonesia’s internal security 
matters. Subsequently during the year, RISTEK refused to extend my research permission. I suspect that the 
local Korem officers complained to RISTEK about my interest in them (recalling I had already done a year o f  
research in Yogyakarta at that time with no problems from any other informants).
127 The intelligence collection functions o f  the territorial units w ill be discussed in the next chapter.
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territorial forces, stated that the Korem’s primary duty is implementing a training schedule 
for personnel underneath its command. The training schedule is sent down on an annual 
basis from Kodam headquarters in Semarang. Particularly noteworthy, however, was the 
attitude o f  my interviewees to the army’s role in local security. My respondents conceded 
that the Korem does have a support function for the police. This responsibility is governed 
under specific military protocols.128 My interviewees were cautious to underline that, as far 
as they were aware, there had never been a security disturbance in Yogyakarta where their 
forces had been formally required to use repressive force in support o f  the police. In 
response to my prompting, they did recall that there were a number o f  incidents in which 
territorial forces had been mobilised under police command (for example the 2006 regional 
elections for the mayor o f  Yogyakarta). At such times, army personnel were only ever put 
on active alert (tetap disiagakan), but were not actually deployed outside their barracks.
• 1 ?QThis information is supported by other sources.
In order to obtain direct confirmation I put the question to the Korem leadership, as to 
whether territorial forces ever (in their command), had independently responded to civil 
disturbances or been involved in any manner o f  internal security operation. My question 
was refuted and 1 was told that this was a task for the Indonesian police. The lead 
respondent, the head o f  intelligence drew a comparison with Australia explaining “our 
duties are much like those o f  the defence force o f  your own country [Australia]. We are 
here for defensive purposes. We are not that much different to the Australian military.” In 
this way the respondents deliberately denied that the Korem was permitted to deploy its
130organic forces independently in support o f  internal security operations. I can conclude 
from my only interview with the military that, at least according to their interpretation o f
128 Which for TNI forces is written in the Mabes TNI doctrine: Petunjuk Pelaksanaan tentang Bantuan 
kepada Polri dalam rangka Bantuan Kamtibmas (2006). I was not however permitted to read the doctrine.
1-91 found some supporting information from the head o f  the intelligence section in the Pol.PP unit o f  
Yogyakarta city. In his experience o f  election security operations in 2006, TNI forces were put on stand-by, 
but never actually used. Interview, Former Kepala Seksi Intel. Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta, 19 April 
2008.
130 This view  was qualified by the respondents at an earlier part o f  the interview. The head o f  operations, in 
his explanation o f  the principles o f  assistance to the police did point out that the military police (Denpom) are 
charged with enforcing military law over TNI personnel. As such Denpom always conducts either 
independent or joint patrols with the police (he gave the example o f  Lebaran, when Denpom join the police in 
anti-vice activities; largely for the purpose o f  arresting TNI personnel swept up in the raids). Their duties 
however only extend to searching and arresting TNI personnel. Interview: Kasi Intelijen, Kasi Teritorial dan 
Kasi Operasi, Korem 072, 2008.
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their tasks, the army believe they have no mandate to conduct independent security 
operations. Most importantly, I have found no other interviewee in Yogyakarta - police 
officer, journalist, former gangster, regional government bureaucrat, or other source - who 
has contradicted these officer’s testimony.
Based upon information gleaned from other sources and field observations, 1 am aware that 
the TNI is also actively assisting in community development projects run by regional 
government. This activity seems to be a modern adaption o f  the old Suharto era program 
‘ABRI masuk Desa’ (ABRI enters the village. I cannot speculate as to the number and scale 
o f  such projects in Yogyakarta today. I have though, at one time, observed one o f  these 
projects in the sub-district o f  Kotagede, Yogyakarta city, in May 2008. At that time one 
platoon o f  TNI forces had been organised to reconstruct a dike wall damaged in flooding. 
After discussions with the village (or Kelurahan) head o f  governmental affairs and with 
personnel on the work detail it became apparent that the territorial troops were providing 
unpaid labour to the project. The arrangement was that the kelurahan provided the 
materials, while the TNI provided the workforce. Although this is only one example, I find 
supporting references to such programs in the documents o f  the regional leaders conference 
in the Kabupaten o f  Sleman. At one meeting the Kodim commander o f  Sleman requested 
that the kabupaten provide funds for the Kodim to continue its program o f  bhakti sosial (or 
social assistance) as the Kodim had no funds o f  its ow n.132 I speculate that the condition o f  
the territorial forces in Sleman and the sub-district o f  Kotagede is probably similar: local 
TNI commands probably have no funds to administer what they see as an important civil 
engagement program. In the interim, the army continues to provide ad-hoc assistance but 
under the aegis o f  the local government.
With the exception o f  intelligence gathering, which will be discussed in chapter three, the 
above information summarises the data that I have been able to uncover about the activities 
o f  the Yogyakarta territorial command. The clear message which emerges from this 
evidence is how functionally limited the Indonesian military actually is in security 
management. The Indonesian military have little opportunity to transform their state
131 Field Observation, 19 May 2008.
132 Kabupaten Sleman: Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah, 18 Novem ber 2006, para.4.
128
defence responsibilities into practical involvement in the local security environment. In 
Yogyakarta, the security activities o f  territorial army units only seem to consist o f  
supporting the police.
There are finally two other law enforcement actors in the case study area which provide 
examples o f  how the national government can enforce laws through non-police agencies, 
these are the provincial immigration office, and the regional tax office. Both o f  these 
organisations, like the regional government forestry and the transport bureaucracies, 
implement sectoral laws. Both o f  these actors have limited mandates, but they are 
nevertheless part o f  the network o f  security in Yogyakarta.
The Yogyakarta Immigration Office is the provincial service point for the national 
immigration service, which is part o f  the Ministry o f  Law and Human Rights. The duties o f  
the immigration service are defined under Law No.9/1992 on Immigration, The 
immigration office is tasked with the duty o f  investigating violations o f  immigration law 
concerning foreigners who overstay or abuse their visas.133 The law empowers PPNS 
within the immigration service to investigate suspected crimes under immigration law. 
Within the two and a half years from 2006 to July 2008, the Yogyakarta Immigration 
Office investigated only four cases o f  immigration violations. The office has two PPNS.134
The Tax Office o f  Yogyakarta is the provincial service point for the national Directorate 
General o f  Taxation, an arm o f  the Indonesian Ministry o f  Finance. The Yogyakarta Tax 
Office has authority under two regulations o f  the Indonesian Finance Ministry to conduct
• • • • 11Sinvestigations into criminal conspiracies to avoid tax. The Office has eight PPNS and has 
uncovered three cases o f  criminal conspiracy, all o f  which were passed on to their head 
office in Jakarta for investigation. The reason for this low rate o f  prosecution is that the 
Yogyakarta Office o f  the Directorate General o f  Taxation was only opened in October
133 Undang-Undang Nomor 9/1992 tentang Keimigrasian, Bab VIII, Ketentuan Pidana.
134 Interview, Eko Prinono, Kepala Seksi Pengawasan dan Penindakan, Kantor Imigrasi Yogyakarta, 1 July
2008.
135 These regulations are: Peraturan Menteri Keuangan Nomor: 202/PM  K.03/2007 tentang Tata Cara 
Pemeriksaan Bukti Permulaan Tindak Pidana di Bidang Perpajakan. Keputusan Direktur Jenderal Pajak 
Nomor: KEP-272/PJ/2002 tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Pengamatan, Pemeriksaan Bukti Permulaan dan 
Penyidikan Tindak pidana Bidang Perpajakan. The crimes are defined in UU 28/2007 tentang Perubahan Ke-3 
atas UU 6/1983 tentang ketentuan Umum dan Tata Cara Perpajakan.
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2007. Previously taxation matters were dealt with by a sub-branch o f  the directorate in 
Yogyakarta. In the structure o f  the Directorate General o f  Taxation, the sub-branch did not 
have the full authority o f  a regional office. As such the three cases o f  violation o f  tax law 
which were found in Yogyakarta up to 2007, were not actually handled in Yogyakarta.136 In 
summary the remaining national law enforcement actors have authority for investigating 
crime, but are largely inactive. We will nevertheless look at their law enforcement relations 
with the police, in chapter four.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the case study site and the security agencies within it. Part o f  the 
objective has been to justify the relevance o f  this dissertation to the study o f  relations in 
security networks. I selected Yogyakarta as a case study initially to test the hypothesis that 
relations among security actors were bad. Unexpectedly, these hypotheses proved to be 
wrong. Instead what this thesis has set out to do is explain the alternative findings o f  why 
there are collaboration and clear divisions o f  labour among security agencies. As argued in 
this chapter, case study research provides valuable insights for answering the questions o f  
my research. Case study research is a powerful way for us to form empirical knowledge 
about the practice o f  security management at the sub-national level through in-depth, 
qualitative research. So far, this data has been missing from the contemporary literature.
Given the reputation o f  Yogyakarta as an unusual province within Indonesia, my thesis 
needs to confront potential criticisms regarding the relevance o f  my findings. In brief, I 
argue that the rich, qualitative data that emerges from a single case study project makes this 
form o f  research both justifiable and valuable, even for its purely empirical benefits. If  we 
wish to pursue the comparative value o f  Yogyakarta, I argue that this province can be used 
to generalise about relations within other security environments in Indonesia. In part this is 
because the state security organisations found within Yogyakarta are likely to operate 
within jurisdictions and work patterns that are universal in Indonesia. Likewise many
136 Interview, Kepala Kantor Pajak Daerah Yogyakarta Sigit, 27 June 2008.
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assumptions about Yogyakarta’s exceptional ism are questionable when we apply them to 
the security sector. Nevertheless it is conceded this thesis is presented as a single qualitative 
case study and justified on this basis alone.
The discussion o f  the Yogyakarta environment revealed that the case study is under­
developed, has a large population density and has an interesting mix of  actual and potential 
security threats. In terms o f  active threats, everyday crime afflicts Yogyakarta in much the 
same way as it probably does the rest o f  Indonesia. The large university sector leads to a 
complex mix o f  potential threats. The large number o f  young people combined with a 
permissive intellectual environment feeds a number o f  extremist movements and political 
agitation. This is manifested most visibly in the significant number o f  demonstrations 
around the provincial capital.
Finally, the largest part o f  this chapter consists o f  an analysis o f  the major public security 
actors in the Yogyakarta region, examining their size, jurisdiction and a broad overview o f  
their activities. This chapter has only reviewed public security organisations, given that 
these groupings are intricate and possess complex boundaries o f  jurisdiction. Even by 
merely examining the public sector, we obtain a picture o f  a highly plural, multifaceted 
security network. Within the national government apparatus we find police, army, tax and 
immigration officers all involved in security and law enforcement in the province. Added to 
this is a large array o f  regional government agencies, like civil service police, forestry 
police and transport officers. Yet the Indonesian police, by virtue o f  its size, authority and 
broad range o f  activities emerges clearly as the most significant among these groupings.
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Chapter 3: Collaboration Among State Security Institutions and the Role o f  Joint Agency
Committees
This chapter begins my analysis o f  collaboration among state security organisations. Within 
the Indonesian system o f  security management joint-institutional taskforces play a 
particularly important role in facilitating security cooperation. This chapter explores how 
interagency security committees operate in Yogyakarta. Ranked in order o f  importance, this 
chapter will examine the Regional Leader’s Conference (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah or 
Muspida), the Regional Intelligence Community meeting (Komunitas Intelijen Daerah or 
Kominda), the meeting o f  the Regional Head o f  Government, Regional Courts, Regional 
State Prosecutors and Police (Kepala Daerah, Pengadilan, Kejaksaan, Kepolisan -  
Kediljapol), and the sub-district leader’s forum (Musywarah Pimpinan Kecamatan or 
Muspika). Beside these examples there are also several taskforces which facilitate 
interagency law enforcement in specific sectors (such as the enforcement working group of  
the regional Narcotics Agency or the forestry security taskforce o f  the provincial forestry 
office).1
One o f  the prominent characteristics o f  this system is the absence o f ‘unity o f  comm and’ or 
a single institutional leader within the committee.2 A second characteristic is that agencies 
participate in these forums voluntarily. No superior entity or officer obliges them to
cooperate. American strategists have claimed that such models o f  inter-agency cooperation
• • • ■) 
which do not possess a dominant leader, are ineffective for creating collaboration. In part,
1 There is one other security forum I am aware o f  but have been unable to research as its initiator, the State 
Prosecutor’s office, refused to grant my request for an interview. This is the Community B elie f Supervisory 
Team (or Tim Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat -  Tim Pakem). This team is com posed o f  police, 
regional court, and regional government/interior ministry representatives (usually from the Kesatuan Bangsa 
dan Politik area). The team meets to discuss the ‘law fulness’ o f  deviant movem ents. The only information I 
have on this grouping com es from press reports. Tim Pakem in other parts o f  Indonesia have been especially  
active in monitoring heretical Islamic groups. 1 assume, given the organisational hierarchy o f  the state 
prosecutors that the team also exists in Yogyakarta. For press releases o f  the Kejaksaan Agung discussing Tim  
Pakem activities see: Republic Indonesia, Kejaksaan Agung, Jaksa Agung Muda Intelijen: 
< http://www.kejaksaan.go.id/unit kejaksaan.php?idu=22> last accessed 30 July 2009.
2 John T. Fishel, ‘The Interagency Arena at the Operational Level: The Cases N ow  Known as Stability 
Operations.’ In: Marcella, Affairs of State, 438.
3 Fishel, ‘The Interagency Arena at the Operational L evel.’ In: Marcella, Affairs of State, 438.
132
my data suggests this analysis is correct. The various joint-security forums in my case study 
site are not orientated to producing outcomes. While there is evidence to suggest these 
forums have engineered combined operations, the examples are few. Security committees 
in Yogyakarta are more suited to producing discussion.
Several factors explain why these forums produce dialogue rather than action. The 
prevailing security environment in Yogyakarta is a major factor. Only rarely do threats 
emerge in Yogyakarta which are o f  such significance that they demand a joint agency 
response. A second factor is the lack o f  a unifying strategic goal. American strategists argue 
that successful interagency security committees require a single, unifying objective. Except 
for narcotics and anti-logging taskforces, Yogyakarta’s security forums have only general 
terms o f  reference.4 The final explanation for the dialogue-over-results outcome is 
weaknesses in decision-making. Without a dominant leader in inter-agency committees, 
decisions are made on the basis o f  consensus. Consensus decisionmaking is slow and 
ineffective in driving action.
Having made the case that interagency security meetings in Yogyakarta are not orientated 
to producing outcomes, to judge them on this criteria alone would be unfair. I argue the 
primary benefit o f  joint-agency forums, ironically, lies in their ability to facilitate dialogue 
and consensus. The establishment o f  consensus is not an insignificant achievement. 
Common perceptions o f  inter-institutional relations in Indonesia assume that security actors 
are in conflict. The literature would have us believe Indonesia’s problem is not how to 
create the best interagency security outcomes but rather how to discourage interagency 
disputes. Judged on this basis, the evidence from Yogyakarta shows that interagency 
meetings are helpful in creating agreement. Arguably therefore we should see the security 
cooperation glass as being half full, rather than half empty.
To return to the issue o f  security outcomes, in this chapter it is clear that in the few times 
where joint-operations are required, generally the security forums serve to build the 
consensus which permits officers in the field, much lower down the chain, to put agreed 
decisions into action. Most often, when operations do take place, they take place between
4 Fishel, ‘The Interagency Arena at the Operational L evel.’ In: Marcella, Affairs of State, 438.
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Polri elements and Pol.PP, and often the police become the ‘leading sector’ (i.e. the agency 
which takes command). Occasionally when an issue falls within the regional government 
jurisdiction (for example, conducting evictions), the Pol.PP take the lead. The TNI, when 
they are very rarely involved in such activities, do so purely as a support element. 
Therefore the superior responsibilities and repressive powers o f  the police make Polri the 
metaphorical ‘muscle’ behind the joint agency process.
The final and unexpected finding o f  this chapter is that regional government actually plays 
a key role in joint agency forums. This situation is counterintuitive as regional government 
has only weak law enforcement capabilities o f  its own. All inter-institutional taskforces fall 
under the administration o f  regional government. Because o f  this, regional governments -  
particularly through the Muspida -  are able to impose some o f  its concerns on the national 
security apparatus and draw the national apparatus into resolving local problems. While 
regional government may have a loud voice in the meeting rooms, the forums require the 
powers o f  the police to enforce resolutions. Given that the primary interlocutors in 
interagency meetings - the police, military, regional government, the law courts and state 
prosecutors - are all virtually independent at the regional level, the issue o f  why they 
choose to cooperate becomes a critical question. I will provide a detailed analysis o f  the 
motives for security cooperation in chapter four. I begin this chapter however with a brief 
discussion o f  American studies o f  interagency security forums. This enables to contrast the 
strengths and weaknesses o f  the meeting process in Yogyakarta with the established theory. 
I then move into a review o f  each o f  the joint security conferences in turn.
The American Interagency Security Debate
The idea that interagency taskforces can play a meaningful role in security management 
comes from a branch o f  American security studies. At the beginning o f  the nineteen 
nineties, military policymakers and theorists o f  strategic studies began to examine has 
interagency cooperation within American national security policy. The failure o f  US 
intelligence agencies to stop the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks revitalised interest in
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this school o f  thinking.^ For my thesis this area o f  research is inspirational but o f  limited 
theoretical value. As the United States is a stable, united superpower this discourse is 
exclusively directed at debating how the interagency functions in managing America’s 
external security. In this school scholars discuss such things as the appropriate design o f  the 
American National Security Council,6 the role o f  interagency cooperation for military 
nation-building operations (like Kosovo in 1998),7 the weaknesses in the security structures 
o f  federal government,8 and so on. As such, a large part o f  these discussions are context 
specific to the United States.
While much o f  the work in this field is virtually irrelevant outside the American federal 
government, at least one writer has provided theory which is o f  interest to the non- 
American context. John Fishel analysed six case studies o f  interagency military operations. 
This includes the Malayan Emergency, the operation o f  the American combined services 
command during the Vietnam war, US narcotics interdiction operations in Florida and the 
Colombian government’s handling o f  the Colombian civil war. Fishel’s analysis o f  the 
interagency management o f  these security problems led him to infer: “ [there is] one 
obvious conclusion [about interagency cooperation]. Where there was unity o f  command, 
there was unity o f  effort and effective interagency coordination, not otherwise.” Fishel 
argues therefore that interagency taskforces require one leading institution as a necessity to 
achieve coordination. Secondly, “without a strategic objective, the best operational plan had 
little likelihood o f  mission success.” Therefore, every successful interagency activity must 
crystallise around a clear objective.9
Although one could argue that there are vast differences o f  kind between Fishel’s research 
on high conflict scenarios and my own research in Yogyakarta, to some extent this situation 
highlights the paucity o f  theory construction on this topic. Fishel’s research is one o f  the
5 Gabriel Marcella, ‘Understanding the Interagency Process: the Challenge o f  Adaption.’ In: Marcella, Affairs 
o f State, 3.
6 Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, Elizabeth McKune, ‘The National Security Policy Process: The 
National Security Council and Interagency System .’ In: Marcella, Affairs o f State, 97-171.
7 N eyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley ‘Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations.’ 
Paper, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National D efense University (August 2005).
8 Col. David J. Clement, ‘Improving the Efficiency o f  the Interagency.’ Paper, United States Army War 
C ollege (2005).
9 John T. Fishel, ‘The Interagency Arena at the Operational L evel.’ In: Marcella, Affairs of State, 438.
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few sources which attempts to make conclusions about interagency security relations at the 
meso or operational level. His observations on interagency taskforces in various war-like 
scenarios at least provides us with a yardstick to measure the functioning o f  security 
committees in Yogyakarta. As argued above some o f  his claims are accurate. Operational 
outcomes are closely linked to strong leadership and clear purpose. Security taskforces in 
Yogyakarta lack these elements, the effectiveness o f  them is accordingly small Yet FishePs 
analysis is heavily weighted to assuming the primary goal o f  interagency operations should 
be achieving outcomes. This assumption may be appropriate for countries like the United 
States where it is assumed agencies can be trusted to work cooperatively. For countries like 
Indonesia, the literature leads us to believe interagency cooperation is inherently 
problematic because o f  inter-institutional hostility and uncertain boundaries o f  jurisdiction. 
While supporting Fishel’s conclusion, I propose that in Indonesia our expectations o f  
success should be more conservative. I argue that where interagency security taskforces 
play a role in facilitating dialogue and consensus - which is prima facie  evidence o f  
collaboration - this should be noted as an achievement in and o f  itself.
Regional Leader’s Conference (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah)
In Indonesia, the Muspida is the most senior and important interagency security forum 
below the national government. The Muspida brings together the most important 
government figures at the provincial and district level. Historically, the Muspida had its 
origins in the nineteen sixties. In 1986, the president issued the most current executive 
order on the Muspida security meetings.10 According to this presidential decree, the 
primary intention o f  the Muspida is to “smoothen the implementation o f  national 
development” and “to assure the stability and unity o f  the state.” Following this, a 
secondary purpose is to strengthen the powers o f  local heads o f  government in developing
10 Keputusan President Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 1986 tentang Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah. 
Although according to the notes o f  the executive order, the forum has existed since at least 1967. Keppres 
10/1986 only served to revive the Muspida. Other boards with a similar composition can be found in the 
nineteen fifties. Lowry, Armed Forces of Indonesia, 75.
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their respective territories." If we overlook the Suharto-era rhetoric, the actual intention o f  
the Muspida is to allow regional actors to discuss and plan security.
National regulations on the Muspida are clear in certain respects, like the definition o f  the 
membership o f  the committee, but less plain about the Muspida’s exact functions. The 
Muspida consists o f  the governor at the provincial level and the bupati or walikota at the 
district level, as well as the regional military commander, the regional head o f  police, and
• 19the regional state prosecutor. The head o f  local government is tasked as the chair o f  the 
meeting. According to the presidential executive order, the Muspida is only authorised to 
achieve coordination. The chair is not empowered to make rulings that are binding upon the 
members. In a separate instruction, the minister o f  the interior has created a further 
requirement that Muspida meetings must take place at all regional levels o f  government 
once every three months (or sooner as required).13 Aside from these general points o f  
guidance, state regulations do not rule on what issues the Muspida should or should not 
discuss. The absence o f  a central, organising purpose emerges as a major theme in the 
operation o f  the Muspida in Yogyakarta.
The notes from district Muspida meetings provide us with the richest and largest array o f  
data for this chapter. Most o f  this information originates from declassified meeting notes 
compiled by the district governments o f  Sleman (2006-2008), Bantul (2003-2006) and 
Yogyakarta city (which provided miscellaneous papers from 2002 and 2003 and 
chronologically complete records from 2004-2007). This data is admittedly imperfect. The 
time series only spans several years, due to poor document storage. Sometimes the notes 
are incomplete or lapse into brief summaries.14 The provincial administration denied access 
to all its documents, preventing a comparison between layers o f  regional government.
11 Keppres 10/1986, ‘Menimbang: a & b.’
12 Keppres 10/1986, Pasal 4.
13 Surat Perintah Menteri Dalam Negeri, Hal: Pelaksanaan Keputusan Presiden N o. 10/1986, 
N o.l24 /1926/P U O D , Pasal 3. Within DIY, the governor has decided that all sitting fees and operational costs 
imposed by such forums are burdened upon the local government budget [Keputusan Gubernur Daerah 
Istimewa Yogyakarta N o.262/K PT S/1999, Pasal 3 and 4].
14 Information was deliberately withheld from me only once to my knowledge. This event concerned a July
2007 meeting o f  the Muspida in the city o f  Yogyakarta. The city’s Bagian Tata Pemerintahan withheld the 
meeting notes because the Muspida apparently discussed incidents o f  inter-ethnic conflict among university 
students. Aside from this meeting, the district governments assessed their Muspida notes as either unclassified  
or classified at the lowest level o f  secrecy, thus allowing the notes to be released to me in complete form.
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Despite these weaknesses in the data collection, nevertheless we should not underestimate 
the significance o f  these sources. These documents are the only publicly available, primary 
source government documents which I have found that reveal how security actors interact 
at the sub-national level. Given the originality o f  the source material, and the general 
importance o f  the Muspida for security collaboration, it is justifiable to analyse each district 
Muspida individually.
The declassified Muspida notes depict a functional system o f  security cooperation, though 
one which emphasises talk rather than action. As the organiser o f  the Muspida, regional 
government has an unexpectedly strong voice in the meetings. Despite the fact that national 
regulations link the Muspida to countering threats to national unity, in the post­
decentralisation period the district governments largely use the Muspida as a means o f  
involving national agencies in the resolution o f  local problems. Because regional 
government establishes the agenda, regional government decides much o f  what gets 
discussed. We therefore see a lot o f  matters which fall within regional government 
responsibility (i.e. vice, local election security) appearing in the Muspida. The other 
participants in the Muspida generally concede the initiative to regional government. 
However, serious matters which require repressive force generally get passed on to the 
police.
Muspida o f  Sleman
The Muspida o f  Sleman district13 shows many o f  the basic traits which are apparent in the 
Muspida o f  Bantul and Yogyakarta city -  that is, the Muspida discusses a broad variety o f  
security problems and many o f  them relate to the portfolio o f  regional government. 
Muspida documents from Sleman show the importance o f  the police in enforcing security. 
The documents also depict a good degree o f  consensus in meetings. What is interesting 
about the Muspida o f  Sleman though is that it is newer. After the introduction o f  local
13 The Kabupaten o f  Sleman refers to its Muspida as the Rapat Koordinisasi Pimpinan Daerah (Regional 
Leader’s Coordination M eeting or Rakorpim).
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autonomy the district government allowed the Muspida process to fall into inactivity, it was 
revived only in July 2006. According to the chief o f  the district bureaucracy, this was a 
matter o f  legal interpretation. The kabupaten government considered the 1999 autonomy 
laws did not specifically allow regional (otherwise termed horizontal) institutions to 
cooperate with national (vertical) institutions. This situation changed with the updated 2004 
laws on regional autonomy.16 This fact underlines one o f  the interesting things about this 
topic. Regional security cooperation is entirely dependent on the willingness o f  the 
institutions to work together.
Unfortunately, as the Muspida was only revived after 2006 there is not a long time span o f  
data. On the other hand, the participants did engage in very mature and introspective 
discussions after the resurrection o f  the meeting, in which they surveyed the security 
environment o f  the district. This set o f  talks differs from the notes o f  the other older 
Muspidas, where the roles o f  each agency and their attitudes to the meeting process have 
crystallised, and discussions are much more matter-of-fact. Therefore by comparison the 
documents from Sleman are fewer, but more interesting.
The Muspida o f  Sleman tackled a broad range o f  issues during 2006 to 2008 -  from natural 
disaster management to terrorism -  but it appears evident that while local government took 
the initiative in setting the agenda, it was the police that provided most o f  the wherewithal 
to handle problems. Being true to its foundations as a forum organised under local 
government, the bupati o f  Sleman took the lead in re-assembling the Muspida and setting 
its first discussion. On 29 June 2006, the bupati submitted papers to the regional leadership 
o f  Sleman17 asking them to attend a coordinating meeting to restart the Muspida. The 
bupati defined the Muspida’s task as to discuss five core problems:
16 The district secretary argues that Indonesia’s first autonomy law, UU 5/1974, refers to the Muspida while  
Indonesia’s next decentralisation laws UU 22 and 25/1999 do not. Therefore, until the 1999 local autonomy 
laws were superseded through UU 32/2004 (and the ruling o f  Pasal 27, huruf J which explicitly permits 
centre-region cooperation), the Muspida was not held officially in Sleman. The regional leaders did meet 
between 1999 and 2004, but on a personal, non-formal basis. Interview with Ir. Sutrisno, District Secretary o f  
the Kabupaten o f  Sleman, 30 July 2007. ‘Materi Rapat Persiapan Rakorpimda / Muspida, 29 Juni 2006 .’
17 Invited to attend were the deputy ch ie f o f  the district, the district state prosecutor and their deputy, the head 
o f  the district police, the deputy head o f  police, the district military commander and his ch ie f o f  staff and the 
Sleman district secretary. Notably absent however was the head o f  the district court. Kabupaten o f  Sleman: 
Materi Rapat Persiapan Rakorpimda /  Muspida, 29 Juni 2006 (provided by the Bagian Tata Pemerintahan), 
p .l.
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1. Policy on the execution o f  public law and order, for exam ple:
The handling o f  street sellers
Land conflict
M ass Dem onstrations
Neighbourhood Watch [ronda siskam ling] m anagem ent 
etc
2. Prevention o f  Natural Disasters, for exam ple:
Action Plan for Gunung Merapi [an active volcano in the district]
Handling o f  aftershocks [fo llow ing a m assive earthquake in Yogyakarta in June 2006] 
etc
3. Population Problems, for example:
C itizenship cards 
Supervision o f  foreigners 
etc
4. Social Problems, for exam ple:
A buse o f  N arcotics  
Handling o f  Street Children 
etc
5. U pholding statutory law and regulations, for exam ple:
Judicial Operations 
Joint Patrols
Sleman’s first Muspida forum in July 2006 met and seems to have considered point one as 
the most important issue. In the July meeting the Muspida resolved to create a unified 
government approach to the threat o f  terrorism. In particular, the Muspida called for a 
comprehensive response strategy taking in all government agencies down to the kecamatan 
level, the need for anticipatory measures (mapping the district’s population and developing 
mechanisms for reporting threats) and warning the community to be cautious about 
“visitors” . These measures were passed on to the Polres, the Kodim, the Public Order 
Bureau and the Bureau o f  Population [Dinas Kependudukan\ for technical implementation. 
The Muspida declared that action should be taken on certain crime trends, in particular 
motor vehicle theft, narcotics and gambling. The Muspida also debated the need for a 
response to the danger o f  inter-ethnic conflict, but decided this was an issue o f  pure
18 Sleman, Materi Persiapan Rakorpimda, June 2006.
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criminality and handed the issue over to the police.19 The Muspida did agree to approve a 
survey o f  the various ethnic groups in Sleman and to offer these groups ‘patriotic 
education’ and opportunities for inter-ethnic dialogue.20 These programs were again passed 
on to the Pol.PP, the police and the Kodim for execution.
The Muspida’s early resolutions all seem rather grand and short on substance, but there is 
evidence to suggest that Muspida participants moved on at least some o f  the resolutions. 
The 2007 budget papers o f  the Dinas Ketertiban, indicate there were appropriations for the 
bureau to conduct ‘ethnic data mapping’ together with Sleman’s Kodim. One can only 
imagine this means that the two institutions did joint population surveys. There was also
• • 91
another program in the Dinas’ budget for giving ‘democratic education’ to young adults. 
The Sleman Muspida did therefore attempt to transform some o f  its consensus motions into 
action.
In subsequent meetings, it is apparent the district government felt a subtle and 
unconscious sense o f  ownership over the Muspida process. The meetings following July
2006 took on an expanded membership mostly drawn from the district government. For 
the next forum held on 18 November 2006 the district invited a host o f  representatives 
from its own technical agencies such as: the assistant district secretary (for political 
affairs), the head o f  the Dinas Pol.PP, the heads o f  the Family Planning Bureau, the 
District Auditing Office, the Bureau o f  Population, the Bureau o f  Water, Mining and 
Natural Disaster Management and the head o f  the Legal and Government Affairs
99  • • •Bureau." It seems curious that in a forum essentially intended for coordinating security 
affairs, the district involved such a large number o f  unrelated agencies. The notes also 
show most o f  these agencies had very little to contribute to the meetings. While this trend
19 Perceptions o f  the threat o f  inter-ethnic conflict (or Konflik SARA as it is termed) is particularly sharp in 
Yogyakarta due to the large, transient population o f  students from across the archipelago.
20 ‘Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah (Rakorda)’. Kabupaten o f  Sleman, 4 July 2006.
21 Kabupaten Sleman Dinas Pol.PP: Rencana Kerja Tahunan 2007, Program 5. ‘Pengembangan Etika 
Demokrasi.’ This program includes Rp.30 million for “State Ideology” seminars and Rp.23 million for 
intelligence gathering towards likely sources o f  instability (included in this line item was the data mapping o f  
foreigners and foreign NGOs, former members o f  “forbidden organisations” [organisasi terlarang which is 
code for the former Indonesian Communist Party], the children o f  foreigners and Indonesians and areas 
vulnerable to inter-group conflict and demonstrations). The latter o f  these programs was performed by Pol.PP 
personnel together with the district Kodim.
22 Kabupaten Sleman, Memo: Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah, 19 September 2006.
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may be understandable given that Sleman was experimenting with the forum at that time, 
this information also suggests the district was subtly imprinting its own agenda on the 
Muspida.
It would not be correct either to maintain that the Muspida o f  Sleman was only a tool for 
local government interests, the national security agencies put forward their own issues as 
well. In preparation for the November 2006 meeting, the Kapolres o f  Sleman circulated 
his own discussion paper to the Muspida asking that the government o f  Sleman, among 
other things, to donate land and building materials for sub-district police stations. He 
added to this an additional request for patrol motorcycles, escort cars and financial 
assistance for the Polres’ anti-narcotics operations. The Polres also complained that the 
kabupaten should take a stake in paying for certain activities that had been burdened upon 
the national agencies. The Kapolres mentioned in particular autoposy costs, vehicle 
accidents and the ‘services’ the police give to regional PPNS investigators in enforcing 
district ordinances. The Kapolres also asked the district executive for greater assistance in 
policing. The police pointed out they needed more information from local government to 
do “people mapping.” In fact, over the next several meetings the Kapolres would often 
express his disappointment that the pemerintah daerah was not doing enough to help the 
police to collect data on all the residents, foreigners, hotels and boarding houses o f  the 
district. Finally, the Kapolres also asked for more assistance from the local government’s 
social welfare apparatus (the Dinas Sosial) in giving care to beggars, prostitutes and poor 
people who fell into police custody.23
The local military commander (Dandim), like the Kapolres, was also not reticent about 
making his own requests for district government support. Financially, the Dandim pointed 
out that his communications equipment were disrepair and this required assistance. The 
Dandim also declared some o f  his offices had been damaged (presumably by the 2006 
earthquake) and the Kodim required replacement buildings. The Dandim added finally 
that his Kodim’s welfare program (the karya bhakti activities referred to in chapter two) 
lacked funding from the TN I’s own sources. As such, the Dandim looked to the
23 Wakil Kapolres Ayi Supardan, Polres Sleman: Permasalahan Bahan Materi Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan 
Daerah Kabupaten Sleman (September 2006).
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government o f  Sleman for financial aid. Operationally, the Dandim made clear he 
believed the Muspida elements should revive the past practices o f  mutually gathering and 
sharing intelligence (here he referred to as the Suharto era Bakorstanasda). The Kodim 
commander also foreshadowed the approach o f  the sensitive holiday period -  Christmas 
and Idul Adha -  and stated that the integrated security patrols which had occurred in 
previous times, should be continued.24
In a reflection perhaps o f  the closeness o f  the working relationships between the local and 
national government agencies, the bupati o f  Sleman committed to some o f  the police and 
military requests. The bupati agreed to fund joint activities with the vertical institutions 
(particularly the state prosecutors and the police) for the ‘war on drugs’ through the 
Badan Narkotika Kabupaten (district drug agency). The kabupaten also deferred to the 
police’s requests and put on their agenda a proposal for a new kabupaten regulation 
governing the distribution o f  district fines.23 While not agreeing to the requisition o f  
vehicles and equipment, the bupati pointed out that with preparations for an expansion o f  
disaster relief equipment, the Kodim and Polres would be able to take advantage o f  the 
available materials. Furthermore, acting on mutual concerns regarding the end o f  year 
festivals Idul Adha and Christmas, joint patrols between the Polres, Kodim and Pol.PP 
would continue.
While in these instances the national government actors were hardly assuming control o f  
the agenda, clearly they were asserting their interests and issues o f  concern. While this 
does not overturn the point that the Muspida generally attends to the concerns o f  local 
government, it does indicate there is a sense o f  shared purpose in this forum. O f  particular 
note was the ability o f  the various actors to arrive at in-principle commitments for specific 
activities, such as joint patrols, data sharing and anti-terrorism responses. These examples 
illustrate the capacity o f  local institutions to take the initiative in handling shared
24 The Dandim’s requests were compiled by Assisten Sekretaris Daerah Setya Budhi in: Resume Rapat 
Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah (Rakorda) Kabupaten Sleman 18 November 2006.
23 The redistribution o f  district fines saw district fine monies divided as follows: 55% to the Sleman 
government, with the police and state prosecutors obtaining 12.5% respectively and the district court 20%. 
Interview, Edi Hermanan and Heru Djoko, Kepala Sub-Bagian Bantuan Hukum and Kepala Sub-bagian 
Dokumentasi in the Bagian Hukum, Kabupaten Sleman, 2 August 2007.
26 Kabupaten Sleman: Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah 22 December 2006.
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concerns. The examples also illustrate how cooperation, rather than conflict, defines these 
inter-institutional relationships.
The early meetings o f  the Muspida o f  Sleman raise another critical issue for interagency 
cooperation: the funding o f  jo in t activities. While I will address this issue more 
comprehensively in chapter four, it is appropriate to provide an introduction to the issue 
here. As Jun Honna and Marcus Mietzner have pointed out, during both the Suharto era 
and the early democratisation period, regional TNI and Polri elements have used regional
97government to supplement their own budgets. The evidence from Yogyakarta indicates 
this practice went on in my case study site as it did elsewhere in Indonesia. As will be 
discussed in chapter four, this practice is an important part o f  inter-institutional 
cooperation. As decentralisation has progressed, however, it has become gradually more 
difficult for regional governments to grant cash payments to national security forces. 
While chapter four discusses inter-institutional funding in greater detail, this chapter will 
only highlight the issue as it arises in interagency committees.
At the Muspida o f  February 2007, the bupati o f  Sleman dropped something o f  a 
bombshell; the interior minister had decided to impose strict regulations on region-centre 
financial assistance. In a circular memo from the minister concerning regional budgets, 
the minister ruled that henceforth it was illegal for local government to grant money to 
national government institutions in the regions. While local governments had been
• • 98  •
discouraged from doing this in the past, in 2006 it was expressly forbidden. In effect, 
this caused the government o f  Sleman to rethink some o f  its budgetary commitments and 
warn its national government interlocutors that future joint-spending would be subject to
• 9Q t .
strenuous auditing. Although the meeting notes are couched in official language the
27 Jun Honna, ‘Local Civil-Military Relations During the First Phase o f  Democratic Transition, 1999-2004: A 
Comparison o f  West, Central and East Java.’ Indonesia, N o.82 (October 2006). Mietzner, ‘Business as 
Usual?’ (2003).
~8 See: Surat Edaran Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor : 9 0 3 /3 172/SJ tanggal 10 Desember tahun 2004 perihal 
Pedoman Penyusunan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah Tahun Anggaran 2005, pada Anggaran 
Belanja, Bagian Bagi Hasil dan Bantuan Keuangan Nom or (4).
~9 Kabupaten Sleman: Hasil Rakorpim 19 Februari 2007. Within the case study the way that the local 
government actors have tended to interpret this ruling is that they no longer fund block grants to their national 
government partners. Instead, they appropriate money for specific joint-operational activities. Interview with 
Head o f  Operations Hartana, Dinas Ketertiban Kota Y ogya, 23 October 2007. Also: Interview with Sekretaris 
Daerah Bantul Gendut Sudarto 9 October 2007.
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district government seemed shaken by the new policy. The secretariat documented the 
bupati proposing the following about future inter-institutional support:
- In execution, the budget user and the assisting apparatus [the national institutions like 
Polri, TNI, etc.] so that they avoid the risk o f  problem s in the future w ill choose  
m ethods w hich are legally correct, and in this it must be added there is a need to pay 
attention to justice, soc io logy  [sic] and psychology o f  the com m unity.
- To solid ify  the actions to be taken, if  there are things w hich are doubtful from the 
regulations then it is best to consult with various com petent parties like: higher 
governm ent (Prop, Depdagri, Depkeu, other departments), oversight bodies (Bawasda, 
Irjen, BPKP, BPK, etc) and report to the leadership.
- there needs to be further regulation as a guideline for the execution o f  activities.30
It would have been fascinating to know how the central government actors responded in 
the meeting. Unfortunately, due to poor document keeping the subsequent pages o f  the 
notes were lost. I did however question the Bupati o f  Sleman, Ibnu Subiyanto as to 
whether this change in central government policy created problems between his 
administration and the central government representatives in the Muspida. He said at the 
time it did, but since 2007 the Minister had withdrawn his policy and cross-institutional
T 1
funding still continues in a different form. The bupati did not really answer the question 
satisfactorily but I speculate that, given the Dandim and the Kapolres’s hopes for financial 
aid, this policy probably caused consternation at the time. The bupati is correct on his 
second point. Judging by evidence from the other districts, regional governments still 
continue to pay Polri, TNI and the other central government actors. What has changed is 
that regional governments now pay on a fee-for-service basis whenever cooperation is 
necessary. More, however, will be discussed o f  this in chapter four.
The final recorded meetings o f  the Muspida o f  Sleman from 2007 show some key 
weaknesses in the Muspida process. In particular the Muspida o f  Sleman encountered 
substantial difficulty in mounting a credible joint-response to major security threats. The
0 Kabupaten Sleman: Hasil Rakorpim 19 Februari 2007.
31 In fact, 1 find no evidence that the interior minister rescinded his order. What the minister did subsequently 
was to clarify his intent in public statements. The Interior Ministry declared regional governments are 
forbidden from making direct cash grants to national institutions that operate in their regions (or instansi 
vertikal). Regional governments may however fund joint activities with the national institutions. This 
clarification is probably what the bupati referred to. See: Press Statement, Ministry o f  the Interior, ‘Penjelasan 
DIRJEN BAK D Mengenai Belanja Bantuan Kepada Instansi Vertikal tang Bersumber dari APBD (23 
February 2006 ).’ < http:/Ayww.depdagri.go.id/konten.php?nama=Pers&op=detail&id=l 5> A ccessed May
2008. Interview, Bupati o f  Sleman Ibnu Subiyanto, 10 June 2008.
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example par-excellence o f  this problem is terrorism. In late March 2007, a major network 
o f  terrorists was discovered in the northern parts o f  Sleman (in the Kaliurang region). 
Seven terrorists under the nominal leadership o f  the mastermind Abu Dujana were 
captured in a police assault. Two others were killed. The police specialist anti-terror 
detachment Densus-88 confiscated several assault rifles, hundreds o f  rounds o f  
ammunition and hundreds o f  kilograms o f  exp losives/2 This operation was probably 
handled completely outside the knowledge o f  the Sleman police, or anyone in 
Yogyakarta. The intelligence that triggered the operation came from arrests made earlier 
in January 2007 in Central Sulawesi. Therefore it is likely National Police Headquarters, 
rather than Polda DIY, commanded this operation.33 All o f  the discussions I have had with 
Polres Sleman on the topic show they did not know details o f  the arrests even as reported 
in the media. ’4 This indicates they were probably not part o f  the operation at all. The local 
authorities therefore probably deserve no credit for the successful arrests but they do 
deserve to be judged for their response to the terrorist threat, once they were aware one 
existed.
In responding to the March 2007 arrests - and to other serious security problems for that 
matter - the joint-agency response from Sleman was not proportionate. In the next 
meeting o f  the Muspida on 4 July 2007 the participants discussed the handling o f  the then 
undeniable terrorist threat. The first problem with this meeting was its timing. The 
Muspida was held three months after a major domestic terrorist network was discovered 
in their area. Given the seriousness o f  the security breach, the Muspida arguably 
underestimated the situation.33 The only ideas that the Muspida participants could come 
up with in July 2007 were exactly the same as those put forward by the Muspida in July 
2006: strengthening supervision activities by police and military at the street level, data 
mapping the population, encouraging civil society to report suspect activities by
j2 ‘Yogyakarta Bukan Sarang Teroris: Penembakan Dua Tersangka Dilakukan Karena Mereka M elawan’, 
Kompas, 4 April 2007.
33 The fact that so swiftly after the operation (less than one w eek later) the suspects were all flown to Jakarta 
supports the conclusion. ‘Tersangka Terorisme Sleman Mengaku Anggota JI, Punya 20 Nama A lias’, 
Detik.com 3 April 2007.
'4 Interview, Wakil Kepala Polres Sleman Dede Alamsyah, 5 September 2007.
'5 In fairness, other secret meetings may very well have been held before this date. I am unaware o f  any and I 
doubt that any were held but I bracket that fact as a possibility and if so, I concede the criticism. See: Resume 
Rakorda Kabupaten Sleman 4 July 2007.
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newcomers, etc. These preventive measures were ineffective in nabbing the terrorists 
twelve months beforehand, but that irony appears lost in the meeting n o te s /6 In fairness, 
detecting secretive criminal organisations is very difficult. The authorities in Sleman may 
very well have felt overwhelmed. Nevertheless, given the seriousness o f  the event, the 
slow response afterwards and the rehashing o f  inadequate strategies from the past, the 
July 2007 Muspida shows the difficulty these forums encounter in producing effective 
ac t io n /7
To compile what we can learn from the Muspida o f  Sleman, the information provides a 
particularly interesting snapshot o f  how the conference process develops from the 
beginning. Clearly the local government sets the meeting agenda. Therefore many o f  the 
group resolutions attend to the interests o f  local government. Over the important security 
matters the central government actors -  in particular the police -  also have input into the 
agenda. Indeed, the police provide the statutory power to put into effect the operational 
security resolutions made by the Muspida, like commanding joint patrols. We also gain 
the sense that, where it feels able, the district government seeks to fulfil the requests made 
by the national government apparatuses. Since many o f  their counterparts requests are 
financial in nature, the district government is placed in the uncomfortable position o f  
having to reject most o f  their overtures.
’6 The bupati has an interesting interpretation o f  this w hole saga. When I questioned him on the effectiveness 
o f  his administration and the efforts o f  the local security apparatus, he said this: in 2006 he had implemented a 
program in which the village leadership, was encouraged to report (and he said infiltrate) suspicious activities 
by their citizens. The information was funnelled to his government and then distributed to polres Sleman and 
the Kodim. Out o f  this program, so he says, the kabupaten actually learned o f  the terrorists before the March 
operation. I challenged this explanation by pointing out that the March 2007 arrests actually resulted from 
information supplied by suspects arrested in Central Sulawesi in January 2007. He agreed but said his 
government did know about the terrorist cells in their own territory before any arrests were made. I then 
asked, why did he not do something about it, such as asking the police to arrest them? He replied, that in order 
to protect the informants at the village level, they decided not to do this. I find this w hole explanation highly 
implausible. M ost likely this w hole episode took everyone in the district by surprise. Interview, Ibnu 
Subiyanto, 2008.
'7 The July 2007 Muspida meeting also went on to discuss tw o other serious problems: inter-ethnic gang 
tensions (unexplained in the notes) and motor vehicle theft. The Muspida resolved that the police should 
refocus on handling such problems through criminal prosecutions and dialogue. The bupati also 
recommended that all Muspida components should be involved in holding inter-cultural dialogue forums, as 
a means o f  dissuading the different ethnic groupings in Sleman from conflict. In addition the bupati also 
requested that his Bureau o f  Public Order, the police and the military, data map the various ethnic quarters 
o f  the district. Those measures were exactly the same as those proposed in the first Muspida meeting o f  the 
year before. Why the Muspida considered these measures would be any more effective one year later 
remains unknown and highlights weaknesses o f  leadership and vision. Sleman, Resume Rakorda, July 2007.
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Finally, there is one last point about the usefulness o f  the Muspida, as a discussion and 
planning forum the Muspida is a high value asset. The Muspida process raises the most 
vital problems faced by the district o f  Sleman and seeks a consensus based approach to 
managing the problems identified. The greatest benefit o f  the Muspida then is probably 
also its greatest weakness, it is more focused on talk than action. It mostly identifies 
problems rather than plans solutions, it approves coordinated activities but leaves to other 
elements -  mostly the police and the Dinas Ketertiban -  the details as to how coordination 
occurs in the field. From the data available it seems that several high-security challenges -  
terrorism, ethnic violence and robbery -  are beyond the imagination and capabilities o f  
this Muspida to resolve. This supports the value o f  Fishel’s claim that the best interagency 
outcomes derive from taskforces with firm objectives unified under solid leadership. 
Despite the Muspida’s weaknesses though, we can clearly see cooperation taking place.
Muspida o f  Yogyakarta City
In contrast to the neighbouring district o f  Sleman, the Muspida o f  Kota Yogyakarta 
focuses more on areas o f  concern to local government, like vice for example, rather than 
broad security issues such as inter-ethnic conflict. This focus results from a combination 
o f  executive policy and the influence o f  local government bureaucrats. The current mayor 
o f  the city, Herry Zudianto (2001 - present), is a civilian politician. Zudianto therefore 
tends to be less interested in security matters than the man he replaced in 2001, an army
o
colonel. Up to 2007, the Muspida o f  Yogyakarta was also served by a Secretariat made 
up o f  Pol.PP officers. Because the personnel o f  this Secretariat were responsible for 
shaping the meeting’s agenda items, much o f  what was discussed in the Muspida were
s According to the former head o f  the Muspida Secretariat, Ari Nugroho, the former mayor o f  Yogyakarta, 
Colonel Winarto (7-2001), was deeply interested in security developm ents in the city and often demanded 
extensive reports and notes from the Muspida Secretariat. This probably reflected his biases as a military 
officer. When Herry Zudianto, the current mayor replaced Winarto in 2001, Zudianto ordered the Secretariat 
to limit its preparatory research for the meetings to things only o f  concern to the city government. Zudianto 
also demanded that the Secretariat prepare only brief notes and reports for the Muspida. This preference 
probably reflects Zudianto’s background and predilections as a career politician who, so it seem s, had little 
time for grand planning about regional security. Interview with Ari N. Yohannes, Kepala Seksi Pengamanan, 
Bagian Ketertiban dan Ketentraman, Dinas Ketertiban, 31 August 2007.
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things that interested the Pol.PP: such as cleaning up vice, beggars, and so on. Thus the 
district government in Yogyakarta city was like the government o f  Sleman in that is also 
steered the meeting agenda o f  the Muspida to areas o f  its own interest. Although this is 
true, many o f  the Muspida’s decisions still required the active cooperation o f  national 
government agencies, in particular the police.
One o f  the major, persistent concerns o f  the Yogyakarta city Muspida is ‘social disease’ 
(‘penyakit sosial') or as it is commonly abbreviated ‘pekat’. Since pekat falls under the 
rubric o f  ‘public order’, reducing it is one o f  the core responsibilities o f  the local 
administration. The district government classifies a number o f  social problems within the 
over-arching label o f  penyakit sosial: prostitution, gambling, illegal alcohol distribution, 
narcotics use, begging, adultery (particularly during Islamic festivals), juvenile 
delinquency and the like. It is evident from the early meeting notes that the regional 
administration pressed the national security actors very hard to help the city combat vice; 
in particular it sought the help o f  the district police. At this time much o f  the concern 
about vice was directed at gambling. Most o f  the meetings from 2003 for example were 
spent on debating how to stamp out social disease in general and gambling in particular.
The war on gambling in the early two thousands was a particularly vexing issue for joint- 
institutional collaboration. This is because the Indonesian criminal code (KUHP) 
describes gambling as a purely criminal offence. As such, only the Indonesian police may
IQ # # #
combat it. Yet according to senior crime journalists, former gangsters, Islamic vigilantes 
and senior Pol.PP in the city o f  Yogyakarta, it is an open secret that for many decades 
Polda DIY actively backed the gambling trade.40 In this permissive environment gambling
39 Interview, Norwidi, 23 October 2007. Norwidi, who is a senior Pol.PP officer in the Bureau and head o f  the 
Pol.PP section explains that the district government’s interpretation o f  the criminal code [Pasal 303 to be 
exact], nullifies any role for non-polri institutions in combating gambling.
40 Interviews, Norwidi, October 2007; senior criminal affairs journalist for Yogyakarta daily newspaper 
Kedaulatan Rakyat, Hariardi, 25 June 2008; head o f  Gerakan Pemuda Kabah in Yogyakarta city (GPK is the 
youth w ing o f  the Islamist party PPP, GPK has a reputation as one o f  Y ogya’s old gangster groups) Harist, 26 
September 2007 (Harist was part o f  GPK’s Islamist vigilante faction); Pak Gemblek (Gemblek was 
introduced to me as a former boss gangster. Gemblek was the mentor o f  another notorious Yogyakarta 
gangster, Gun Jack), 19 July 2007.
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in the city flourished.41 Yet the city also found itself in a conundrum. According to some 
sources in the Dinas Ketertiban, Mayor Zudianto’s administration felt under pressure 
from the local community, which in the main opposed the gambling industry. The city 
administration believed that concerned citizens held the executive morally and electorally 
responsible for public order, including the war on gambling. Yet the city administration 
had no power over the police to make them tackle the issue.42 As a result the mayor was 
in a relatively powerless position and we see this in the Muspida notes. Prior to 2005 the 
mayor made numerous appeals to the police command. In an October 2002 Muspida, in a 
mildly provocative way, the mayor stated he would ask the provincial police commander 
to attend the city Muspida to explain the Kapolda’s policy on preventing pekat.4j In April 
2003 the Muspida asked the Poltabes to hold a special meeting to explain how the 
command would increase its efforts to destroy gambling. The mayor even asked the 
Poltabes to investigate specific businesses (which he named). Appeals such as this go on 
during meetings o f  following years, but all o f  them it seems were ineffective in stopping 
gambling.44
Below the leadership discussions, however, the Dinas Ketertiban o f  the city continued to 
mount ineffective anti-gambling operations with the police. In these operations the city 
“facilitated” [read encouraged] the Poltabes to tackle gambling. The head o f  the city’s 
Pol.PP detachment described the activities as follows:
W e m otivated those activities [joint anti-gam bling operations between the Pol.PP and 
the police]. At that time, our role w as facilitating and m otivating the police so that they 
did enforce the law... w e desired to create an im age that w e and the p olice cooperated. 
A lthough for significant change, w e w eren’t very hopeful... Because those who
41 Various types o f  gambling were practiced, Togel (a type o f  lottery), card gam es, slot machines/arcade 
games, bonggol (?), etc. This type o f  gambling was practiced in both ad hoc, street cafe type arrangements 
and secret casinos/nightclubs.
42 This was not described to me as a pressing political issue that threatened the mayor’s re-election or 
something so serious. Rather my source in the Pol.PP presented it as a matter o f  fact observation. Most 
ordinary Yogyakartans were angry with the growth o f  the industry and wanted the mayor to do something 
about it. Yet those on the inside o f  the bureaucracy knew the mayor had very little capacity to do so. 
Interview, anonymous source, October 2007 and 29 July 2007. Kota Yogyakarta, Press Release: ‘Kapolda 
DIY Diminta hentikan Pekat’ (21 October 2004), Available from:
<http://upik.iogia.go.id/news/index.cfm7berita id = 21102004084602& x=::2>. Last A ccessed 30 July 2009.
43 It is unknown if  anything came o f  the M ayor’s intention.
44 Kota Yogyakarta: Hasil Rapat Muspida 14 October 2002. Bahan Rapat Muspida 31 March 2003. Hasil 
Rapat Muspida 3 April 2003, 14 July 2004, 19 May 2005, 30 June 2005.
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conducted investigations were the police. And even for us [Pol.PP] to participate w e 
had to do it with our friends in the police... w e were often asked [by the police] our 
Operational Targets. And w e often replied ‘later, when w e are on the w a y ’ [m eaning  
the Pol.PP would not inform the police o f  the places to be targeted before departing on 
the operation, in order to avoid leaks]. Like at one tim e in Terban market. Terban 
market, in the afternoon w as used as a regular market, but at night it becam e a 
gam bling den. And the culprits w ho protected it were from the security apparatus. The 
turnover there could be hundreds o f  m illions. And if  w e held an operation, w e  
reconnoitred the area first. But that was already known. Thus in five minutes, as w e  
gave the signs w e were heading to Terban, the gam bling im m ediately stopped. A s w e  
entered the gam bling outlets all o f  them suddenly turned into cafes [using hand 
gestures he suggested a leak o f  information]. And after w e left, the gam bling would  
begin again. The reason being in that environm ent there were many culprits from the 
apparatus [police] which played around there.45
Such was the condition o f  the anti-gambling raids. Although operations were held, corrupt 
police would notify the gambling organisers o f  pre-operation reconnaissance missions. 
Because o f  this the campaigns were ineffective.46
The Muspida notes o f  Yogyakarta show that the war on gambling abruptly changed in
2005. The change apparently had nothing to do with the local environment, and everything 
to do with policy changes within the police. In this year the newly appointed Kapolri, 
Sutanto, declared one o f  his top priorities would be to crush the gambling industry. After 
threatening to sack any Kapolda who failed to tackle gambling, Sutanto’s regional 
commanders fell in line with his policy and began to attack gambling outlets 47 So much so 
that by the end o f  2005, the Muspida stopped pleading for action on what until that time 
had been an incessant topic. According to Norwidi again:
The m om ent after [Sutanto] was appointed, he gave a statement that, first o f  all, he 
w ould eradicate gam bling... And this cam e like a breath o f  fresh air for us. B ecause for 
several years when w e conducted activities the obstacles were fairly great. Because a 
part o f  the security apparatus [coded wording to im ply Polri] really stuck out in the 
protection o f  gam bling outlets. And after there was that statement, w e found it much 
easier to conduct our activities.48
45 Interview, Norwidi, October 2007.
46 The Bureau o f  Public Order does not list how many operations took place but its internal reports indicate in 
2003 over 750 suspects were arrested in combined operations with the police for various gambling offences 
and 200 were arrested in 2004. Laporan Akuntibilitas: Rekapitulasi Hasil Operasi Penyakit Masyarakat 2003- 
2006.
47 ‘Naik-Turun Sutanto’, Majalah Tempo, Laporan Utama. Edisi. 27/X X X V /28 Agustus - 03 September 2006.
48 Interview, Norwidi, 2008.
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In 2006 the year following Sutanto’s appointment, it seems that the Poltabes made such a 
turn around that the city’s Dinas Ketertiban did not even bother to run joint anti gambling 
operations with the po lice49
While the gambling situation is on the surface an extraordinary case, it illustrates clearly 
the dependence o f  this Muspida on police assistance. When the police are disposed to 
assist, joint responses to regional problems can succeed. But if the police refuse to act or 
drag their feet, joint activities flounder as there is no other element o f  the security network 
that can step forward to fill the void. Such is the centrality o f  the police role. The issue also 
shows a demonstrable failure o f  cross-institutional collaboration. Although with the 
passage o f  time Polri’s internal policy changes resolved the issue, the example shows the 
obstacle institutional self-interest can pose for security management. While there are few 
other examples as blatant, the gambling example shows that police can easily avoid 
participation when it does not suit their interests.
The dependence o f  the Muspida on police assistance is also supported in other examples, in 
a number o f  anti-vice operations which the regional government should have been able to 
discharge alone, the district still sought to involve the police. In 2004 the Pol.PP who 
staffed the Muspida Secretariat resolved in a number o f  their own meetings to ask the 
Poltabes for assistance with Pol.PP responsibilities. They sought to involve the Poltabes’s 
Binamitra detachment in ‘Student Operations [to combat youth delinquency].’ They sought 
meetings with all city’s sub-district police commanders to unify perceptions on how to 
tackle pekat. The Secretariat directly requested the police continue combined anti-vice 
patrols with the Pol.PP while also requesting police assistance to close night clubs and 
pornography ou tle ts /0 These requests were echoed in Muspida meetings.51 It is not that the 
city administration felt incapable o f  acting alone. The Bureau o f  Public Order does perform 
many o f  its own anti-vice operations, like arresting beggars and confiscating illegal alcohol
49 Laporan Akuntibilitas: Rekapitulasi Hasil Operasi Penyakit Masyarakat 2003-2006.
50 Notulen, Rapat Koordinasi Sekretariat Muspida Kota Yogyakarta: 30 January 2004, 25 February 2004, 5 
may 2004, 29 May 2004, 7 June 2004, 23 June 2004.
51 Kota Yogyakarta: Hasil Rapat Muspida, 9 August 2004, 19 May 2005, 30 August 2005, 28 Novem ber 
2005.
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for example. " Rather, what the evidence shows is a distinctive attitude from law 
enforcement officials in this district who believe that good relations with the police enhance 
their own effectiveness.33 This attitude is not something they intimate in as many words, 
but it is perceptible from these internal documents. With the exception o f  the gambling 
precedent, the Poltabes largely reciprocated these desires from the city government for a 
close relationship.
Another repeated cause o f  concern for the Muspida o f  Yogyakarta city was security for 
public events, especially elections. In an emerging democracy like Indonesia, elections 
have often been seen as a locus o f  instability.54 However like the Muspida’s problems 
with gambling, the issue o f  election security throws up a complication for inter-agency 
cooperation. Indonesian law makes the General Elections Commission (at the national and 
the regional level) responsible for conducting elections.33 But the agency with the power 
to enforce election security is Polri. This situation once again forces regional government 
into cooperative relations with the police.36
The city o f  Yogyakarta faced elections in 2004 (for the national parliament and 
presidency) and in 2006 (for mayor). In both o f  these elections all security responsibilities
52 While Pol.PP and PPNS officers have sufficient authority to conduct their own operations, even to arrest 
people, informants in the Dinas Ketertiban o f  Yogyakarta city still believe the police have superiority over 
them. The head o f  the Dinas has said for example: “We are not free from the police apparatus, what’s more 
when w e consider affairs o f  the PPNS, because the police are the supervisory coordinator o f  PPNS.” This 
hints to som e extent at the normative (not merely legal) supremacy o f  the police in law enforcement.
Interview Kepala Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta Supriyono, 5 June 2007.
53 Interview, Norwidi, 14 June 2007.
54 As an indication o f  the subconscious fears o f  security disturbances erupting during election campaigns, in 
2009 the Indonesian election com m ission (K PU) and all o f  Indonesia’s registered parties launched an official 
“Kampanye Damai Pemilu” in 2009. In this campaign all parties pledged to accept the results o f  the election  
peacefully. Behind this public campaign lies real fears that in a country like Indonesia, with powerful, 
wealthy, ambitious elites, party m asses can always push the objectives o f  their party with violence. For the 
official campaign website see: Republik Indonesia, website, Kampanye Damai Pemilu Indonesia 2009  
< http://kampanyedamaipemilu2009.web.id/>. A ccessed 30 July 2009.
55 As an example o f  the powers and constitution o f  the KPU see: Undang-Undang 12/2003 tentang Pemilihan 
Umum untuk Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah (that law has since been superseded but it provides an idea o f  the role o f  the KPU in the period o f  my 
research).
The Ministry o f  the Interior has drafted regulations to guide regional governments in managing regional 
election security. The guidelines are very clear. They stipulate that in ‘secure’ conditions, command o f  
election security falls under the head o f  the province/district. If intelligence determines the election is likely to 
be slightly or moderately disrupted, command is transferred to the police. Menteri Dalam N egeri, Pedoman: 
Penyelenggaraan Ketertiban, Ketentraman dan Kemanan Dalam Rangka Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil 
Kepala Daerah (2006), Bab V, p.24.
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S7were passed to the Poltabes. It is difficult to tell whether the Muspida was especially 
concerned about the 2006 contest as the notes are incomplete. In 2004 however, the 
Muspida and the Muspida Secretariat discuss election preparations at seven different 
meetings, but no specific plans were made in the meetings. Mostly the Muspida 
participants, only convey or note information, suggesting that much o f  the operational 
details were worked out by the police alone. If  so, this would resemble the situation in
2006, when the city government handed the entire local election security responsibilities 
to the Poltabes command.39
There are other examples o f  the Muspida discussing security for big, public events. One 
o f  the other prominent examples were preparations to protect foreigners in anticipation o f  
the American invasion o f  Iraq in March 2003.60 In this incident the Muspida noted the 
problem and turned it over to the police for execution. The Muspida o f  Yogyakarta then 
follows the same trend seen in Sleman. When major events occur which carry a risk o f  
disturbing public safety, the Muspida looks to Polri to lead the handling o f  the event.
The evidence from the Muspida o f  Yogyakarta city implies that although the local 
government may administer the meetings and may even seek to exploit the forum to raise 
its own interests, the Muspida process is still dependent on the police for taking action to 
implement the repressive, law enforcement side o f  the Muspida’s resolutions. Using the 
gambling example we can see that if the police do not wish to comply with the group, it 
becomes very difficult for the inter-agency security effort to work. This situation results 
from the weakness o f  other state agencies relative to Polri and the fact that participation in 
this interagency forum is purely voluntary.
57 The police codenamed their operation for the 2004 Indonesian general elections“Mantap Brata XII”. See: 
M eliala, Evaluation of Polri Role, 13-14. For 2006 local election security see: Kepolisian Kota Besar 
Yogyakarta and Pemerintah Kotamadya Yogyakarta: Perjanjian Kerjasama Antara Pemerintah Kota dan 
Kepolisian Kota Besar tentang Pengamanan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (22 April 2006).
58 Kota Yogyakarta: Notulen Rapat Muspida, 17 March, 2 April, 6 May 2004. Kota Yogyakarta Sekretariat 
Muspida: Notulen Rapat Persiapan Muspida 17 January, 27 January, 15 May 2004.
59 Poltabes Yogyakarta dan Pemerintah Kota, Perjanjian Kerjasama, 2006.
60 Kotamadya Yogyakarta: Tambahan Bahan Rapat Muspida (Radiogram Mendagri N o .X XX  3000/SJ 
TGL.19 MARET 2003). Kotamadya Yogyakarta: Bahan Rapat Muspida. 31 Maret 2003.
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Muspida o f Bantul
The focus o f  concern for the Muspida o f  Bantul is slightly different from the other two 
Muspida. Rather than being obviously biased towards the concerns o f  the district 
government, the Muspida o f  Bantul mostly discusses matters not directly related to the 
regional government portfolio. Characteristically these are things like election security, 
demonstrations, natural disasters and securing public events. This situation is probably 
reflective o f  the fact that there are problems in the relationship between the police and local 
government in this particular kabupaten. As a result joint planning suffers. While the issues 
will be explored in more detail in chapter four, it will suffice to mention here that the police 
in this district are, according to a number o f  reliable sources, more corrupt than in other 
parts o f  the province. Because the Bantul police protect illegal liquor vendors and other 
black market trades, Polres Bantul is almost completely unwilling to help local government 
in their efforts to stamp out ‘pekat’. Nevertheless, dialogue and cooperation does take place 
in the Bantul Muspida. The pre-condition for cooperation appears to be that the issue under 
discussion is one o f  general interest and does not contradict the institutional self-interest of 
one o f  the Muspida parties. Having made this substantial caveat, however, the notes o f  the 
Muspida clearly show the default setting o f  regional authorities there is to work 
collaboratively.
While a number o f  different events have been discussed in this forum, there is one event in 
particular that draws our attention. This was a security disturbance created by community 
opposition to the construction o f  electricity wires. This problem, referred to as the 
“SUTET” issue,61 became a drawn out, two year wrangle. The SUTET issue is raised here 
because it becomes another illustration o f  the capacity o f  all the security arms o f  the
61 “Saluran Udara Tegangan Ekstra T inggi” or Ultra High Tight Overhead Wires. This construction project in 
Bantul was part o f  a much bigger effort to expand the Java-Bali electricity grid.
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Indonesian state to unite and solve common problems. The incident also plainly illustrates 
the various jurisdictional boundaries o f  the three most important parts o f  the Muspida: the 
regional executive head, the territorial military unit and the regional police. In responding 
to the SUTET issue, we can see that the police in Bantul was a the only power that has the 
authority to employ repressive force. It was backed up by the territorial army command, 
which lent personnel and localised intelligence gathering to support the combined effort. 
Finally, the local district head was able to use his own normative legitimacy as the 
representative o f  the district to push forward a peaceful resolution. While the issue was 
eventually resolved with dialogue for two years the SUTET problem regularly entered 
Bantul’s Muspida discussions.
To give a brief background to the SUTET issue, according to aggrieved local citizens, the 
problem began in November 2003 when Indonesia’s national electricity company, PLN, 
began excavating sites in the hilly region o f  Dlingo in eastern Bantul for the purpose o f  
installing electricity towers.63 Over the years the number o f  sub-districts involved widened. 
According to the citizens, at that time PLN did not offer them compensation for the losses 
o f  their land and, in later negotiations, PLN would only concede to providing them 
compensation much below their asking price.64
From late 2003 - the earliest stage o f  the problem - the security elements o f  the kabupaten 
demonstrated they grasped the issue. On 17 November 2003, the Muspida met specifically 
to discuss the SUTET problem. The Muspida showed it was aware that in Sewon, a sub­
district in central Bantul and a target o f  the development, citizens were already 
demonstrating. The Kapolres o f  Bantul declared that the police had identified eight 
ringleaders and were calling them in to the Polres for questioning. The Muspida decided to 
wait for the results o f  the police investigation.63 At the following Muspida, 30 December, 
the Kapolres reported that his investigation had concluded but he had also received an order
62 The various sides to the dispute -  the National Electricity Company and the aggrieved citizens o f  Bantul -  
appealed to the Sultan o f  Yogyakarta in 2005 for mediation. The Sultan succeeded in achieving consensus. 
‘Warga Bantul Menyetujui Pembangunan Jaringan SUTET: Sultan HB X, ‘in i  Hasil Pertemuan dengan 
Warga & Dirut PLN”, Pikiran Rakyat, 29 August 2005.
Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 28 Januari 2005.
64 ‘Puluhan Warga Dlingo Datangi DPRD Bantul Adukan Masalah Sutet’, Media Indonesia 24 February 
2005.
65 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 17 Novem ber 2003.
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from the head o f  the national police, the Kapolri, not to allow the SUTET issue to disturb 
security preparations for the 2004 election. The Kapolres asked for a further several weeks 
grace for the police to handle the problem alone. Also showing his own capacity for 
situational awareness, the military district commander, the Dandim, reported that the army 
understood the ringleader o f  the demonstrations in Sewon had decided to cooperate with 
the authorities and urge his allies to refrain from halting the development.66 At the 
following meeting, however, probably in a reflection o f  the superior priority o f  the election, 
the Muspida decided to resolve the SUTET issue at the “ lower level” or to encourage the 
sub-districts to negotiate the issue with protesters.67 The initial recommendation to take 
these steps originated from the police representative. Over the next year the SUTET issue 
would fade into the background as preparations for the national election assumed priority.
The SUTET issue flared again in January 2005. At this time it became apparent that 
citizens o f  another kecamatan, Pajangan, rejected the constructions. Over the year 2004, a 
number o f  kecamatans had been convinced to accept the tower emplacements. Because o f  
this the Muspida was not required to take further action. In January 2005 however, a third 
party group o f  NGOs from outside the kabupaten volunteered to support aggrieved local
• • • • • • • • 
citizens. Within the Muspida there appeared to be a degree o f  suspicion toward this 
intrusion, as if the outsiders were stirring trouble.69 At this juncture, the Indonesian military 
again demonstrated one o f  the sole rights it still appears to possess in the realm o f  internal 
security: intelligence collection. At the January 25 meeting the Dandim declared that his 
forces had already collected data on all the citizens potentially affected by the SUTET 
construction. The Kodim had identified the sub-districts most likely to pose resistance and 
requested that the district government involve itself as an impartial mediator between PLN 
and the communities identified. It seems that going forward, this became the consensus
66 This situational awareness reflects one o f  the strongest benefits the military draws from its territorial units -  
the capacity for the army to use its territorial forces to monitor the micro-social level. The Dandim received 
this intelligence through his Koramil. Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 30 Desember 
2003.
67 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 20 Januari 2004.
68 According to the head o f  the Kabupaten’s Pol.PP unit, Kandiawan, the term NGO can only be applied 
loosely to these groups. He says, people residing outside Bantul moved in, formed “N G O s” to protest the 
constructions but, “with only four or five people inside them.” These NGOs only had the objective o f  
extorting money from PLN to stop protesting. I have not found an independent source outside the district 
government which confirms his view . Interview, Kandiawan, 10 April 2008.
69 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 25 January 2005.
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view on how to resolve the issue. At the following meeting in February 2005 the kabupaten 
singled out a number o f  villages in Pajangan where more intense negotiations were 
required. Showing up one o f  the essential differences between military and police authority, 
the Kapolres at this meeting pointed out his sub-district commands had already been alerted 
to provide physical security to the selected areas.70 The Kapolres’ contribution sharply 
contrasts with the role that the military assumed up to that point; the army had only seen 
itself as able to accumulate information rather than providing direct security intervention as 
the police did. This is similar to the way the Kodim in Sleman behaved, in limiting itself to 
data-mapping vulnerable areas.
By July 2005, however, the situation had noticeably worsened, with some citizens o f  a new 
area, Kersen, resorting to violence and attacking and vandalising some o f  the homes o f  
local Polri personnel. Residents o f  other villages also began engaging in fresh 
demonstrations. In response, the bupati called all the leaders o f  the kecamatans and the 
PLN electricity company for a special Muspida to discuss the state o f  affairs. According to 
the Muspida notes, a delegation from the national parliament some time before had visited 
Bantul and impressed upon the bupati the need for the SUTET project to succeed. Their 
lobbying appears to have influenced his decision to fully support the implementation o f  the 
project. The other Muspida elements hardly needed convincing -  the forum thus resolved to 
ensure the final success o f  the project. For achieving this end, the Kapolres declared that his 
force would arrest the suspected ringleaders around the Kersen area, complete a full survey 
o f  the remaining opposition and report back on the results. The Muspida expressed its 
support for the Polres’ actions.71
The situation came to a climax in an extraordinary meeting in the site o f  the village Kersen 
itself in August 2005 -  attending were the full compliment o f  the Muspida and the sub­
district and village leadership (the Kapolsek, Danramil, camat and the village head, the 
lurah). At this conference, the lurah expressed his fears that the people o f  his area were 
readying weapons for a final standoff against the project. In response, the Muspida declared 
its lasting support for PLN to finish its final tower constructions. The Kapolres declared
7U Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 26 February 2005.
71 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 28 July 2005.
158
that he would deploy one company o f  troops to secure the embattled lurah and for 
anticipating the potential anarchy that would follow. The meeting ended with PLN
79declaring a final set o f  dates for the installation o f  the last towers. Unexpectedly, the 
whole episode was resolved in a matter o f  days after that meeting when the revered Sultan
70
o f  Yogyakarta stepped in to mediate personal negotiations between the sides.
Although the standoff ended peacefully, the SUTET issue is an interesting study o f  local 
security coordination. Throughout the situation, the local government took on the role o f  
introducing and establishing consensus. The episode also shows that the police are the only 
agency imbued with authority to provide physical security and repress any threats o f  
disturbance. It is the police that led the physical response and other elements played a 
supporting role. The SUTET issue also shows the shadowy role o f  the TN I’s territorial 
command, which refrained from a direct role in responding to the crisis but continued to 
exercise its ability to gather intelligence and plan the coordinated response to the threat. 
The SUTET incident shows then, a clear breakdown o f  the relative roles o f  the primary 
state agencies which oversee local security.
This information from Bantul also shows that unity o f  effort is possible in the taskforce 
model o f  cooperation found in the Muspida. In this situation, Muspida participants clearly 
were able to discuss and plot a loosely coordinated response to an evolving problem. 
Regional government, police and military each contributed their different capabilities. 
While much of  the data previously referred to shows dialogue rather than action, in this 
example we see the capacity o f  the Muspida to handle a threat, demonstrating that it is 
possible for forums that lack a unifying leadership to cooperatively respond to security 
problems. This observation is further confirmed by my analysis o f  the intelligence sharing 
forum, the Kominda.
72 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 23 August, 2005.
73 See footnote 62.
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Regional Intelligence Community (Komunitas Intelijen Daerah -  Kominda)
Beneath the regional leaders meeting there is another ubiquitous regional security forum, 
the Regional Intelligence Community meeting (or Kominda). The Kominda is a modern 
day revival o f  the Suharto era Bakorstanasda. The current Kominda meetings, like the 
Bakorstanasda system, bring together all the intelligence elements in government agencies 
that operate in the regions, and encourage them to share data to anticipate common threats.
Unlike the Muspida, executive orders o f  the minister o f  the interior establish the shape o f  
the Kominda system.74 The Interior Ministry puts the Kominda forum under the leadership 
o f  provincial and district government and directs all regional administrations to establish a 
Kominda meeting in their respective territories.75 Under the ministerial regulation, the 
Kominda brings together all o f  the principle intelligence agents found at the sub-national 
level: police intelligence, the State Intelligence Body (or Badan Intelijen Negara - BIN), 
military intelligence, the intelligence units o f  the State Prosecutors Office, local 
government enforcement agencies and any other agency with an intelligence capability. 
The role o f  the Kominda is to pool the data these various agencies collect, analyse potential
• • • • 7
threats to national stability and make recommendations to local government. As such, the 
Kominda falls under the administration o f  regional government and feeds into the Muspida. 
It is difficult to infer why the minister o f  the interior chose to pass his 2006 regulation. 
Perhaps the minister was using his authority over regional governments to encourage them 
to resuscitate dialogue between the various parties involved in internal security and 
encourage them to renew intelligence sharing. From the little information available it seems 
that if this was the intention, then it has been realised. Almost all my information about the 
Kominda comes from the city o f  Yogyakarta.77 Beside Yogyakarta city the Kominda also
74 Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri 11/2006 tentang Komunitas Intelijen Daerah, ‘M enimbang’.
75 Permen N o .l 1 2006, Pasal 2-4.
lh Permen N o. 11 2006, Pasal 7.
77 In the course o f  research, I struck up a relationship with the then head o f  the Pol.PP intelligence section in 
the Dinas Ketertiban. My informant was intelligent, proud o f  his work and liked to talk about it. His evidence 
forms virtually all the information that I have been able to be collect on the activities o f  the Kominda. Given 
that all other agencies are highly secretive about the Kominda, finding this informant was very serendipitous.
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exists at the provincial level and in the Kabupaten o f  Sleman. The other kabupaten 
featured in this research, Bantul, did not at the time o f  my research have a Kominda.79
The structure o f  the Kominda in Yogyakarta city is determined by a mayoral order from
2007. This order declares that the Kominda is made up o f  the deputy mayor (as chair), the 
head o f  the Poltabes intelligence unit (as deputy chair), the head o f  the district’s office o f  
National Unity, Youth and Sports (Kantor Kesatuan Bangsa, Pemuda dan Olahraga - 
Kesbangpol) whose office functions as the Kominda secretariat and, as ordinary members,
orv
the head o f  the Dinas Ketertiban, the head o f  the military intelligence from the district 
Kodim, the head o f  the district State Prosecutor’s intelligence office and a representative 
from the city’s BIN (State Intelligence Agency) detachment.81 The current Kominda system 
continues the former Bakorstanasda meetings which took place in the city since the 
nineteen eighties. The only difference between the Bakorstanasda meeting and the post-
• • i • R'?2007 Kominda is that the Kominda has a basis in law and the old Bakorstanasda did not.
In terms o f  roles, the primary task o f  the Kominda is to pool the intelligence data o f  its 
members, analyse perceived ‘threats to stability’ and recommend policy to the Muspida, 
which it does approximately once every month. Although the Kominda has unlimited scope 
to discuss whatever it deems necessary, there are several common topics which enter its 
discussions. One o f  these topics is the activities o f  suspect political, religious and social 
movements. The concept o f  what is suspect is left to the discretion o f  the intelligence 
professionals, but common groups o f  concern are fundamentalist Islamic movements and 
socialist groups. Another Kominda task is ‘mapping vulnerable areas’ i.e. areas which have 
certain characteristics (social, economic, political or criminal) which make them likely to 
produce instability. One o f  the final common topics o f  discussion during my informant’s
78 Interview, Kassat Intell. Poltabes and Kassat Intell Sleman, 2007. Interview, Kepala Bagian Pol.PP 
Nugroho Prasetyo, Dinas Ketertiban Propinsi, 26 May 2008.
79 The reason why Bantul does not have a Kominda is because the bupati, for personal political reasons, 
believed the creation o f  a Kominda would make him appear too close to the security apparatus. Interview, 
Kandiawan, 29 October 2007.
80 However, the head o f  the dinas preferred not to attend the meetings. Instead he appointed the head o f  his 
Pol.PP intelligence section to stand in his place. Interview, former head o f  the Pol.PP intelligence detachment 
o f  the Dinas Ketertiban, Kota Yogyakarta, 19 April 2008 and 29 October 2007.
81 Keputusan Walikota Yogyakarta Nom or 69/K EP/2007 tentang Pembentukan Komunitas Intelijen Daerah, 
Lampiran: ‘Susunan Keanggotaan’.
82 Interview, former head o f  Pol.PP intelligence section, 29 October 2007.
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time on the Kominda was preparation for the mayoral election o f  2006. Although the 
electoral term in Indonesia is five years, we must recall that there are three major layers o f  
democratically elected government (district, province and centre), which can operate on 
different cycles. Usually the intelligence agencies will begin preparing election security one
oi
year before the poll. One can imagine that in districts where national, provincial and 
district elections fall on different years, the Kominda would probably be reasonably busy 
with monitoring this situation.
In addition to this grand picture, I have obtained one set o f  declassified meeting notes from 
the Kominda o f  Yogyakarta city that illustrate what was discussed in one meeting on 8 
August, 2007. In this meeting we see some o f  the typical problems that raise the interest o f  
this district’s intelligence agencies: religious extremism and suspect political activities. In 
particular the Kominda discussed two separate findings concerning ‘radical’ Islamic 
groups. According to the meeting notes on 27 July 2007, a group o f  more than eighty 
university students under the banner o f  the Negara Islam Indonesia -  a fundamentalist
• 04
movement described as being committed to the creation o f  an Islamic state -  were found 
boarding coaches near a Yogyakarta public monument. Allegedly their objective was to 
attend a large extremist rally in Jakarta. This information came from five members o f  the 
group who “freed themselves” from the event (presumably at the point o f  embarkation). 
These people were interrogated by unknown sources, presumably one o f  the Kominda’s 
participating agencies. The five students gave their names and details, described how they 
were recruited into the Negara Islam movement and where its headquarters was located (in 
West Java). The Kominda also revealed that it had come to their attention that an Islamic
• • • RSreligious cult, A1 Qiyadah Islamiyah, had been found in Yogyakarta. The meeting notes 
go into a discussion o f  the practices o f  this group but no information comes to light 
concerning its location or size. Finally the Kominda members also stated that they became 
aware in the nearby city o f  Solo, outside Yogyakarta, there were found some English study 
books which carried the picture o f  the communist hammer and sickle. Although none had
83 Interview, former head o f  Pol.PP intelligence section, April 2008.
84 Otherwise known as the Daral Islam movement.
85 In appreciating the significance o f  this finding we must recall the specific social conditions o f  Indonesia, 
where religion is a deeply meaningful issue , individually, socially and politically. Religious m ovem ents-  
particularly Islamic ones -  which stray from mainstream doctrine are often seen as dangerous since they run 
the risk o f  sparking social conflict.
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been found in Yogyakarta the issue was flagged as something to watch out for, “to guard 
against a return o f  communist ideology.”86 The Kominda resolved to do the following: 
continue intelligence gathering on the Negara Islam Indonesia, request that other parts o f  
the government apparatus (principally, they imply, the Education Department) renew 
pedagogy on the secular state philosophy -  Pancasila. Finally they chose to alert campus 
authorities where the Nil was active and request that they observe the movement and report
• • 87on its activities.
The first thing which stands out about the discussions o f  this August 2007 meeting is the 
peculiar fear o f  the security apparatus regarding national unity. The Suharto era obsession 
with social conformity, national unity and anti-communism certainly still persists in the 
way that security agencies perceive threats.88 Right wing Islamists, trivial evidence o f  
communist symbology and religious heretics all enter the threat matrix and are seen as 
things worthy o f  further observation. It is not my place to judge whether these practices are 
legitimate forms o f  expression or actual threats to the unity o f  society. I consider this debate 
best left to the Indonesian political process. Analytically, however, we can conclude that 
social control still remains a dominant concern for the Indonesian model o f  security 
management. Intelligence collection is one o f  the key means which the Indonesian state has 
for anticipating threats to stability. Viewed from the perspective o f  the Indonesian state, 
Polri is justified in maintaining a vast network o f  economic intelligence units, political 
intelligence units, and so on. It seems sensible for so many parts o f  the government -  BIN, 
TNI, Pol.PP, Polri, state prosecutors, and so on -  to be active in regional intelligence 
gathering. The present day Indonesian state therefore very much continues the practices o f
86 Kantor Kesatuan Bangsa, Pemuda dan Olahraga, Kota Yogyakarta: Laporan Hasil Rapat Kominda, 8 
August 2007.
871 can independently confirm this did happen. In an interview with the head o f  security at Gadjah Mada 
University, Deda Suwandi, I discovered that the head o f  the provincial military intelligence unit telephoned 
Deda at around this time to question him on the NIL He was asked whether he knew o f  its existence on his 
campus. He claimed it did not. Military intelligence then informed Deda that a number o f  UGM students were 
involved, though it is apparent there were no UGM students in the group that was questioned in July. 
Presumably this telephone conversation took place after the 27 July event. The military was presumably 
contacting all the Yogyakarta universities for collecting information and disseminating warnings. Interview, 
R.Deda Suwandi, Kepala Satuan Keamanan dan Keselamatan Kampus UGM , 27 October 2008. Kota 
Yogyakarta: Laporan Hasil Rapat Kominda, 8 August 2007.
88 Honna, Military Politics and Democratisation, 9-10. Tanter, ‘Intelligence and Security A gencies in 
Indonesia’, 214.
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the New Order: monitoring the activities o f  its citizens in the name o f  order and stability. 
The state also maintains a very broad interpretation o f  what constitutes a likely threat.
The other notable thing about this 2007 Kominda meeting is its lack o f  practical 
recommendations. For example, the Kominda recommends that in response to the 
circulation o f  communist oriented books there needs to be further observation o f  
bookshops. If we suspend the debate over freedom o f  expression and look at the issue from 
the eyes o f  an Indonesian intelligence professional, perhaps it would have been wiser to 
recommend that someone call the local distributors and request they do not stock such
89 •books. Perhaps the Kominda had a more in-depth discussion than the notes suggest, and 
all such options were canvassed. The more likely explanation is that whatever the skills this 
grouping has in regards to gathering intelligence, they are not very imaginative in actually 
responding to security problems.
Beyond the previous example o f  what goes on in one o f  the Kominda meetings, my source 
has provided some fascinating information on how the different agencies o f  this district 
Kominda operate. Each agency has its own interests and capabilities. For example, the 
Kodim (and he implied BIN as well) is most interested in issues pertaining to ‘the unity o f  
the state’, or “soal NKRF  as he put it. Specifically, BIN and TNI intelligence are interested 
in things like terrorism.90 The regional government and the police are more interested in 
general public order and security. The intelligence agents o f  the Jaksa often bring 
information related to land ownership and religious issues, for reasons that were not 
explained. Therefore: “every institution carries its own problems, and in the Kominda they 
are discussed, which will become the priority and which will be reported to the mayor.” 91 
My source mentioned at one time that the chair o f  the city Kominda, the deputy mayor, 
does not often attend meetings. As a result, the deputy chair o f  the forum, the head o f  the
89 This was not the only unimaginative idea. In reaction to the Negara Islam movement the Kominda 
recommends a “refreshing, increasing and improvement o f  Pancasila Ideology in the com m unity.” A more 
realistic idea may have been to actually call all the University rectors and ask them to watch out for the N il 
organisation and discourage their students from join ing it. As discussed in a prior footnote this is actually 
what happened, but I assume the military was acting on its own initiative in that matter, as the Kominda did 
not recommend this action itself.
90 Interview, former head o f  Pol.PP intelligence section, 2007.
91 Interview, former head o f  Pol.PP intelligence section, 2008.
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Poltabes police intelligence unit, leads the meetings. " I asked whether this led to the 
Kominda being biased towards the interests o f  the police. My source responded that 
intelligence sharing was not weighted towards the interests o f  one party over another, rather 
any intelligence shared in the Kominda is that which is considered in the common interest.
What is discussed in the Kom inda are problems which have a global characteristic. 
Because each o f  the institutions respectively has their ow n interests which cannot be 
revealed in the Kom inda. With the existence o f  Kominda sourced intelligence, the 
institutions have a m ulti-fold function. That is searching for information for the
interests o f  the institutions them selves, also collecting  material for the Kom inda [and
93the interests o f  all participants for situational awareness].
In terms o f  intelligence collection each Kominda participant has its own agents in the field. 
The Kodim has its own intelligence staff as well as its sub-district Koramil and individual 
military personnel allocated to the village, the Babinsa. These elements act as the 
intelligence antennae o f  the military.94 The police have similar capabilities, but on a much 
larger scale. The district and provincial Jaksa offices have their own small intelligence 
team, which my source describes as relatively weak since it often asks the other Kominda 
members for additional information. The city’s Pol.PP unit also has its own small nine man 
intelligence unit. My source does not know anything about the size o f  BIN in Yoyakarta, 
since he only knows the one agent who turns up to the meetings. In weighing up the 
proficiency o f  these agencies my source believes the police and the military are less 
effective than the other agencies:
Intel [agents] from the Kodim  or from the Poltabes are easily  detected by the 
com m unity. If  w e talk about intel [agents] from the Prosecutors, Satpol.PP, or even  
BIN, they are difficult to be detected, because they don’t have a military scent. 
C onsequently, their scope is wider. B esides that, intel agents from all institutions don’t 
wear uniforms, so that they don’t seem  to stick out.
While his observation seems logical my source is from the Pol.PP and his testimony may 
be biased. But his observation is true qualitatively, then quantitatively most o f  the 
information that enters the Kominda probably comes from Polri and the TNI, since they
1)2 The lack o f  interest shown by the deputy mayor also shows how much value the intelligence professionals 
attach to this forum, since in the absence o f  regional government initiative they continue to collaborate on 
their own.
93 Interview, former head o f  Pol.PP intelligence section, 2008 and 2007.
1)4 Interview, Kassat Intel. Poltabes, October 2007.
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have the most ears on the ground. The method o f  intelligence collection is exclusively 
human source. That is, each o f  these various agents moves about in the community in 
civilian dress, absorbing data from their informants and from the word on the street.
They in searching for information are not like detectives. [An intel. agent] w ill study 
the problem first. For exam ple, by pretending to be a merchant. Som e tim e later he w ill 
touch on the problem. And, unconsciously the com m unity g ives information. Because 
intel. only needs information. If talking about enforcem ent, that is done by another 
team. Like in the Public Order Bureau. We search for information concerning the 
distribution o f  illegal alcohol by pretending to be the buyers. And to becom e an 
acquaintance o f  the seller can take a long tim e.95
Although the intelligence sharing that goes on in the Kominda is itself an illustration o f  
security cooperation, Kominda meetings have also led to other inter-agency operations in 
the field. Though not all are successful they do demonstrate how professional security 
cooperation at one level can lead to cooperation at another. My source has provided three 
different examples o f  this.
One example o f  the Kominda’s influence on cooperation in the field comes from May
2007. The head o f  a neighbourhood association (.Kepala RW) telephoned the Yogyakarta 
city hotline with information that a hardline Islamist from Afghanistan had taken residence 
in the city and was delivering sermons in some o f  the city’s mosques. Most worryingly he 
was apparently attempting to collect donations. As such there was a reasonable fear that 
this person was attempting to raise support for the terrorist cause in Afghanistan. The Dinas 
Ketertiban brought this piece o f  intelligence to the Kominda for debate.96 In the Kominda 
forum it was decided that as the issue had the overtone o f  foreign activity, BIN was best 
placed to handle the problem. The BIN detachment in the city took the information and 
passed the issue upward through its chain o f  command to BIN headquarters in Jakarta. 
Jakarta headquarters recommended that BIN in the district file the case with the Yogyakarta 
immigration authorities. The Yogyakarta immigration office investigated the matter and
95 Interview, former head o f  Pol.PP intelligence section, 2008.
96 According to my informant, the information came from a “pengurus mesjid” or an administrative officer in 
a mosque. This pengurus heard the sermons and reported the person to the head o f  his neighbourhood (the 
RT), who reported it to Kepala RW w ho reported the issue to the local government hotline, which was then 
filtered to the Dinas Ketertiban. Am ong other things that chain o f  events illustrates how Indonesia’s 
multilayered bureaucratic system enhances human intelligence collection by effectively expanding the 
number o f ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground.
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discovered that the Afghani had abused the conditions o f  a limited tourist visa. Although 
my source is unaware o f  how this incident ended, it is probable that the immigration service 
forced the man to leave Indonesia.
My source also provided a second example o f  the Kominda’s intelligence collection 
capabilities which produced a failed security operation in the field. At one time in 2006 the 
city Kodim asked Pol.PP intelligence to investigate street traders {pedagang) in front o f  the 
provincial police’s Mobile Brigade (Brimob) building. After investigation, the Pol.PP 
intelligence unit discovered the street traders were selling illegal liquor and engaging in 
other illicit activities. Apparently this trading was supported by corrupt elements o f  the 
police and the military there. During its investigations the Dinas also discovered that many 
o f  the criminal merchants did not have appropriate permission from the district to trade. As 
such, the traders were vulnerable to eviction. After Pol.PP intelligence reported back to the 
Kominda, the Kominda recommended to the Muspida that a combined Pol.PP, police and 
military operation be launched to clear out the area. The Muspida agreed. Two days before 
the operation however, the head o f  the Pol.PP intelligence section checked with the head o f  
the sub-district who was responsible for overseeing business licensing in the area. As it 
turned out all o f  the merchants due to be evicted had days beforehand acquired the 
appropriate permission. Clearly a leak o f  information had occurred. While that planned 
operation ended in failure it does illustrate the existence o f  a logical chain o f  security 
cooperation. Joint-intelligence gathering can lead to combined operations in the field.
The final example o f  the city o f  Yogyakarta’s Kominda in action, concerns a fight between 
university students from different ethnic groups. In this incident, which happened sometime 
during late 2007, a drunken youth from South Sulawesi was involved in a fight with 
another university student from Ambon. In response, Ambonese youths set upon and
• Q7
torched the residential college (asrama) o f  the Yogyakarta Sulawesi student community. 
To that point, this conflict had occurred in the territory o f  Sleman. But in response the
97 In Indonesia it is customary for most provincial governments to operate a residential college (asrama 
mahasis^va) for their tertiary students in external provinces. Although the fight began in Sleman, because the 
Sulawesian asrama was located in Yogyakarta city, the city became embroiled in this conflict. See also: 
‘Asrama M ahasiswa Sulawesi Selatan di Yogyakarta Diserang Enam Saksi Dimintai’, Kompas 15 January
2008.
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Sulawesian student community attempted to burn down the residential college o f  the 
Ambonese, which happened to be located in the city o f  Yogyakarta. After the loss o f  the 
Sulawesian college, the city’s Poltabes command set up guards on the Ambonese asrama, 
and were thus able to thwart a mob o f  Sulawesian students attempting to attack it. After the 
incident, the Muspida requested the Kominda to reconnoitre the situation. The Kominda 
met on the night o f  the aborted attack, to identify the students and representatives among 
them. Apparently the police took the lead in this process as they had the authority to 
investigate crime beyond the boundaries o f  the city. The Yogyakarta city Muspida then 
called leadership figures from the respective student communities to meet before them. 
These representatives were told in stern terms there was to be no further violence -  the 
message apparently was that if the students wished to fight they should do it outside
QO #
Yogyakarta. As a result, the tit-for-tat attacks between the Ambonese and Sulawesians 
ceased after the Muspida’s intervention.
What these three examples show is the ability o f  the joint intelligence process to support 
local security management. By sharing intelligence and analysis, district intelligence 
elements are able to enhance their individual capabilities to detect sources o f  disturbance. 
The evidence from these examples also suggests the Kominda has a mixed record o f  
success in the field. Despite success in two cases, one operation was spoiled by corrupt 
leaks. Nevertheless, whatever the Kominda’s effectiveness, the data does show these parties 
share a commitment as intelligence professionals to collaboration in support o f  security 
outcomes. This evidence again casts doubt upon the negative assessments o f  the literature, 
which define interagency relations as perpetually hostile and contested. At the local level, 
intelligence agencies are capable o f  mature collaboration.
The final point to add about the Kominda is that this forum is above all a servant o f  
regional government. The Kominda reports to the Muspida and the Muspida decides what 
will be done with Kominda reports. The regional government effectively owns the 
intelligence analysis that comes out o f  the Kominda. When 1 approached the office o f  the 
Bagian Tata Pemerintahan (the District Secretariat) in the city o f  Yogyakarta 1 was
98 Interview, former head o f  Pol.PP intelligence section, 2008.
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informed that the city government does not forward Kominda or Muspida information 
upward to the provincial government. Intelligence products therefore do not leave the 
district. The bureaucrats in the Secretariat made a valid point that the hierarchical structure 
o f  Polri and TNI “probably” means that the police and military participants report 
discussions o f  the Kominda through their chains o f  com m and."  Nevertheless the civilian 
state structure is probably not exploiting this forum to the limits o f  its effectiveness.
In summary, the Kominda is a critical example o f  cooperation through intelligence sharing. 
The Kominda is premised upon equal participation in sharing, analysing and recommending 
responses to jointly identified threats. In the city o f  Yogyakarta the process seems to take 
place well and has an effect on actual operations in the field. How much effect though is an 
open question. The Kominda is certainly, however, one further example o f  inter-agency 
collaboration.
The Meeting o f  the Regional Head o f  Government, Regional Courts, Regional State 
Prosecutor and Police (Kepala Daerah, Pengadilan, Kejaksaan, Kepolisan -  Kediljapol)
There is one other meta-security forum which meets in Yogyakarta. It is much less active 
and much less influential than the two previous examples, but nevertheless it provides 
another demonstration o f  cooperation among law enforcement organisations. This forum is 
the Kediljapol. The Kediljapol brings together all the law enforcement agencies at the sub­
national level to discuss technical legal issues. The Kediljapol is different from the Muspida 
and Kominda in that these forums discuss security in a global fashion, while the Kediljapol 
examines only matters pertaining to the interpretation and application o f  criminal law. 
While the state prosecutors and the regional justices were only minor contributors to the 
Muspida process, these organisations are important in the Kediljapol. The forum is active 
mostly at the provincial level. Some o f  the district governments have experimented with the
99 The only time when the district w ill forward information to the province is when the city com es across an 
issue that it believes will affect other districts or an issue it believes will concern the province. From 2007 to 
2008 the Bagian Tata Pemerintahan had not been in contact with the Provincial Muspida at all, nor with the 
Muspikas o f  the sub-districts. Interview, Kepala Bagian Tata Pemerintahan Kota Yogyakarta, 12 May 2008.
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Kediljapol in the past and one Kabupaten, Sleman, even maintains it at the present, but 
beneath the province the forum is largely moribund.
The Kediljapol has been held at the provincial level “probably” for the last ten to fifteen 
years, but has had a legal mandate through provincial regulations only since 2004.100 The 
terms o f  reference for the Kediljapol are, like the Muspida, vague. The governor has made 
the forum responsible for discussing all manner o f  problems which arise between the 
forum’s participants over the execution o f  their functions.101 In reality what the Kediljapol 
does is to extend an opportunity to all the state’s legal elements to meet and discuss their 
problems: from the interpretation o f  law to their complaints about one another. In the 
meeting notes which have been made available to me, many o f  the Kediljapol’s discussions 
relate to case handling. For example, the provincial government has previously brought to 
the meetings questions over whether the Legal Section (Bagian Hukum) in the districts are 
allowed to represent district governments in court. Polda DIY and the provincial state 
prosecutors have complained that the provincial court has threatened the prosecution o f
• 109cases by demanding unreasonable standards o f  evidence. Although it remains uncertain 
from the meeting notes as to how those issues were resolved, it seems that the Kediljapol, 
like the Muspida seeks to resolve mutual problems through dialogue. Unlike the Muspida,
the Kediljapol meets rarely, perhaps twice or three times a year and lacks a permanent
• i rnchair. ' Based upon this information, the Kediljapol is probably best described as a 
technical coordination discussion group. I found no evidence that the forum activates
100 I say this with som e caution. The interviewee who provided me with this information is a senior 
bureaucrat, R. Nugroho, who works in the Biro Hukum (Legal Branch) o f  the provincial government and is 
responsible for managing the Kediljapol (Interview, 29 October 2007). As has been found many times in 
different situations, this bureaucrat has only occupied the position for a period o f  several years and the 
knowledge o f  the interviewee (and colleagues) about the period before his tenure is limited. The interviewee 
did, however, refer to a previous joint declaration o f  the Chiefs o f  the Supreme Court, State Prosecutors and 
Police o f  1992 (Keputusan Bersama Ketua Mahkamah Agung RI, Menteri Kehakiman RI, Kejaksaan Agung  
RI, Kepala Kepolisian Negara RI Nomor K M K /007/SK B/III/1992, M .01.PW .03/1992, Kep017/JA/3/1992, 
KepO 1 /III /l992 tentang Pemantapan Keterpaduan sesam e Aparatur Penegak Hukum Dalam Menangani dan 
menyelesaikan Perkara-Perkara Pidana). After som e discussion with colleagues, the interviewee indicated that 
this decision “probably” was the catalyst for the creation o f  the Kediljapol in Yogyakarta and it has been held 
continuously “ever since”. The most current regulation for the forum is: Keputusan Gubernur DIY Nomor 
28/TIM /2004 tentang Pembentukan Tim Koordinasi Dilkehjapol Propinsi DIY.
101 Propinsi DIY, Keputusan Gubernur 28/2004, Kedua.
102 This information originates from two documents given to me by Nugroho titled “Permasalahan Hukum 
Propinsi DIY 2006” and “Permasalahan/Pemecahan di Lapangan”. These were described as submission 
documents to the Kedilapol from 2006.
103 The C hief Justice, or any other representative may choose to lead the meeting. Interview, R.Nugroho, 29 
October 2007.
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investigations or seeks to prosecute the enforcement o f  law, rather that it seeks to 
coordinate the administration o f  law.
The Kediljapol has formerly been held in all o f  the three districts under examination and is 
active currently in one o f  them -  Sleman. In Sleman, the district government has 
reconvened the forum after 2005 for the same reasons that it reconvened the Muspida; its 
interpretation o f  changes in the 2004 autonomy law supposedly now allows the district to 
cooperate with central government agencies. Since 2005, the Kediljapol o f  Sleman has 
convened at least twice, once in 2005 and once in 2006, to discuss two issues -  the 
resurrection o f  the forum and how to divide the money collected from local government 
fines.104 The Kediljapol o f  Bantul, to the best o f  the knowledge available, convened in 1998 
but was deactivated in 2000. According to an interviewee from the Kabupaten’s legal 
office, it was decided in 2000 that all matters in the Kediljapol could be referred to the 
discussions o f  the Muspida.103 The city o f  Yogyakarta also created its own Kediljapol in 
2004. But, after a period o f  only six months o f  formal existence, political factions in the 
regional parliament levied suspicions that the forum created a Tegal conspiracy’, and the 
forum was deactivated there also.106
While the Kediljapol exists at the margins in the case study, we can reasonably use the 
Kediljapol as a further example o f  how separate law enforcement institutions come together 
to jointly discuss matters o f  mutual interest. Since interviewees in the Legal Bureaus o f  
regional government are only administrators o f  the meetings and not participants, it is 
unclear how well this forum works. The Kediljapol provides further evidence though that 
the umbrella o f  local government again provides key opportunities for cooperative 
problem-solving.
104 Interview, Hermanan and Djoko, Bagian Hukum Sleman, 2007.
105 Interview with R.Sutinah, Seksi Bantuan Hukum, Bagian Hukum, Kabupaten Bantul, 29 October 2007.
106 Interview with Basuki Harris, Kepala Bagian Hukum, Kotamadya Yogyakarta, 21 September 2007.
Sub-District Leadership Conference (Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan - Muspika)
I wish to mention only in passing the existence of  another forum which is also important 
for inter-institutional relations, but takes place at a much lower level, the sub-district. This 
forum, the Muspika, brings together the head o f  the sub-district police (the Kapolsek), the 
head o f  the sub-district military detachment (the Danramil) and the head o f  the sub-district 
bureaucracy (the Camat). The Muspika is another continuation from the Suharto era and 
operates exactly like the Muspida, though on a reduced scale. From the sub-districts 1 have 
visited, the Muspika tends to discuss micro-security problems, like traffic conditions, the
107trade in illegal alcohol and the like.
Sectoral Forums: The Regional Narcotics Agency and the Enforcement Taskforce o f  the 
Forestry Police
Beyond the meta-forums for general security problems, there are several small inter-agency 
meetings designed to tackle sectorally specific law enforcement issues. Although these 
forums are small, mostly passive and often ineffective, they are the final examples which 
show concerted efforts on the part o f  state actors to coordinate security. Like the previous 
forums, they operate under regional government offices and are dependent on the police.
One o f  these entities is the Narcotics Agency o f  the provincial government (Badan 
Narkotika Propinsi or BNP) and the districts (Badan Narkotika Kabupaten/Kota or BNK). 
These agencies are the regional offices o f  the Badan Narkotika Nasional (National 
Narcotics Agency), though because o f  decentralisation the BNP and BNK function 
autonomously. Like the national Narcotics Agency, the BNP and the BNK carry out the 
‘war on drugs’ through coordinating drug prevention programs, drug treatment programs
107 The Muspika is a nation wide institution, but in Yogyakarta it is governed in detail by gubernatorial order. 
Surat Perintah Gubemor, Perihal: Muspika, No. 138/197 24 January 1986.
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and drug law enforcement. As will become apparent, the ability o f  the BNP/BNK to 
actually push the agenda law enforcement is very weak. As such the BNP/BNK tend to 
focus their work on prevention and treatment. Putatively, however, these agencies do claim 
a coordinating role for the ‘war on drugs.’ Paradoxically, their lack o f  action is more telling 
than what they do, as it illustrates again the critical importance o f  Polri in regional security.
The BNP and the BNK have ‘repressive taskforces’ (or Satgas), but these groupings do
10Rvery little law enforcement. Using the BNK o f  the city o f  Yogyakarta as an example, 
their repressive taskforce is chaired by the head o f  the Poltabes Narcotics Unit. This 
taskforce also consists o f  the head o f  the city’s Pol.PP units and PPNS units, the head o f  the 
investigative unit o f  the provincial Food and Drug Bureau, the city Kodim’s head o f  
intelligence, representatives o f  the district prosecutors and district court and a number o f  
other members.109 The founding regulation o f  the Yogyakarta city BNK is similar to the 
provincial regulation for the BNP. The repressive Satgas o f  the Yogyakarta city BNK is 
permitted to “conduct coordination and observation on activities o f  enforcement on raids, 
arrests, confiscations, and investigations” and “conduct stake-outs and enforcement towards 
places/businesses.” 110 The satgas functions largely as a dialogue forum, while Polri 
narcotics detectives are responsible for anti-narcotics activities on the ground. As described 
by the head o f  the police Narcotics Unit for Poltabes Yogyakarta:
In the public sector, p olice cooperate with B N K ... Indeed w e cooperate. But for 
enforcing the law only w e [the police narcotics detectives] can. When it concerns them  
[BN K ] they can only g ive lectures, provide supporting funds... therefore possibly [it 
can be said] that forum discusses problem s. W ithin BN K  there are N G O s, furthermore 
there are narcotics bodies w hich have already been created by the com m unity... They 
g ive information to the police. A side from that there is an exchange o f  thoughts and 
also an exchange o f  information... According to my opinion this BNK  is only an 
umbrella forum [wadah\. But for the frontline law enforcem ent this continues to be the 
p o lice .111
Once a year the National Narcotics Agency, the BNN, hands down orders to Indonesia’s 
various BNP and BNK at the regional level, to execute special anti-narcotics operations to
108 Peraturan Daerah Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 9/2007 tentang Badan Narkotika Propinsi, Pasal 
15. See as an example: Keputusan Walikota Yogyakarta 224/K ep/2006 tentang Penetapan Personil Badan 
Narkotika Kota.
109 Kota Yogyakarta, 224/2006, Lampiran Susunan Personalia, V, B.
110 Kota Yogyakarta, 224/2006, Bab.V, Pasal 7 (5). Perda DIY 9/2007, Pasal 15.
111 Interview with Kassat Narkoba Poltabes Andy Traspoetra, 25 September 2007.
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coincide with the international anti-drug day. Although the operations come from the BNN, 
it is regional police that execute the operations. The same narcotics chief detective from 
Poltabes described this operation as follows:
On HARI B E R SIN A R  [the codenam e o f  the operation!... BN N  loads [beban] that on 
M abes Polri, BN P loads the operation on the Polda, and BNK  loads the operation on 
the Poltabes. Therefore the Poltabes also has responsibility to the Polda, the Polda is 
responsible to M abes. B esides Poltabes there is also Bantul, Slem an and so on. Thus 
w e m ove all in one lin e .112
Discussions with the head o f  the BNP and the secretariat o f  the BNK o f  Yogyakarta city 
indicate that this officer’s views on the distribution o f  power in the BNP/BNK is correct.113 
According to the provincial head o f  the BNP:
We [from BNP] are not alw ays invited [in police activities/anti-narcotics operations].
Thus w e are friends only. Therefore i f  they [the Polda narcotic detectives] operate, w e  
don’t know. W e are considered to make them uncom fortable. W e are only given a 
sam ple [o f  drugs], from the originals up to the synthetic. But when they do the 
enforcem ent, w e d on ’t know. Even for the data [on arrests etc.], w e must go begging to 
them. There is one operation from BNP [the Hari Bersinar operation referred to above], 
for com m em orating International Anti-Narcotics day. But w e g ive that operation to 
them [the police]. But when Polri conducts an operation, [the BNP] sta ff w ho are 
involved only consists o f  two people. They are only from the [BNP] secretariat. And  
the large part o f  the operation is from Polri. The operation’s budget is also used by 
Polri a lo n e .114
The satgas represif o f  the BNP and BNK is therefore not very active and seems at best to 
observe and report on the anti-drug activities o f  police detectives. In all likelihood the 
BNP/BNK’s “coordinative” functions over drug law enforcement is a political device, 
which gives the illusion o f  a government wide response to Indonesia’s narcotics problems, 
while in reality Polri’s detectives run the entire show. Yet this example is still an instructive 
one. The BNP/BNK forum is yet another illustration o f  security cooperation in practice, 
largely in this case between the police and regional government. The fact that all law 
enforcement functions fall to Polri in this forum is an extreme illustration o f  the importance 
o f  the police in the regional security network.
112 Interview, Kassat Narkoba Poltabes, 2007.
113 Interview, Sekretaris Badan Narkotika Kota, 26 July 2007.
114 Interview, Kepala Badan Narkotika Propinsi A.Priyatno, 24 October 2008.
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The final noteworthy example o f  a sectoral interagency forum is the enforcement taskforce 
o f  the provincial forestry office. Unlike the BNP/BNK this forum oversees more activities 
but also depends upon the police. Within the provincial Forestry Bureau there is a ‘Forest 
Security Coordination Team.’ This body handles all anti-illegal logging operations in the 
province o f  Yogyakarta. This team consists o f  the head o f  the Forestry Bureau (functionally 
represented by the bureau’s Forestry Police Section or Seksi Pengamanan), the provincial 
prosecutors office, Polda DIY (represented by the Directorate o f  Detectives), the provincial 
Korem, the provincial court and a number o f  other miscellaneous participants.113 Looking 
at the operations orders from 2006 which was the last year the team conducted enforcement 
activities, the Forestry Bureau planned operations for twenty four days in that year. These 
combined operations included patrols, the arrest o f  suspects (if any were to be swept up -  
according to their recapitulated data there apparently were none in that year) and engaging 
the local community in dialogue.116 Out o f  those activities the Dinas Kehutanan budgeted 
for between ten to fifteen court cases every year, but these figures are rarely realised given 
the low amount o f  illegal logging in Yogyakarta. The Forest Security Team heavily 
depends on the Polda’s detectives since the investigative licenses of  the two PPNS in the 
provincial Forestry Police section have expired. Therefore only police detectives can now 
investigate cases o f  illegal logging in Yogyakarta. This situation to some extent results 
from the low level o f  illegal logging in the province and the consequent lack o f  capacity in 
the Forestry Bureau. Yet even if this reality was different, the police would still be an 
integral part o f  this team because o f  the sectoral superiority o f  police detectives over PPNS. 
More o f  this issue will be raised in chapter four.
Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the evidence for collaboration among state security actors in 
regional security forums. Ranked in order o f  importance and seniority there is the Regional 
Leader’s Conference (Muspida), the Regional Intelligence Community meeting (Kominda),
115 Keputusan Gubernur Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 6/TIM /2006, Lampiran Susunan Personil.
116 Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Propinsi DIY, Rencana Operasi Perlindungan dan Pengamanan Hutan, 
p.6- 10 .
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the meeting o f  the Regional Head o f  Government, Regional Courts, Regional State 
Prosecutors and Police (Kediljapol), the sub-district leader’s forum (Musywarah Pimpinan 
Kecamatan or Muspika), and two sectoral taskforces designed to facilitate joint-agency law 
enforcement over narcotics and illegal logging.
The distinctive feature o f  these meetings is an absence o f  what American strategists have 
dubbed ‘unity o f  comm and’ or the centralisation o f  leadership in a single institution. In 
these various forums individual parties participate voluntarily. No central government 
agency or officer obliges the security organisations at the regional level to collaborate. 
American strategists have claimed this model o f  inter-agency cooperation is not effective in 
achieving outcomes. In part, the evidence from my case study site o f  Yogyakarta reifies this 
analysis. The central product o f  joint security taskforces in Yogyakarta is consensus and 
dialogue, rather than results. This situation devolves from the voluntary nature of  
participation. A second explanation for the difficulty these forums have in driving 
outcomes is that they are not designed to serve a specific agenda. Instead the committees 
are, with the exception o f  the BNP/BNK and the Foresty Security Team, to monitor the 
general security landscape. To some extent, however, the weak record o f  these joint forums 
in managing threats is not the central issue.
To stress the importance o f  security outcomes overlooks the substantial benefit these 
forums have in facilitating dialogue and consensus. The literature on security in Indonesia 
would have us believe inter-institutional relations in the security sector are poor and 
defined by conflict. The evidence presented in this chapter shows this is not the case. The 
fact that state security agencies actually communicate at all is noteworthy and constitutes 
prima facie evidence o f  collaboration. One could argue that some o f  the evidence in this 
chapter supports the conventional view o f  competition and corruption leading to poor 
security outcomes. The best example o f  this would be the police protection o f  illegal 
gambling dens in Yogyakarta city. While noting these exceptions, I would nevertheless 
argue that the vast weight o f  evidence in this chapter suggests that dialogue and 
collaboration is the default setting o f  these security institutions.
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The joint agency security forums in Yogyakarta are also not incapable o f  producing action. 
In the few instances where joint operations were required, generally the security forums 
served to build the consensus which permitted officers in the field, to put agreed decisions 
into action. When operations did take place, they generally occurred between Polri 
elements and Pol.PP, and often the police become the ‘leading sector.’ The superior 
responsibilities and repressive powers o f  the police make Polri the power behind the joint 
agency process.
An unexpected finding is that regional government actually plays a key role in the joint 
agency meetings. All o f  the inter-institutional taskforces fall under the administration o f  
regional government. Because o f  this factor we see that regional government -  particularly 
in the Muspida -  is able to impose some o f  its concerns on the meetings and is able to draw 
the national security apparatus into the resolution o f  local problems. Although regional 
government may have a loud voice in the meeting rooms, nevertheless the forums required 
the powers o f  the police to enforce the joint resolutions.
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Chapter 4: Funding, Joint Operations and the Other Aspects to the Working Relationships
o f  State Security Agencies
This chapter continues the analysis o f  inter-agency relations within the state sector. In this 
chapter we examine how state security actors interact beyond regional government forums. 
Inter-institutional contact outside regional security forums takes at least four different 
forms: the funding o f  inter-agency activities, the execution o f  occasional joint operations 
(which many times takes place purely between the operational elements o f  the participating 
institutions without Muspida approval), “pembinaan ” or what may be termed in English as 
supervising/caring (for)1 in which the police provide services and support to the other law 
enforcement arms o f  the state (the PPNS) and, finally, interaction in the form of  
memorandums o f  understanding which codify attitudes and obligations between 
organisations. I arrange these practices in roughly their order o f  value, with funding being 
very important and the only standing MOU that I have discovered contributing in only a 
weak manner to interagency relations.
If considered as a whole, these interactions mostly take place between regional government 
and the police. Since regional government initiates most o f  these forms o f  engagement, the 
evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates the extent to which regional government 
depends upon Polri. The participation o f  other state organisations in these practices is often 
minimal. This situation underlines a circumstance which is made apparent throughout this 
dissertation: the most important actors in security management in my case study site are the 
national police, followed far behind by district government.
1 The Indonesian language has a rich variety o f  terms to describe (shades of) the concept o f  a senior caring for 
or managing a junior (membina, membimbing, mengasuh, mendampingi and so on). Contemporary English 
has a restricted vocabulary for rendering these terms, largely because the concept in English is faintly 
patronising. Yet in an Asian society like Indonesia, the practice o f  pembinaan is considered benign (even  
positive). As w e shall see in chapters five and six a large part o f  the police role is to guide the weaker parts o f  
the non-state security sector. Although by no means uniform, I was struck by how much the non-police 
security providers (especially the commercial security industry, the ronda and FKPM, among others) 
embraced this terminology, without any sense o f  irony or resentment. In western countries this type o f  
hierarchical relationship would probably not enjoy the same cultural acceptance.
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This chapter enhances our understanding o f  networked security for three reasons. Firstly, 
this chapter reveals comprehensive new, empirical data on how security organisations 
interact in Indonesia. Secondly, this chapter again shows the surprisingly important role 
played by regional government in facilitating security cooperation, while also revealing the 
central role occupied by the police within the network. Regional government may often 
cultivate methods o f  cooperation but the police are the source o f  strength for joint 
operations and a source o f  knowledge and training services. Thirdly this chapter also shows 
that cooperation is the dominant form o f  behaviour between state security actors, in spite o f  
the assumptions in the scholarly literature o f  widespread hostility and conflict.
In presenting this chapter I have deliberately eschewed reliance on official statements from 
leaders o f  government agencies. In my interviews I found that there was a tendency for 
public servants to provide bland official statements about their working relations with 
partner agencies. Therefore, I decided to look only at the evidence o f  action and activities. 
In doing so, I specifically hunted for information which would suggest agencies ignore or 
are apathetic to solicitations for cooperation. Where I have encountered such instances, as 
in Pol.PP relations with the police in the district o f  Bantul, I discuss the evidence. In 
general, however, there are few examples o f  non-col laborative behaviour. I find this further 
solidifies my argument that the dominant impulse o f  state security groups is to cooperate.
Why agencies choose to cooperate raises factors o f  agency and structure, and these issues 
need to be discussed separately as they apply to Polri and the non-police organisations. 
Non-police bureaucracies must cooperate with the police in order to adequately perform 
their mandates. Thus the Pol.PP and regional government seek police support in order to 
enhance their own enforcement powers. PPNS must deal with Polri investigators in order to 
prosecute criminal cases. As a result o f  national security reforms, territorial army forces are 
only able to deploy in regional security as part o f  combined operations with Polri 
personnel. Thus structural, systemic factors make non-Polri bureaucracies dependent on the 
police. Yet within this system we also see the influence o f  agency. Not all bureaucracies 
behave the same. In the city o f  Yogyakarta, public order officials deliberately cultivate 
close relations with their district police. In Bantul, the regional government seeks to buy
179
police support. Such choices imply that within structural parameters, non-Polri agencies 
adopt different patterns o f  engagement towards the police.
Why the Indonesian police choose to lend their assistance to other agencies, raises more 
difficult questions. I postulate that the willingness o f  the police to do so is founded on four 
reasons. Firstly, clear divisions o f  labour have an anodyne effect on interagency relations. 
Because there is little duplication o f  functions between these agencies, there is little 
contestation over security responsibilities. The police can freely lend assistance from a 
position o f  confidence, knowing that no other agency contests Polri’s responsibility for 
internal security. Secondly, there are patterns o f  learned behaviour. Some aspects o f  police 
support derive from behaviours which have taken place over decades, two examples being 
Polri supervision o f  PPNS and police attendance at Muspida meetings. Arguably such 
patterns o f  support inculcate receptiveness to cross-institutional collaboration. Thirdly, 
certain accepted rules o f  behaviour mitigate the costs o f  inter-institutional collaboration. 
There is an in-principle commitment within the Indonesian public sector to compensate 
external agencies when their assistance is requested. This agreement removes from the 
police the financial penalty costs o f  cooperation. Finally there is the nature o f  the police 
role itself. The police are responsible for day-to-day security. Security is enhanced through 
the mutual collaboration o f  state actors. Therefore with little to lose, it becomes a 
responsible rational choice for the police to support non-Polri agencies.
Funding
Cross-institutional funding is an important component o f  security cooperation. Given the 
relative dependence o f  regional governments on the assistance o f  national security 
agencies, transfers o f  cash, more often than not, come from local government and are 
directed at the police, military and other national institutions. Most o f  the discussion in the 
following section shows how these transfers occur. Recently, Jakarta has moved to curtail 
the most egregious aspects o f  these relationships by imposing strict limits on the ability o f  
regional governments to fund national institutions. My research shows that although joint
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funding has been reduced significantly, it still occurs. It should be mentioned though that 
inter-institutional funding is not a topic that is easy to research. The easiest and most 
reliable information on joint funding comes from publicly available financial audits o f  the 
Indonesian Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, BPK). While I have not found 
reliable information that leads me to conclude illegal, unrecorded payments are being made, 
it is highly likely that this practice still occurs. However, my research has only been able to 
uncover funding that supports professional activities.
While the scholarly literature shows that regional armed forces and regional governments 
have historically had an intertwined relationship, today the situation is very different. As 
discussed in chapter one, during the New Order the Indonesian army territorial command 
fused onto and dominated regional government. This enabled army commanders to tap into
• • • 9 • • •
the resources o f  the civil administration.*" Reformasi and decentralisation from 1998 to
2004 initiated the first phase o f  dislodging the military from local government, but over this 
period parts o f  military influence remained in place. While active military officers were 
withdrawn from regional government (or resigned their active commissions), TNI/Polri 
factions continued to exist in local parliaments. Though their influence was reduced, TNI 
representatives occasionally emerged as key voting blocs in local governments. Provincial 
and district executives therefore found themselves having to negotiate with military 
representatives for the passage o f  their legislative agendas. As a result, regional executive 
heads would grant budget concessions to territorial forces, often in the form o f  “ local 
security funds.” Mahroza found one especially generous district in East Java where 10% o f  
the entire district budget was transferred to the district Kodim.3 Yet the presence o f  military 
representatives in parliament ended in 2004. With the removal o f  military representatives a 
vital inducement for regional governments to grant funds to local TNI forces has now 
disappeared. As is apparent below, funding still occurs. Today however, the rationale for 
regional governments to financially support the national security apparatus is less strong 
and based upon the idea o f  payment for services rendered.
2 Honna, ‘Local Civil-Military Relations: A Comparison o f  West, Central and East Java’, 81-83. See also: 
Mahroza, Military Withdrawal, 56-63.
3 Mahroza, Local Perspective on Military Withdrawal, 234-235.
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New rules imposed by Jakarta have dramatically changed the dynamics o f  cross- 
institutional funding in the regions. In 2005 the interior minister issued a ruling that 
discouraged, but did not apparently forbid, regional government from providing grants to 
central government bodies.4 In 2006 the minister tightened this provision by issuing Surat 
Edaran 903 concerning how regional governments may formulate their budgets.5 The 
minister declared that the annual budgets o f  national government institutions operating in 
the regions are sufficient for their activities. Provinces and districts (instansi horizontal or 
horizontal institutions) may not supplement the budgets o f  national government agencies 
(instansi vertikal or horizontal institutions) through grants from the regional budget 
(APBD). Direct financial grants from the APBD to national bodies are now, therefore, 
forbidden. This ruling led to both angst and elation among regional government.6
Due to a negative initial reaction from the regions to his 2006 edict, the interior minister 
subsequently issued a qualification o f  his ruling. This qualification has allowed local 
government to fund the activities o f  national government agencies but in a much reduced 
form. The minister now allows districts and provinces to budget for “joint activities” 
between local government and national government bodies where the national agencies 
‘assist’ in the activities o f  their regional government counterparts.7 Following the minister’s 
recommendation, local governments have today adopted the practice o f  funding joint 
activities on a case by case basis rather than as they did before -  making direct grants o f  
cash or assets to central government security actors. The head o f  the Pol.PP section in the 
city o f  Yogyakarta, illustrated this difference. At one interview, he and I discussed his 
Bureau’s 2006 yearly report. The respondent explained in that year the Bureau made a
4See: Menteri Dalam N egeri, Surat Edaran: 9 0 3 /3 172/SJ.
5 Menteri Dalam Negeri: Surat Edaran: 903/2429/SJ tanggal 21 September 2005, Pedoman Penyusunan 
APBD TA 2006 dan Pertanggungjawaban Pelaksanaan A PBD  T A 2005.
6 Angst from som e, such as the district secretary o f  Bantul, who has argued that the new system places 
regional government in an uncomfortable position o f  having to reject requests from important institutions 
which it continuously works with. According to the Secretary’s statement in a BPK audit from 2005: “The 
District Secretary o f  the Kabupaten o f  Bantul understands the problem and stated that in executing the 
functions o f  government in the field, it is difficult not to g ive financial assistance to vertical institutions.” On 
the other hand, other district government officials such as the district secretary o f  Sleman view  the interior 
minister’s directive positively since, he im plies, it gives Sleman the grounds to legitimately refuse financial 
requests which strain the district budget. See: Republik Indonesia, Badan Pemeriksan Keuangan: Hasil 
Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Bantul Tahun Anggaran 2005 (25 July 2006), 133. Also: 
Interview with District Secretary o f  Sleman, Sutrisno, July 2007.
7 Website, Menteri Dalam Negeri: “Penjelasan Dirjen BAK D Mengenai Belanja Bantuan Kepada Instansi 
Vertikal yang Bersumber dari A PBD ” 23 Februari 2006. A ccessed 15 December 2007.
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block annual payment to the city Kodim and Poltabes, which was no longer deemed 
acceptable.
If w e talk about the Rp.140 m illion for the Poltabes, and the Rp.40 m illion for the 
Kodim. This is in the framework o f  providing assistance to institutions in the year
2006. What I mean is i f  w e request assistance from the Poltabes or the Kodim  there 
w ouldn’t be a problem. But m aking them accountable [for how they use those funds], 
that’s difficult. Thus this year [2007] the practice has changed to focus on supporting 
governm ent activities. For exam ple, the activity to support security for relocation at 
Klitihan [referring to a specific com bined operation to relocate street traders]. H ow ever  
many people [police/TN I] participate, w e paid. Therefore its quite real [i.e. 
accountable]... Before, that R p.190 m illion, w e d idn’t know how they spent it. N ow , 
w e actually know .8
In the past years this district government (and presumably all others did the same) made a 
yearly block grant to the national security actors with the expectation that the district would 
be able to call upon their support whensoever needed. But they had no way o f  knowing if 
the funding provided ever matched the material support. From 2006 these practices are no 
longer permitted. Instead the regional governments give funds to instansi vertikal on an as 
needs basis, and only when local district personnel are involved in the mission.
Prior to the passage o f  the interior minister’s 2006 order, it seems that almost all o f  the 
local governments o f  Yogyakarta were in the habit o f  paying moderate sums o f  money to 
the national security institutions. We can see this situation best through publicly available 
reports o f  the Indonesian Auditing Board, BPK.9 To take the provincial government as the 
first example. In the budget year 2004, the provincial government made the following 
payments to vertical institutions:10
8 Interview, Norwidi, October 2007.
l) BPK is the Indonesian Audit Board (or Auditor General). This agency has the authority to audit every 
Indonesian national and regional government organisation. It conducts these audits in random surveys every 
half-year. While BPK’s audits are the most accurate information there are limits to the usefulness o f  the data. 
Audits o f  the districts and the province o f  Yogyakarta only began in 2004 and 2005. After initially revealing 
the financial malpractices and recommending that the Yogyakarta governments cease making large grants to 
national agencies, the regional administrations heeded BPK’s requests. The most recent BPK reports o f  the 
last two years show almost no references to instansi vertikal at all. Thus w e can say that BPK’s reports in 
2004-2005 into the finances o f  Sleman, Bantul, Yogyakarta city, and the provincial government offer an 
interesting snapshot into how security funding worked before 2006. These practices have since changed.
10 Republik Indonesia, Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan: Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Propinsi 
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta Tahun Anggaran 2004 (August 2005), p. 196.
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Kodim Kulonprogo Rp 43.800.000
Kodim Bantul Rp 38.800.000
Kodim Yogyakarta Rp 38.800.000
Kodim Sleman Rp 38.800.000
Kodim Gunung Kidul Rp 43.800.000
Korem 072 Rp 4.500.000
Kodam IV Diponegoro Rp 4.000.000
Distrantib * Rp 82.600.000
Honorarium Rp 45.900.000
Total Rp341.000.000
* money was given to the provincial Dinas Trantibum (a different term for the Bureau o f  Public Order) 
with the intention o f  channelling the funds to national security agencies in Yogyakarta
Based on an audit o f  a separate account the BPK also noted that other payments had been 
made to vertical institutions in 2 0 0 4 : '1
Korem 072 Rp 277.000.000
Polda DIY Rp 75.000.000
Total Rp 352.000.000
Therefore the BPK audit on the 2004 Yogyakarta provincial budget shows the province 
gave at least Rp.693 million (around US$77,000) to the national security agencies and 
almost 90% o f  the money went to the military. But it is possible that these figures 
understate the situation. At this time the central government had not yet formally forbidden 
regional administrations granting money to central government agencies. The only reason 
why BPK had listed these payments was because the auditor considered the money 
‘wrongly allocated’, essentially the cash came from accounts designed to serve other 
purposes. Therefore these payments may in fact be the tip o f  a bigger iceberg.
11 The money for vertical security institutions, however, made up around only 1% o f  the Rp.639 billion in 
realised expenditure for the province in 2004. BPK, Hasil Pemeriksaan Propinsi DIY 2004, p. 199 and Bagian 
Pertama, Bab. 11, B, p.7.
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The other interesting thing to note about the provincial government payments is that most 
were directed towards the military. The reason for this is unclear. It is unlikely that the 
payments were quid pro quo for security services, precisely because the evidence in the rest 
o f  this dissertation indicates that the military was not active in internal security activities. 
There is little reason to suppose the situation in 2004 was different to the period o f  my field 
research in 2007-2008. Speculatively, one possible explanation is the composition o f  
parliament at that time. During the 1999-2004 period, military representatives continued to 
sit in national and regional parliaments. As Honna and Mahroza have pointed out, it was
customary in post-1999 Indonesia for regional heads o f  government to pay military
• 12 parliamentary fractions with appropriations from local budgets. Probably the same
dynamics Honna and Mahroza describes were at work in Yogyakarta.
The funding patterns in the districts were much the same as in the province, but after the 
minister o f  the interior began discouraging regional governments from direct cash grants in 
the 2005 financial year, a wider array o f  malpractices came to light in BPK audits.13 The
2005 audits o f  BPK therefore provide an interesting snapshot o f  how the districts 
subsidised national government agencies (and occasionally did so generously) prior to
2006. However it must be added this is only a snapshot. BPK audits o f  Bantul, Sleman and 
Yogyakarta district governments after 2006 show that the direct grants to national 
security/law enforcement institutions revealed in BPK’s 2004 and 2005 audits have now 
ceased.14
The auditors report on the 2005 budget o f  Kabupaten Bantul shows Bantul provided the 
most generous support to central agencies. The findings o f  this report are, in parts, quite 
striking and illustrate how this district attempted to buy close relations with the national
12 Mahroza, Military Withdrawal, 56-63. See also: Honna, ‘Local Civil-Military Relations, 81-83
13 Surat Edaran Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor: 903/3172/SJ, Pedoman Penyusunan 2005.
14 The only exception to this was a 2007 BPK audit which found that the city o f  Yogyakarta was loaning out a 
large number o f  vehicles (five four-wheel vehicles and nine motorbikes) and miscellaneous other electronic 
equipment to the district police, prosecutors, courts, and army unit. BPK deemed these loans not sufficient 
with procedure as the loan periods were unspecified. Republik Indonesia: Badan Pemerikssan Keuangan: 
Laporan Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Sistem Pengendalian Intern Dalam Kerangka Pemeriksaan Laporan 
Keuangan Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta Tahun Anggaran 2007 (30 June 2008), p.30. Republic Indonesia, 
Badan Pemeriksan Keuangan: Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Bantul Tahun Anggaran 
2007 (24 June 2008). Badan Pemerikssan Keuangan: Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten 
Sleman Tahun Anggaran 2007 (15 July 2008).
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law and security agencies. In the financial year 2005, the district disbursed funds o f  around 
Rp.608 million to central government security institutions. BPK tables the cash payments 
as follows:
Assistance to the Muspida Rp 92.453.000
Security assistance:
POLRES Kab. Bantul Rp 156.200.000
KODIM 0729 Kab. Bantul Rp 88.250.000
State Prosecutors Kab. Bantul Rp 133.000.000
State Law Court Kab. Bantul Rp 20.000.000
Satbrimob [police mobile brigade] Rp 6.500.000
KOREM 702/Kodam IV Diponegoro Rp 38.625.000
Korps Paskhas TNI AULanudAdisucipto 
[air force ground security]
Rp 2.000.000
Paspamres [Presidential security unit] Rp 600.000
Total Rp 537.628.000
To this, the auditors added other financial assistance in the form o f  one payment o f  Rp.65 
million to the Polres o f  Bantul and one payment o f  Rp.5 million to the Kodim. In one year 
this was a large sum o f  money for a small, mostly under-developed kabupaten.15
Bantul’s donations did not cease with financial assistance. In the same year, the BPK noted 
there were other donations o f  expensive capital goods. In total, the district granted some 
seventeen new and used vehicles to national government security agencies in 2005, in 
addition to other electronic equipment. BPK has broken down these findings as follows:
Toyota Kijang Innova Rp. 139.300.000,00 2005 State Prosecutors
(1 unit)
15 One reason for this extraordinary amount o f  money was that in 2005 the president made a special visit to 
Bantul. The Kabupaten partially subsidised the costs o f  security for his visit. This helps explains why so much 
money was transferred to the military (including Paspampres, the presidential security detachment). Even 
accepting this fact, the payment is very large and one security operation does not account for it all.
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Toyota Kijang Innova Type E Rp.l39.300.000,00 2005 
(1 unit)
State Courts
Honda Supra Fit Rp.20.400.000,00 2005 
(2 unit)
State Prosecutors
Truck Toyota Dyna 2003 (1 unit) Kodim
Total [for above]: 
Rp299.000.000,00
Suzuki Trail TS 125 2003 (7 unit) Polres
Suzuki TS 125 2002 (3 unit) Polres
Toyota kijang pick up 2001 (1 unit) Kodim
Toyota Kijang Innova type E 
2005
(1 unit) State courts
On top o f  these donations was added one computer that the district gave to the Kodim o f  
Bantul, one computer that was donated to the regional BIN office and one Motorola mobile 
phone donated to the Bantul police. Excluding the Motorola this last batch o f  equipment is 
estimated at Rp. 14.1 million. In all therefore, we could conservatively estimate that the 
Kabupaten o f  Bantul, in one financial year, gave away over Rp.l billion (approximately 
US$ 111,000) o f  cash and capital goods to national government law and security 
institutions.16 We must recall that this is merely a snapshot o f  the funding relations in one 
random year before the introduction o f  a ‘stop order’ on financial grants. It is difficult to 
accurately generalise on the basis o f  this information. While acknowledging the quantity of  
the transfers in Bantul seem unusually large, these grants were not unprecedented though 
among the other districts.
In the other districts the same funding relationship can be seen, albeit on a smaller scale. In 
the Kabupaten o f  Gunung Kidul, which is a northern district that is not a focus o f  this 
research but is included here to illustrate the ubiquity o f  the funding practices, BPK
16 But to put the situation in perspective, this is only a small part o f  the Kabupaten’s (realised) 2005 
expenditure o f  Rp.417 billion. Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Bantul Tahun Anggaran 2005, p.5, 132-133, 
141-142.
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discovered in the year 2004, the Kabupaten disbursed around Rp.593.2 million to its 
national security partners -  the police, the military, the state prosecutors and the national
courts.17 In the budget year 2005, the city o f  Yogyakarta also gave Rp.477 million to
18vertical law enforcement and security agencies. In 2005 another remote kabupaten in 
Yogyakarta, Kulon Progo provided around Rp.157 million to vertical security bodies.19 The 
Kabupaten o f  Sleman also was found to have made contributions o f  Rp.807 million to 
unspecified ‘vertical institutions.’ The BPK is not clear on whether Sleman gave some of  
this money to law enforcement and security actors but, given trends in the other districts, 
this is highly likely.20 It is clear therefore that making direct cash grants to national 
agencies was a common practice for regional government in Yogyakarta.
Turning to the post-2006 period, we can see that local government still continues to pay 
their national government security partners but the practice has changed to concentrate on 
funding specific, joint activities. This situation is evident in the recent budgets o f  Sleman 
and Yogyakarta city. Nevertheless, there is still a sharp difference between the generosity 
o f  these two districts and the Kabupaten o f  Bantul. Sleman and the city o f  Yogyakarta 
stress ‘professional’ cooperation with the police and other agencies. Bantul on the other 
hand still attempts to buy positive relations by transferring (comparatively) large amounts 
o f  money. This situation is informed by fundamentally different relations between the 
security elements in the different areas.
Looking at recent funding practices o f  Sleman and Kota Yogyakarta, substantial funding 
still occurs but this funding has been tied to joint activities and specific programs. In the 
2007 budget o f  the Bureau o f  Public Order Bureau in Sleman, the Bureau allocated Rp.36 
million for cooperative activities between the police and the Sleman Pol.PP unit. In the
17 These figures may actually understate the degree o f  assistance. The money was hidden in tw o separate 
appropriations accounts totalling Rp.2.7 billion. BPK did not list all the recipients o f  the activities budgeted 
for under these programs. As in the case with the provincial government in 2004, the only reason why BPK 
investigated these accounts at all is because they were not managed and accounted for appropriately. Republik 
Indonesia: Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Gunung 
Kidul Tahun Anggaran 2004 (28 March 2005), Lampiran II.A & II.B also p .145-146.
18 Republik Indonesia: Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kota 
Yogyakarta (12 June 2006), 108-109.
19 Republik Indonesia: Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten 
Kulon Progo (11 May 2006), p.68 .
20 Republik Indonesia: Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten 
Sleman (26 Juli 2006), 118.
same year the Bureau also allocated Rp.63 million for cooperation with the district Kodim 
in providing guidance (pembinaan) to village security units (Linmas). Added to that 
amount was another Rp.8 million for joint intelligence gathering between the Kodim, 
Pol.PP and the Linmas. The bureau allocated Rp.65 million for supporting the Kominda
intelligence meetings and Rp.73 million for PPNS operations (which are done in the form
• • 2 1o f  sting-type operations involving the police, the prosecutors, and the district court). The 
Bureau o f  Public Order in Yogyakarta city meanwhile had drawn up budgets in 2007 which 
allocated Rp.40 million to the state prosecutors, the district court and district police
99detectives to train the Dinas’ PPNS personnel. This funding is much reduced in 
comparison to the largesse o f  previous years. The data suggests that the districts have 
adopted a system in which cross institutional funding is tied to specific activities rather than 
in the form o f  general cash payments.
Bantul on the other hand still shows hints o f  the former-but-now-frowned-on strategy o f  
trying to buy the allegiance o f  national security elements through large cash transfers. 
Albeit this happens in much reduced form. Although the district’s public order officials 
keep relatively opaque budgets, one clear example o f  the fact that Bantul continues past 
behaviour is the extraordinarily high honoraria the district pays to members o f  the Muspida. 
In 2007, the budget for the Muspida o f  Bantul was as follows:
Bupati Rp.48 million lx l  2x4 million
Dandim 0729 Rp.42 million lx l  2x3.5million
Kapolres Rp.42 million lx l  2x3.5 million
Kajari [head prosecutor] Rp.42 million lx l  2x3.5 million
Sekda [district secretary] Rp.30 million 1x12x2.5million
Deputy Bupati Rp.30 million 1x12x2.5 million
Chair o f  the State Court Rp.30 million 1x12x2.5million
Secretariat Rp.56.7 million
Keputusan Bupati Nomor 76/2007, Pembentukan Sekretariat Muspida dan Pedoman Penggunaan Dana Muspida.
:i Kabupaten Sleman: Dinas Pol.PP, Rencana Kerja 2007, program 2 (2 ) b . , program 4 (5 )a ., (6)b. and c.
' 2 Dinas Ketertiban, Laporan Akuntibilitas 2006, Rekening Pembinaan PPNS. Interview with senior PPNS, 
Arfo, 16 April 2008.
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This money is a very generous attendance allowance. For the heads o f  the police, military 
and other national officers, this official honorarium is probably as much or greater than
9 'J
their entire yearly wage.
Having laid out the case that even after 2006 money was still being transferred from 
regional governments to the national law and security apparatuses, a pertinent question to 
ask is how is this money spent? At least part o f  the funds seems to be used for operational 
compensation. Joint operations will be explained in more detail in the next section, here I 
provide some examples which illustrate the payment o f  money in practice. Several times in 
2007 I had the opportunity to observe joint activities o f  Pol.PP and Poltabes personnel in 
Yogyakarta city. One o f  these joint operations was an anti-prostitution raid conducted on 29 
July. This operation involved forty five personnel; thirty Pol.PP and fifteen from the police. 
At another time I witnessed a ‘pembinaan’ operation (or a social supervision activity) in 
which about five Binamitra police from the Poltabes with twenty three Pol.PP paid a series 
o f  visits to pos kamling (neighbourhood watch posts); this activity was held on 15 August 
2007. Both activities began at around nine thirty at night. Before the troops were put in 
formation for the activity briefing they were allowed to file past a paymaster in the Pol.PP 
office and each officer, police and Pol.PP, was paid about Rp.25,000.24 This payment 
constituted their meal allowance and a small honorarium for transport costs. After the 
activity, the Pol.PP also paid for the police to fill up their vehicles with petrol, in the first 
operation that consisted o f  one truck and ten dirt bikes. These kinds o f  combined operations 
took place four to five times every month according to the head o f  the city’s Pol.PP unit. 
For such activities the city budgets Rp.600,000-700,000 for every group o f  ten personnel 
(or one regu) involved in the activity. In general, operational costs therefore mostly seem to
23 In 2003 for example the base monthly w age (not including allowances) o f  a major in the Indonesian army 
was between Rp.1.06 million and Rp.1.09 m illion. A Major is the usual rank o f  a Kodim commander. 
Republik Indonesia: Peraturan Pemerintah N o. 12/2003 tentang Perubahan atas Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 
28/2001 tentang Gaji Anggota Tentara Nasional Indonesia; Lampiran.
24 One o f  my Pol.PP sources claims that individual allowances are formally Rp.8000 for meals and Rp.6000 
for transportation. A separate source in the police confirms this is the scale o f  payments they use as w ell. 
Formal or not, I however saw more than Rp 14,000 being paid during my field observations. Interview, 
Norwidi, 23 October 2007. Interview, AKBP Kristiono Head o f  Operations, Polres Sleman, 1 N ovem ber 
2007.
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consist o f  allowances for individual personnel and petrol.23 This situation is probably 
roughly similar in the other regions o f  the case study.
The discussion thus far provokes the question: why do regional governments in the case 
study believe they must pay their national security partners at all? Regional government 
effectively is funding a responsibility - security management - which falls within the job 
descriptions o f  the “vertical institutions” anyway. Surely, given the competing pressures on 
any organisation’s resources, this money could be better spent in other areas. This idea was 
put to a number o f  local government interviewees in the case study site, both policymakers 
like regional secretaries and executive heads and the ‘implementers’ in the Bureaus o f  
Public Order. Their responses provide an interesting insight into the dependence o f  regional 
governments on national security agencies. Their responses also illustrate the challenge o f  
attempting to coordinate the various elements o f  the state security apparatus, elements 
which are in reality independent from one another but which are jointly responsible for the 
production o f  security.
The most prominent point that emerges in the thinking o f  regional government on security 
management is that regional government believes it is normatively responsible for creating 
a secure and orderly environment. This feeling o f  responsibility not only exists because o f  
obligations created by national legislation, but most importantly because local government 
is convinced that the voting population o f  their territories hold them responsible for 
security. As put by the Secretary o f  Bantul:
For us [the district governm ent] it’s difficult. W e don’t have the authority. For exam ple -  the 
President cam e [to Bantul] som e tim e ago and visited the coastline. But those w ho have 
authority for securing the president are only T N I... N ow  it’s not possible for us [in matters o f  
security] not to help. If som ething were to happen w e [the district governm ent] are the ones 
w ho w ill be b lam ed ...b y  everyone, by governm ent and the com m u n ity ... w e feel responsible 
for security.26
Or according to the Bupati o f  Sleman:
Actually w e don ’t handle security problem s, security both o f  a national dim ension and
Interview, Norwidi, 23 October 2007.
6 Interview, District Secretary o f  Bantul, October 2007.
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a regional dim ension is handled by the police, whereas under regional autonom y  
security problem s should becom e the responsibility o f  the regional head and the police 
are controlled by the regional h ead ... but between the statutes that issue is still 
unresolved, it hasn’t yet been syn ch ron ised ... consequently w e [district governm ent] 
only handle it [security] from a social aspect, like illegal alcohol, youth  
accom m odation, etc.
What this district head meant is that although he believes regional autonomy legislation 
delegates him normative responsibility for security management, actual control still lies in 
the hands o f  the police. Consequently, when faced with a security problem (following on 
from his implied meaning we can take the example o f  youth violence) the district is limited 
to tackling the social causes o f  the issue - like poverty and alcohol trading, which are two 
issues which clearly fall under district responsibility. Encouraging the police to tackle 
security problems which have become a concern for the district government therefore 
becomes a difficult challenge:
[district governm ent] is still searching for a forum for conducting cooperation [with 
Polri], but because it [security] is in their hands, in the past w e just didn’t bother... [in 
taking this approach though] there em erged a lot o f  dissatisfaction in the com m unity, 
because i f  crim e occurred the com m unity often com plained to the Bupati.27
Thus regional government feels that it is not politically free to surrender responsibility for 
security and order to the national security apparatus. This mindset explains why at times 
local governments in Yogyakarta have financed special security events (for example visits 
by dignitaries like the president) which are clearly the responsibility o f  the national security 
apparatus, or have subsidised the handling o f  problems for which the districts feel 
normatively responsible but are unable to manage in practice (such as gambling). In such 
situations regional government feels justified in paying the national government agencies to 
service the security need on behalf of, or together with, the regional government. This is a 
“user pays” service by any other name. In explaining this system the district secretary o f  
Bantul said the following:
That which may not be permitted is i f  w e [local governm ent] pay for their [national security 
forces] activities. But i f  it concerns our activities and w e request their assistance, they may 
[receive our funding]. That can be budgeted for because w e request their assistance. Because  
they are the supreme powers [in matters o f  secu rity ]... o f  course there are things w hich fall
27 Interview, Bupati Sleman, June 2008.
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outside our authority. Like securing the president, that is a T N I/Police affair. That which is 
not permitted under the Surat Edaran [o f  2006] is for exam ple if  the p olice hold a training 
activity, for us to pay for that would not be permitted. But i f  w e have an activity and request 
their assistance then they [the security forces] may [assist the district governm ent]. It’s like 
with Lebaran. This is a regional governm ent event for the com m unity. W e request their 
[security force] a ssistan ce .... and w e g ive them m oney for m eals and other operational 
co sts ...b eca u se  they don ’t have the m oney.
This obviously opens the question: why do the police and the military not pay for these 
activities themselves? Are their own budgets insufficient? The same district secretary 
responded thus:
That w e [regional governm ent] don’t know. Indeed because the police and the military 
budget w e cannot know. Even there are other things which w e cannot know  [about security 
force activity]. But they alw ays say that their budget is not large enough -  “ We only have 
enough m oney for w ages” etc. For these things [operational expenses] they don’t have 
m oney. M aybe that m oney exists in Jakarta but [laughing] it d oesn ’t filter down to the troops 
in the regions.28
Budget insufficiency as a reason for subsidising the costs o f  the national security apparatus 
reveals much about the dynamics o f  relations in the Kabupaten o f  Bantul. I will discuss the 
distinctive character o f  relations in each o f  the districts below. However the broad point to 
conclude about these funding patterns is that regional government faces a conundrum. It 
feels politically responsible for ensuring security but lacks the means to achieve it. 
Therefore, regional government provides incentives to the national law enforcement 
apparatus to pay attention to its concerns. Specifically, local administrations try to remove 
penalty fees for joint cooperation by subsidising the operational costs o f  the national 
government agencies, in particular the police.
In the Indonesian context an obvious question to ask is whether these cash transfers are 
corrupt or improper. Arguably, the answer is no. The payments I have evidence for can be 
calculated in the hundreds o f  millions o f  rupiah, rather than the hundreds o f  billions. 
Formal payments are relatively modest. I use the terminology ‘formal payments’ 
deliberately. It is not my intention to deny that senior bureaucrats and elected officials 
make illegal or personal payments to one another. Unconfirmed rumours suggest these
8 Interview, District Secretary Bantul, October 2007.
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practices occur in Yogyakarta.29 Rather I wish to discuss the evidence that I have for 
formal, inter-institutional payments derived from state budgets. Given that the formal 
payments are reasonably modest and regional government does have a plausible 
explanation for why these payments are appropriate, on the balance o f  probabilities it is 
likely that these payments are at least mostly for the purpose that is described -  to subsidise 
costs.
Although all three district governments transfer money to the national security apparatus, 
interestingly their degree o f  willingness to do so differs. Probing reasons why this is the 
case leads to the broader differences in the style o f  inter-institutional collaboration in 
Sleman, Yogyakarta city and Bantul. Each o f  the districts choose to collaborate with the 
national security apparatus. How they do so can be different. Although the following 
paragraphs digress from the issue o f  funding, the following discussion on the different 
approaches to inter-institutional collaboration helps to elucidate why Bantul for example 
donates large sums o f  money and Yogyakarta city does not. In brief, 1 argue that the local 
environment and the different styles o f  governance in each o f  the districts influences the 
way in which the districts engage their security partners.
The city o f  Yogyakarta for example is reluctant to grant the national law and security 
institutions much money. Instead, the city prefers to emphasise synergy and professional 
cooperation. This philosophy is implemented both by officials in the field and in the 
policies o f  the district administration. The leadership o f  the city’s Bureau o f  Public Order is 
diligent in maintaining professional links with the district’s whole legal apparatus, not only 
the police. The Dinas holds monthly dialogues between the district PPNS, district judges, 
the district’s state prosecutors and Poltabes police detectives for the purpose o f  giving 
training to PPNS.30 The Dinas has also been quite creative in its other methods o f
29 For example 1 came across unconfirmed rumours that the Bupati o f  Bantul gave a personal gift o f  several 
hectares o f  land to then Kapolda DIY, Untung S.Radjab on his appointment in 2008. Whether this was a 
goodw ill gesture or a quid pro quo payment (and if  so for what) is unknown. Interview with Crime Reporter 
for the daily newspaper Radar Yogya, Ibnu Taufik, 2 May 2009.
0 This training support is important in preserving the skills o f  regional government PPNS investigators, who 
only receive three months o f  initial training in investigative techniques. It was also explained to me that these 
meetings offer the regional government law enforcers the opportunity to lobby for their agenda with the 
courts, police and prosecutors. Norwidi gave me an illustration: illegal tree felling. In the past, Yogyakarta 
city justices have punished these offences with fines which did not even cover the city’s recovery costs for the
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engagement. Since at least 1998, the city has asked for and received a police liaison officer 
who is permanently seconded to the Pol.PP unit. The officer who served in this capacity 
during the period o f  my research, Ibna Tiono, is a senior non-commissioned police officer 
from the Bagian Binamitra o f  Poltabes. This officer acts as a point o f  coordination between 
the police command and the Pol.PP.31 The officer also lends weight to the Pol.PP’s 
activities in the field. He is able to use his powers o f  arrest if the Pol.PP were ever to 
encounter violence or resistance to their activities. The commander o f  the Pol.PP 
detachment claims this liaison officer is not under his command but is permanently 
available to lend support. To the best o f  my knowledge his presence is a free service from 
the Poltabes. The head o f  the city’s Pol.PP detachment also claims that his office goes to 
some effort to try to develop cordial personal relations with the key leadership personnel in
19 • •
Poltabes. From my interviews with the police, there is some truth to the claim. 
Similarly, the city also attempts to show that it does not feel financially beholden to the 
national law enforcement apparatus. The city insists that all fines which arise from breaches 
o f  district law are returned to the city. In the other parts o f  the province it was usual for this 
money to be divided among the police, the prosecutors, the courts and the regional 
government.34 What all this information points to is that the city o f  Yogyakarta has a 
distinct style o f  maintaining relations with its central government partners. The city 
attempts to build professional links with the police as the basis for involving them in city 
affairs, rather than attempting to buy their loyalty or appease them. Part o f  the credit for this 
strategy also goes to the district police themselves, who choose to reciprocate the overtures
or
o f  the city administration.
investigation. In PPNS meetings, the Dinas Ketertiban lobbied local justices to raise the minimum fines. 
Interview, Norwidi, 10 April 2008. Interview, Arfo, 19 April 2008.
31 I saw this for example during one o f  my field observations in the Dinas in 2007. During a combined  
operation supervising pos kamling, I witnessed Adjutan Inspektur Polisi Satu Tiono managing the briefing 
hand o ff  between the Pol.PP leader and the visiting police in the pre-operation parade. AIPTU Tiono did not 
lead the operation, which fell to a Pol.PP regu commander. But I assume the police exchange officer did 
organise for the police detachment to com e. Field Observation, 5 August 2007. Interview, Senior PPNS Arfo,
19 April 2008.
'2 Interview, Norwidi, 9 April 2008.
33 Interview, Kasbagops Poltabes, 12 August 2007.
'4 The city does not do this merely because it needs the money. In the year 2005 the c ity’s total original 
income was Rp.84 billion (Pendapatan Asli Daerah). Yet “non-tax incom e” (including fines) only accounted 
for Rp.l 1 billion. BPK: Hasil Pemeriksaan Kota Yogyakarta, 2005, p.6 . Interview, Arfo, 19 April 2008.
35 In my opinion the police command in the city o f  Yogyakarta had by far the highest standards o f  
professionalism o f  any in the province. The Poltabes at least tried to be professional, open and service 
oriented. This is not only my opinion but one that is shared by a number o f  the criminal affairs journalists and
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The Kabupaten o f  Bantul however, was the polar opposite o f  Yogyakarta city. In this 
district there was a pronounced tendency for the local government to attempt to buy the 
allegiance o f  the central government’s security and law enforcement institutions. Bantul has 
a reputation for being a hard region with a high tolerance o f  corruption.36 The police here 
are especially corrupt and this causes problems in the police-district government 
relationship. The difficulties in sustaining cooperation between the police and local 
government have, it seems, led to a model o f  local government-security force engagement 
which is unique in the region. It is a model in which the Bantul government seeks first to 
‘purchase’ or ‘entice’ the cooperation o f  the national enforcement agencies. This has 
become such a common expectation that the police expect to be paid for routine procedural 
matters. I once asked Kandiawan, the head o f  the Public Order Office in Bantul whether 
there were any problems in getting the police to approve their case files for submission to 
the state prosecutor. The head o f  the office claimed:
[for every file] there must be an attachment, so w e stick on the picture o f  Bung
K am o... the reason being it’s in the com m on interest, but w e [the O ffice o f  Public
Order] don’t have an interest in this. U pholding law should be the interests o f  us all.37
The reference to Bung Karno is President Sukarno, whose portrait is on the Rp. 100,000 
bill. Kandiawan’s statement implied his office has to pay the police for every investigation 
approval. This type o f  behaviour shapes Kandiawan’s deep distrust, even contempt, 
towards the police. Relations between the Pol.PP and Polres Bantul are quite bad; the kind 
o f  joint anti-vice raids which go on in Yogyakarta are simply out o f  the question in Bantul.
This is for the simple reason that, according to Kandiawan, other parties pay the Polres to
• • • • • • 18 
turn a blind eye to the problems his office is interested in combating. The best example is
the trade in illegal alcohol. Kandiawan related to me a story which illustrates the problem.
even Islamic vigilantes. N one o f  my interviewees had a good explanation for why this is the case. But I often 
heard the Poltabes being contrasted with Polres Bantul, which my informants see as the most corrupt and 
troublesome in the province. Interview, Senior Journalist and Chairman o f  Policewatch Yogyakarta Kusno 
Setiotom o, 10 June 2008. Interview, Hasby Lukman former Chairman o f  Front Jihad Indonesia (a local 
Yogyakarta hardline Islamic group), 10 October 2007. Interview, Criminal Affairs Journalist Radar Yogya I. 
Taufik, June 2008.
’6 See previous footnote.
'7 Interview, Kandiawan, 10 April 2008. 
s Interview, Kandiawan, 29 October 2007.
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As background information, it is procedure in Indonesia that all contraband items 
(pornography, drugs, illegal alcohol etc.) may only be disposed o f  -  i.e. incinerated -  by the 
police. Some time ago, Kandiawan began to suspect that the bottles o f  alcohol his office 
were confiscating in raids, were ending up back on the streets. To confirm his suspicions in 
one raid Kandiawan scratched a mark on the glass exterior of.several confiscated bottles o f  
alcohol before handing them to the Bantul police for destruction. Within ten days,
• IQKandiawan re-confiscated some o f  these same bottles in subsequent raids. Thus the 
institutional self-interest o f  Polres Bantul prevents there being meaningful collaboration 
between the police and the Pol.PP in anti-vice activities. Nevertheless we should not forget 
that in issues which concern the general security o f  the district cooperation does occur; we 
see this in disruptive events like the SUTET incident.
Another, less prosaic reason why the Bantul district government seeks to subsidise national 
security agencies, according to the district secretary, is that his administration fears without 
such financial support, the police and the military may turn to banditry or extortion. In 
making this claim the district secretary explained:
It’s like this, there’s another thing w e are afraid of. If they [the security forces] are not 
‘facilitated’ by us they may becom e gangsters. They may blackmail business people or 
ordinary citizens in the street. N ow , that is som ething that w e d on ’t want. Therefore w e say to 
them, w e w ill accom odate you so  you don’t becom e gangsters. Indeed other districts that 
don ’t g ive  [such funding] may say ‘there’s no problem ’, but try checking with their 
com m unities... therefore w e [in the Bantul governm ent] protect our people from the actions 
o f  the ‘uniform ed m afia.’ If they don’t have any ‘activ ities’ and there isn ’t anything to pay 
[them with], they w ill look [for m oney] in other p laces... then finally w e [local governm ent] 
w ill be blam ed.40
I am unconvinced that his explanation is valid. Although I have found no evidence (or 
hearsay) which suggests that the security forces are engaging in extortion in Bantul, I do 
not attribute this situation to the fact that the Kabupaten makes occasional grants to the 
district’s security elements. I doubt that the Kabupaten could afford to pay enough money 
to dissuade the security forces from extortion if the forces really did desire to do so. Rather,
I think that what the secretary’s statement shows is the willingness o f  this Kabupaten to use 
money grants as a tactic for influencing the behaviour o f  TNI, Polri and the other national
39 Interview, Kandiawan, April 2008.
40 Interview, District Secretary Bantul, October 2007.
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agencies. From the perspective o f  the district government the stability o f  Bantul is 
dependent upon the goodwill o f  self-interested security agencies. Thus it makes sense to 
support these actors with payments for the occasions in which their influence is necessary. 
Local government must, if it wishes to obtain the benefits o f  security force activity, pay the 
provider.
In Sleman there is evidence for both types o f  engagement: the district government attempts 
to both professionally engage the law enforcement apparatus and transfer money. I make 
this claim cautiously as the evidence from Sleman is not as clear as in the other districts.41 
While there is cooperation between police and regional government in Sleman, I do not 
detect a clear approach towards engagement as is present in the cases o f  Bantul and 
Yogyakarta city. There is evidence to demonstrate professional engagement through joint 
operations.42 There is also evidence which indicates the Sleman government pays the 
district legal apparatus extra money which they probably are not entitled to; one prominent 
example is a share o f  the district’s fine revenue.43 In the case o f  Sleman, it is possible that 
the district government blends both styles o f  engagement seen in Bantul and Yogyakarta 
city; on the one hand paying funds to the security apparatus while on the other also 
attempting to engage them in professional activities.
Arguably the differences between these cases show the influence o f  agency. In response to 
the structural dilemma o f  how to collaborate with more powerful, independent, national 
government bureaucracies the districts have crafted certain styles o f  engagement. In the
41 Part o f  the reason for my hesitancy in making conclusions about Slem an’s strategy o f  engagement is the 
problems I encountered in data collection. The Dinas Ketertiban o f  Sleman should have been able to give  
som e guidance on the nature o f  its relations with the district’s other law enforcement actors, but it was 
difficult to interview the head o f  the Dinas. After two initial interviews, the head o f  the Dinas made it clear 
that he objected to my research and further cooperation was suspended. The impression these interviews gave 
to me was that this bureau is weakly led and poorly managed. The head o f  the Dinas was probably not 
competent to give detailed commentary on his portfolio. Unfortunately few  o f  his staff were w illing to be 
interviewed without his consent.
42 Aside from the activities mentioned in the Dinas Pol.PP budget there is also evidence for other occasional 
joint activities run by the Public Order Bureau as well as other regional government departments. As an 
example, the Tourism Bureau (Dinas Pariwisata) runs a series o f  combined patrols with Polres Sleman during 
Ramadhan. Under Sleman laws the Tourism Bureau is responsible for registering night clubs and 
entertainment outlets (tempat hiburan). During Ramadhan 2007, every day the Dinas Pariwisata ran 
combined patrols with the Tourist Police o f  Polres Sleman, the Sleman Pol.PP and the Dinas Pariwisata’s own 
inspectors. Interview, Seksi Perijinan Dinas Pariwisata, Heri S. Trisno, 28 September 2007.
43 This was planned at 55% for the district, 20% for the district court and 12.5% for the police and the 
prosecutors. Interview, Hermanan and Djoko, Bagian Hukum, Kabupaten Sleman, August 2007.
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case o f  Yogyakarta city, the district authorities emphasise professional links. In Bantul, the 
district seeks to encourage cooperation through cash payments. In Sleman, there is limited 
evidence for both types o f  behaviour. Most likely these differences o f  style reflect 
subconscious responses shaped by the institutional governmental culture within these 
districts. I do not find evidence to indicate public order officials in the regional 
governments have consciously reflected upon their methods o f  engagement. Nevertheless, 
these outcomes do reflect choice and are not pre-determined by structure.
Despite the regional differences in the approach o f  the district governments towards joint 
cooperation, the similarities are greater. Firstly, in all the cases, underpinning joint 
cooperation was a principle that the user must pay: whenever one security actor requests the 
assistance o f  another, the user must subsidise the partner’s costs. This system facilitates 
cooperation by removing some o f  the penalty fees for joint operations. Secondly, joint 
cooperation does occur in each o f  the regions. Having made this argument, the evidence 
from Bantul indicates that corruption and institutional self-interest has undermined 
collaboration. Although this is true, I point out that this is not as widespread as one would 
believe. Rather cooperation, even in Bantul, is the norm.
Finally, it must be noted that thus far I have only analysed the evidence for funding which 
arises from regional government requests towards the national security actors. Yet there are 
cases in which police and TNI seek the assistance o f  other government agencies for 
performing their own missions. In reality such requests for assistance are rare, and I have 
very little data on the dynamics o f  funding in such cases. What information I do have will 
be shared in the following section on joint operations.
Joint Operations
The funding relationships that are described above support a number o f  joint operations. 
Underpinning the over-arching concept o f  joint operations is the fact that the three principal 
state executors o f  security - police, Pol.PP and TNI - all have a commitment to maintaining
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security and order. For the police their primary motive is clear, creating security and order 
is their raison d'etre. As discussed above, local government also believes that it is 
democratically accountable for order and security. The Indonesian military has as one o f  its 
core tasks the protection o f  the integrity and sovereignty o f  the Indonesian state. While the 
broad powers that the military once had over domestic security have now waned, the 
continuation o f  the territorial command system offers the TNI an opportunity to offer 
limited support to some joint security operations - more often than not in the role o f  
exclusively supporting the police. In the following section we will examine some o f  the 
different types o f  joint operations, what happens during these operations and the protocols 
which guide the behaviour o f  the participating institutions.
One point to make about these joint operations is that although they can occur frequently 
they are not normal activities for the institutions involved. The more dominant reality for 
the police, TNI and Pol.PP is the daily grind o f  their work: tackling crime, training for war 
or patrolling markets, as respective examples. Each o f  the institutions do these tasks 
independently. Although inter-institutional relations is the main topic o f  my dissertation, it 
must be pointed out that, for these organisations, cooperation with other institutions takes 
place as an addition to their normal work.
The frequency o f  joint operations varies. There are operations which have an element o f  
routineness and predictability, while there are many which are non-cyclical and unusual. 
The most frequent operations are those which are called for by the Public Order Bureaus o f  
the district governments and are held by the Pol.PP together with the district police to 
combat vice. These operations do not happen in Bantul but they do take place in the city o f  
Yogyakarta and Sleman. In a one year period the Pol.PP in the city o f  Yogyakarta program 
for up to seventy two o f  these joint anti-vice operations, but anecdotally they happen only 
four to Five times per month.44 The district o f  Sleman sets aside a budget for anti-vice 
patrols and operations with Polres Sleman (Rp.36 million in 2007 to cover fifteen 
combined activities), though I cannot confirm how many are actually carried out.43 Beside
44 In addition there is an intensified operational period during Ramadhan, when the Pol.PP do daily combined 
patrols with Poltabes and the military police, sw eeping the city for vice. Kotamadya Yogyakarta, Dinas 
Ketertiban: Rencana Kegiatan Pengendalian Operasi (2007), p. 10-11. Interview, Norwidi, 10 April 2008.
45 Dinas Pol.PP dan Ketertiban Sleman, Rencana Kinerja 2007, 4 (5) a.
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the Pol.PP there are other parts o f  regional government agencies which implement joint 
operations on a frequent basis. The Transportation Bureaus o f  the districts hold periodic 
roadside stings with the Satlantas (Traffic Police unit) o f  the district police commands.46 
The Bureau o f  Transportation in Yogyakarta city plans for up to twelve o f  these stings per 
month.47 In Sleman, the combined roadside operations with the police are much less 
frequent and are wrapped into bigger PPNS-Police operations (called operasi pro-yustisi) 
which are held only several times per year.48 Some o f  the other regular, cyclical joint 
operations occur around Ramadhan/Lebaran and Christmas/New Year in which the 
institutions do joint patrols and joint anti-vice raids. We will see how these activities 
operate below.
Beside the predictable operations there are also non-cyclical joint operations which occur 
infrequently. Some o f  the operations which can be grouped under this classifier have 
already been introduced in the previous chapter: security for public events like elections, 
concerts, visits by VIP guests, mass demonstrations (particularly those that rally against 
government assets, like the presidential palace in Yogyakarta city), and so on. To these 
occasions I add the example o f  forced evictions, which usually fall under the responsibility 
o f  the regional government Pol.PP as it is often the case that some element o f  local 
government licensing is at dispute.49
46 Under the transport law in effect during my research, only the police may stop traffic. Within the 
Indonesian traffic system, police are responsible for issuing vehicle registration and licenses while the 
Department o f  Transportation (and its regional staff) is responsible for certifying the roadworthiness o f  
vehicles. To stop traffic for the purpose o f  conducting an inspection, district transport bureaucrats require 
traffic police to stop vehicles on their behalf. Interview, Sultan Fatoni, 10 Novem ber 2008. Interview, Kepala 
Seksi Pengendalian Operasi Udin and M .Moeljanto, Dinas Perhubungan Kota, 1 N ovem ber 2008. The same 
principle has been upheld in the latest Indonesian traffic law. See: Republik Indonesian: Undang Undang 
22/2009 tentang Lalu Lintas dan Angkutan Jalan, Pasal 262, Ayat 3.
47 My interviewees quote this number as an ideal quantity but most probably fewer than tw elve operations 
occur in an average month. In these ‘operasi pro-yustisi’ (aimed at fining violators) the average operation 
consists o f  forty personnel from the Transportation Bureau, forty Traffic Police from the Poltabes and six 
PPNS from the c ity ’s Dinas Ketertiban. How many suspects are arrested in a usual activity was not known.
My interviewees in the Transport Bureau literally asked me to go and see the police as ‘all the information is 
with them .’ As it turned out the traffic police also did not retain this data. Interview, Udi and Moeljanto, 
N ovem ber 2008.
4X Interivew, Fatoni, 10 Novem ber 2008.
49 One such incident which occurred during my period o f  research was the forced eviction o f  several hundred 
vendors from an area o f  land on the Bantul coastline near Parangtritis. This took place during December 2007. 
Another one o f  these operations which was planned but abandoned (as the community in dispute eventually 
ceased their opposition) was the relocation o f  street traders from markets in Pasar Klitihan in the city o f  
Yogyakarta. This occurred in November 2007. In both incidents this operation was planned under the
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In order to give some idea o f  the execution o f  joint operations, it is helpful to describe a 
couple o f  examples. The first example is o f  a routine activity between the Pol.PP and police 
o f  Yogyakarta city, namely anti -pekat raids during the Ramadhan/Lebaran period. The 
second example is that o f  a tri-institutional security operation (Police, Pol.PP, TNI) to 
secure the electoral campaign for mayoral elections in Yogyakarta city. In these operations 
it is apparent that Polri is much less competent at instigating combined operations than 
regional government. Arguably, because Polri occupies a hegemonic position within the 
security network, the police invest much less effort in integrating external assistance in 
police activities than providing their assistance to other agencies.
The Ramadhan/Lebaran period in Indonesia demands a high level o f  inter-service 
collaboration, at this time the Muslim community imposes pressure on government to 
uphold moral order. In particular, the fasting month arouses the intolerance o f  hardline 
Islamists for all manner o f  things they deem as vices and temptations; like illegal alcohol, 
public intimacy, etc. As discussed in chapter one, there are hardline Islamist groups in 
Yogyakarta, like the MMI, FJI and GAM. The combined demands o f  all o f  these groups 
and the general environment o f  piety, encourages the police and the Pol.PP to be especially 
active during Ramadhan/Lebaran. Their thinking is that if they are visibly active in 
stamping out maksiat, or vice, this will discourage hardliners from vigilante behaviour.30
The combined police-Pol.PP Ramadhan operations in Yogyakarta city in 2007 were split 
into two different phases. In the first phase - from around 15 September to 8 October or 
almost the entire period o f  Ramadhan - the Pol.PP ‘took the lead.’ In the second phase - 
from 9 to 23 October, or the Lebaran holiday51 - the police took control o f  operations. 
During the Ramadhan phase there was intense coordination between the police and district 
government. Starting from September 10 to September 15, the head o f  the Dinas
leadership o f  the Pol.PP, with police brought in as back-up (and in the case o f  Bantul, a platoon o f  TNI as 
w ell). Interview, Kandiawan, 2008. Interview, Norwidi, 2007.
50 Interview with Norwidi, 22 September 2007.
51 This festival marks the end o f  the fasting month. Traditionally, M uslims return to their hometowns for 
family gatherings. In a nation o f  over 235 million people however, Lebaran tends to create a major strain on 
transportation, logistics, the econom y and o f  course security. In a tourist centre like Yogyakarta the 
population sw ells dramatically over the period o f  Lebaran. The consequence is that the security forces -  under 
police coordination -  hold a large operation during this time aimed at protecting traffic and visitors.
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Ketertiban’s Pol.PP detachment was involved in planning with the operations planning 
section in Poltabes. These discussions led to four weeks o f  sustained operations. During the 
first week the Pol.PP mounted daily and nightly patrols o f  the city’s territory. This was in 
line with a unified intelligence assessment that the first week o f  the fasting month was the 
most vulnerable to ‘disturbances o f  the peace’ such as entertainment venues doing business, 
couples engaging in public displays o f  affection, public drunkenness and other things which 
fall under the aegis o f  prohibited behaviour. From weeks two to four however, combined 
operations put police in the lead as the intelligence assessment predicted that a higher rate 
o f  crimes (such as theft) would be seen in anticipation o f  Lebaran. " For the duration o f  
Ramadhan up until October 9, there were two shifts in operation -  one from 09:00 to 17:00 
and another from 19:00 to 03:00. Each o f  these shifts consisted o f  two Pol.PP “regu” (or 
sections), between twenty two to twenty five troops strong with a similar number o f  beat
• SIpolice (or Samapta). Attached to most shifts were one or more military police officers. 
Each shift went on at least one patrol during its period o f  duty.
The interesting thing about the Pol.PP-police arrangement was that during this Ramadhan 
period, the Dinas Ketertiban took care o f  the administration o f  the operations but did not 
often take the command in the field. The bureau’s offices for example served as the 
operational headquarters for the patrols and the Dinas Ketertiban, as “facilitator”, paid the 
police’s costs.34 O f  the several operations that I observed, however, all were commanded in 
the field by a police officer.55 Each shift o f  forty or so combined police and Pol.PP would
i2 This was the view  according to the Dinas Ketertiban’s Satpol PP ch ie f Norwidi. The Police were supposed 
to accompany Pol.PP patrols during this first w eek but, according to my observations at this time, the 
expected police detachments never appeared. This may be due to the fact that the Pol.PP called o ff  their 
patrols due to a lack o f ‘culprits’ being seen in the field. I know this because several times in that first week I 
turned up to the Dinas Ketertiban office and waited, only to be told later that the patrol had been called o f f  
All o f  these Ramadhan patrols however were, so to speak, ‘intelligence led’. That is to say, non-uniformed 
intelligence personnel from the Pol.PP and the police would patrol the streets and radio (or sm s) the locations 
o f  law breakers (engaging in prostitution for example). The combined patrols would then swoop in and round 
up the targets. Interview, Norwidi, 22 September 2007.
53 The role o f  the military police was primarily to anticipate the possibility o f  TNI personnel being arrested 
during the sweeps. According to Indonesian jurisprudence the civilian police may not arrest military 
personnel, which is a principle that creates an important caveat on police power over the military. Secondly  
the military police also turn up to show the community that there is a ‘united front’ among the government 
elem ents. Interview, Military Police Sergeant (name withheld), 21 September 2007.
34 Interview, Norwidi, 21 September 2007.
55 During the Ramadhan operations the D inas’ ordinary police liaison officer was joined by another similar 
ranking officer from the Poltabes’ Samapta unit. These two police officers rotated between them selves the 
command over all o f  the joint operations that I witnessed.
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deploy in a mobile convoy around the city either searching for pre-determined targets or 
merely patrolling ‘vulnerable’ areas. The records indicate that the authorities seized illegal 
liquor, prostitutes, transsexuals, homeless people and persons without proper citizenship 
papers in these operations.56 At the conclusion o f  a successful mission the police would 
accompany the Pol.PP back to the Dinas offices and guard the suspects until they could be 
sent to court, usually the next working day. Almost all o f  the accused however, were 
actually charged under infractions o f  local government law. The purpose o f  having the 
police for these operations was essentially to lend hired manpower and resources as well as 
the police’s powers o f  arrest over brothel based prostitution, to the local government 
counterpart.
Thus we can conclude from the example o f  the Ramadhan operation that the sub-national 
partner agency is again dependent on the authority o f  the police. The local government 
body defers to police prerogatives at both the planning stage and in mission execution. The 
civil service police are forced to rent Polri services while not being able to control how 
these services are provided. What is being transferred from the police to the Pol.PP is not as 
simple though as the power o f  arrest. The Yogyakarta Bureau o f  Public Order believes it is 
able to detain suspects who have infringed local laws. Rather, what the Pol.PP seek from 
the police in this case are Polri’s tactical assets, not only o f  manpower, resources and 
intelligence but also the transmission o f  Polri’s absolute authority over criminal affairs; 
such as assault, theft, and so on. These superior police assets add substantial strength to the 
Pol.PP activity, ensuring the success o f  what would be difficult for the Pol.PP to handle 
alone. In the words o f  the Dinas’ Pol.PP chief: “w e’re not free [lepas] o f  our friends in the
SR • • • •
police.” While this example demonstrates that the inter-service coordination certainly 
takes place, the relationship is not a balanced one.
During the Lebaran phase o f  operations however, the police took the lead in implementing 
a transport security operation (code-named “ Ketupat Progo”). For the police, this operation
56 These Ramadhan patrols confiscated around 351 bottles o f  illegal liquor, eighty prostitutes or transsexuals, 
one customer o f  a transsexual, fifty five street people and twenty five people without proper citizenship  
papers.
57 Interview, Norwidi, 25 Novem ber 2008.
38 Interview, Norwidi, 29 July 2007.
204
was a success in achieving its stated aims -  Polda DIY provided a secure environment for 
the Lebaran holiday. Yet the police were unable to manage a truly joint-agency response, 
though this was one o f  their aims.
In Yogyakarta Operasi Ketupat Progo was part o f  a nationwide operation planned by 
Mabes Polri and implemented throughout Indonesia. The primary aim o f  this operation was 
to secure the movement o f  traffic around the country.39 Thus aside from performing 
enhanced patrol activities, each o f  the Polres in Polda DIY identified critical choke points 
in arterial transport routes and set up temporary police security posts/service points (pos 
pengamanan or pospam) to direct people and traffic in these areas. In the territory o f  
Yogyakarta city, Poltabes created ten pospam around areas like the central railway station 
(Stasiun Tugu), the main inter-provincial bus terminal (Terminal Bus Giwingan) and one of  
Yogyakarta’s major malls (Galleria Mall).60 In Sleman, the Polres created six major 
pospam and nineteen sub-pospam for directing traffic.61 In an average pospam in the area 
o f  Poltabes the police stationed fifty one Polri personnel, in three shifts o f  seventeen each. 
In Polres Sleman, there were around forty six personnel per pospam. Each was in theory 
responsible for patrolling and securing the territory 500 metres around each post. I made 
visits on different occasions to six o f  these pospam during 2007. At each o f  these times 
much o f  what the police performed was patrolling and directing traffic.
The interesting feature o f  these pospam was that, although the police operations orders for 
Ketupat Progo claimed to allocate specific non-police personnel to each pospam, in reality 
none o f  these personnel materialised. In Poltabes, the police operations orders called for 
142 non-police personnel, including military police, Pol.PP, transport bureau officers, and 
civil society groups (like the Indonesian Red Cross, ambulance, boy scouts, and the like). 
These personnel were supposed to be allocated to each pospam. Thus the pospam of 
Terminal Giwingan for example should have commanded six military police, two Pol.PP
39 Polres Sleman, Rencana Kegiatan “Ops Ketupat Progo -  2007” No.Pol.: B /15/X /Bag Ops, ‘Struktur 
Organisasi Ops Ketupat Progo.’
60 Poltabes, Anev Giat Ops Ketupat Progo 2007: Wilayah Poltabes (3-22 October 2007), 11.
61 Polres Sleman, Rencana Kegiatan Ketupat Progo, Peta Pos Pam Ops Ketupat Progo.
62 Field notes o f  visits to Station Tugu, 10 October 2007 and Plaza Ambarukmo 16 October 2007.
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and six transport bureau personnel.6’ Though the distribution o f  personnel was different the 
situation was the same in Polres Sleman. Yet in each o f  my visits to every pospam the only 
non-police institutions which bothered to turn up were the Red Cross and the boy scouts.64
The absence o f  non-Polri support personnel is an interesting example o f  a failure o f  joint 
agency cooperation. I attribute this situation to the following factors. Firstly, joint-agency 
involvement was done on an entirely voluntary basis, the police did not offer incentive 
money to external institutions.65 As a result the only institutions to attend were the 
volunteer civil society representatives, who did not anticipate being paid at all. Secondly, 
the police themselves were not enthusiastic about facilitating a joint agency operation. The 
operations orders o f  Poltabes and Polres Sleman indicate that both o f  these commands 
convened public meetings to facilitate a discussion with non-police actors to support the 
operation.66 I was invited to attend one o f  these meetings in Polres Sleman on 2 October
2007. The meeting, done under the banner o f  the Muspida o f  Sleman (but held in the Polres 
Sleman operations room) was, in my estimation, more o f  an opportunity for the Polres to 
showcase their security operation to a public audience than a genuine attempt at raising 
assistance from other parties. The fact that this meeting was held three days before the 
launch o f  the operation demonstrates just how little concern the police had for the 
involvement o f  other institutions. In reality this is understandable. There was very little that 
other parties could have contributed to this policing operation, other than to wait idly at the 
Polri pospam. Yet the police were aggrandising when they allocated phantom personnel to 
their operation who never showed up. Since the police publicly erected large summaries o f  
their operations orders at every pospam in Sleman and Yogyakarta city, I assume the reason 
why they claimed phantom non-Polri personnel was to make their operation look more 
inclusive than it was. What this example highlights is that Polri is much less interested in 
coordinating with other security elements than non-police organisations are in cooperating
63 Poltabes, Anev Giat Ops Ketupat Progo 2007, 10-11. In Polres Sleman, it was not anticipated there would 
be any Pol.PP or military police. Polres Sleman, Rencana Kegiatan Ketupat Progo, Peta Pos Pam Ops Ketupat 
Progo.
64 In Polres Sleman there was a group called Senkom (Sentra Komunikasi Mitra Polri) which is a volunteer 
group o f  radio communications enthusiasts who befriend and support the police. This group put a number o f  
volunteers at the two pospam I visited.
65 Interview, Kepala Bagian Operasi Poltabes, 24 October 2007.
66 Polres Sleman, Rencana Kegiatan Ketupat Progo, Peta Pos Pam Ops Ketupat Progo, p.5, “Penetahapan 
Operasi”, a) Tahap Persiapan. Poltabes, Anev Giat Ops Ketupat Progo 2007, 46.
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with it. This example arguably alludes to the oblivious self-confidence o f  the police in their 
own authority. Polri in this example was not serious about engaging other parties precisely 
because it did not need to. Its own authority was sufficient.
From the Ramadhan/Lebaran routine joint operation we now turn to examine a non-routine 
joint operation commanded by the police - the security mission for the 2006 mayoral 
elections o f  Yogyakarta city. Recalling what was mentioned in chapter three, elections in 
contemporary Indonesia are often viewed as carrying substantial risks o f  instability. This is 
true as well in the local environment. Nankyung Choi noted in her research o f  
democratisation in Yogyakarta, there was a significant amount o f  violence in politics 
during the early reform period.67 Because o f  the risk o f  violence, elections are always 
accompanied by a security operation. The superior role o f  Polri in local elections is due to 
national laws that delegate the police specific powers over election security. Government 
Regulation 6/2005 declares that the police are responsible for the security and good order o f  
regional elections. In accordance with this statute, the Poltabes o f  Yogyakarta city took 
control o f  the planning and execution o f  the mission, while drawing on the support o f  the 
city’s Pol.PP and Kodim units.
Although the police delivered the security, the city government approved and funded the 
operation. In this process we see again the dependence o f  local government on the police. 
The first step in 2006 was for the district government to create an overarching body to 
manage election security, dubbed the Election Security Coordination team. Reflecting its 
foundation as a joint operation under police leadership, the team consisted o f  the 
commander o f  the Poltabes as the chairman, with the heads o f  the Dinas Ketertiban and the 
Kodim commander as his deputies. Beneath them was a vast assemblage o f  security 
personnel 69 The second act was for the city to provide a hefty budget to fund the
67 Nankyung Choi, ‘Democratisation, Decentralisation and Local Party Politics in Post-Soeharto Indonesia.’ 
Doctoral Dissertation, Australian National University (September 2003), 191.
68 Republik Indonesia: Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 6 Tahun 2005 tentang Pemilihan, Pengesahan, 
Pengangkatan dan pemberhentihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah, Pasal 145. Under the same 
provision the Pol.PP are made responsible for assisting the police.
69 The heads o f  the regional electoral com m ission, electoral observers (Banwaslu), the head o f  police 
operations at Poltabes, the ch ief o f  staff for the city Kodim, the head o f  the state prosecutor’s intelligence 
office, the head o f  Kodim operations, the heads o f  the Poltabes’ detectives, patrol, traffic and intelligence unit,
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operation. To make the process official the city signed a memorandum o f  understanding 
with the Poltabes. In the agreement the parties agreed to recognise police control over the 
delivery o f  election security and for the city to fully fund all o f  the police’s costs.70
Intelligence very heavily guided the election security operation. Although intelligence 
gathering was a joint task the police coordinated these activities. Up to one year before the 
election, the city’s intelligence elements began collecting information. The intelligence 
agencies gathered data on such things as the identities o f  the party leaderships, the 
geographic bases o f  the party masses, how likely the party supporters were to commit 
violence, and the like.71 Election security was determined on the basis o f  a sliding scale 
assessment, between “secure” conditions (without significant disturbances) to vulnerability 
level three, two and one (with one being the worst, where the election process cannot 
function due to political violence).72 The police were responsible for assessing the 
intelligence and determining which level o f  readiness was appropriate for the operation. 
Their assessment was the city o f  Yogyakarta would be level three, though the situation 
apparently never reached that level during the campaign proper. The police assessment was 
applied to the city as a whole, meaning that the election process would only be disturbed by 
periodic political violence. But within the city the police conducted assessments o f  
individual areas, particularly those which contained the mass bases o f  parties like the PDIP 
and PPP, which bordered one another, and classified these as being level 1 and 2. An 
example was the suburb Kauman, which was a PPP stronghold but which PDIP supporters
• • 71passed in campaign convoys.
The police executed the operation in concert with the Pol.PP and TNI but clearly the 
operation was under police management. In all the election security operation took over
the head o f  Pol.PP operations and intelligence, all o f  the city’s Polsek police commanders and several other 
representatives.
7(1 The costs were originally estimated at Rp.l .04 billion, but the police them selves spent only Rp.789 million. 
In all the entire security costs o f  the election were finalised at Rp.866 m illion. Perjanjian Kerjasama Antara 
Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta dan Kepolisian Kota Besar Yogyakarta tentang Pengamanan Pemilihan Kepala 
Daerah Langsung, 22 April 2006. Kepolisian Poltabes Kota Yogyakarta, Berita Acara Rekonsiliasi, 20 
December 2007. Kota Yogyakarta, Dinas Ketertiban: Menyelenggarakan Pengamanan Pilkada 2006  
(December 2006).
71 Interview, former head o f  Pol.PP intelligence detachment for the city o f  Yogyakarta, 19 April 2008.
72 Menteri Dalam Negeri, Pedoman Penyelenggaraan Ketertiban, Ketenteraman dan Keamanan dalam Rangka 
Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah (2006), Bab II, p.6-9.
73 Interview, Norwidi, 10 April 2008. Interview, head o f  Pol.PP intell, April 2008.
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275 days, an unusually long time.74 During the campaign the Poltabes together with its 
partners -  the Kodim and city Pol.PP -  provided a number o f  security services: guarding 
the local electoral commission offices, providing training for participating security 
personnel, protecting the electoral candidates, patrolling and securing the campaign, 
protecting the supply o f  electoral materials, guarding the vote counting process and 
providing personal security for the candidates.73 Violence during the campaign itself was 
minimal, so much so that although TNI forces from the Yogyakarta Korem’s infantry 
battalion were put on standby, they did not leave their barracks during the election 
campaign, but were instead on passive alert (‘siaga pasif ’).76 Although this may have been 
a joint operation, the allocation o f  personnel alone demonstrates precisely which agency 
had the most input. Poltabes provided 852 police (not including 200 additional supporting 
personnel from the Polda) while the TNI provided 200. The city’s Satpol.PP detachment 
spared eighty eight personnel for the mission, which was over half o f  the whole agency’s 
workforce.77
This example shows clearly the pre-eminence o f  the police in exceptional, localised, 
security operations. The police assumed the lead in commanding, delivering and 
coordinating the security mission. The other parties, the military and local government were 
relegated to a backseat role o f  assisting the police in force -  for local government -  funding 
the tasks carried out by the lead agency. While national law in this case formally delegated 
responsibility to Polri it must be recalled that the broader foundations o f  police power -  that 
o f  security, the powers o f  criminal arrest and their superior resources -  are more than 
adequate to make the police the dominant actor in such joint operations.
Moving on from these examples o f  interagency operations, the next issue is the protocols 
which underpin their execution. There is in fact a clear logic and a common understanding
74 The election had to be put o ff  several times due to the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. Interview, Norwidi, 
October 2007.
73 Report, Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta: “Pengamanan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Kota Yogyakarta 
Tahun 2006”, Part IV.
76 Campaign posts o f  the PDIP were set on fire and there was rock throwing at party campaigns but this was 
not sufficient to stall the election. Interview, Norwidi, April 2008. Interview, former head o f  Pol.PP 
intelligence, April 2008.
77 Kepolisian Kota Besar Yogyakarta: Rekap Penggunaan Dana Lat Pra Ops dan Pam KPUD (sic) Pilkada 
2006 Kota Yogyakarta (2006).
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about how individual institutions can operate together, even if these protocols do not have, 
as far as I can ascertain, any formal legal status. As was discussed in chapter one, the police 
and the Indonesian military have a concept called ‘bawah kendali operasi (BKO).' As far as 
1 have discovered this is the understanding which informally guides joint security 
operations.78 As discussed in chapter one, there is old doctrine from the Department o f  
Defence which explains how BKO joint operational procedures guide police and military 
cooperation. This doctrine is no longer valid for the police after its separation from the
7Q
Defence Department. High ranking informants in the Mabes Polri Legal Division as well 
as police operations officers in my case study site both point out, Polri has not yet produced 
any general guiding doctrine on how the police should cooperate with TNI or any other 
state security apparatus.80 My interviews with staff from Korem 072 in Yogyakarta reveal 
there are internal TNI protocols for how TNI elements can lend assistance to the police, but
o 1
I am aware only o f  the existence and not the content o f  the documents. What I have 
gleaned from my interviews with TNI and the police is that the old concept o f  BKO is 
recognised by both parties. A district or provincial police or military chief -  who 
commands the ‘leading sector’ for an operation -  is able to make a written request for a 
given number o f  personnel from their opposite number. When the military receive this 
request it is passed to the Kodam commander (the Pangdam) for approval. Once approved, 
the supporting entity releases its personnel to be placed under the command o f  the ‘leading 
sector’ for the duration o f  the operation. Operational costs, like meal allowances and
78 I make this argument with one caveat. Indonesia does have very old, Sukarno era legislation (which are still 
legally valid) that determine security em ergencies. This legislation does spell out system s o f  coordination 
between police, military and regional government. But as states o f  emergency are very rare in Indonesia, this 
legislation is hardly ever used. Therefore under normal, non-emergency conditions, police and military 
elem ents refer to the principles o f  bcnvah kendali operasi. See: Republik Indonesia: Undang Undang 23/1959  
tentang Keadaan Bahaya and Lembaran UU Nom or 52/1960. Also: Jansen, ‘Relations among Security and 
Law Enforcement Institutions in Indonesia’, 451-452.
79 Interview, former police general Farouk Mohamed, September 2008.
80 Interview, anonymous source from Divisi Hukum dan Pembinaan Mabes Polri, 18 Novem ber 2008. 
Interview, AKBP Z.Arifin Kepala Pusat Pengendalian Operasi Polda DIY, 6 Novem ber 2008. The question to 
ask here is why the police have not yet bothered to draw up their own doctrine for dealing with other 
agencies. When I put this question to my source in Polri’s Legal D ivision he seem ed a little surprised and 
even slightly offended, declaring his office was busy with other priorities. I think however the explanation 
given to me by the former deputy commander o f  the Indonesian police, Adang Daradjatun is most convincing. 
I asked Adang on a different but related topic, as to why the police did not write into the 2002 Police Law 
(which Polri drafted) a proper description o f  security and the lines o f  authority between itself and TNI.
Adang explained at that time Polri believed that the old BKO doctrine o f  the Department o f  D efence was 
sufficiently clear for all parties. Following Adang’s statements I would hypothesise that one o f  the major 
reasons why Polri has not attempted to regulate its own relations with other state agencies is through sheer 
lack o f  vision and imagination in Mabes Polri. Interview, Adang, September 2008.
81 Interview, Head o f  Intelligence, Operations and Territorial Forces Korem 072, June 2008.
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• R?transport costs, become the responsibility o f  the leading sector. This is the theory o f  BKO. 
In reality, however, the military is so constrained in its authority that the local TNI 
elements can, apparently, only do one task independently in the area o f  internal security:
01
guarding the head o f  state and international VIPs at the level o f  head o f  state. Thus BKO 
under ordinary security conditions is mostly a one way street, from the TNI to the police.
There are some excellent questions to be asked about specific features o f  the BKO system, 
unfortunately few o f  which I can answer. We can ask for example, are troops in a BKO 
operation supposed to treat their BKO commander as if he were their normal commander? 
Are TNI forces in a BKO operation still governed under their internal rules or by police 
ones? Are there things which they can do and the police cannot and vice versa? These are 
good questions which my informants have not answered. There are good reasons for why 
the BKO system may not cover these details. Firstly, the BKO system in Yogyakarta is 
untested. In all operations to date, the police have only ever readied military personnel but 
never used them. Therefore my informants have probably never had the experience o f  
having had to deploy BKO forces in the field. Secondly, the BKO system is not codified in 
police doctrine. It relies upon the corporate memory o f  ranking officers in the police and 
the military, who can recall the pre-2000 period when Polri and TNI were unified under the 
same command structure. Nevertheless, it is incorrect to claim that there is no system for 
joint-agency cooperation in the field. My research reveals there is. The BKO system may 
be imperfect and formal regulation is necessary, but the system exists nonetheless.
82 Interview, Head o f  Intelligence, Operations and Territorial Forces Korem 072, June 2008. Sources in the 
police confirm the general explanation provided by the sources from the Korem, Interview, Kasbagops 
Poltabes, October 2007.
83 My source o f  information for this claim were two o f  the deputy operations officers o f  Polda DIY. The 
sources were partisan but, from my own observations I doubt that they were misleading. They say guarding 
heads o f  state and international VIPs at the level o f  the head o f  state is the only task they know o f  that the TNI 
may take the lead in. In Yogyakarta this is not an inconsequential thing. During the period o f  my research the 
city was visited by V ice President Jusuf Kalla (2006), the former Prime Minister o f  N ew  Zealand Helen 
Clarke (2007) and Prince Charles o f  the United Kingdom (2008). The police grumble that operations such as 
these should be their responsibility but that the TNI Law o f  2004 is explicit in mentioning that security for 
heads o f  state is a responsibility o f  the TNI. In the latest o f  these occasions, a visit by Prince Charles in 
October 2008, the local Korem requested several hundred police personnel to direct traffic and secure the 
outside o f  the Prince’s meeting venues. The police granted the TNI’s request though apparently, the police 
complained that the Korem did not have enough money to fund its costs and Polda DIY had to meet som e o f  
the operational expenditure from its own pocket. According to these police sources, the whole operation was 
planned in Jakarta, handed to Kodam IV in Central Java and the Yogyakarta Korem were merely the 
pelaksana (or executor) o f  the task. Interview, Kapusdalops AKBP Z.Arifin and assistant Kapusdalops AKBP  
Kristiono Polda DIY, 6 November 2008
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Yet it must also be recalled that regional government, not the police, is the actor which 
initiates most o f  the combined operations; thus, we should ask what is its approach to 
combined operations? Interestingly regional government adopts the same principles o f  
BKO as we see in the Polri-TNI environment. We see this in the examples o f  the combined 
Pol.PP-Poltabes anti vice raids in Yogyakarta city. Under that system the Pol.PP also made 
formal requests o f  assistance, received supporting forces underneath its putative command 
and paid for the operational costs o f  the supporting elements.
When I questioned Pol.PP officers as to what protocols determined how they conduct joint 
operations the uniform answer was that the Pol.PP do not have any formal, Interior 
Ministry regulations, instead the process they follow more or less comes about through 
common sense.84 As one o f  the Bantul Pol.PP leaders explained, combined operations with 
the police are based on ‘improvisation in the field.’ The Pol.PP for example obtain orders 
from their bupati, if the Pol.PP officials feel unable to handle the situation themselves they 
approach the police for assistance and ‘borrow’ the capabilities o f  the police and TNI. I 
put the proposition to my informants, that their method o f  doing joint activities imitated
oz:
elements o f  Polri or TNI doctrine, but they replied that this was not the case. Rather 
regional law enforcement cooperated with the national security apparatus, according to 
them, merely on the basis o f  simple logic. Probably these informants were right. For 
regional governments, achieving joint operations by requesting, gaining control o f  and then 
paying for capabilities they do not indigenously possess is merely a rational way o f  doing 
business. In effect, they have a BKO system without the history that Polri and TNI share 
with doing such joint operations. What this evidence shows is the simplicity o f  the way in 
which joint operations proceed. There are principles which all o f  the actors recognise when 
they lend assistance to one another. This system -  without any formal basis in law -  seems 
to function effectively in my case study site.
84 Interview, Head o f  the Security Section (Pol.PP) in the Bantul O ffice o f  Public Order, Jadi Bayu Broto and 
Wahyu Priyanto, Head o f  Upholding Regional Regulation Section (PPNS), 7 Novem ber 2008. Interview, 
Norwidi, 25 Novem ber 2008.
85 Interview, Bayu Broto and Priyatno, Novem ber 2008.
861 am not entirely convinced this is true. When talking to Pol.PP informants I have heard them using word 
forms, like ‘lapis kemampuan’ and ‘leading sector’ and other terminology which com es straight from the 
police environment. I do not put forward my hunch as reliable evidence, but there may be at least a slight 
transfer o f  ideas from one sector to another.
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Thus, from the discussion o f  security operations we can see the following things: joint 
operations do occur in the case study, there is a system which is recognised by all the major 
state parties for how operations may be executed in practice; within these operations the 
police are the fundamental element, either in directly planning, commanding and executing 
the combined operations or in lending support to the activities o f  the TNI and regional 
government. It appears that local government seizes most o f  the initiative in conducting 
joint security tasks. Due to its much weaker claim to direct involvement in security we only
• 87very rarely see the military move beyond anything but a supporting role.
Police Pembinaan (Guidance/Supervision) o f  Non-Polri Law Enforcement
One o f  the final forms o f  interaction among state security actors occurs when the police 
provide services to the other law enforcement elements o f  the state: the PPNS. These 
practices provide another illustration o f  why the police assume the dominant role at the 
centre o f  the regional security network.
Recalling what was described in chapter two, there are various types o f  PPNS in the case 
study region, all o f  them appear dependent upon cooperation with the police. In chapter two 
we introduced the fact that in order for PPNS to achieve a criminal prosecution their cases 
must pass an inspection by Polri’s reserse kriminal or detectives.88 This system operates for 
PPNS in both levels o f  the bureaucracy, national and regional. Thus Forestry Police, PPNS 
in the Bureaus o f  Public Order in the district and provincial governments, the immigration
87 As an explanatory point, when the TNI are involved in either police or Pol.PP activities (such as the 
evictions in Parangtritis, Bantul), they did not really do anything. For example in the 2006 Mayoral elections 
the city, Kodim forces were only stationed in their barracks and placed on passive alert. In the Parangtritis 
situation, the Pol.PP anticipated they would be faced with violent demonstration. In this situation a primary 
line o f  Pol.PP was deployed to handle the demonstrators. Behind them was a line o f  police from Polres 
Bantul. Behind the police were a line o f  TNI from the Bantul Kodim. The thinking behind this process is that 
i f  the Pol.PP are not able to contain the protest, the police move up to reinforce them. If the police are not 
strong enough the TNI move in to reinforce the police. Although I was not present at the Parangtritis situation 
(and in any case the Bantul Pol.PP did not face any resistance) I have been present at demonstrations in 
Yogyakarta city which have had similar composition o f  forces. At such times the military and police do not 
carry lethal weaponry, only riot gear. Interview, Kandiawan, April 2008.
88 UU 2/2002, Pasal 16 (k).
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service, the tax inspectors, all must submit any criminal investigations in their areas of
oq #
responsibility to the Indonesian police before their cases can be heard in court. This 
makes the police an indispensable link in the chain o f  state law enforcement.
Besides having legal supremacy within state law enforcement Polri also possesses 
normative superiority as well.90 Many PPNS have a psychological view o f  the police as the 
natural agency o f  law enforcement, a view which is inculcated by the process through 
which PPNS obtain their training; from the police. The first step for any bureaucrat who 
becomes a PPNS investigator is for them to undertake three months o f  training in 
investigative techniques. The majority o f  bureaucrats undertake this training direct from 
Mabes Polri.91 Thus PPNS not only require the permission o f  police detectives to prosecute 
a criminal case, they also draw their instruction from the police as well. Each o f  the 
Bureaus o f  Public Order in the districts also offers continuous training to PPNS, by funding 
workshops with their local Polres. The police provide refresher training to PPNS in the 
district governments approximately once every month.92 Thus the PPNS, even when 
maintaining their limited capacity through training activities, are reminded o f  their junior 
investigative status as they train under the tutelage o f  police detectives.
The PPNS-police relationship again underlines the supremacy o f  Polri in the security 
network. Indonesian law gives the police a mandated, superior role in cross-checking the 
work o f  PPNS. This situation reinforces the normative superiority the police have as 
‘rightful’ or ‘natural’ law enforcement investigators.
89 Immigration service and taxation PPNS I have interviewed in Yogyakarta acknowledge that this is indeed 
the system under which they operate, but they have never actually undertaken a criminal investigation. My 
interviewee from the immigration service prefers to recommend direct deportation rather than criminal 
investigation. The Yogyakarta region Tax Office was only established in 2007 and had yet to formally 
complete a criminal investigation. Interview, Head o f  Oversight and Execution Section (Pengawasan dan 
Penindakan) Eko Prinono, Immigration O ffice Yogyakarta, 1 July 2008. Interview, Head o f  the Regional Tax 
Office in Yogyakarta, Sigit, 27 June 2008.
90 For Polri this role is made clear in the Police Law, which allocates them the responsibility to “conduct 
coordination, supervision and the developm ent (pembinaan) o f  special police, PPNS and forms o f  civil 
society security.” UU 2/2002, Pasal 14 (1), f.
91 The Ministry o f  the Interior is authorised to conduct its own PPNS training. Several o f  the PPNS I 
interviewed for example did their training (diktat) with the Yogyakarta provincial government. Yet even in 
these circumstances, the police do the instruction while the Interior Ministry facilitates the training. The 
Interview, Head o f  PPNS section Dinas Ketertiban, Yogyakarta city Susilo Irfan, 13 May 2007. Interview, 
senior PPNS Dinas Ketertiban Yogyakarta city, Arfo, April 2008.
92 Interview, Head o f  PPNS Section, O ffice o f  Public Order Bantul, Priyono, Novem ber 2008. Interview, 
Arfo, April 2008. Interview, Head o f  PPNS Section, Bureau o f  Public Order Sleman, August 2007.
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Memoranda o f  Understanding
The final form o f  engagement worthy o f  mention are legal agreements. By definition, 
agreements serve to create understanding and codify obligations between participants. In 
the Indonesian public sector, as in the private sector, state agencies enter into agreements 
with one another. Written agreements are probably most useful at the national level, where 
we can find a legion o f  covenants Polri has signed. The influence o f  the one and only 
standing agreement which I have found in Yogyakarta is minimal. But the fact that an 
agreement exists provides a further illustration o f  cooperation within the network and 
deserves passing mention.
The Memorandum o f  Understanding o f  2007 between the provincial government o f  
Yogyakarta and the provincial police, is a symbolic statement o f  the commitment o f  the 
police and regional government to cooperate over security, but outlines few concrete 
obligations.94 This MOU also suggests that one o f  the important priorities for the police in 
providing services to external agencies is obtaining financial subsidies for their 
contribution. The police initially offered a very similar agreement to the provincial 
government in the year 2002. It is difficult to precisely determine why the Polda did this as 
there are no serving officers who can comment on the details o f  an initiative so far in the 
past.93 According to informants from the provincial government, the agreement failed
93 The follow ing MOU are only relevant to my research, as broad exam ples o f  the forms which inter- 
bureaucratic cooperation can take. The follow ing agreements are M OUs which Mabes Polri has entered into 
with other state agencies: Surat Keputusan Bersama (SK B) antara Pertamina dan POLRI tentang 
Kesepakatan Bersama Penyelenggaraan Pengamanan di Lingkungan Usaha Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara 
dan Penertiban Penyalahgunaan, <http://www.pertamina.com/index.php?Itemid=
33& id=1423& option=com  content&task=view>. Accessed: 7 Novem ber 2009. Kesepakatan Bersama antara 
Badan Pertanahan Nasional Republik Indonesia dengan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Nom or : 3- 
SKB-BPN RI-2007 /N o . P o l .: B /576/III/2007 tentang Penanganan Masalah Pertanahan, 
< http://aansetva.files.wordpress.com/2009/01/skb 03 2007 .pdf>. Last accessed: 7 Novem ber 2009.
94 Keputusan Bersama Gubernur Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta dan Kepala Kepolisian Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta tentang Kerjasama Penyelenggaraan Ketenteraman dan Ketertiban Umum serta Pemeliharaan 
Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat di Wilayah Provinsi Daerah Istemiwa Yogyakarta, 6 July 2007.
95 In the same year the Minister o f  the Interior signed a Memorandum o f  Understanding with the head o f  the 
police on the same topic. It is possible that the momentum for the agreement in Yogyakarta came from this
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because the police requested that all the costs for regional government-police cooperation, 
be borne by the regional government budget.96 This was unacceptable for the province. In 
2006, the governor revisited the issue and offered a modified agreement. The current MOU 
stipulates that the two signatories agree to increase their level o f  cooperation while
97recognising that both sides retain responsibility over public order. The regional 
government agrees to help the provincial police in facilitating their operations while the 
Polda agreed to assist provincial government with requests for assistance in executing the 
province’s own public order tasks. In turn the police also commit to providing information
QO # # #
on the regional security situation. Differing from the original text, the 2007 MOU 
declared that both sides commit to funding their activities jointly.99
This agreement, however, is mostly redundant and redundant for two reasons. Firstly, as 
one informant has related, the core purpose o f  the document is to legitimate all the 
combined activities o f  the two parties.100 Following this rationale, all the agreement does is 
to give formal approval to what was already happening on the ground. Secondly, because in 
Indonesia decentralisation provides that the implementation o f  policy is done by the 
districts and not the provinces, the province’s role in public order management is actually 
very limited. Thus what this agreement shows, like the other examples used in this chapter, 
is that state security agencies fundamentally wish to cooperate with one another. The 
provincial MOU provides another illustration o f  how they do so.
process. See: Kesepakataan Bersama Menteri Dalam Negri dan Kepala Kepolisian tentang Kerjasama 
Pembinaan dan Penyelenggaran Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Masyarakat (17 July 2002).
96 My informant is a senior bureaucrat in the ‘Cooperation Branch’ at the Yogyakarta Provincial Government.
I have not found any police who can comm ent on either the former or the current agreement, so my 
information is one-sided. Interview, Assistant to the Head o f  the Bureau o f  Cooperation, Sudardi, 21 
September 2007.
97 Propinsi DIY dan Polda DIY, Kerjasama Penyelenggaraan Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Umum, 2007,
Bab.II. and Bab.IV Pasal 4 and 5.
98 The parties also agree to coordinate matters o f  joint operations through program coordinators in the 
provincial Binamitra office o f  the police and the Dinas Kententraman dan Ketertiban Umum in the provincial 
government. Propinsi DIY dan Polda DIY, Kerjasama Penyelenggaraan Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Umum,
2007, Pasal 4-6.
99 According to my informant, the way this principle operates is that when the police wish to hold a joint 
activity, the police pay operational costs. When the provincial government w ishes to hold a joint activity the 
reverse applies. Propinsi DIY dan Polda DIY, Kerjasama Penyelenggaraan Ketentraman dan Ketertiban 
Umum, 2007, Pasal 8.
100 Interview, Sudaradi, September 2007.
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Why cooperate?
Having by now repeatedly demonstrated the point that the primary impulse o f  state security 
actors is to collaborate rather than compete or conflict, the final question raised by chapters 
three and four is: why is cooperation the dominant form o f  interaction? A very important 
part o f  the answer is the anodyne effect o f  a clear division o f  labour between the state 
security institutions. The police do not duplicate regional government functions over public 
order, nor does regional government perform Polri functions in providing security services 
and enforcing the criminal code. The Indonesian military remains firmly lodged in its 
barracks and is unable to enforce internal security independently. The various other minor 
policing actors such as immigration PPNS, Forestry Police, and others each perform their 
small mandates without intruding on the activities o f  other agencies. Because there is not a 
substantial overlap in functions, there is little space for competition between agencies to 
increase their authority. But this factor only provides a partial answer.
The question o f  why state agencies cooperate needs to be applied separately across the 
sector, addressing the question to both Polri and the non-police agencies. Dealing firstly 
with the non-Polri security organisations, from the evidence presented above it is clear that 
non-Polri security agencies are dependent upon police powers in order to fulfil their 
mandates. An extreme example o f  this are the relations o f  the PPNS with the police. PPNS 
are required under statutory procedure to pass their files to Polri investigators for 
inspection. Likewise the Pol.PP have the power to use repressive force but their capacities 
are so small and their authority so limited that often these organisations need superior 
police resources in order to discharge their work. The territorial forces o f  the Indonesian 
army are almost entirely only able to deploy their forces domestically to support police 
operations. All o f  the non-police actors therefore are obligated to seek police services or 
coordination in order to fully function within the sector.
The more interesting question though is why the police choose to cooperate with other 
agencies. After all, one o f  the core findings o f  chapters three and four has been that public 
security bureaucracies in Yogyakarta are functionally independent. The example o f  the
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Lebaran operation indicates the police do not require assistance from partner agencies to 
discharge Polri’s own mission. In the majority o f  cases, Polda DIY appears to collaborate 
with other bureaucracies for purposes not primarily determined by its own self-interest. The 
question is why?
I suggest there are four explanations for why the police are willing to cooperate with other 
public security organisations. Firstly, there is the benign effect derived from clear divisions 
o f  labour. Because there is little duplication o f  functions between police, military, regional 
government and the other groupings, there is little contestation over security 
responsibilities. The police can freely lend assistance from a position o f  confidence, 
knowing that no other agency contests Polri’s ownership o f  criminal investigation and 
internal security. Secondly, the accepted rules o f  behaviour mitigate the costs o f  inter- 
institutional collaboration. There is an in-principle commitment that requesting institutions 
should compensate supporting agencies when assistance is required. This agreement 
removes the financial penalty costs o f  cooperation for the police. With these two factors, 
Polri has little to lose by supporting external agencies. Thirdly, there is arguably some 
influence o f  learned behaviour. Some patterns o f  police support derive from behaviours 
which have taken place over decades. Polri supervision o f  PPNS and special police can be 
dated back at least until 1962.101 Similarly cooperative forums like the Muspida and 
Muspika have probably operated at the regional level since the nineteen sixties. Thus 
successive generations o f  police leaders have risen through the ranks participating and 
overseeing patterns o f  support to non-Polri agencies. Arguably such patterns o f  historical 
behaviour inculcate receptiveness to cross-institutional collaboration; simply because it 
evolves to become an accepted part o f  the job. It is conceded, however these explanations 
all appeal to inductive reasoning. Often my police informants have not provided reflective 
answers on their motives for collaborating with other agencies. Usually I received 
superficial responses which appeal to professional responsibility. Although there is merit to 
their answers, I contest there are deeper explanations.
101 Mabes Polri: Pembinaan Kepolisian Khusus dan Penyidik Pegawai Negeri Sipil (Selayang Pandang Pasca 
Polri Mandiri), (Jakarta: Mabes Polri, 1 July 2003), 4-5.
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The final factor in explaining why the police cooperate derives from the police 
responsibility for security. In making this case I defer to the most senior regional police 
officer whom gave on-the-record responses for my research, the deputy head o f  Polda DIY, 
Grand Commissioner Sunaryono.102 The Commissioner suggested very simply that Polda 
DIY chooses to cooperate with external institutions because it is professionally responsible 
for security. Partner agencies, like the TNI and regional government, have separate 
mandates but all have a collective, institutional interest in ensuring order and stability. Out 
o f  this spirit o f  professionalism, Sunaryono argues that Polri elects to collaborate with other 
state enforcement agencies. Despite the seeming naivety o f  his commentary, the argument 
is highly plausible, and derives from the above factors. Polri has relatively little to lose 
financially from inter-institutional collaboration. It faces little competition for its own 
functions. Security is enhanced through the mutual collaboration o f  the state actors. 
Therefore with little to lose and much to gain professionally in terms o f  enhanced security 
outcomes, it becomes a responsible rational choice for the police to support non-Polri 
security agencies.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the interactions o f  state security agencies outside regional 
government forums. It has found that security organisations engage one another in at least 
four ways: funding inter-agency activities, executing occasional joint operations, 
“pembinaan ” in which the police supervise other law enforcement arms o f  the state and 
finally memoranda o f  understanding which attempt to codify obligations between security 
actors. These patterns o f  behaviour have been organised in roughly their order o f  
importance, with funding being very significant and the only standing security related 
MOU in Yogyakarta contributing in a weak manner to interagency relations.
This chapter has again shown the surprisingly important role played by regional 
government in facilitating security cooperation, while also revealing the central role
102 Interview, Wakil Kapolda DIY Komisaris Besar Sunaryono, 24 July 2007.
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occupied by the police within the regional security network. Regional government may 
often cultivate methods o f  cooperation but the police are the source o f  strength for joint 
operations and a key source o f  knowledge and training services. This chapter also illustrates 
the fact that there is far greater evidence to show that cooperation is the dominant form o f  
behaviour, as opposed to hostility and conflict, which is assumed by much o f  the scholarly 
and journalistic literature on Indonesian security.
This chapter finds that non-Polri agencies must cooperate with the police in order to 
adequately perform their mandates. Thus the Pol.PP seek police support in order to enhance 
their own enforcement powers. PPNS must deal with Polri investigators in order to 
prosecute criminal cases. As a consequence o f  national security reforms, territorial army 
forces are only able to deploy in regional security as part o f  combined operations with Polri 
personnel. Thus structural, systemic factors make non-Polri bureaucracies dependent on the 
police. Yet within this system we also see the influence o f  agency. Not all bureaucracies 
behave similarly. In the city o f  Yogyakarta, public order officials deliberately cultivate 
close relations with the city’s police commands. In Bantul, the regional government seeks 
to buy police support. Such choices imply that within structural parameters, non-Polri 
agencies adopt different patterns o f  engagement towards the police.
Why the Indonesian police choose to lend their assistance to other agencies, raises more 
difficult questions. I postulate that the willingness o f  the police to do so is founded on four 
reasons. Firstly, there is a benign effect derived o f  clear divisions o f  labour. With little role 
duplication o f  functions, there is little contestation over jurisdiction. The police can freely 
lend external assistance without surrendering aspects o f  their own mission. Historical 
patterns o f  police support instil receptiveness to inter-institutional collaboration. Thirdly, 
there is an in-principle commitment to compensate supporting agencies when assistance is 
requested. This agreement removes the financial penalty costs o f  cooperation for the police. 
Finally there is the nature o f  the police job  description itself. The police are responsible for 
day-to-day security. Security is enhanced through the mutual collaboration o f  the state 
actors. Therefore with little to lose, it becomes a responsible choice for the police to 
support non-Polri security organisations.
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Chapter 5: Commercial Security
While the previous two chapters examined relations within the public sector, chapters five 
and six examines non-state security organisations. Chapter five begins this analysis by 
reviewing the commercial security industry. Both chapters show that the national police 
dominate not only the formal, government side o f  the security network but also the non­
government part as well. This finding carries important theoretical implications. For 
Indonesia these chapters show that the state security apparatus still continues to exert a 
supervisory role over the sector in ways that are remarkably similar to the Suharto era. 
Early writers like Joshua Barker have attributed these behaviours to attributes o f  the New 
Order state.1 Adopting a networked security analysis encourages us, however, to avoid 
generalisations about state power, and view the state as a non-unitary entity. The 
distribution o f  power within the security network in Yogyakarta indicates that one state 
actor, the national police, has risen to a dominant position. In Indonesia, the national police 
have authority to regulate and directly supervise many o f  the non-state security 
organisations, especially security guards and private security companies. This authority 
elevates the police to a superior position within security management.
In the policing literature the term ‘commercial security sector’ is the label for a concept
•  2which actually has two parts: providers o f  security services and consumers o f  security. 
Consumers come in a variety o f  types: schools, shopping malls, banks, or any private or 
public interest which pays for security. Providers o f  Security are companies or individuals 
which sell security -  from security products (like electronic CCTV cameras) to private 
guards. The mainstream networked security literature conceives o f  the commercial security
industry as being an emergent challenger to the police. The premise is that the commercial
• • • 1 security sector is an alternate source o f  authority and provision to the state police.
1 Barker, ‘State o f  Fear’, 8-9.
2 Shearing and Loader use the terms “auspices” and “providers”. Shearing and Loader, Governing Security, 
15-18.
3 Such an argument is made explicit in statements such as the following: “such bodies [private security 
companies] often work closely with states and their agents, their very existence can be viewed as representing 
something o f  a challenge to the first premise o f  the traditional paradigm [o f the monopoly o f  the state over
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The situation in Indonesia however is quite different: far from challenging the police, the 
commercial security sector in Indonesia has been co-opted by Polri. The dependence o f  
commercial security actors on Polri occurs for different reasons depending on whether we 
view the issue from the perspective o f  a consumer or a provider. My research indicates 
many consumers maintain direct relationships with elements o f  the police. Through such 
relationships consumers obtain a type o f  informal ‘security insurance’. Where direct 
relationships do occur the consumers o f  security maintain contact with the police as an 
addition to, rather than a replacement of, their own private security apparatus. Even in 
instances where consumers do not actively seek out direct relations with the police, they 
acknowledge the normative and legal superiority o f  Polri within the sector. Thus consumers 
o f  security feel they need police support. If considered from the perspective o f  the 
providers o f  security, the police dominate these entities for two reasons: firstly, in 
Indonesia the national police regulate the commercial security industry. Secondly, different 
parts o f  the police hierarchy provide supervision (or pembinaan) to the providers o f  
security. Although the police do not often involve themselves in controlling the provision 
o f  security by private providers, Polri’s regulatory and normative superiority make it the 
dominant party in the provider-police relationship.
Thus what we see in Yogyakarta is qualitatively different from what we would expect 
according to the arguments o f  writers in the mainstream networked policing school. The 
commercial security sector in Yogyakarta is not autonomous o f  the police. N or are the 
police merely an anchor o f  support in a broader network as Adam Crawford depicts in his 
research.4 Rather in Yogyakarta we see that the commercial security sector is dependent on 
the police. It is dependent for a mixture o f  reasons: because the police regulate the sector, 
because the police possess special assets (such as intelligence data) which some groups 
seek to access and because the police are seen as the normatively superior entity that has 
unique security powers (such as that o f  arrest). These interactions show how the networked
coercion within its own borders] by insisting that states are not the only authorities with the right and capacity 
to provide guarantees o f  security.” Shearing and Loader, Governing Security, 15-16. See also: lan Loader and 
Neil Walker, ‘Policing as a Public G ood,’ 12-13. Mark Button, Private Policing (Oregon: Willand Publishing, 
2002), 27, 31-32.
4 Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State’, 459.
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model needs to be readapted in my case study site. The internal power relationships o f  this 
network position the state police at the centre o f  the commercial security industry.
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section I re-examine parts o f  the 
Indonesian studies literature which describe the appropriation o f  non-state policing during 
the New Order. My dissertation significantly updates this research showing the 
continuation and even intensification o f  police strategies o f  control in the current era. In the 
following section, I present a brief description o f  the primary instrument o f  the police for 
supervising society today: the Binamitra or Babinkamtibmas/Polmas police. In the third 
section, I analyse a sample o f  Yogyakarta’s consumers o f  commercial security. Following 
the economic profile o f  Yogyakarta laid out in chapter two, 1 have selected six enterprises 
in the most important sectors o f  the regional economy. These enterprises consist o f  three 
hotels, the two largest retail shopping malls in the province and a major university. I look at 
the security arrangements in each o f  these entities and how each o f  them relates with the 
police. In the final section, I examine the providers o f  security services. The security 
services industry in Indonesia is divided into two major streams: private security companies 
that operate under police license (Badan Usaha Jasa Pengamanan or BUJP) and a floating 
mass o f  security guards (Satuan Pengamanan or Satpam) who have obtained official 
training from Polri. In Yogyakarta the floating mass o f  Satpam constitute the larger source 
o f  supply. I will examine how managers o f  these companies and individual Satpam perform 
their work and interact with Polri.
The Literature on Commercial Security in Indonesia
There is little analysis o f  the commercial security industry in Indonesia. The best insight 
into this topic derives from Joshua Barker’s research into the strategies o f  the late New 
Order state for managing security at the local level.5 Barker argued the N ew  Order state
5 There are a several other sources which explore criminality and the extermination o f  criminals in Suharto era 
Indonesia. Yet Barker advances beyond these sources to provide an analysis o f  how state security actors inter­
related with parts o f  society other than gangsters. For an example o f  the former see: David Bourchier, ‘Crime, 
Law and State Authority in Indonesia.’ In Budiman, State and Civil Society in Indonesia.
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applied a two fold strategy to assert dominance over society. One part o f  the strategy 
involved a mass extermination o f  suspected criminals {pembunuhan misterius) to 
“appropriate] the power that "criminals" and gangs represented.” The other part o f  the 
strategy involved state surveillance over key parts o f  the non-state security landscape, these 
other points being Indonesia’s neighbourhood watch patrols or ronda and private security 
guards (Satpam and “hansip”). This system was termed the siskamling (sistem keamanan 
lingkungan or local environment security system):
Siskam ling was started in 1980 as an off-shoot o f  a larger governm ent program called  
K opkam tib... It represented an attempt by the N ew  Order governm ent to im pose overt 
state control over local security practices by taking them out o f  the hands o f  organized  
private g a n g s ... Siskam ling's system  o f  control worked by dividing local security 
guards into three types: satpam (Satuan Pengamanan, or Security Unit), Kamra (or 
"hansip"), and ronda (night guard). In general, satpam guards were responsible for 
protecting com m ercial and public buildings and spaces, w hile hansip and ronda guards 
were responsible for patrolling residential neighborhoods. Satpam and hansip were 
salaried and uniformed guards w hile the ronda, a far older institution, was still based 
on com m unity obligation and used no uniforms. All three elem ents o f  the security 
system  were brought under the control o f  the "Guidance o f  Society" (Bimbingan 
Masyarakat, or Bim m as) division o f  the Police. B ecause the guards were not paid by 
the Police, however, Bimmas's so le functions were surveillance and training.6
The state’s institutionalisation o f  private security into the hands o f  only ‘approved’ non­
state groups, functioned to co-opt society into a state administered security system. State 
superiority was, according to Barker, institutionalised through continuous surveillance and 
contact by a special arm o f  the police: Bimmas.7
My research shows that what Barker observed about the N ew  Order’s strategies o f  control 
has been continued into the present era; the police continue to directly supervise key parts 
o f  the non-government security sector. At his time o f  writing, Barker explained this 
behaviour by pointing to the centralising tendencies o f  the Suharto regime. Yet ten years 
after the fall o f  Suharto a technocratic, non-political agency - Polri - still attempts to 
maintain parts o f  the same style o f  social control as it did during the Suharto era. Since the 
N ew  Order can no longer be seen as the sole causation for this policy, this behaviour 
arguably sheds light on the distinctive approach to policing within Polri. As Leonard
6 Joshua Barker, ‘State o f  Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto’s N ew Order.’ Indonesia 66 
(October 1998), 9, 19.
7 Barker, ‘State o f  Fear’, 9, 19.
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Sebastian has noted, the Indonesian state historically has been deeply concerned about 
inter-group conflict, national disintegration and social instability. These anxieties are 
reflected in Polri’s strategy o f  policing. The police have developed a social control 
intensive model o f  security management. Non-state providers o f  security such as those 
revealed by Barker, which could become disruptive and uncontrolled are brought beneath 
police supervision. While this chapter substantially extends Barker’s early research on how 
the police attempt to control private security, it also adds considerable empirical depth by 
examining Polri’s primary instrument o f  social control: the Binamitra/Polmas personnel.
Polri’s Regulation o f  Non-State Security Organisations and the Instruments o f  Police 
Supervision: Polmas/Babinkamtibmas/Binamitra officers
The Indonesian police take a syncretic approach to the regulation o f  non-state security 
actors. Polri lumps all non-state security elements under the category o f  Pengamanan 
Swakarsa (Self-security). According to the Police Law No.2/2002 Pengamanan Swakarsa 
(or Pamswakarsa) are:
forms o f  self-security [pengamanan swakarsa] is a type o f  security which is 
established over the desire, awareness and interests o f  the com m unity itse lf which then 
obtains the affirmation o f  the National Police, like environm ent security units [Satpam] 
and com panies in the security services sector.9
According to this meaning Pamswakarsa are all manner o f  non-state security groupings 
within society, from the commercial security industry to the ronda siskamling 
neighbourhood watch. Therefore Indonesian law and by association, police regulation does 
not differentiate between the for-profit security sector and volunteer civil society security 
groups. In theory Polri may regulate all non-state security organisations.10 In practice, this
8 Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideolog, 55.
9 Penjelasan UU No.2/2002, Pasal 3, Ayat 1, huruf c
10 Police regulation o f  the non-state security sector did not begin with the Police Law in 2002. As Barker 
shows, the police have exercised this right for decades. In fact, the earliest police regulation that I have 
encountered on Pam Swakarsa comes from 1980. Penjelasan UU N o.2/2002, Pasal 3, Ayat 1, hurufc. 
Kepolisian Republik Indonesia: Pola Pembinaan Satuan-Satuan Pengamanan (Satpam) Skep Kapolri No.Pol. : 
SKEP/126/XII/1980).
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power is unevenly applied. As will be discussed in chapter six, there are many security 
groups like the militias o f  political parties, whom the police do not seek to directly regulate. 
Yet Polri’s claim to a mandate for regulating private forms o f  security is a startlingly 
ambitious attempt by the police to elevate itself above the sector.
Yet such observations on the regulatory superiority o f  the police seem grandiose when one 
is confronted in the field with the very modest condition o f  many non-government security 
groups. The apt imagery here is the (often) dilapidated pos kamling which houses the 
residential night ronda. The pos kamling which one finds in the average village (kampung) 
is an improvised hut, usually constructed from shoddy materials, with a small size and 
cramped interior. Several times I have visited these security posts in the company o f  police 
officers and had to swallow feelings o f  sympathy for the people who faithfully serve in 
organisations that are so ramshackle and humble. I can extend the same observation to 
many Pam swakarsa groups I have encountered. By extension this makes the police 
supervisory role seem somewhat exaggerated. But whatever the exterior presentation, these 
forms o f  security are meaningful for ordinary Indonesians." Similarly the value o f  these 
groups to my research does not devolve from how well resourced they are, but rather what 
they say about the nature o f  relationships within the network. The status o f  Pam swakarsa 
groups beneath the police, reflects the powerful position o f  Polri within local security.
The primary police instrument o f  supervision is the Binamitra/Polmas police. Although the 
appellation is different depending on where the officers are in the police hierarchy, the 
function o f  these police remains the same: to engage Polri’s external partners and monitor 
Pam swakarsa. As Meliala notes in his research on community policing in Indonesia, the 
Polmas role is not a popular one for police officers. This is partly because the role offers
19little opportunity for corruption. ~ In terms o f  the police’s relations with society however, 
the Polmas/Binamitra are very strategic. Polmas officers are effectively the first point o f  
call for ordinary Indonesians in dealing with the police. Their purpose is to put forward the 
friendly, direct face o f  Polri to society at large. As will be discussed in chapter six, many o f  
the volunteer security groupings value Polmas officers because their existence offers direct
11 Kristiansen and Trijono, ‘Local Government Reforms and Security Systems’, 251.
12 Meliala, ‘Sensitive Policing: Indonesia’s Case,’ 204-205.
226
access to the police. Given the importance o f  the Polmas in the networked security relations 
discussed in chapters five and six, it is fitting to provide a background to their functions.
Although there are Binamitra offices in the Polda and the Polres, this arm o f  Polri does its 
most important work at the lowest level o f  the police hierarchy: the sub-district Polsek. 
Within the Polsek, such officers (termed Polisi Masyarakat or Polmas) directly engage with 
civil society.Ij In the Polsek, there are two Polmas officers attached to every village.14 
Based on my field observations o f  nine Polsek in different parts o f  Polda DIY it is usual for 
a Polsek to have around three villages and six Polmas officers. Polmas officers are often old 
in age and senior in rank (usually a Brigadir Polisi Satu or Brigadir Polisi Kepala, which is 
roughly equivalent to a senior sergeant in the army). Unlike the other units o f  a Polsek 
(Intelligence, Patrol, Traffic and Detective units) the Polmas officer is highly autonomous. 
The Polmas officer answers directly to the Polsek commander and the Polsek commander 
generally leaves every pair o f  Polmas officers to monitor the events o f  their allocated 
village. The Polres have a policy that the Polsek must program at least fourteen activities 
for each Polmas officer per week, though it is usual for the Polmas to do more than this.13 
The shape o f  these activities is multifarious and can include: disseminating police 
information in schools, participating in mass religious seminars {pengajian), providing 
security at social events (like sub-village markets), visiting clusters o f  night ronda, and so 
o n .16 The Polmas are also on call to their villages to provide assistance as called upon. It is 
customary for the Polmas to be known to the major community leaders in their villages. 
These leaders - be they a head o f  a sub-village neighbourhood association or the 
coordinator o f  the night ronda, or other figure - will know and be in direct telephone 
contact with their villages’ two Polmas officers. If these leaders require the police (for 
example in the case o f  domestic violence or the capture o f  a thief), community leaders feel 
capable o f  calling the Polmas for assistance. Surprisingly, according to my interviewees in
13 When Mabes Polri adopted its strategy o f  community-oriented policing in 2006, the police changed the 
terminology for these officers from Babinkamtibmas police (Bintara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban 
Masyarakat) to Polmas (Polisi Masyarakat -  Community Police).
14 According to my sources before 2000 there were only 1-2 Babinkamtibmas per Polsek. After 2000, Polda 
DIY expanded the force to one per village. Today there are two officers per village. In the words o f  one o f  my 
Polmas informants, “DIY is full o f  Babin now.” Interview, Adjutan Inspektur Polisi Satu Sarjono and Adjutan 
Inspektur Polisi Satu Subiantoro, Polmas officers in Polsek Pandak, Polres Bantul, 9 October 2008.
15 Interview, Police Officers Munadi and Enik, Bagian Binamitra, Polres Bantul 27 August 2008.
1(1 Interview, Sarjono and Subiantoro, October 2008. Interview, Brigadir Polisi Kepala Jamingan and Brigadir 
Polisi Dua Sujito, Polsek Piyungan 30 August 2008.
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the community, the Polmas service their rare requests quickly and without hesitation.17 In 
this role the Polmas not only serve and engage society but also monitor and supervise it as 
well.
The Binamitra police in the Polres and Polda are much fewer in number and in function. In 
Polres Sleman for example there are only ten Binamitra staff while in Polda DIY there are 
thirteen. These police play a support role to the Polmas in the Polseks through data 
collection and the provision o f  training. The Binamitra o f  the Polres and Polda also support 
Polri’s program o f  engaging police partners (mitra polisi) but do so at a higher level. Thus 
as discussed in chapter four for example, the Bagian Binamitra in Poltabes was the service 
point for police assistance to the city o f  Yogyakarta’s Bureau o f  Public Order. The 
Binamitra section in Polda DIY was likewise responsible for drafting the Polda’s MOU 
with the provincial government.
While I have discussed the important role played by the Polmas/Binamitra, we must recall 
that Polri not only operates as a unitary actor (coordinated through its hierarchy) but also as 
a disaggregated entity, through various units operating autonomously. It is not Polmas 
alone that represent the police in their relations with other groupings, it is merely that this 
activity is the distinct responsibility o f  Binamitra/Polmas officers. For the commercial 
security industry the Polmas in fact are rarely seen, which is ironic given that police 
doctrine makes Polmas officers nominally responsible for supervising Satpam.19 Instead, 
some o f  my Satpam informants mention that they have the most contact with Patrol Police 
(samapta) and Tourist Police (polisipariwisata) who visit Satpam workplaces in the course 
o f  normal police patrolling. Thus, in understanding how the police inter-relate with the 
wider security network, it is important to point out that the police institution is itself 
complicated and has many points o f  contact with other security organisations.
17 Interview with Ketua FKPM Jlagran, RW03 Sutiono and Sekretaris Setiyana 17 June 2008. Interview, 
Ketua Senkom DIY/former Ketua RT Atus Syahbudin and Ketua Senkom Bantul/Ketua RT Sungkono 10 
May 2008.
18 Polda DIY, Kuat Pers (December 2006). Polres Sleman, Jumlah DSPP -  RIIL (August 2007).
19 According to my Satpam interviewees, their local Polsek’s Polmas officers exercise their duties by visiting 
the Satpam’s workplaces on very rare occasions (generally once every half year) for the purpose o f  mapping 
Satpam numbers. This contact with the police pales in comparison to the sometimes daily contact the Satpam 
have with other opsnal like the patrol police. Interview, Satpam Suzaidan, Wasirudin and Marjono, Mall 
Malioboro 23 October 2008.
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Consumers o f  Security
The range o f  private entities that require security services is very broad. At one end o f  the 
spectrum are large commercial organisations like banks, shopping malls, and the like, 
which demand many Satpam and have complex security arrangements. At the other end o f  
the spectrum there are innumerable small and middle-sized entities, like schools, small 
shops, restaurants, housing complexes and so on which have much simpler security
systems; often only one or two Satpam. It is impossible to obtain reliable information on
20the raw numbers o f  security consumers in Yogyakarta. The police do not collect this data.^ 
To provide a crude estimate I refer to data from the provincial Association o f  Indonesian 
Security Managers (AMSI) which is the peak representative body for the commercial 
security industry in Indonesia and has thirty four member organisations in Yogyakarta. 
AMSI Yogyakarta has fourteen hotels, five banks, two shopping malls, three hospitals,
three factories, three government utilities companies, a TV station and three universities as
21its members. This list at least provides us with a sample o f  the type o f  large consumers o f  
security which exist in Yogyakarta.
Following the structure o f  the Yogyakarta economy -  which is dominated by the retail, 
hotel and tertiary education sector -  I sought out six enterprises from these sectors which I 
believe reflect a representative sample o f  the major commercial security users in the 
province. In the retail sector my investigation focused on two o f  the province’s largest 
shopping malls: Plaza Ambarukmo and Mall Malioboro. Plaza Ambarukmo is
20 This is somewhat unexpected as the police are usually fastidious about collecting data on all manner o f  
what one would otherwise consider trivial issues. Anecdotally I once read the yearly work plan o f  one Polsek 
in Sleman which contained detailed information on the agricultural yields o f  the sub-district. It struck me as a 
surprise then that Polda DIY does not accumulate information on a reasonably important topic like 
commercial security users who fall within their area o f  responsibility.
21 AMSI Yogyakarta also has fourteen private security companies (or BUJP) as members. The BUJP should 
be excluded from this analysis as they have no choice over their membership. Police regulations compel the 
BUJP to be members o f  AMSI, as AMSI is the official (police approved) representative o f  the commercial 
security sector. More will be discussed at the end o f  the chapter. Assosiasi Manager Security Indonesia 
Yogyakarta: ‘Daftar Anggota AMSI Daerah Instimewa Yogyakarta’ [the document was given to me by the 
Treasurer o f  AMSI and was up to date as o f  June 2007].
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Yogyakarta’s largest and newest shopping mall. Mall Malioboro is an older shopping mall, 
which is smaller than Plaza Ambarukmo and interestingly has a closer relationship to the 
police. Both facilities cater to the upper middle class. The three hotels included in this study
99 • •are: Hotel Grande Mercure, a five star facility located in a tourist hotel precinct in the 
northern part o f  Yogyakarta city, Inna Garuda Hotel, a four star facility at the centre o f  
Yogyakarta city (in the main tourist trading area Malioboro Street) and Apartemen 
Sejahtera, a three star complex in the southern, urban suburbs o f  Sleman (in the central 
residential, university and commerce precinct o f  Yogyakarta). I selected three different 
classes o f  hotel for a reason. 1 assumed (correctly as it turned out) that because each o f  
these businesses targeted a different segment o f  the market, each business had different 
security needs. The five star hotel targets an upper class clientele and has fairly complex 
security arrangements. The four star hotel targets the upper middle class market while the 
three star apartment complex has a lower class o f  customer and a much simpler security 
system. Finally, 1 also review the security arrangements o f  Universitas Gadjah Mada 
(UGM), Yogyakarta’s largest and most prestigious university.
The evidence which emerges from the five businesses (the hotels and shopping malls) 
creates an interesting picture; despite maintaining their own private security apparatus four 
o f  the five consumers seek additional relations with elements o f  the police. Relationships 
with the police significantly enhance the capabilities o f  the businesses’ own security. Direct 
relations give businesses access to ‘fixers’ in the police, who are seen as able to 
immediately respond to security crises on behalf o f  their clients. In the event o f  the arrest o f  
a guest or a brawl or any other such emergency situation, a business is able to contact its 
police fixers and depend upon prompt police service. Businesses also obtain direct access to 
police intelligence about criminal trends, a practice which some o f  them seem to value. 
Finally, businesses can sometimes use their direct relations with the police to strengthen the 
quality o f  their own Satpam force, through additional training and capacity building. For 
five o f  these private enterprises, all o f  the previous services make direct relations with the 
police an insurance policy and a value-adder in security terms.
22 From 2009 this hotel was renamed Hotel Phoenix.
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The exceptional case among the previous examples is Grande Mercure, the five star hotel. 
This business does not have direct relations with Polri. Instead, Grande Mercure has a 
policy o f  investing in the professionalism o f  its own Satpam force. But when questioned on 
the issue o f  the hotel’s relations with the police it is clear that hotel management consider 
Polri to be a superior agency, while believing their own apparatus is dependent on police 
powers. This business is thus not as exceptional as it appears at first glance. Crucially, the 
other thing that emerges from my interviews is that there is scarce evidence to show these 
businesses relate with other security actors. Occasionally there are relations with territorial 
army elements but this is exclusively for the purpose o f  accessing intelligence. Thus when 
these consumers o f  security think o f  external support they invariably channel their efforts to 
the police.
The final example, UGM, is somewhat different. UGM is not run on a commercial basis. Its 
level o f  turnover is not linked to a steady flow o f  customers and hence its security 
arrangements do not need to be as great as those in the market economy. Nevertheless, 
UGM does have its own large Satpam force which operates with relatively high 
professional standards. UGM has only irregular contact with Polda DIY. Yet, like Grande 
Mercure, this private security entity acknowledges it cannot operate without Polri. In this 
sense the UGM private security force also recognises the normative superiority o f  the 
police.
Shopping Malls
Plaza Ambarukmo (Amplas) has the most complex security environment o f  all the facilities 
under examination. Yet, ironically, the Amplas management devotes only a moderate 
degree o f  attention to the m all’s security arrangements. Amplas is not only Yogyakarta’s 
largest but also its most luxurious shopping mall. The mall tailors to a high class o f  
clientele, who presumably have expectations o f  a high level o f  visible security. Amplas is
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located in an area (Kecamatan Depok) that has the highest rate o f  crime in Yogyakarta." 
There is a nightclub in the shopping centre which produces at least a small amount o f  
drunkenness during evening trade. Yet according to Amplas management and their security 
staff, the centre experiences only rare disturbances o f  security; usually missing property, 
occasional public drunkenness (generally during weekends) and rarely drunken fights.24 At 
the time o f  my research Amplas management sub-contracted its security to a commercial 
security services company called ISS (International Security Services)." 1SS corporate 
headquarters is in Jakarta. The company manages the Amplas contract by attaching a two- 
person coordination team to the mall (who are appointed by ISS Jakarta) and by tapping 
into Yogyakarta’s pool o f  regional Satpam. The ISS contractors supply ninety three 
Satpam, recruited in Yogyakarta, to the Plaza. These personnel are split into three shifts. On 
any one shift Satpam are broken up into static monitoring posts around thirteen different 
points in the building, such as entrance gates, exit gates, loading docks, and so on. In 
addition the security force also conducts periodic patrols o f  the Plaza premises.
23
The ISS contractors, on behalf o f  their centre clients, maintain close contact with the police. 
ISS’s first point o f  contact is with the closest Polsek, Polsek Depok Barat which is 
conveniently located several hundred metres down the street. Once a week the ISS 
leadership at the Plaza meet with Polsek Depok Barat to discuss the security situation 
around Plaza Ambarukmo. This meeting, which the ISS Superintendent refers to as “Team 
Plaza Ambarukmo” also involves the army Koramil in Kecamatan Depok. This team meets 
every week, primarily to exchange intelligence information for the benefit o f  the Plaza. The
23 This fact was revealed in a workshop I attended in Polda DIY in 2007. Depok has more reported crime than 
the rest o f Sleman district combined as Depok contains most o f  the province’s universities and houses most o f  
the student population. As discussed in chapter two, the student population are both victims and perpetrators 
o f  much o f  the province’s crimes. Field Notes, ‘CSPS Conflict Resolution Seminar bersama Polda DIY’ (18-
22 May 2007), Day 2.
4 Interview with ISS Security Supervisor and Deputy Security Chief, Prabowo and ISS Security 
Superintendent and Head o f  Security Sugiyanto, 17 May 2008.
23 In the three years since the shopping centre opened security arrangements changed three times. In 2006
Amplas’s security was handled by another firm called 911. In 2007 Amplas management attempted to handle
their own security in-house while in late 2007 management again held tenders and granted the contract to ISS. 
Interview with Budiono, Deputy Head o f Human Resources for PT. Yogya Indah Sejahtera (Amplas 
Management), 17 May 2008.
26 Although a Polsek in all other circumstances covers one kecamatan, due to the extent o f  crime in this sub­
district in 2006 Polres Sleman made the unique decision to establish Polsek commands down to the village 
level. Thus Kecamatan Depok effectively has three Polsek -  one for each o f  its villages. Interview, Camat 
Depok, Supardal 4 June 2008.
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ISS Superintendent and his deputy both agreed that this meeting was a very useful tool for 
them to obtain a wide angle view o f  security trends in the area around the mall. As an 
example o f  the type o f  things discussed in meetings o f  ‘Team Plaza Ambarukm o’, the 
superintendent mentioned the projected likelihood o f  demonstrations. When I asked as to 
what type o f  emergency assistance ISS obtained from the police, the interviewees 
mentioned that the Polsek was always on standby to provide support if  called on. ISS 
however “rarely” had to call the police. When a request is made it is usually to ask for 
police aid in detaining people caught in drunken fights.
The ISS leadership at the Plaza left an impression they maintained a consistent, direct line 
o f  communication with their local police command and that this command was active in 
assisting them. As a security contracting firm, however, these ISS staff were also obliged to 
remain under the supervision o f  the provincial police command, specifically the Biro 
Binamitra. Approximately once every month, the provincial police Binamitra office called 
the ISS leadership to the Polda to attend meetings. The two ISS leaders did not explain the 
content o f  these meetings but referred to them as evidence o f  their ongoing need to submit 
to police oversight {pembinaan). Because the interviewees that supplied this information 
were relatively low-ranking personnel they were not able to answer important questions 
like whether TNI and the police are paid for their services or who initiated the “Team Plaza 
Ambarukmo” .27 But what is evident from their accounts is the maintenance o f  a close 
relationship between the police and this private security company. Although the police do 
not intrude on the execution o f  security activities, the private security company does seek to 
maintain access to unique police powers (like those o f  arrest) as well as ancillary services, 
such as intelligence gathering. '
My second shopping mall case study is Mall Malioboro which is located on the main 
shopping and tourist precinct o f  Yogyakarta, Malioboro Street, an area very vulnerable to 
crime. Because Malioboro street contains one o f  Indonesia’s presidential palaces, as well as
27 It became apparent after my meeting that Amplas management were not very open to my research. To their 
credit they did not object to me interviewing their security contractors, but I was only ever able to carry out 
one interview with these personnel. It became apparent in the interview that these contractors were ‘doers’ 
{pelaksana) and their capacity for giving detailed background information on the mail’s external relations was 
limited.
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the provincial parliament and the governor’s complex, very often demonstrations pass by 
outside the Mall. In addition, there is also a risk to the mall from criminals, especially 
thieves, entering from the densely packed streets outside the centre. Although centre 
management insist they experience very little crime, the risk is nevertheless high.
The management o f  Mall Malioboro places higher significance on its security arrangements 
than Plaza Ambarukmo and therefore places a higher emphasis on a relationship with the 
Indonesian security apparatus. One explanation for this difference is the fact that Mall 
Malioboro began operations in 1994, under the New  Order, at a time when many businesses 
sought direct relations with security forces. This is something which the management freely 
admits. Mall Malioboro was also its parent com pany’s first shopping centre, thus in 1994 
the company was highly concerned about security risks to the investment. Owing to this 
fact, centre management in the early nineteen nineties sought direct relationships with 
different parts o f  ABRI in Yogyakarta, such as the district’s police detective unit, the 
Kodim’s military intelligence unit, a Kopassus unit from neighbouring Solo, and others. At 
the time, management sought these relationships to obtain special services like information 
on the criminal affairs o f  Yogyakarta, assistance in selecting security staff, building their 
Satpam’s capabilities through training and emergency security assistance. Because 
management incorporated these practices in its original business plan as well as the fact that 
the Mall lived through the turbulence o f  the reformasi period, the management o f  Mall 
Malioboro is perhaps unusually anxious about security. An interesting outcome o f  this 
situation is the fact that Mall management continues to involve the Indonesian army in its 
affairs.
Mall Malioboro has a security staff o f  fifty personnel divided into three shifts. Management 
employs all o f  their personnel in-house and plans to install an expensive CCTV network in 
the near future. This pre-occupation with security is intriguing given that the outside 
shopping district - Malioboro Street - is very well policed. The length o f  the street falls 
under the responsibility o f  three individual Polseks (Danurejan, Gedong Tengan and 
Gondoman). Towards the southern end o f  the street, barely 500 meters from the shopping
x Interview with Operations and IT manager, Hadiwijaya Sasanadi and H.R.D manager Hendro Susanto,
Mall Malioboro, 16 June 2008.
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centre is the district police office, Poltabes. Poltabes houses hundreds o f  its own operational 
personnel at that location. Directly beside the Poltabes building is the regional Korem 
headquarters. In the middle o f  the street dozens o f  provincial Pol.PP permanently guard 
Yogyakarta’s DPRD and governor’s offices. Although passing demonstrations are frequent, 
there is no shortage o f  security personnel close at hand to the mall. Yet Mall Malioboro, 
ironically, shows greater interest in its security affairs than its larger, richer competitor 
Plaza Ambarukmo. This situation serves to illustrate the point that the private security 
industry does not follow an objective assessment o f  security needs but rather the subjective 
assumptions o f  corporate management.
In terms o f  its external relations, Mall Malioboro continues the same direct relations with 
the security apparatus today as it has in years past. During the Suharto period, Malioboro 
established a Tim Pengamanan Khusus (Special Security Team or Pamsus) consisting o f  
officers from the city’s Kodim, the military police, Poltabes, neighbouring Polseks and 
Kopassus. Quite importantly, management points out this team was formed on its initiative 
-  and paid from the M ali’s budget. Today, however, management maintains the same 
Pamsus arrangement but with a reduced membership. The current Pamsus o f  Mall 
Malioboro consists o f  the head o f  the city’s Kodim intelligence unit - which gives the Mall 
access to army intelligence - another officer from Poltabes’ Binamitra detachment whose 
purpose is to oversee the m all’s Satpam and another police officer from the Polda’s elite 
response unit Brimob, because o f  potential concerns about terrorism. This Pamsus provides 
several valuable services to Mall Malioboro. Like the Team Plaza Ambarukmo, this 
Pamsus channels intelligence to Mall management, on for example demonstrations and 
criminal gang activities. The Pamsus occasionally coordinates training services for the 
Mali’s Satpam (for example weekly self-defence lessons with the police) and also, 
crucially, the Pamsus functions as a point o f  contact for the Mall should emergency
i 29assistance be necessary.
The Mall also has certain obligatory responsibilities to the police. Binamitra officers from 
Poltabes headquarters drop in occasionally to data map Mall Malioboro’s Satpam and 
observe their work. Samapta (patrol) police often drop in, usually daily, on their patrol
29 Interview, Hadiwijaya and Hendro, June 2008.
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rounds to seek information from the Satpam. Usually this only consists o f  checking the 
Satpam’s log books and chatting over e v e n ts /0 Like the ISS staff, a representative from 
Mall Malioboro is also obliged to attend monthly consultation meetings with the Polda’s 
Binamitra detachment.
As with Ambarukmo Plaza, Mall Malioboro’s direct relations with the security apparatus 
function as a type o f  insurance policy, providing direct, on-call access to security services. 
This direct relationship bolsters the M all’s own security arrangements. The appropriate 
metaphor to be used in this context is that o f  an insurance policy, since emergency 
assistance from the Pamsus has rarely been necessary. Yet insurance is one o f  those 
critical products which many businesses choose to purchase, though often never use. For 
Yogyakarta’s largest businesses it seems security is often viewed the same way. It is 
important to point out that this security service, like real insurance, is not free. Centre 
management willingly admit that they pay the security apparatus for their assistance, 
though they do not specify how much. Whatever the cost, it seems that Mall management 
are willing to pay for, and highly value the assistance they obtain in return. Mall 
management view the security services not as a necessary evil but rather as a useful asset.
Hotels
There are two other consumers o f  security in my sample which seek a close relationship 
with the police. Two o f  the three hotels that provided information for my research maintain
30 The short hand phrase for this among Satpam is ‘Polisi, dia mampir, tanya aman? Aman. Ya udah -  pergi. ’ 
(The police drop by and ask us ‘is the situation safe.’ We reply ‘yes, it’s safe.’ Then they go.). This often 
heard refrain underlines the regularity o f  police-Satpam contact. Although most meetings are uneventful, 
Satpam in the establishments 1 research are in habitual contact with elements o f  Polri, usually the patrol 
police. Interview, Komandan Sektor Timur SKKK UGM Marsito and Satpam Wahayudi, 28 October 2008.
The management could recall barely five episodes o f  crime that had ever occurred on their premises. One o f  
the examples was fraud (a dukun santet or shaman allegedly tricked a McDonalds employee into delivering 
the contents o f  the restaurant’s safe) while the others were minor cases o f theft. At one time the Mall did call 
upon the assistance o f  its Pamsus during 1998. At this time the Mall called on a platoon o f  Brimob troops to 
secure the building during the worst o f  the reformasi riots. Interview, Hadiwijaya and Hendro, June 2008.
Interview, Hadiwijaya and Hendro, June 2008.
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some form o f  direct link with Polri, but the exact form o f  these links varies depending on 
which segment o f  the market the business appeals to.
Hotel Inna Garuda, like the shopping mall cases, seeks direct relations with the police 
besides maintaining its own permanent Satpam force. The hotel is located in Malioboro 
Street, Yogyakarta city and offers international standard four star accommodation. The 
hotel is in a reasonably secure environment, given the high density o f  police close to 
Malioboro Street. The hotel maintains a security staff o f  sixteen Satpam (one chief o f  
security, five supervisors and ten ordinary members) who are divided into three shifts. Each 
shift contains a minimum o f  four Satpam.33 The hotel also has access to three assistant 
police (Ass.Pol.) who are permanently allocated to the hotel. While these police do not 
work regularly at the hotel, they are on permanent stand-by, ready to provide emergency 
aid, training services and other incidental assistance.34 As part o f  its package o f  assistance 
to this hotel, the Polda provides Inna Garuda’s Satpam staff with their initial private 
security training sufficient for the Satpam to obtain accreditation. In addition, the police 
also provide self-defence instruction (three times a week) and occasional specialist training. 
At least once a month the hotel’s Ass.Pol. hold seminars to educate the Satpam on changing
• r* IS • • • •crime trends (like fraud and theft). Beside direct assistance to the hotel’s private security 
guards, hotel management meets on an ongoing basis with representatives from Poltabes. 
These meetings take place on an undetermined schedule, once a month or once every 
several months. According to the Ass.Pol one o f  the purposes o f  these meetings is to 
exchange information, with the police contributing data on criminal trends.36
Hotel Inna Garuda has strong similarities in its relations with the police to the shopping 
malls Amplas and Malioboro -  the value o f  the relationship to the hotel is that it provides 
direct access to the police, in particular: to individual police officers permanently available
33 When I organised my first interview at Hotel Inna Garuda the interviewee the hotel provided was one o f  its 
police assistants rather than the hotel’s own security staff. Interview with Assistant Police for Inna Garuda, 
Brigadier Polisi Rinto Pamuji, 18 June 2008.
’4 Interview, Rinto Pamuji, June 2008.
’5 Rinto gave an example o f  one seminar that was held recently at the time o f  my interview. The police staged
a mock conference at the hotel and police in civilian clothing played the part o f  thieves. The hotel’s Satpam 
were tasked with identifying the pretend thieves. Beside this example Rinto also mentioned bomb 
identification, arrest procedure and evacuation procedure as other things that cropped up in these seminars. 
Interview, Rinto Pamuji, June 2008.
'6 Interview, Rinto Pamuji, June 2008.
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to provide emergency assistance, to police training services and police intelligence. 
Although my interviewee could not recall a single incident were the hotel ever had to call 
for emergency assistance, it could be reasonably hypothesised that Inna Garuda’s 
relationship with Polri is in fact another elaborate form o f  insurance. Like with Mall 
Malioboro, hotel management admits that they initiated this relationship (though they did 
not specify when) and the management pay for the services (though they do not disclose
17how much).
The relationship between the police and another hotel, Apartemen Sejahtera, shows the 
same pattern o f  relationships as the other examples, though on a reduced scale. The reason 
why the police-business relationship is o f  a simpler nature in this example is that 
Apartemen Sejahtera is a more down-market establishment than Inna Garuda. Apartemen 
Sejahtera has a three star ranking (by Indonesian domestic standards) and caters to the 
lower middle class. The hotel is actually more accurately described as a serviced apartment 
complex. It thus has fewer resources to spend on security. Even if  the management had a 
greater budget the tastes o f  its guests are hardly as demanding as the guests o f  an 
international hotel chain. However, the same basic impulse to seek a direct relationship 
with the police is present in the case o f  Apartemen Sejahtera.
The apartment’s management has contracted the services o f  a police ‘fixer’, an officer 
referred to as Wayan. This officer has not made himself available to be interviewed, so all 
the information on his role is obtained directly from the apartment’s staff. As such, it is not 
possible to determine his rank or position or duties in the police as my interviewees do not 
know, but Apartemen Sejahtera’s duty manager seems to believe he is a middle ranking 
officer o f  some kind.38 The owners o f  the complex apparently knew Wayan personally and 
offered him work as the apartment’s police contact. He is paid a stipend for his service, 
though management did not disclose how much. Wayan’s exact role is as a type o f  non­
resident supervisor to the business’ Satpam. Apartemen Sejahtera has ten private security 
guards, and a head o f  security.39 This team is mostly employed in manning the front (and
'7 Email contact with Edy Suharyono, training manager for Hotel Inna Garuda (the member o f  staff made 
responsible for coordinating my interviews), 1 July 2008.
’8 Interview with Duty Manager, Apartement Sejahtera, Dinia Achmad 22 November 2008.
39 Interview with the Head o f  Security o f Apartemen Sejahtera, Budiono 18 June 2008.
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only) entrance to the facility, twenty four hours a day. Although the head o f  security 
acknowledges that the apartment has never had an episode that required the involvement o f  
Wayan (with the exception o f  a fire), it seems that theoretically Wayan performs a similar 
role as the Ass.Pol for Inna Garuda: emergency back-up. As put by the head o f  security 
“usually if there is a problem which can’t be handled in the field we report to Pak Wayan.” 
It is then hoped that Pak Wayan, using his powers inside the police, can resolve problems 
for the apartment; “therefore we handle fa problem] first, then we will request orders from 
Pak Wayan, later Pak Wayan will determine [the course o f  action] and request assistance o f  
the Polsek or Polres.”40 Aside from the expectation Wayan will be able to use his influence 
inside the Polri bureaucracy, this police contact also occasionally performs self-defence and 
physical training for the private security team. Aside from this, however, Wayan is rarely 
needed. In this case, the dynamics are basically the same as in the case o f  Inna Garuda. The 
owners o f  this establishment have sought out direct contact with part o f  the police apparatus 
as form o f  emergency insurance for their asset.
Thus far, four o f  the five commercial businesses have chosen to maintain direct links with 
the police, the fifth case study however, Hotel Grande Mercure, is different. Hotel Grand 
Mercure has a staff o f  thirty one Satpam organised again in three shifts.41 Grand Mercure’s 
personnel man nine posts around their complex like the front entrance gates, lobby, 
basement and a twenty four hour CCTV system. Showing the high commitment to security 
in this business, the hotel set up its CCTV network from the opening o f  the hotel in 2004. 
The network covers thirty two separate points in the building. As in the other interviews 
Grand Mercure claimed to have never experienced a crime on its premises.
Regarding its external relations, Hotel Grand Mercure eschews a policy o f  dependence on 
external security institutions and instead focuses on creating a strong private security force 
o f  its own. This situation is somewhat counter-intuitive as this hotel is a five star facility. 
Given its class o f  patron, one could expect this business to have attached the highest 
importance to security and therefore have placed the highest value upon support from the
40 Interview, Budiono, June 2008.
41 Interview, Head o f  Security at Hotel Grande Mercure, Gatot Subroto, 22 August 2008.
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police. Yet this was not the case. Grande Mercure has a professional relationship with the 
police, but not a close, ongoing partnership. According to the hotel’s chief o f  security:
We continue to maintain relations with the police. We can’t leave that behind. But not 
too far, because I can still handle things here if  anything com es up. But w e continue to 
maintain relations with the police and the tourist police. If for exam ple there was a 
problem, w e would report it to them.
The hotel therefore chooses to deal with the police on a selective and professional basis 
only. Thus there was no Ass.Pol. or police fixers working for Grand Mercure. But Hotel 
security did admit to having both obligatory contact with the police and occasionally 
seeking certain services from them. For example the hotel passively accepted information 
from the police on crime trends -  particularly in relation to warnings o f  terrorist activities 
and organised theft rings. The hotel also must, like all commercial security entities, accept 
periodic inspections o f  its Satpam by Binamitra police. Like all Indonesian accommodation 
outlets the hotel also must report the identities o f  foreigners staying on its premises to the 
police. It made these reports to its local Polsek. It was rare though for Grand Mercure to 
seek external assistance. When it did so its requests were mostly for trainers for its internal 
security seminars, such as personnel from the Brimob bomb squad for bomb recognition 
instruction. This training was irregular and very different from the services that the four 
other establishments seek from their police contacts.42 Although the hotel did not seek 
direct relations with Polri elements, neither did hotel security see themselves as 
independent from the police either. As the security manager made clear, he viewed the 
police as an indispensable form o f  support. Hotel Grand Mercure sees the police as the only 
agency which can legitimately deal with security problems should they ever arise.
University Campus Security
My final case study is Universitas Gadjah Mada, which has a large private security force. 
This university has a similar philosophy in its private security arrangements as Hotel Grand 
Mercure; it maintains a relatively robust Satpam force while cultivating minimum,
42 Interview, Subroto, August 2008.
240
professional contact with the police. UGM is the largest university in Yogyakarta. It has a 
student population o f  54,000 sprawling over a central campus that covers six or seven city 
blocks.43 Although in past years the university authorities took a relaxed attitude to 
security, since 2003 the Rector elevated the UGM security service to a Unit led by a 
Director. In the university structure this means the campus security service (or Kesatuan 
Keamanan dan Keselamatan Kampus, SATCA^sic]) is answerable only to the Rector, giving 
SKKK a high status within UGM. The UGM security service has 131 Satpam.44 In the 
other establishments I researched most o f  the activities Satpam performed were passive 
guarding. At UGM, however, the size o f  the campus grounds encourage the campus Satpam 
force to be more active in such things as directing internal traffic and conducting mobile 
patrols. UGM Satpam also engage in the more common passive tasks o f  guarding buildings 
and manning command posts.
Unlike the other establishments, UGM does have a fairly dynamic set o f  security concerns, 
coming from the young, boisterous and activist student population. According to campus 
security, the most serious problem they face is theft, which is usually o f  personal electronic 
equipment. Thefts on campus grounds are usually crimes o f  opportunity, probably 
committed by students themselves. However, the most frequent problem the campus 
security authorities say they encounter are violations o f  lsusila'> or public morals, when 
students engage in intimate behaviour in public.45 When asked how highly demonstrations 
rate on their agenda, the campus security chief, who has served four years in his role, says 
there are numerous demonstrations but none have ended in “anarchic actions” (or tindakan 
anarkis). All protests must be under the standard o f  one o f  the UGM student guilds; if a 
protest does not have the stamp o f  a student guild oration is forbidden and the group is 
dispersed. According to the security chief this system o f  guild-organised protest has limited 
the possibility for rowdy protests. This system pacifies the students by giving them an
4' UGM Website: Figures. Accessable from: < http://www.ugm.ac.id/eng/content.php?page=0&display=6>. 
Last accessed 11 August 2009.
44 This number does not include another seventy or so Satpam which are under the control o f  the individual 
faculties. Interview, Suwandi, October 2008.
43 According to SKKK data, since 2004 demonstrations have trended downwards from forty in that year to
fifteen in 2007. Traffic accidents have also trended downwards from eighty nine in 2004 to thirty two in 2007. 
Thefts have increased every year from six in 2004 to twenty seven in 2007. Violent fights track only several
cases each year while violations o f  public morals consistently reach at or over 100 cases every year. SKKK 
UGM, Grafik Kejadian di Kampus UGM (2008?).
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opportunity to protest for their cause under the controlled leadership o f  their student 
representatives. The security chief insists that in his four years there has not yet been an 
incidence o f  a protest which has ended in violence. Nor has there ever been a student 
protest in which he has been forced to call in the assistance o f  the police.46
When it comes to external security organisations the campus, like Hotel Grand Mercure, 
has a reliable but arms-length relationship with the police. The relationship is underwritten 
by the fact that campus security needs access to police law enforcement powers, but access 
to these powers only occurs as a public service on the part o f  the police and not through 
special relationships. In describing the general attitude o f  campus security to the police, it is 
apparent that campus security attaches high value to Polri and actively seeks to 
communicate with them. When asked whether Polri are o f  any use to SKKK the response is 
unequivocal: “ [the police] are very useful. However the frequency [of communication] is 
too small. It needs to be increased... the coordination is good. But their visits need to be 
increased... But generally it’s good. Every time there is a request the [police] response is
• • ^47positive.
The reason why UGM attaches value to assistance from the police is much the same as with 
the other organisations. The police have unique assets that the campus security needs. One 
o f  these assets is sectoral training. UGM sends all o f  its Satpam recruits to undergo one 
month o f  training with the Polda to obtain police-issued trade licenses. As will be discussed 
below the police are intimately involved in the licensing and training o f  Satpam. Through 
this training, U G M ’s Satpam recruits obtain knowledge on sectoral laws, equipment 
handling (like how to use hand cuffs and the like) and other skills from the primary source 
o f  knowledge on policing: Polri. UGM also needs the police for emergency security 
assistance, which they have had occasion to request. During graduation period, the chief o f  
security called on Polres Sleman to provide personnel to direct traffic on the major roads 
which intersect the campus. This is something that the SKKK, as a private organisation,
46 Other senior Satpam agree with this. Interview, SKKK Komandan Sektor Timur Marsito, 28 October 2008.
47 Interview, Suwandi October 2008.
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may not do on public roads. Apparently the Polres grants these requests, sending around 
thirty traffic police at each time.
The SKKK have also infrequently requested police assistance when there have been large 
student demonstrations on the campus, though the police have only ever been required to 
assemble outside the campus grounds and remain on stand-by.48 Apparently Polres Sleman 
has always been willing to answer these requests for assistance: “without negotiation... 
Whenever I call them, they [police from Polres Sleman] come.”491 asked the chief o f  UGM 
security why he thought that Polres Sleman bothered to assist UGM, was it because UGM 
was such a large university? The chief responded: “ I think Polres Sleman doesn’t 
differentiate amongst UGM, UNY, Atma Jaya [other prominent universities located near 
UGM]. The important thing is the Polres desires the campus not to become a place for acts 
o f  anarchism.” Although the campus defray police costs for the few occasions when police 
are called on for assistance, this only concerns the provision o f  food to police on the ground 
and diesel for their vehicles. From the security c h ie f s  perspective, money then is not a 
motive for the police when rendering assistance. Thus we can see that, if  anything, campus 
security is dissatisfied with what it perceives as too little attention from Polri. The campus 
authorities consider the police to be valuable sources o f  support and sectoral knowledge.
UGM also has very little contact with the other primary sources o f  external security, the 
Pol.PP and the TNI. U G M ’s main cause o f  concern with regard to the Pol.PP is unregulated 
street sellers {pedagang kaki lima) who use U G M ’s open access points to enter the campus 
and trade. The campus authorities frequently invite the Sleman Pol.PP to tackle the street
48 It should be mentioned that Indonesia has special procedures for security in its education institutions. 
University students are permitted to demonstrate on their campuses with the permission o f  their rectors. The 
police or any security element may not enter without the permission o f  the rector. According to the head o f  
security in UGM, he has never had cause to request the police enter UGM to deal with a protest. Interview, 
Suwandi October 2008.
49 In one incident that had occurred not long before the time o f  my interview with the head o f  security, 
protestors came to the campus from Kulon Progo. The background to the incident was that UGM had been 
involved in a sand mining venture in the district o f  Kulon Progo that was opposed by citizens there. Thirty 
one truckloads o f  Kulon Progo residents came to demonstrate at the campus. At that time, the head o f  security 
called Polres Sleman and the Kapolres came directly to deal with the situation with 100 o f  his personnel. The 
demonstration ended peacefully. The head o f  security used this example as one which demonstrated the 
efficient service he had come to receive from the police. Interview, Suwandi October 2008. ‘Warga Kulon 
Progo Demo UGM ’ Kapanlagi.com, 21 July 2008 <http://www.kapanlagi.eom/h/0000240321 .html>
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sellers, apparently with only limited response?0 The regional TNI forces, however, have 
almost never been involved in campus security, since at least after reformasi. On this issue 
the chief o f  security commented:
Today, w e don’t coordinate with the Kodim or the Koramil. Because the system  has 
already changed. Therefore they [TNI] can’t act as in the past and perform social and 
security control functions. N ow  their function is military [i.e. defence]. Therefore w e  
don’t invite them to participate [in UGM  security arrangements]. Except if  there is an 
international guest. Like the N ew  Zealand Prime Minister. Security [for her visit] was 
planned by the military. For security for heads o f  state, they are protected by the 
military. The police only assist. In past tim es they [police and TNI] were together. 
N ow  its only i f  there is a VVIP guest at the level o f  a head o f  state they [TNI] are 
involved.
Although in general the security chief maintains no contact with the territorial army, he 
does mention one incident in which he was contacted by the provincial head o f  military 
intelligence. This incident was mentioned in chapter three, when students from various 
Yogyakarta universities were observed participating in a radical Islamist event. Beside this 
one example the UGM head o f  security has had virtually no contact with the TNI.51
Thus, we can conclude two things from the UGM example. Firstly, although campus 
security does not seek to create a special relationship with Polri elements, they do seek and 
value Polri support nevertheless. Secondly, when it comes to external security support, 
UGM channels its demands to the police. University security acknowledges that the police 
is the only actor with authority in security matters. This finding is consistent with the other 
examples. Consumers o f  commercial security may possess their own internal security 
systems, but they recognise that their own arrangements depend on continuous contact with 
Polri.
30 In an amusing example o f  the lukewarm attentiveness o f  the Sleman Pol.PP, the chief o f  security claimed 
once to have called the head o f  Sleman’s Public Order Bureau and asked for assistance in cleaning up street 
sellers on UGM property. The ch ief o f  security was told by the head o f  the bureau ‘do it yourself and if  there 
are any problems call me back.’ Interview, Suwandi, October 2008.
51 Interview, Suwandi, October 2008.
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One o f  the surprising features o f  these relationships is that consumers o f  security services 
very rarely call on the police for assistance, yet four o f  the six case studies go to elaborate 
lengths to keep direct relations with the police. 1 have used the metaphor o f  an insurance 
policy to hypothesise why this might be the case. In deploying this metaphor we need to 
understand the specific circumstances o f  Indonesia. Indonesia has never had a reliable 
‘911’ style telephone system that provides a central emergency services coordination 
point.32 Indonesia does not even have a history o f  prompt, free, universal public services in 
the case o f  emergencies, quite the opposite in fact. Public servants in Indonesia have a 
reputation for slowness, bureaucracy and unfriendly service; in the public consciousness the 
police, as an institution, stand out especially prominently on this point. Polri’s service
• • • , # . standards rank consistently poorly in public opinion polls. Yet as this thesis points out, 
Polri is still the primary instrument o f  internal security. Viewed from this perspective, it is 
perhaps understandable that an entrepreneur who invests billions o f  rupiah into an asset like 
a hotel, is unwilling to risk the safety o f  their investment on the belief that the Indonesian 
police can be trusted to deliver prompt and free security services in the event o f  an 
emergency. Four o f  the five businesses in this research certainly think this way. Four o f  the 
five businesses prefer to develop direct links with specific parts o f  the Indonesian police in 
order to extract extra services above what they are otherwise entitled to.
Another relevant question to ask is whether such payments by private business to the police 
are corruption? I argue, it depends on how the money is used. The practices I reveal in my 
research can be viewed, from the security consumer perspective, as the commercialisation
52 Indonesia for some time attempted to maintain a universal emergency system for emergency services. The 
police emergency number was 110. Other such numbers were, for example 113 for the fire department and
118 or 119 for the ambulance service. The system was poorly used, poorly operated and eventually scrapped. 
The problem with the police number was that few people knew o f  it. Anecdotally, some police commands did 
not service this number at all while others were in the habit o f  putting callers through to voicemail. In an 
admission o f  the failure o f  the project, Mabes Polri in 2008 announced the system would be rebuilt with the 
new number: 112. As o f  January 30 2009 however, only Polda Metro Jaya (in Jakarta) and Polda West Java 
had trial-tested the new number, apparently due to lack o f  resources for a nation-wide rollout. ‘Program 
Reaksi Cepat Polisi, Telepon 112, Dalam 15 Menit Polisi Datang’, Vivanews 30 January 2009. Available 
from: <http://metro.vivanews.com/news/read/25316-polisi luncurkan call center baru 112.>, last accessed 
29 August 2009.
53 Kompas media group conducts yearly opinion polling o f  public satisfaction in the police. In Kompas’ 
November 2009 poll, public satisfaction with the police reached only 32.6%. Although the 2009 results 
marked an all-time low due to specific police corruption scandals o f  that year, over the two thousands public 
satisfaction in Polri generally fluctuated in the 40-50% range, which is a poor showing o f  confidence. ‘Jajak 
Pendapat Kompas: Saatnya Reformasi Penegak Hukum’, Kompas 16 November 2009.
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o f  a public service. As Adam Crawford and other criminologists point out, it has long been 
common in the Western world for private entities to purchase extra services from the 
police. Crawford himself uses an example o f  the Gateshead shopping mall in the United 
Kingdom which ‘rents’ twelve police officers from the Northumbria police department, as 
an illustration o f  this phenomenon.54 In principle, there is little difference between the 
scenarios described in the policing literature o f  the developed world and Indonesia. In my 
case study, four o f  the five private businesses choose to pay for additional services they 
would not otherwise be entitled to. As Crawford has argued, in such cases private interests 
effectively cartelise a public service.55 While one can question whether such actions are fair 
uses o f  tax-payer resources, they are accepted practices in the developed world and are not 
necessarily corruption in Indonesia. The question really depends on how such money is 
employed by the police. If these payments are being used to enrich senior officers (which is 
probably the most likely scenario), then police resources are being employed corruptly. If 
the payments are channelled to compliment the police budget then such private payments 
are not, in principle, illegal. My research was not able to uncover how these funds were 
dispersed within Polri, the question therefore remains open.
I do not view these payments as protection money either. Protection money implies that a 
person or organisation is obliged to pay moneys to avoid violent consequences. The 
consumers o f  security I research in Yogyakarta pay for tangible returns, such as enhanced 
access to intelligence, police training support and direct access to ‘fixers’ in the police 
environment. They are not obliged to make these payments; one o f  the hotels does not even 
bother with such arrangements at all. This is not to say that the police do not extract bribes 
or protection money in other forms, but these cases should not be interpreted as evidence o f  
extortion.
It becomes difficult therefore in this situation to apply the argument o f  the policing 
networks theorists that the commercial security industry has become a rival to the police. 
Although consumers deliver much o f  their own security using their own resources,
54 Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State’, 463.
55 See: Adam Crawford, ‘Policing and Security as “Club Goods”: The New Enclosures?’ In: Democracy, 
Society and the Governance o f Security, B.Dupont and J. Woods (ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
111-138.
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consumers are not independent o f  the police when doing so; they still demand police 
assistance. This situation bears a strong resemblance to the type o f  argument proposed by 
Crawford.56 As explained in the introduction, Crawford depicts the police in the United 
Kingdom as acting like an anchor. The special powers o f  the police act as a centre o f  
gravity which draws non-police security actors to the police in order that non-police actors 
can perform more effectively. Individual nodal actors are therefore autonomous but 
remained linked to the police. In the case o f  security consumers in Indonesia, that anchor 
chain is considerably shorter than in Crawford’s metaphor. This is at the behest o f  the 
consumers themselves, rather than Polri. Indeed this Indonesian case study suggests we 
need to amend the dominant model o f  the networked security theorists. The police are not 
equivalent to other security entities in the network; Polri’s authority and special powers 
make it unique. The commercial security actors in this research are not independent from 
the police or able to deal with the police on an equal basis. The relationship is one o f  
dependency.
Providers o f  Security
Turning to review the supply side o f  the market, this half  o f  the commercial security 
industry is more firmly under the shadow o f  the Indonesian police than consumers o f  
security. Providers o f  security are divided into two streams: incorporated security 
companies which sell security services to the market, and a floating mass o f  Satpam who 
hold trade qualifications from the police and privately sell their labour directly to 
consumers. Although Polri is not interested in how Satpam or private companies deliver 
their services, Polri actively asserts its power to regulate and supervise the providers. This 
situation creates a clear dominant-subordinate relationship. While the relationship can be 
burdensome - sometimes severely - for the security companies, individual Satpam seem to 
regard their relations with the police positively. In the following three sub-sections we look 
at how police regulate the providers o f  security. We then look at several case studies o f
56 Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State.’
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private security companies in Yogyakarta and their activities and relations with the police. 
In the final sub-section we look at the perspectives o f  individual Satpam, their activities and 
relations with Polri.
Police Regulation
Although Polri has the right to regulate the world o f  private policing, in reality Polri’s 
approach to regulation shows a lack o f  consistency; there are a large number o f  recent, 
detailed police regulations which govern private security companies but much less material 
on other Pam Swakarsa groups. When it comes to police regulation o f  the generic Pam 
Swakarsa, the most recent police ordinance consists o f  a series o f  guidelines and orders that 
Mabes Polri addresses to its own members on how to supervise (or membina) Satpam and 
other Pam Swakarsa groups.58 Buried within these documents are descriptions o f  the 
powers o f  Pam Swakarsa and their responsibilities. This new doctrine expands on older, 
more detailed doctrine from pre-reformasi times. Comparatively, there is a great amount o f  
detailed, modern regulation on the BUJP.59 As to why the police devote most o f  their 
regulatory effort towards the security companies is difficult to explain. It is possible that 
Polri regulates BUJP especially closely as this offers the police opportunities for 
corruption. As will be discussed, police use their licensing powers to obtain illegal 
payments from BUJP. As such police regulation probably serves a duel purpose. Firstly and 
most importantly, it imposes police control over Pam Swakarsa. Secondly, regulation gives 
the police opportunities to extract money from the corporate providers o f  security.
57 For the most current regulatory documents see (for BUJP): Peraturan Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik 
Indonesia, No. 17/2006 tentang Pedoman Pembinaan Badan Usaha Jasa Pengamanan. The more general set o f  
regulations which apply to the sector as a whole and govern the activities o f  individual Satpam can be found 
in: Mabes Polri: Buku Pedoman Tugas Pengamanan Swakarsa. Edition 2001 (Mabes Polri: J1 Trunojoyo No.3 
Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, August 2001).
38 The most current o f  which are: Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Surat Keputusan Kepala Kepolisian Pola 
Pembinaan Sistem Keamanan dan Pengamanan Swakarsa No.Pol. SKEP/765/X/2005 25 October 2005 and 
Pedoman Pembinaan Satuan Pengamanan No.Pol. SKEP/629/XI/ 25 November 2005.
59 In the course o f  researching this topic I liaised with the Kamsa detachment (Keamanan Swakarsa -  Civil 
Society Security) o f  Polda DIY’s Biro Binamitra. Over a series o f months I accessed all o f  their available 
information on police doctrine, training, data collection and other material relating to police management o f  
non-state security elements. I am confident I have the most current material which explains how the police 
regulate the commercial security sector and civil society security elements.
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A BUJP requires the permission o f  the Indonesian police to operate.60 The Indonesian 
police license BUJPs to provide six different types o f  services: Security Consultancy, 
Security Devices, Security Training and Education, Security Transport, Escort Services and 
K-9 (sic) services. In lay terms these services are: commercial assessments o f  the security 
needs o f  a client, providing devices like alarms and cameras, supplying training to Satpam 
recruits, transporting valuable goods like cash, supplying bodyguard services and, 
obviously, dog patrols. 61 Polri’s commitment to governance does not cease with defining 
what BUJPs may do. The police also go into some detail in defining how a company must 
deliver its services. To take one o f  these service areas as an example, security consultancy, 
Polri declares:
The shape o f  activities o f  Security Consultancy Service C om panies... consists of:
a. Conducting security suitability evaluation services for objects, assets and 
environments;
b. M aking basic security plans and designs which are structured and system atised  
sufficient with the vulnerability potential o f  the object to be secured;
c. Conducting research and developm ent about the methods and security procedures 
to be used [for securing] an object;
E tc ...
Although there is nothing especially controversial about the police defining - in very 
specific terms - what companies licensed under their authority may do, this typical 
quotation from Polri regulations hints at the degree o f  pedantry with which the police 
attempt to govern the sector as a whole and the BUJPs in particular.
Although police regulation is most strict towards the BUJP, Polri also regulate Satpam 
quite extensively too. To give an idea o f  the extent to which the police attempt to exercise 
control over their private ‘counterparts’, the official Book o f  Guidelines for Private 
Security (Buku Pedoman Tugas Pengamanan Swakarsa), which is published by police 
headquarters, consists o f  292 pages o f  regulations, most o f  which are solely drafted by
60 Peraturan Kapolri, No. 17/2006, Pasal 12.
61 Peraturan Kapolri no. 17/2006, Pasal 2.
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Mabes Polri.62 This set o f  regulations covers everything from the authority o f  Satpam to 
their curriculum, standards o f  dress, registration, permission to use weapons and their work 
hours and workplace conditions.6j In terms o f  job  description, Polri declares that Satpam 
are in simple terms, responsible for the security and good order o f  their work place. Aside 
from directing Satpam to obey their individual workplace employers, Mabes Polri 
empowers security guards to perform the following functions: control the movement o f  
employees, regulate traffic and visitors in their places o f  work, guard their workplaces, 
conduct patrols, take initial steps to secure the scene o f  a crime or accident and arrest 
suspected criminals.64 The above information is an edited summary o f  what is a very 
detailed set o f  instructions. What we see here then is the micro-managerial attitude o f  the 
police. Mabes Polri seeks to impose, in almost exhaustive detail, its interpretation o f  the 
legitimate activities o f  commercial security.65 This underlines the unique nature o f  policing 
in Indonesia where Polri is not merely a partner or even just normatively superior. The 
Indonesian police actively seek to coopt the suppliers o f  commercial security.
62 Some o f  the information contained within the 292 pages is superfluous (for example there are a number o f  
Chief o f  Police Orders (or Surat Keputusan Kapolri -  SKEP) which countermand or repeal each other). 
Furthermore, approximately forty pages o f the document discusses private security in the forestry industry 
which is something very important in the sector as a whole, but is not relevant for my dissertation. 
Nevertheless, the sheer density o f  this book in some ways illustrates how the police exercise detailed -  at 
times micro -  management o f  the commercial security sector. Mabes Polris, Buku Pengamanan Swakarsa, 
(2001).
63 Some o f  the regulations regarding hours o f  workplace conditions are joint declarations with the Ministry o f  
Manpower. For powers o f  Satpam see: Sub-Direktorat Bimbingan Masyarakat Direktorat Bimbingan 
Masyarakat Polri, “Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Satuan Pengamanan/Satpam”. In: Mabes Polri, Buku 
Pengamanan Swakarsa, p4-19. For uniform standards see: Surat Keputusan Kapolri, Pakaian Seragam 
Satuan-Satuan Pengamanan (Satpam): SKEP/74/IV/1981. For registration requirements for Satpam see: Surat 
Keputusan Kapolri: Registrasi Satuan-Satuan Pengamanan (Satpam): SKEP/75/IV/1981. For weapons 
permission see: Surat Keputusan Kapolri: Buku Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Senjata 
Non-Organik TNI/Polri : SKEP/1198/IX/2000. Some o f  these decrees have been superceded. One example 
being the training curriculum. But other decrees, such as those concerning dress standards and work functions 
are still apparently valid. For the current Satpam curriculum see: Peraturan Kapolri, Nomor 18/2006, Satuan 
Acara Pelajaraan Pelatihan Satuan Pengamanan (12 December 2006).
64 Direktorat Bimbingan Masyarakat, ‘Pedoman Tugas Satpam’, 4-18.
65 For example, in section 4. o f  its directions, Mabes Polri provides guidelines on the things “which must be 
paid attention to during the period o f  [a Satpam’s] duty.” The police provide directions on: the ‘appropriate 
attitudes and behaviour o f  Satpam’ (including keeping hair neat and trimmed), ‘personal equipment [to be 
carried]’, ‘methods o f  receiving guests’ and ‘methods o f  answering the telephone’ -  all with very detailed 
sub-instructions. When defining how a Satpam can perform their tasks Mabes Polri makes clear that Satpam 
are only empowered to use repressive force in limited circumstances; such as detaining suspects and 
preventing acts o f  violence in their workplaces. See: Direktorat Bimbingan Masyarakat, ‘Pedoman Tugas 
Satpam’ -  Part.d., subsection 1 and 9.
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The Commercial Security Industry in Yogyakarta
At the time o f  my research, there were a surprisingly large number o f  both BUJP and 
individual Satpam in Yogyakarta. As o f  June 2008 there were twenty one BUJP, seven o f  
these companies were formed in Yogyakarta while the balance were headquartered outside 
the province but had business operations in DIY.66 One o f  these companies was a ‘cash and 
carry business’, while the other twenty were listed as recruiters and suppliers o f  Satpam. 
Six o f  these companies operated Satpam training courses (or diklat services) which, as will 
be discussed below, is often a richer business venture than security contracting. 
Yogyakarta’s BUJP could all be classed as small to medium sized with most being at the 
small end o f  the spectrum (less than fifty employees). The two largest BUJP in Yogyakarta,
• f \ 7Garda Total Security and Garuda Merah employed 89 and 81 personnel respectively. In 
Yogyakarta in 2008 there were 4,533 individual Satpam. If ranked by district most could be 
found in Sleman (2,166) and the city o f  Yogyakarta (1,736) with the remainder in Bantul 
(375), Kulon Progo (130) and Gunung Kidul (126).68 These individual Satpam made up the 
majority o f  the supply side o f  the industry. Although Yogyakarta’s commercial security 
industry is tiny compared to Jakarta or Surabaya, Yogyakarta does indeed have all the 
component parts which offer us a picture o f  the sector in Indonesia.
Security Companies
The two BUJP included in this study are PT. Total Security and PT. Garuda Merah.69 There 
are similarities and differences between these companies. Both operate under strict police 
licensing and in that manner are directly dependent on the police for their existence. There 
are some major differences in their operations and attitudes to the police. The managers o f
66 An example discussed previously is ISS, the security contractor for Plaza Ambarukmo.
<l7 Polda DIY, Biro Binamitra: Badan Usaha Jasa Pengamanan di Wilayah Hukum Polda DIY, Juni 2008. PT. 
Garuda Merah, Struktur Organisasi (2008?). PT. Garda Total Security, Struktur Organisasi (2007?).
68 Polda DIY, Biro Binamitra: Data Satpam 2008 (Juni 2008).
69 I also included another small Satpam training company, PT.Manggala Pratama, in my research. It is not 
discussed, as it adds nothing which is not covered in the other examples.
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Total Security have a resentful attitude to police dominance over their company and freely 
admit they must pay bribes to police officers. Garuda Merah on the other hand pays much 
smaller bribes to Polri officers and has a neutral attitude to their relations with Polda DIY. 
What is clear, however, is that police licensing tightly limits the autonomy o f  these 
companies. Because these companies operate with police permission they bear little 
resemblance to the security companies that operate in the developed world, which are 
purely commercial and market-based.
Looking firstly at Total Security, this BUJP is the largest and oldest in the province, in 
comparison to Garuda Merah, Total’s managers have poor opinion o f  the police. Total 
Security was established in 2004.70 The com pany’s two owners describe themselves as 
private businessmen though the main partner, Seti Widodo, also claims members o f  his 
family were senior officers in the police.71 According to one o f  the senior management 
team, obtaining the permission o f  the police to open this business took six months and cost 
the owners Rp.100 million in bribes -  though this amount does perhaps seem exaggerated 
given what was later paid by Garuda M erah’s owners. Total Security has two business 
operations: the provision o f  training services and the out-sourcing o f  Satpam. Every year 
the company delivers around five basic training classes for Satpam recruits. The training 
lasts for one and a half months and includes fifty-seventy recruits in each class. Each recruit 
pays Rp.2.5 million and upon graduating, meets the Polri formal standard to perform work
7 0  #as a Satpam. Total Security takes the best o f  its graduates and channels them into its 
outsourcing contracts. In June 2007, the company employed seventy two Satpam in 
contracts with thirteen different companies. According to Total, its customers are mostly 
small to medium sized enterprises. In 2007 Total’s largest customer was an amusement 
park called ‘Taman Pintar’, which provided a Rp.90 million contract for twenty three 
Satpam. Total’s smallest contracts were for single Satpam in several small companies.74
70 Interview, Directors Seti Widodo and Atus Nurwijanarko, PT. Garuda Merah, 14 April 2008.
71 Interview, Widodo and Atus, 5 November 2007.
72 Interview with Operations Manager S.Parjiyanto, PT. Garuda Merah, 5 October 2007.
73 Interview with Operations Manager Parjiyanto and Executive Secretary Nuning, PT. Garuda Merah, 2 
October 2007 and unnamed documents shown to me at Total Security.
74 Interview, Habib (an employee from the accounting desk), PT. Garuda Merah, 5 October 2007.
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Although Total Security’s owners do not directly state they have a poor view o f  the police, 
by exploring the subtle, implied meanings within their statements, one begins to understand 
they believe the police are heavy-handed in dealing with the company. The managers 
assume Total has little choice but to accept this state o f  affairs if it wants to remain in 
business. In one conversation with the two owners, Seti Widodo and Agus Nurwijanarko, 
in 2007, I asked what their profitability was. After some brief exchanges they both agreed 
for financial year 2007 their company would make 0% profit. Without prompting, Widodo 
claimed the reason for this was excessive police bribes -  or as he described it ‘upeti.’ I 
asked the directors whether the police demand bribes. He explained that this upeti is not 
demanded, it is expected. Unless it was paid he said the extension o f  the com pany’s license 
“akan dipersulit” (would be made difficult).75 In accordance with police regulations every 
year the Polda audits BUJP to determine whether the companies are fit to remain in
7 •business. Presumably at these times police expect payments to be made. In my interviews 
with the company’s management it was apparent that Total Security’s directors were 
frustrated and disappointed with their subordination to the police. As claimed by the
77com pany’s executive secretary, “ indeed we are under the police.”
What we begin to see therefore in the Total example is just how closely the police control 
BUJP. The superiority o f  the police is not dependent upon direct management. Total 
Security remains autonomous. Rather what Polri has achieved is to invent systems o f  
control which keep these companies dependent on police patronage. Without police 
approval these companies cannot operate. One likely explanation for this set o f  
relationships is the fact that BUJP are a potential money earner for the police.
As all o f  Yogyakarta’s indigenous BUJP are involved in training Satpam it is appropriate to 
digress briefly to discuss Satpam training. All Satpam training in Indonesia is dictated by 
Polri and delivered to a police standard. The police demand that all security guards must 
obtain police certified training; this requirement is one o f  the main methods by which Polri
75 Upeti is a Javanese term to describe ‘gift’ or tribute donated to a king. Upeti is formally donated as an act o f  
fdial loyalty but with a strong undertone o f  extortion. Interview, Widodo and Agus, 5 November 2007.
76 Interview, Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Treasurer o f  the Yogyakarta branch o f  the Asosiasi Manager 
Security Indonesia, 24 June 2008. AMSI Yogyakarta accompanies the Polda’s BUJP Audit Team in its yearly 
inspections o f  the BUJP in Yogyakarta.
77 Interview, Executive Secretary, October 2008.
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establishes its dominance over Satpam. Satpam training can be delivered by both the police 
themselves or by appropriately licensed private security companies, like the two BUJP in 
this research.78 Police headquarters have set their own curriculum for Satpam.79 Private 
security guards can take three types o f  police mandated courses: basic (for recruits), 
intermediate and advanced (for those already qualified). The police enforce strict standards
orv # #for entry into each o f  these courses o f  training. The police also standardise the curriculum 
for each set o f  courses. The Satpam basic training course for example consists o f  232 hours 
o f  training, including units on self-defence and use o f  handcuffs, recognition o f  explosives 
and narcotics, English language training and other topics organised in twenty three separate 
classes. One o f  the BUJP directors has quite neatly described their role in this training as 
that o f  an ‘event organiser’ - but a more accurate description would probably be a 
franchisee.81 The BUJPs which offer training services take a Polri designed service and 
assume the risk o f  marketing it to potential Satpam. Polri even reserves a massive role in 
the delivery o f  training by BUJP. According to BUJP informants, they depend upon Polri 
personnel to deliver up to 80% o f  their curriculum.82 Although there is some doubt on the 
part o f  BUJP as to whether they are permitted to use non-Polri instructors, it seems to be 
that they follow the safest path and use the police. One BUJP informant claims this is
o ibecause police personnel are most knowledgeable about the work o f  Satpam. Although no
78 Prior to the establishment o f  companies like Total Security, Satpam training in Yogyakarta was done in 
each o f  the Polres. The fees were lower, only Rp.250,000, and my sense is that this training was more like a 
police ‘service’ to the community -  giving job skills to people who may have otherwise ended up as gangsters 
or become unemployed. The emergence o f  the BUJPs has made these services redundant. The police still 
offer their own Satpam training but this is now done by the Kamsa detachment o f  Biro Binamitra in Polda 
DIY. The Polda offers their training in competition with the BUJP, at the price o f  Rp.2.8 million. According 
to a police informant these funds are a cash earning enterprise which are distributed among members o f  the 
Kamsa detachment. When I asked the informant why the police competed with the private sector to deliver • 
these courses the informant, with some humour replied, ‘if  we didn’t we [the Kamsa detachment] wouldn’t 
have anything else to do.’ Interview, anonymous source in Kamsa Detachment, Polda DIY, November 2007.
79 Peraturan Kapolri, Nomor 18/2006, Satuan Acara Pelajaraan Pelatihan Satuan Pengamanan (12 December 
2006)
80 For example to undertake basic training (Garda Pratama) a Satpam recruit must pass a police background 
check (SKCK), be between the ages o f  20 and 30, graduate from middle high school and pass other 
requirements. Tighter requirements apply for the intermediate and advanced courses. The advanced course 
can only be delivered by Police Headquarters. Perpol 18/2006, Pasal 2, 8.
81 Interview, Direktur Utama Garuda Merah Bayu Nugroho, 29 October 2008.
82 Interview, Direktur Garuda Merah, October 2008. One o f  the operations managers at Total Security claim 
about 70% o f  their curriculum is delivered by police instructors. Interview, Operations Manager, October 
2007.
83 According to the executive secretary o f  Total Security: “if  we consider capability in giving material it must 
be the police [who become instructors]. But that also does not close the possibility teaching is able to be 
handled by other people who have capabilities which are the same as the police... Occasionally we are 
confused at whether certain things should be taught by police. But, fundamentally since Satpam work is close
254
informant has said so, I speculate that the BUJP also use police instructors because this is 
another form o f  unofficial tax the police expect to be paid. For Total Security, to contract 
one police instructor for up to 85 minutes costs Rp.45,000 (for a middle ranking officer o f
84Captain /Adjutant Komisaris Polisi rank). The higher the rank, the greater the cost. Based 
upon my observations, Polda DIY ’s Biro Binamitra provides most o f  the instructors for 
Total and Garuda Merah.83
Clearly Polri retains tight control o f  the design o f  Satpam training and even its provision; 
this system has implications for the police’s relations with individual Satpam and with the 
BUJP. By designing, standardising and delivering Satpam training Polri demonstrates from 
the very beginning its legal supremacy over the commercial security industry. Satpam are 
left in no doubt that they are dependent upon and indeed are an extension of, the police 
apparatus. The apt symbol o f  this is contained in the uniforms Satpam wear; every Satpam 
in Indonesia carries on the shoulder o f  their police standardised uniforms the emblem o f  the 
provincial police command where they serve. For the BUJP, the role o f  the police in 
training Satpam reinforces their dependence on Polri. In effect, the BUJP are mere conduits 
for the police, extracting rent from the service while the police in turn extract commissions 
from the BUJP. This issue also sheds light one o f  the other major truths about the supply 
end o f  the commercial security sector. The police financially profit from the regulation o f  
the security industry.
Continuing the discussion o f  the BUJP, the next example is the second largest company in 
Yogyakarta, Garuda Merah. This company seemed to be in a much healthier financial 
position than Total but also to have a merely lukewarm relationship with the police. Like 
Total Security, Garuda Merah operated both diklat training and security outsourcing. The 
company began operations in October 2007. According to the corporate director, the 
owners o f  Garuda Merah were all civilians and set up the company as a family owned 
business. They ran Garuda Merah therefore without using backers within the police. 
Surprisingly the process o f  establishment took only several months, the shortest period o f
to that o f  the police then, yes, it must be the police [who teach Satpam courses].” Interview, Nuning, October 
2007.
S4 Interview, Operations Manager, October 2008.
8:1 Interview, Direktur Garuda Merah, October 2008.
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time was in fact receiving permission from the police. The company submitted a request for 
a license first with Polda DIY, which took one week to issue a reply. After obtaining the 
Polda’s recommendation, final permission came from Mabes Polri one week later. For this 
service Garuda Merah paid Rp.4 million to the Polda and Rp.7.5 million in “thank you”
* • • • • • money to Mabes Polri. The company derives 80-90% o f  its turnover from training 
courses, where the profit margin was an incredible 50%. By October 2008, Garuda Merah 
already began its seventh basic Satpam course, which on average delivered training to forty 
Satpam recruits. Like Total, Garuda Merah channelled the best o f  its graduates into its 
outsourcing business. Although the company had thirteen outsourcing contracts these 
contracts composed a tiny share o f  its business. Garuda Merah’s largest contract was for 
sixty Satpam supplied to PT. Kereta Api, the national train operator. These Satpam guarded 
Yogyakarta’s two main train stations, Tugu and Lempuyangan. Judging by the information 
1 obtained, Garuda Merah was much closer to the example o f  a successful BUJP than its
• 87competitor Total.
As described previously, Garuda Merah has a lukewarm relationship with the police, the 
business deals with the police as it must. According to its principal director: “Our relations 
[with the police] are limited to work. Not too far and not too close. If  we have a need with 
the Polda we discuss it with the Polda. Our relations are not more than work relations.” 
Like Total, Polda DIY audits Garuda Merah. Because the company was so new however, 
its first audit was yet to be done at the time o f  my interview. Like Total, Garuda Merah also 
sub-contracted the majority o f  its training to police instructors. Unlike Total the company 
did not complain o f  having to pay regular police bribes (though it must be conceded the 
company was yet to be audited, therefore it was yet to face its first real test o f  police 
avarice). The company did admit, however, that it made set payments to the police. Garuda 
Merah paid the Polda Rp. 150,000 for preparing each certificate o f  attainment for its Satpam 
graduates, a massive mark-up for a piece o f  paper. The company also admitted to setting
86 Prior to their submission for a license from the police the owners o f  Garuda Merah were required to obtain 
all the various permissions for operating a business in Indonesia, including having legal status as a company 
(PT.), Ijin Gangguan (permission from the district government), NPWP and registration with the Department 
o f  Manpower. These steps all consumed a bit over one month. Interview, Direktor Utama, October 2008.
87 Apparently the company derives only 6-8% profit from its outsourcing contracts, the reason being the 
Satpam market in Yogyakarta is overcrowded and there is severe price competition. Interview, Direktur 
Utama, October 2008.
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aside payments o f  Rp. 1-1.5 million for distinguished police guests to attend its opening and 
graduating ceremonies. Beside these payments, the company says it had a strict policy o f  
not paying any further grants to the police. This experience with bribery marks a major 
difference between Total and Garuda Merah. The former appeared to be in an extortionate 
relationship with the police while the latter claimed to make only limited, commission type 
payments. I find it difficult to explain the difference between these cases. One possibility is 
that one o f  the interviewees was not telling the whole truth. Another possibility may be that 
Garuda Merah entered the market after 2007 at a period when Polri was attempting to 
improve its standards o f  probity, whereas Total Security may be trapped in old, unchanged 
patterns o f  patronage and may be too timid to assert its objections.
In relation to its outsourcing contracts, Garuda Merah maintained communication with the 
Polsek where its Satpam worked. Thus for example Polsek Danurejan which covers the 
area o f  Stasiun Lempuyangan knew the identities o f  the com pany’s Satpam at the Station, 
while also having the contact details o f  the contractor (the PT. Kereta Api office) and 
Garuda Merah management. In addition to the exchange o f  information, the Polsek were 
also active in checking on the company’s Satpam as part o f  their duty to supervise the non­
state security elements in their territories. The company was aware o f  these visits 
happening between once a week and once a month depending on the diligence o f  the 
Polsek. As a matter o f  course I asked the director whether Garuda Merah had a relationship 
with the Indonesian military. I was informed that the company extended the same 
information on its Satpam workforce to the local Koramil as it did to the Polsek. Beyond
oothis cordiality, the company had no relationship with the TNI. Thus again we see the key 
difference between police and military behaviour in the field. The police are active in 
regulating, supervising and surveying key parts o f  the non-government security sector, 
while the military is barely noticeable.
While Garuda Merah is not as despondent about its relationship with the police as Total 
Security, it is hardly more autonomous than the other company. Both companies clearly 
need police cooperation to operate and both fall under the orbit o f  police regulation and 
supervision. The primary difference appears to be in their vulnerability to police bribery.
88 Interview, Direktor Utama, October 2008.
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Security Guards
While the BUJP are a strategic part o f  the industry, the large number o f  Satpam who sell 
their own labour to the market by far outstrips the number o f  Satpam employed by the 
commercial security companies; because o f  this, the perceptions o f  these people are an 
equally useful component in understanding the security industry in Yogyakarta. What 
emerges from the several Satpam I interviewed is that their work is menial and mostly 
uneventful. Satpam are a poorly valued part o f  the workforce. Their tasks are mostly 
preventive, involving guarding and patrols. The interesting thing about their testimony for 
this topic is what they consider o f  their relationships with the police. All o f  the Satpam 
consider themselves underneath the command o f  Polri. This does not impinge upon the 
Satpam’s loyalties to their workplaces. Rather they see themselves as an abstract extension 
o f  the police, to use the phrase o f  one Satpam, the ‘kepanjangan tangan polisi (an extension 
o f  the hand o f  the police)’. The police are a force which is above and behind the Satpam. 
My metaphor, albeit a bad one, is that o f  a subsidiary company. The subsidiary is fully 
autonomous but nevertheless operates under the influence o f  the parent company. This is 
how Satpam consider their position relative to Polri. The Satpam do not resent their inferior 
status, they in fact consider the police a valuable source o f  support. My evidence for these 
conclusions derives from interviews I conducted with six Satpam in three different 
organisations; three from Mall Malioboro, two from UGM and one from the Hotel Grand 
Mercure. 1 relate some o f  their experiences below.
The most senior Satpam I interviewed were Pak Marsito and Wahayudi, two o f  the campus 
security force for UGM. Both started work in UGM around 1985 and obtained their 
training directly from the city’s police command at that time. Both men are Satpam leaders 
and are responsible for directing other personnel in conducting patrols, guarding Satpam 
posts and regulating traffic. Each o f  them has stories o f  occasionally exciting things during 
their service. Marsito can recall a murder on campus while Wahayudi was involved in 
foiling a burglary. But most o f  their work is unsurprisingly mundane. According to Marsito
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and Wahayudi, demonstrations on campus dropped significantly since the formation o f  the 
SKKK in 2004. The worst problems they routinely face now are unruly street peddlers and 
motor vehicle accidents. According to these informants, the police are rarely needed for 
assistance. Each o f  the respondents could only nominate infrequent episodes when they 
have been forced to request the help o f  the police. Marsito recalls that every new year, 
senior high school students from the adjacent school enter the campus for fights and the 
police are called to break this up. Other contact with the police though is frequent. Police 
samapta patrols from the nearby Polsek Bulaksumur which border the UGM campus often 
drop in on the Satpam’s security posts. Beside the samapta patrols, the Polmas officers in 
the Polsek also drop by to check on them. For the last four years the UGM campus has also 
arranged for ‘representatives’ from the SKKK workforce to attend refresher training at 
Polres Sleman. Aside from these moments, there is no other contact with the police.
The Satpam have firm ideas though about what their relationship is with Polri. Marsito says 
“we always have relations with the police... indeed we are assistant police.” Wahayudin 
says “we (Satpam) are the extended hand o f  the police... we are only first police [as in 
first-aid], [we] can only detain a suspect.” When I asked the question are the police useful 
Maristo and Wahayudin’s answer were emphatic. Wahayudin claimed: “really useful... 
because they have the authority o f  law.” Interestingly, both sources claim they have no 
contact at all with local military forces.89 Thus for these Satpam police are valuable as they 
are a source o f  indispensable support. Polri has the authority to use their superior legal 
powers, such as those o f  arrest, to deal with security incidents which Satpam cannot. 
Satpam, in the eyes o f  the interviewees, only can perform a limited police response, like 
temporarily detaining a suspect. Satpam therefore have limited powers while Polri does not.
The three Satpam from Mall Malioboro more or less share similar opinions to those o f  the 
UGM Satpam. Suzaidan, Wasirudin and Marjono are three senior Satpam in Mall 
Malioboro. Suzaidan has worked for the company for fourteen years, Wasirudin for eleven 
and Marjono for at least eighteen. All o f  them have similar experiences and perceptions o f  
their work. Wasirudin and Marjono obtained Satpam certification with the assistance o f  
their employers, while Suzaidan paid Rp.250,000 o f  his own money for training conducted
89 Interview Marsito and Wahayudi, SKKK UGM , October 2008.
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at Polres Bantul. In regard to their work, the Satpam find themselves doing a routine set o f  
tasks: guarding parking spaces, observing entrances and exits and patrolling within the 
mall. The kinds o f  problems they face are minimal, both in scale and in quantity. Most o f  
the incidents they handle concern customers stealing products from the mall supermarket, 
or thefts o f  other small items like mobile phones. These incidents take place very rarely, 
“ less than once a month” according to Suzaidan. Previously, in the early nineties, the mall 
had severe problems with drunken youths engaging in theft and other illegal practices 
outside the building. The Satpam freely admit to having had to fight and beat these thugs. 
Apparently these incidents ended in the late nineties.
The interesting thing about these Satpam, however, is their attitude to the police. Like the 
Satpam from UGM, those from Mall Malioboro look favourably on their relations with 
Polri. According to Suzaidan: “Here the ones which are always around are the police. From 
morning until mid-afternoon it’s the tourist police, in the evening its personnel from the 
Polsek. And that helps us in our duties psychologically. And we feel more brave in doing 
our jobs.” Or as put by Wasirudin “ [the police] are really very useful. They are able to help 
us in our duties. Mainly in terms o f  making it smoother... from the perspective o f  the law.” 
The Satpam say that the members o f  the local army Koramil and an unnamed garrison 
occasionally drop by on vehicle patrols but the greatest share o f  their contact is with the 
police. Every day samapta patrol police, tourist police and traffic police pass by on routine 
patrols. Thus, like the UGM Satpam, those from Mall Malioboro consider the police the 
indispensable source o f  support. Like the UGM Satpam they cite the importance o f  the 
legal powers o f  the police. The ability to call upon Polri to handle a security problem -  
although they claim this rarely takes place -  functions as a force multiplier for their own 
limited array o f  powers. The police, rather than being a hindrance are actually valuable to 
these Satpam.90
My final observation on the relations o f  Satpam with the police concerns the status that the 
relationship conveys on Satpam. Although the Satpam I interview make no mention o f  this 
issue, I hypothesise that another aspect to their respect for the police is that by identifying
90 Interview, Satpam Suzaidan, Wasirudin and Marjono, October 2008.
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themselves with Polri, Satpam enhance their own self image. By projecting themselves as 
proxies o f  the police (which, under police regulation, they are), these Satpam also probably 
believe part o f  the prestige and authority o f  Polri is conveyed to them. This exchange 
probably goes some way to elevating what for Satpam is otherwise demeaning work.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the commercial security sector in Yogyakarta. We have seen 
how the providers o f  security are dependent on the police. Four o f  the five private 
companies feel they need to maintain direct relations with elements o f  Polri. The remaining 
two users o f  security services still recognise and value Polri’s superiority in the sector. 
Consumers o f  security services depend on the police for a mixture o f  reasons including 
their respect for Polri’s normative supremacy and the enhanced services they can obtain 
from the police. The providers o f  security depend on the police for a mixture o f  reasons, 
including respect for normative authority, enhanced powers in the field but most 
importantly the obligations forced on them by police regulation. Polri regulates the 
commercial providers o f  security quite fastidiously. It does this in the strongest fashion 
with BUJP. BUJP must accommodate police licensing demands and corrupt police rent- 
seeking. The Satpam on the ground recognise their dependence on police assistance and see 
themselves as extensions o f  Polri.
Following on from Barker’s research on security management in the late Suharto era, the 
strong hand o f  the state still continues to exert itself over the security sector in ways that are 
remarkably similar. Nevertheless, while Barker argued that the monitoring and supervision 
o f  society through the Bimmas arm o f  the police was an extension o f  the centralising 
tendencies o f  the Suharto regime, we must now recognise this is not the case. Rather the 
efforts o f  Polri to regulate and supervise Pam Swakarsa speak o f  a particular style o f  social 
control intensive policing. In this chapter we see how the police have applied this strategy 
to the regulation and supervision o f  the suppliers o f  commercial security.
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Beyond Indonesia studies, the analysis o f  this chapter shows the need for modifications to 
the model o f  networked security developed by researchers o f  policing. In countries like 
Indonesia, with strong traditions o f  state control over security, a networked model is a 
useful theoretical device only when seen in light o f  the hierarchical relationships which 
structure the network. We find this in the way Polri asserts dominance over the commercial 
security industry. Thus what we discover in Yogyakarta is qualitatively different from the 
theories put forward by writers in the mainstream networked security school. The police are 
more than a source o f  support or an anchor as Crawford depicts in his research. Rather, the 
internal power relationships o f  this network show clearly that the state police play a 
commanding role even in the commercial security industry.
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Chapter 6: Volunteer Security Groupings
This chapter continues the analysis o f  non-state security actors by evaluating what can be 
described as volunteer security groups. Indonesia has a long heritage o f  an assertive civil 
society accustomed to organising security collectives beyond the boundaries o f  the state. It 
is not surprising that today we can find a large number o f  volunteer civilian security groups 
in Yogyakarta. Although these security groups are constituted for different reasons they all 
share two common features: all are volunteer organisations, and police authority limits the 
autonomy o f  all o f  them. Each o f  these groups, arguably even Islamic vigilantes, recognise 
the supremacy o f  the police and feel very to slightly subordinate towards Polri. This chapter 
makes two theoretical contributions to my dissertation. First, it advances my argument by 
demonstrating that the police assume a central role even in the volunteer, non-state parts o f  
the security network. Secondly, this chapter also offers the opportunity to re-evaluate 
previous scholarly work on gangsterism and the state in Indonesia. In the early 
democratisation period state control over society weakened. One o f  the forces which was 
seen as embodying this phenomenon were quasi-criminal gangs, whose influence was seen 
to grow and expand vis-a-vis the state. Much o f  the literature on gangsters, however, only 
considered this issue from the perspective o f  the gangs. I argue this has left Indonesian 
studies to exaggerate the autonomy and power quasi-criminal groups wield. By integrating 
an analysis o f  how quasi-criminal groups relate with state law enforcement, this chapter 
indicates the influence o f  these gangs in Yogyakarta is a lot more circumscribed than 
previously thought. Thirdly this chapter also makes an important empirical contribution by 
revealing new information on the character o f  policing in Indonesia. As discussed in 
chapter five, the state police have crafted a policy o f  coopting parts o f  the non-state security 
landscape beneath their supervision. Chapter six continues this analysis.
This chapter organises volunteer security groups into three broad types. There is an inner 
cluster o f  groups which have been established with the sponsorship o f  the police and have 
little autonomy from Polri. These groups are the ronda kamling and the Community 
Oriented Policing Forums (Forum Kemitraan Kepolisian dan Masyarakat or FKPM). Like
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the providers o f  commercial security, Polri regulates and supervises these groups as its own 
‘partners.’ From this inner ring o f  dependent actors we move towards the outer parts o f  the 
network that do not have a direct connection with the police: the protection units o f  the 
village (Perlindungan Masyarakat or Linmas) and the militias o f  political parties (Satgas 
partai). These security groups have been established by parent organisations which are 
independent o f  the police, the village governments and political parties. Although the 
Linmas and the Satgas are loyal to different parent organisations, these groups concede they 
must defer to formal police authority in order to discharge their activities. Lastly, there is 
also a fringe layer o f  groups consisting o f  Yogyakarta’s Islamic vigilantes. These groups 
have a fractious relationship with the police. While challenging police superiority they 
nevertheless seek police support to legitimate their activities. For ease o f  understanding we 
can conceive o f  this volunteer section o f  the security network as appearing like a mandala; 
with police influence radiating outwards and strongly impinging the autonomy o f  some 
groups while lightly affecting the autonomy o f  others. The formula o f  analysis applied to 
each volunteer security group in this chapter is to describe the organisation, analyse its 
activities and review its external relations.
The common element in the relationship o f  volunteer security groups with the police is that 
all o f  these groups recognise the normative legal supremacy o f  Polri. This supremacy 
confers an obligation on them to engage the police. For ronda and FKPM, the obligation to 
engage the police is attractive, since it creates relationships in which they can access police 
powers. For the Satgas, the obligation to engage the police is onerous and confers little 
benefit, but it is an unavoidable responsibility. The fractious vigilantes perform activities 
which deliberately set them in conflict with the police. Even so, the vigilantes also 
recognise the danger o f  out-right conflict with Polri. As a matter o f  pragmatism they seek to 
engage parts o f  the police apparatus and moderate their behaviour in order to propitiate the 
police. Arguably, these behaviours indicate an indirect recognition o f  police superiority. 
Fundamentally, what this chapter shows is that Polri is still the centre o f  the security 
network, even in the part o f  the sector in which we would expect to see the highest degree 
o f  autonomy.
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As a final note with regard to the discussion o f  the Satgas, while party militias in 
Yogyakarta seem largely benign today, they have a dark past. Historically Yogyakarta was 
plagued by violence between the various formal and informal security groups which 
clustered around political parties. The worst o f  these groups were the political youth 
movements (laskar pemuda) o f  the parties PDIP and PPP. Although the once violent 
behaviour o f  these youth movements has now moderated, given the power o f  Yogyakarta’s 
political gangs in the early reformasi period a special section is devoted to these groups and 
their demise. We begin however with a review o f  the previous works on volunteer security 
from the Indonesian studies literature, and then move on to look at the groups themselves.
Private Security, Private Violence and the Literature from Indonesia:
There has been a long tradition o f  debate about private sources o f  violence and security in 
Indonesia. In the words o f  Kristiansen and Trijono: “there are long and dark traditions o f  
indistinct and rival policing and criminal justice systems in Indonesia.” 1 While numerous 
authors elucidate how society and the state interacted in the security field during the New
9 • • » * .Order period, o f  most interest to this research is the period after reformasi. There is a 
strong perception emanating from the scholarly literature that private sources o f  authority 
under various guises - organised criminal gangs {preman) or self-organised societal security 
groups (such as the pam swakarsa groups in Bali and Lombok) or religious vigilantes (like 
the Front Pembela Islam, FPI or Islamic Defenders Front among others) - have flourished 
under the loosened state controls o f  the post-reformasi era. Arguably this branch o f  research 
has fostered a strong impression that state control over public law and order has diminished 
in favour o f  civilian expressions o f  security.
1 Kristiansen and Trijono, ‘Local Government Reforms and Security Systems in Indonesia’, 252.
2 See for example: Barker, ‘Containing the Criminal Contagion.’ D.Bourchier, "Crime, Law and State 
Authority in Indonesia". In: State and Civil Society in Indonesia (1990). Robert Cribb, Gangsters and 
Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-49 (Honolulu: University 
o f  Hawaii Press, 1991). Tim Lindsey, ‘From Soepomo to Prabowo: Law, Violence and Corruption in the 
Preman State.’ In: Violent Conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, Representation and Resolution, (ed.) Charles A. 
Coppel (New York: Routledge, 2006).
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The best articulation o f  the argument for the influence o f  private security groups within 
post-Suharto society comes from lan Wilson. As I noted in the introduction, Wilson has 
reviewed several sources o f  private security in the post-reformasi era, among them the 
security militias o f  political parties, ethnic gangs (notably the Front Betawi Brotherhood in 
Jakarta) and religious vigilantes (like the FPI). W ilson’s conclusion is that:
The proliferation of paramilitary and vigilante groups post-1998 represents a 
manifestation of the decentralization of violence as a political, social, and economic 
strategy, with the state losing control as its sole formal source and patron. If we define 
the state in Weber’s terms, as the entity with a territorial monopoly over “legitimate 
violence,” then these other groups present a major challenge to restoring public 
confidence in state institutions and the judicial system.3
Key to Wilson’s argument therefore is that the existence (and claims to legitimacy) o f  other 
security entities not constituted from a basis within the state undermines the state monopoly 
o f  violence. Wilson is not the only scholar to have documented this phenomenon. In his 
work on Pemuda Pancasila, Loren Ryter was among the first Indonesia scholars to 
document the emergence o f  a new post-Suharto era gangster, capable o f  negotiating 
shifting alliances with different political forces in the turbulence o f  reformasi.4 His work 
has been followed by that o f  Stein Kristiansen who charted the expansion o f  paramilitary 
pam swakarsa groups in Lombok and political youth gangs in Yogyakarta.3 The ICG has 
provided other research on private security groupings in Bali and Lombok, while Ryter and 
Wilson have each published similarly themed but separate research at different times.6
A key component missing from this research on non-state security in Indonesia is an 
understanding o f  how the powers o f  the state influence civilian security groups. Arguably 
there has been a pronounced tendency on the part o f  scholars in Indonesian studies to 
accept the existence o f  preman and other groups constitutes an a priori challenge to state 
rule, but not to interrogate how state rule challenges or impacts the way preman groups 
conceive o f  themselves. In Yogyakarta, I find the leaderships o f  these groups view state 
authority (as exercised through the police) as being normatively and practically greater than
3 Wilson, ‘Changing Contours o f  Violence’, 292.
4 Ryter, ‘Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Freemen o f  Suharto’s Order?’ (2001), 153-155.
5 Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia’ (2003).
6 See: ICG, ‘The Perils o f  Private Security in Indonesia’, (2003). Ryter, ‘Reformasi Gangsters’ (2005) and 
Wilson, ‘The Rise and Fall o f  a Gangster’, (2008).
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their own. Fear and respect o f  the police as well as the pragmatic calculation that police 
powers enhance the capabilities o f  volunteer security groups, pushes these groups (even the 
quasi-criminal ones) to seek relations with Polri. In this environment, we can hardly 
conceive o f  the state police as having an equal or horizontal relationship with private 
sources o f  security, or as Wilson puts it, violence having been ‘democratised.’ Instead there 
is a relationship o f  dominance and subordination between the police and volunteer security 
elements, where Polri clearly has a commanding influence over and limits the autonomy of, 
volunteer security elements.
Under the Wings o f  the Police: the Inner Ring o f  Groups With Close Relations to Polri (the 
Ronda and FKPM)
Ronda Siskamling (the [local] environment security system patrol])
The ronda siskamling is the traditional form o f  policing in Indonesia and still constitutes 
the most basic unit o f  community security. Before the formation o f  the first modem 
policing forces during Dutch colonial times, traditional Indonesian society practiced village 
or kampung security, in which groups o f  residents would patrol and protect their own 
kampungs.7 This practice o f  volunteer, community-based patrolling is still the basic 
philosophy behind the modern ronda. Today, however, the state police have subsumed this 
traditional form o f  security beneath their own supervision.8 This process began in the 
nineteen eighties and has been continued since that period.
To understand the ronda siskamling it is necessary first to understand the hierarchy o f  
Indonesian government at the micro level and where the ronda fits within this system. I 
make the following analysis on the basis o f  my field observations.9 In my case study site
7 Kristiansen and Trijono, ‘Local Reforms and Security Systems’, 238.
x Barker, ‘Containing the Criminal Contagion’, 13.
9 For a dated analysis o f  the Rukun Tetangga, Rukun Warga system see: Martha G. Logsdon, ‘Neighbourhood 
Organization in Jakarta.’ Indonesia, Vol. 18 (Oct. 1974).
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the ronda operates at the lowest level o f  the civil administration, the Rukun Tetangga 
(neighbourhood association or RT). An RT is a residential neighbourhood that consists o f  
perhaps 100-200 people, though there is great variation in the size o f  RT. The RT is the 
basic unit in Indonesian society for organising communal activities. The RT does such 
things as cleaning the neighbourhood and arranging the ronda. The RT also discharges 
some important official bureaucratic functions like validating official documents such as 
the ubiquitous Indonesian national identity card, the KTP. Above the RT is the RW (or 
Rukun Warga, the citizen’s association). The RW is ostensibly a forum for meetings o f  
heads o f  the RT to organise social activities on a grander scale.10 Above the RW is the 
Dusun (or sometimes an intermediary level the Dukuh in very rural areas). The head o f  the 
Dusun is a volunteer who discharges similar bureaucratic and social organization tasks as 
the heads o f  the RW and RT, but on a grander scale again. Dusun are responsible to chiefs 
o f  the village (or Kepala Desa). Under Indonesian law, village governments are given the 
responsibility o f  determining the structure and functions o f  the various tiers o f  
administration which exist below the village.11 Given that villages have status in national
law and the RT, RW, Dukuh, and Dusun do not, if  an arbitrary line had to be drawn
• 12between state and society, the line would be drawn at the village.
The village is the first tier o f  administration which can be labelled a type o f  government. 
The village in Indonesia has significant legal autonomy for administering communal assets 
(such as schools and health centres), and has its own revenue generating capacities.13 The 
citizens o f  the village elect their own chief and have a type o f  little parliament. This 
parliament is today referred to as the Badan Permusyawaratan Desa (or Village 
Consultative Body).14 Above the village is the kecamatan (sub-district) which represents
10 To give a brief idea o f  the size o f  an RW, I visited one very urbanised RW in the city o f  Yogyakarta in the 
sub-district o f  Gedong Tengan which consisted 729 residents split up fairly evenly among five individual RT.
11 Republik Indonesia: Peraturan Pemerintah N o.72/2005 tentang Desa, Penjelasan, Umum, Ayat 5.
12 However, given the RT, RW, Dusun and other organisations discharge pseudo-official functions (such as 
document verification) it is difficult to determine precisely when the formal state ends and society begins, all 
arguably merge within Indonesia’s system o f  governance.
13 In my area o f  Java village revenue often comes from the administration o f  village land. For current legal 
status o f  the village and its powers see: PP No.72/2005.
14 There is great variation in the size o f  individual villages depending on whether the village is in an urban, 
rural or intermediate area. I lived for two years in a sub-district in Sleman (Depok) with a population o f
118,000 people split up among three villages. I visited another Kecamatan (Pandak) in a rural part o f  Bantul 
which had one village, Catorharjo, with a population o f  12,000. Website Kabupaten Sleman: Profil 
Kecamatan Depok. Accessable from: <http://www.slemankab .go.id/?hal=detail kecamatan.php&
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the kabupaten, though under Indonesian law the village constitutes an independent 
government unit and is not upwardly accountable to the district.15 Though the village is 
very important in Indonesian society it is beyond the task o f  this dissertation to analyse the 
village beyond its limited role in security.
To analyse the activities and organisation o f  the ronda, I selected five RT in different parts 
o f  Yogyakarta and interviewed local citizens who participated in it.16 Two o f  my ronda 
case-studies were located in a heavily urbanised village or kelurahan o f  Yogyakarta city. 
Two other ronda were located in a peri-urban or kampung village in Sleman and another
• • 17interviewee lived in a rural, agricultural hamlet in Bantul.
There are strong commonalities between each o f  these case studies regarding the activities 
o f  the ronda. In each ronda participation is voluntary. The head o f  the RT oversees a duty 
list o f  ronda volunteers, posted on the pos kamling (kamling post, which serves as the ronda 
meeting point and usually comes in the form o f  a little hut).18 When I asked informants to 
nominate problems with the system, respondents in two o f  the ronda from Yogyakarta city 
suggested their biggest concern was encouraging participants as “sometimes only one or 
two people come.” 19 Other ronda members in Sleman and Bantul claim there are not any
• • 90difficulties in obtaining eleven or twelve participants per night in their RTs. In two o f  the
kecamatan=Depok.>, last accessed 31 August 2009. Interview, AIPTU Sarjono and AIPTU Subiantoro, 
October 2008.
l5However the head o f  the village is required to submit accountability reports to the head o f  the district. PP 
72/2005, Pasal 15, Ayat 2 and Penjelasan PP 72/2005, Umum, Ayat 5.
16 As background information, in 2007 the Poltabes listed there were 862 active ronda siskamling patrols and 
313 “passive” or non-active patrols in Yogyakarta city. Polres Sleman in 2007 listed 2989 ronda siskamling. 
In Bantul there were in 2007, 1768 active ronda and 621 non-active. For references see: Interview, Bagian 
Binamitra Poltabes Yogyakarta, July 2007 . Polres Sleman, Bagian Binamitra, Daftar Pos Kamling 
(September 2007). Interview Brigadir Polisi Kepala Munadi and Brigadir Polisi Dua Enik, Staff officers in 
Bagian Binamitra Polres Bantul, 27 August 2008.
17 My ch ief informant in Bantul was also the head o f  his Dusun. I interviewed this person in his dual capacity 
as a member o f  his village’s FKPM and as a participant in his community’s ronda patrol. The other ronda 
informants were: Pak Supamo and Pak Sugianto, RT.14 and Pak Ismail RT.12, RW03, Kelurahan 
Pringgokusuman, Kecamatan Gedongtengen, City o f  Yogyakarta. From the kabupaten o f  Sleman: Pak 
Samarin, RT05-06 (and unnamed colleagues), RW03 and Pak Suhardi RT04, RW07, Desa Sidokarto, 
Kecamatan Godean. From Bantul: Pak Suparno, Kepala Dusun Gesikan IV (RT 05,06,07), Desa Wijirejo, 
Kecamatan Pandak. 10 and 11 October 2008.
IS As an incentive, each household in the RT makes a compulsory contribution o f  around Rp.100 every night 
and ronda participants take somewhere around Rp7000-9000 (US$ 0.80) per turn. This was the case in all but 
one o f  the RT, RT05-06 from Sleman, where no money was donated.
19 Interview, Suparno and Sugianto, RT.14, 2008. Also: Interview, Ismail, RT.12, 2008.
20 Interview, Suparno, Dusun Gesikan, 2008. Also: Interview, Samarin, RT05-06, 2008.
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case studies, participants claimed their ronda had an additional emergency function, to 
carry sick residents to hospital. Interviewees in two other cases did not mention that issue at 
all and another claimed the purpose o f  their ronda was “purely security.” All interviewees 
agreed that the ronda’s primary purpose is preventative security. This takes the form o f  
ronda volunteers meeting o f  an evening to patrol their RT. Each o f  the ronda case studies 
meet at different times.21 Although these kamling occasionally patrol the boundaries o f  
their RT, based on my observation, much o f  their time is spent chatting in the ubiquitous 
pos kamling. The ronda are entitled to stop visitors or unknown persons who wish to enter 
the RT and verify their intentions. This practice in theory is to prevent thieves or 
undesirables from entering the RT during the middle o f  the night.
Each o f  the ronda informants claims their RT deals with very little if  any crime. We need to 
treat this evidence somewhat cautiously, however, given we can expect few people to 
willingly cast aspersions on the reputation o f  their neighbourhood. With this caveat in 
mind, each informant reported their ronda faced very few problems. One o f  the RT in the 
city o f  Yogyakarta, for example, describes their main concern as drunken people walking 
the main street to the north o f  the RT during weekend evenings. Even this situation was
99 • •encountered “not often.” The interviewee from Bantul reported that the only problem his 
ronda ever experienced was catching teenagers stealing flowers from the gardens o f  the 
RT’s residents, but the incident was resolved “ informally” (secara kekeluargaan or within 
the family).23 None o f  the other informants claim to have dealt with any crime at all, often 
saying “during my time there has never been any [crime].” According to the interviewees 
then, the ronda is almost exclusively about anticipating hypothetical threats.
Concerning external relations, ronda participants have an on-going relationship with the 
police while other local security groups like the Linmas and the army do not feature in 
ronda activities at all. Among my informants there was almost unanimity o f  opinion on the 
police. When I asked the interviewees the question, ‘are the police useful for you?’, their
21 In Desa Sidokarto Sleman, one o f  the RT meets at 12:00-3:00am, the other from 12:00-2:00am. In the city 
o f  Yogyakarta, the two RT meet from 11pm to 3am and 11pm to 1,30am while the Bantul RT meets at 10pm 
to 12  midnight.
22 Interview, Ismail, RT.12, 2008.
23 Interview, Suparno, Dusun Gesikan, 2008.
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responses gave different reasons for police value, but all interviewees agreed that the police 
were important for their ronda. One interviewee implied that relations with the police 
positioned the ronda close to the only source o f  authority in local security affairs:
yes they [police] are useful, obviously because they are the ones with authority [in 
security] -  but they’re happy too [with the existence of the kamling] because there are 
people who pay attention [to local security].24
Another respondent emphasised the fact that the police were important for supervising the 
ronda: “yes indeed, it’s the police who supervise us [mengasuh] -  indeed tha t’s their jo b .” 
Another interviewee, Suparno, argued that the ronda system provided the community with 
direct access to the police. With direct access Suparno believes there is a mutually 
beneficial transfer o f  knowledge:
for polmas officers, they are really helpful for the community. Thus the community 
knows the role of the police and the police know the activities of the community. 
Therefore we support each other.26
Common to all the informants then, was the belief that the police are normatively 
responsible for supervising the ronda and that this relationship was important to them.
As Barker pointed out in the early nineties, the police exercise their authority over the 
ronda in two ways, issuing regulations and Polmas officers providing supervision in the 
field. The police regulations on ronda siskamling that are effective today date from 1993,
• • • • 27though Polri actually began to impose itself over the ronda in the nineteen eighties. Police 
regulations on the ronda show a similar streak o f  pedantry and officiousness as police 
regulations over the commercial security industry.28 If we care to consult the police
24 Interview, Samarin RT 05-06, 2008.
2:1 Interview, Suhadi RT04, 2008.
26 Interview, Suparno, Dusun Gesikan, 2008.
27 Barker, ‘State o f  Fear’, 9. See also: See: Surat Keputusan Menhankam/Pangab Nomor: SKEP 618/V /l 981 
tanggal 25 Mei 1981 tentang Sistem Keamanan Swakarsa.
s One section is devoted to how the ronda is to make different drumbeats when sounding the kentongan. The 
kentongan is a traditional type o f  warning device found in every pos kamling, made o f  hollowed wood and 
beaten with a stick. Apparently there are different types o f  drumbeats for different emergencies, like fires, 
robberies, traffic accidents and even murder. Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Markas Besar 
Kepolisian: Petunjuk Lapangan No.Pol Juklap/207/IV/1993 tentang Pembinaan Pos Kamling. Bab. III. 
Pembinaan Pos Kamling.
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doctrine, there are specific requirements regarding the number o f  members a ronda should 
have, the size o f  the pos kamling, the equipment (including the exact size and colour o f  the 
sash ronda members are supposed to wear) and other trivialities. Based on participant 
observation, few o f  these regulations are actually followed in practice. Quite aside from the 
question o f  how explicitly Polri’s supervisory ambitions are realised the most important 
attribute o f  this system is that the police have a legal claim to supervise the ronda, and this 
claim is respected and acknowledged by those who participate in the ronda system.
The other method o f  police control over the ronda is direct visits by Polmas officers; these 
occur infrequently but embody police dominance. In the five ronda I examined there was 
extreme variation in the amount o f  contact each RT had with its Polmas officers. In one 
case there was variation even in the same neighbourhood. In RT.14, RW03 in Yogyakarta 
city, the interviewees received visits by police only once every three or so months. Usually 
these visits only fulfil the purpose o f  asking the ronda “aman atau tidak' (safe or not) or 
otherwise showing the police face.29 By contrast, the neighbouring RT.12 which is located
• • 'mon a main thoroughfare gets visits by a Polmas officer once every week. In RT.05-06 in 
Sleman, respondents there claimed the Polmas drops by “often” usually only for the 
purpose o f  asking: “ is it safe or not? If it is safe he’s not long here, he goes and that’s it.” In 
the neighbouring RT.04, this ronda is apparently never visited by a Polmas -  the reason 
being that the pos kamling hut is visible from a main thoroughfare. Whenever the police 
patrol passes through they merely slow down and beep their horn. Apparently the informant 
there does not mind, he is on first name terms with the Polmas officer allocated to his 
village and sees him in weekly village meetings.31 In Dusun Gesikan in Bantul, the 
informant claims that in his RT either the Polmas or the Kapolsek visits his neighbourhood 
at least twice a week.32 The purpose o f  these visits is not elaborate, but appears mostly to 
function for ‘showing the police face’ and remaining in direct contact with the community. 
Quite aside from the positive effects for police-community relations, these direct visits also 
act as a constant reminder o f  the normative authority o f  the police.
29 Interview, Suparno and Sugianto RT.14, 2008.
0 Interview, Ismail RT.12, 2008.
1 In fact the informant takes this as a badge o f  pride, believing it shows the police have confidence in the 
capability o f  his ronda. Interview, Suhardi RT.04, 2008.
32 Interview, Suparno, Dusun Gesikan, 2008.
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The critical point about the power imbalance between the ronda and the police is that my 
interviewees did not object to their subordinate position. In fact, they value their relations 
with Polri. The reason is more or less the same as why Satpam value their relations with 
Polri. Ronda members see the police as having powers the ronda does not - to legally 
handle crime. In the words o f  Ismail from RW03, Yogyakarta city: “ We prioritise the RW, 
but for problems outside their capabilities our hopes go to the Pak Babin...  with alacrity the 
Polsek comes [if needed] because our relations are close.” By the same token however, 
when I asked each o f  the informants whether their ronda had any contact with their local 
Koramil or their village Linmas all o f  the respondents answered negatively. The only 
informant to expand slightly on this point was the Dusun head from Bantul, Suparno, who 
explained:
The Linmas’s task is securing activities which are held by the village. Like yesterday 
there was a ceremony for readying the Linmas in anticipation of the 2009 elections.
But with activities regarding the ronda, we cooperate with the Babinkamtibmas only 
[another term for Polmas officer] ...the Koramil is active [in response to the question 
of the interviewer: is the Koramil active in supporting the ronda?]...they are active in 
giving ‘socialisation’...mainly about government programs which are linked with 
security.
I include this quotation to give an idea just how powerful the police are in delivering direct 
security to Indonesian society. Despite the existence o f  other state security entities, even at 
this micro-level, their involvement in security provision pales in comparison to the police. 
The police appear as virtually the only active representative o f  the state that has the 
authority to enforce security. Other elements like the military and the Linmas are reduced 
to the role o f ‘giving advice’ or providing only occasional physical security services. These 
roles are marginal in comparison to what can be performed by the police.
Thus we can infer that the ronda is subordinate to the police. This situation is not merely 
because Polri takes upon itself the task o f  regulating and supervising the kamling. This 
situation is also brought about because ronda participants conceive o f  the ronda as being 
dependent upon Polri. Such relations are beneficial. They enhance the capabilities o f  the 
ronda while enabling the police to further the social control objectives o f  their security
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strategy. The police-ronda relationship hardly illustrates the horizontal, mutually inter­
dependent security network favoured by most scholars o f  networked security.
Forum Kemitraan Polisi dan Masyarakat (Community Oriented Policing Forums)
While the ronda are Indonesia’s traditional form o f  police, after 2006 Polri created a new 
security group as part o f  its effort to engage civil society. These are the FKPM. The FKPM 
share a fundamental similarity with the ronda in that both fall beneath the umbrella o f  
police supervision. However, the existence o f  the FKPM shows Polri’s capacity to adapt 
and broaden its strategy o f  coopting non-state centres o f  security. The purpose o f  the 
FKPM is to resolve local conflicts. Participants in the FKPM project share similarities with 
the participants in the ronda. Like the ronda, FKPM groupings consist o f  volunteers. Also 
like the ronda, members o f  the FKPM value relationships with the police and normatively 
recognise the superiority o f  Polri over their organisations.
The FKPM project is one o f  the few externally visible changes that Polri has made as part 
o f  its internal reform process. Polri released the FKPM policy in 2005 for implementation 
over the period 2006-2009.33 This policy constitutes the product o f  several years o f  trial 
programs in various parts o f  Indonesia.34 The Community Oriented Policing Strategy (or 
COP) has been praised by international donors as presenting a new face o f  Polri to the 
Indonesian community.33 This is true but it also masks the fact the Polri’s COP delivers 
only modest change and involves little extra reform effort on the part o f  police. The greatest 
change attendant with this policy is that police headquarters has expanded the number o f  
Babinkamtibmas/Polmas officers on the ground. The basic premise o f  the COP policy is to 
create a new point o f  contact for the police and the community, in which the two parties can
33 SKEP Kapolri No.Pol.: SKEP/737/X/2005 tentang Kebijakan dan Strategi Penerapan Model Perpolisian 
Masyarakat Dalam Penyelenggaraan Tugas Polri (October 2005).
4 In fact one o f the first places in which Polri trialled this strategy was in Yogyakarta in 2002. ‘Community 
helps police improve image’, Jakarta Post, 5 July 2003.
5 Website: Gallup. ‘After Reforms, Indonesia’s Police Improve Reputation’, 17 November 2007. Accessed 
from: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/102724/after-reforms-indonesias-police-improve-reputation.aspx> . Last 
accessed: 24 November 2009.
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discuss local security problems.36 The police COP policy document is full o f  lofty rhetoric 
and long winded abstractions, and it is difficult to extract from it a clear idea o f  how Polri 
intends to apply its policy in practice. It was only after I began interviewing participants on 
the ground that I learned basic facts about how Polri practices community oriented policing.
In essence the Community Oriented Policing strategy in Indonesia amounts to the 
establishment o f  new meeting forums at the micro-level o f  society, in the village in 
particular. Each forum is composed o f  representatives from the local community who meet 
to resolve security problems, like domestic violence or theft. According to my research, the 
police choose FKPM community representatives from leaders o f  neighbourhood 
associations (i.e Kepala Dusun or Kepala RW). Each FKPM is allocated a Polmas officer 
from its local Polsek. This Polmas officer provides a point o f  contact between the police 
and the FKPM and provides the community-police forum with access to Polri’s authority. 
The Polmas officer is also responsible for legitimising resolutions between disputing parties 
which are mediated within the FKPM. Thus the Polmas officer plays a strategic role by 
adding to the FKPM the normative, legal authority o f  the police. From 2007 Polri began 
rolling out this project with the intention o f  creating an FKPM in every village in 
Indonesia. Polda DIY has been dilatory in implementing the Mabes Polri template. The 
Biro Binamitra explained that, due to difficulties in administrative preparation the Polda 
started promoting (mensosialisasikan) the initiative one year later than called for in the 
Mabes Polri grand plan.38 By May 2007, Polda DIY had succeeded in creating 198 o f  the 
438 community-police forums that had been planned for the year.39 As a result the FKPM I 
researched all had existed for less than one year.
To describe how community policing forums operate I sampled three FKPM from very 
different environments in Yogyakarta. The first o f  my case studies was located in a highly 
urbanised neighbourhood in Yogyakarta city. This FKPM was established in April 2007
’6 Mabes Polri: Lampiran Surat Keputusan Kapolri: SKEP/737/X/2005, Kebijakan dan Strategi Penerapan 
Model Perpolisian Masyarakat dalam Penyelenggaraan Tugas Polri (13 October 2005), Bab II 2(C), p.6.
'7 There are essentially two types o f  FKPM -  wilayah (residential area) and kawasan (commercial zone). 
FKPM wilayah in Yogyakarta are established on the boundaries o f  a village. Polseks take the initiative in 
establishing FKPM kawasan. The Polsek will select a commercial area -  such as a train station or shopping 
district -  which would benefit from the creation o f  an FKPM.
’8 Polda DIY, Evaluasi Sosialisasi Perpolisian Masyarakat (Polmas) Polda DIY (May 2007).
39 Polda DIY, Implimentasi Perpolisian Masyarakat (Polmas) Polda DIY (May 2007).
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and set up on the boundaries o f  an RW rather than a village.40 Organisational identity and 
titulary positions were taken very seriously by the leadership o f  this forum.41 The second 
case study -  Stasiun Lempuyangan -  is an community-police forum established for a 
commercial district, rather than a residential neighbourhood. In this instance the FK PM ’s 
territory was an economy class train station in Yogyakarta city. Polsek Danurejan created 
FKPM Stasiun Lempuyangan in September 2007.42 The membership o f  this forum was 
drawn largely from the commercial guilds (or pagubuyan) which trade around the station, 
such as the taxi drivers, street stall holders, and motorcycle taxi drivers (tukang ojek). The 
pagubuyan supply their leaders as the day-to-day managers o f  the forum, but virtually 
everyone who trades around the station is considered a member o f  FKPM Lempuyangan.43 
The final case study is from the village o f  Wijirejo in Kecamatan Pandak, in the agrarian 
countryside o f  Bantul. The FKPM had only been in operation for six months at the time o f  
my interview. As a matter o f  practicality in these rural areas the police draw the 
membership o f  the FKPM by nominating the chief o f  each Dusun (and one or two others 
from every Dusun) to lead the community-police forums.44 While each o f  my FKPM case 
studies have different characteristics, there is a remarkable similarity in their approach to 
conflict resolution and in their attitudes to the police.
As mentioned previously, the most powerful attribute o f  the FKPM is its capacity to 
become a platform to negotiate the micro-social problems o f  interest to its participants. The 
ingeniousness o f  the system is its simplicity. Through such forums ordinary citizens gain
40 Although Polri doctrine dictates that one FKPM should cover an entire village/kelurahan area, the RWs o f  
this area (Kelurahan Pringgokusuman) initially decided they were not ready to contribute collectively to such 
a grouping. Instead the FKPM was built on the foundations o f  the best organised and most active RW (RW03 
in Kelurahan Pringgokusuman, Kecamatan Gedong Tengan) to be a special sample for the others. The 
leadership o f  this FKPM was transferred from the security committee o f  the RW. Interview with Ketua FKPM 
Jlagran, RW03 Sutiono and Sekretaris Setiyana 17 June 2008.
41 When I was met by the leadership o f  this organisation in their RW building, the seven or so people 
attending our interview greeted me in their RW03 uniforms. They showed me an immaculately kept series o f  
records for their forum, from meeting minutes to membership cards to an incident log. All o f  this showed an 
impressive commitment to the activities o f  the group.
42 Interview Ketua FKPM Stasiun Lempuyangan Haryanto and Wakil Ketua Heri, 17 June 2008.
43 At the time o f  my interview around 600 or more people formally joined this FKPM. The people who live in 
the residential areas around the FKPM also participate in the forum and provide one o f  their own residents as 
the chairman. FKPM Lempuyangan (Document), Daftar Anggota (as at June 2008).
44 There was some disagreement among interviewees on when the FKPM was established. The interviewee 
from the FKPM, Pak Suparno, claimed that the Wijirejo village FKPM had existed for the last three years, but
I find this claim improbable. Instead I refer to the opinion o f  the Polsek’s Polmas officers, who claimed the 
FKPM had existed for only six months. The nominal head o f  the FKPM is the head o f  the village. Interview, 
Suparno Kepala Dusun Gresikan, 2008. Interview, Polmas officers Sarjono and Subiantoro, October 2008.
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continuous, direct access to a single Polmas officer. This officer can take up the concerns o f  
local citizens and legally handle an alleged instance o f  crime. The Polmas officer can also 
act as an impartial witness to negotiations between disputing parties and thus, in the eyes o f  
the FKPM, add normative legal weight to the FK PM ’s dispute resolution. In a society like 
Indonesia which does not have a reliable 911 emergency call system, the direct access to 
members o f  the police provided through the FKPM is a valuable asset for local 
communities.
O f  the three case studies, Bantul has the most systematised procedure for dealing with 
security problems through the FKPM; Polmas officers perform a critical role in this 
process. Although the Forum in the Bantul case study meets routinely every three months, 
when a problem occurs within a Dusun o f  Wijirejo village, the Dusun’s representative on 
the FKPM is involved and seeks to bring the victim and the perpetrator together. For purely 
criminal cases (tindak pidana umum) like violent crime with a weapon, the police stress 
they cannot allow the FKPM to resolve the case. The FKPM can deal with small cases 
{kasus ringan) like domestic violence, extra-marital affairs or theft. According to the police 
90% o f  the problems referred to the FKPM are resolved by negotiation (secara 
musyawarah).^ For example, the one and only case that my informant, a representative o f  
Dusun Gesikan, has dealt with, involved children stealing flowers from the gardens o f  his 
neighbours. In this instance the children and the victims were brought together for a 
discussion and the children signed an agreement (surat kesepakatan). The children admitted 
to the crime and agreed not to repeat the act. The victims signed that they would not take 
further action. The agreement was witnessed and under-signed by the Dusun’s FKPM 
representatives and by the Polmas o fficer.46 The police performed the role o f  an impartial 
witness to the resolution. In essence the police used their legal authority to legitimate the 
negotiation. The community apparently values these services. My informant said: “before 
that institution [the FKPM] existed, we didn’t have a process for resolving a problem. After 
the existence o f  the FKPM, we can bridge a problem through a consensual agreement
45 Interview, Polmas officers Sarjono and Subiantoro, October 2008.
46 On another occasion the Polmas officers o f  Kecamatan Pandak (the Polsek which covers Wijirejo village) 
showed me numerous copies o f  official agreements from other villages that had been negotiated through their 
FKPMs. One example shown to me was a case o f  underage theft. Interview, Sarjono and Subiantoro Polmas 
officers, October 2008.
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[musyawarah mufakat\,”47 Although the formal agreement documents are a policy only o f  
Polres Bantul, the negotiation functions o f  the FKPM are much the same in the other two 
cases.
FKPM RW03 in Yogyakarta city performs much the same dispute resolution functions as 
its counterpart in Bantul. Although in some instances this community-police forum uses a 
similar letter o f  agreement as used in Bantul, this is done on the initiative o f  the RW and 
not as policy o f  the police. In most instances it is sufficient to note an event in the FKPM ’s 
log book. If two sides to a dispute reach an agreement verbally, it is noted in the FKPM log 
and the Polmas signs the log to demonstrate the issue is resolved. The secretary o f  RW03 
describes the function o f  the Polmas in these cases as a “ strong (credible) witness” (saksi 
berat). The FKPM meets once a month to discuss general matters o f  neighbourhood 
security, but responds to specific problems as they arise. Looking at their log o f  events, the 
FKPM was involved in twelve incidents between August 2007 and June 2008, ranging 
from traffic accidents, two cases o f  adultery, to a mentally ill man who attacked a house 
wife. The Polmas officer noted and signed off  on the FK P M ’s response to each o f  these 
events. The informants view the police as useful primarily because the police are capable o f  
taking official responsibility for these disturbances:
for the polmas who is here, indeed [his presence] is very helpful for the community... if  
there are problems they are able to be lifted to the head o f  the RW all at once with the 
polmas. Thus the polmas later will give a report and he will be responsible.49
The answer o f  this FKPM informant bears an interesting resemblance to the opinions o f  the 
Satpam and ronda interviewees. The above interviewee from FKPM RW03 believes the 
forum provides his community with access to police law enforcement powers. Access to 
such powers is seen as acting as a force multiplier for the FKPM.
The FKPM o f  Lempuyangan railway station, however, faces a different set o f  problems and 
has a different relationship with the police as well. The most important set o f  functions for 
this grouping is dealing with eruptions o f  conflict between the transport workers who
47 Interview, Suparno Dusun Gesikan, 2008.
48 Baku Laporan Kejadian Polmas RW03, Kelurahan Pringgokusuman.
49 Interview, Setiyana and Sutiono, October 2008 and 8 July 2008.
278
compete for business outside the station. In dealing with this kind o f  conflict, the FKPM 
relies solely upon informal negotiations between the sides to a dispute. In these instances 
the community-police forum acts as a facilitator and a guarantor o f  agreements. 
Respondents describe the police as only having a back-up role.50 During its year o f  
existence (at the time o f  my interviews) the FKPM had dealt with only a handful o f  
problems. According to their Log o f  Events, FKPM Lempuyangan had dealt with one case 
o f  fraud in December 2007,31 one case o f  a disagreement between two passengers in 
February 2008, ~ and one case o f  a stolen scooter in May 2008. It seems that this FKPM 
takes an approach o f  separating cases that have an element o f  criminality from those which 
are matters o f  social conflict, referring the former to the police and taking responsibility for 
the latter itself. In this regard, the Polmas for Lempuyangan has the most tenuous 
relationship with the FKPM o f  any o f  the three cases. Informants consider his assistance to 
be beneficial but their relationship with the police is clearly more limited than in the other 
examples.34 As to why this is the case, I speculate that through their paguyuban, the 
respective transport workers and other traders around this train station already have a 
representative system that can guarantee and legitimate negotiations between disputing 
sides. The legitimating powers o f  the Polmas are therefore redundant, and the police’s role 
within the FKPM is largely one o f  emergency support.
The FKPM case studies from Yogyakarta demonstrate two things. The police strategy o f  
supervising and regulating non-state security groups, a phenomenon Barker revealed in the 
nineteen nineties, continues today. In fact Polri has expanded the policy by inventing 
FKPM groupings at the micro-social level, which directly draw upon police authority for 
their existence. Secondly, the FKPM provides another illustration o f  the centrality o f  Polri 
in the security network. Within the relationship between Polri and community-police 
forums, the police are in a clear position o f  superiority. Although police superiority is born 
o f  the fact that Polri regulates and initiates the FKPM, the superiority is sustained because
50 Interview Harjanto and Heri, June 2008 and Wakil Ketua II Tri Noviriyanto, 20 October 2008
51 A shop owner in the area had loaned Rp.50,000 to a person o f  unknown identity who had then absconded, 
the incident was reported to the Polsek without resolution.
52 Two station passengers had disputed the ownership o f  an item o f  luggage. According to the log this incident 
was resolved by the FKPM leadership calling the sides together and mediating a resolution.
53 The scooter theft was reported to the local Polsek without resolution. Buka Kejadian FKPM, FKPM Stasiun 
Lempuyangan (as at 2 July 2008).
4 Interview Harjanto and Heri, June 2008 and Wakil Ketua Tri Noviriyanto, 2008.
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local communities demand services from the police, like access to police law enforcement 
powers and the symbolic legal authority Polmas officers inject into dispute resolution 
agreements. The unbalanced power relationships occur, however, within an overall 
framework in which the FKPM are autonomous. The police do not actively attempt to run 
the FKPM, rather the police offer assistance on an as needs basis determined by the FKPM 
participants.
Neither Hot nor Cold: The Middle Ring o f  Organisations Without Direct Links to the 
Police (Satgas and Linmas)
We now turn to examine other civil society groupings which are involved in the provision 
o f  security but which are parts o f  larger organisations. Their structural relationships makes 
such groups less dependent on Polri and diminishes the value o f  the police. There are two 
o f  these type o f  security entities which my research has discovered: the Linmas units which 
are organised underneath the control o f  the villages and the security units o f  political 
parties. Coincidentally, both o f  these organisations are most active during election periods.
Returning to the mandala metaphor proposed in the introduction, this analysis is gradually 
moving out from the central groups solely dependent on the state police to those which 
have an increasingly distant relationship with it. Nevertheless, although the Linmas and 
Satgas are entirely independent o f  the police, they also must acknowledge the authority o f  
Polri. In these examples a different aspect o f  Polri’s superiority comes to the fore. In the 
case o f  the ronda and the FKPM these groupings are coopted by a policy o f  police 
supervision and regulation. In the case o f  the Satgas and the Linmas, these groups must 
defer to Polri because o f  the police’s unique legal authority to enforce domestic security. 
Satgas and Linmas are forced to deal with the police when conducting security affairs 
during elections. The articulation o f  this demand is modest, Satgas for example only feel 
required to provide information to the police on their activities. Linmas units are placed 
under police command when guarding election events. Nevertheless Linmas and Satgas 
volunteers believe they are obliged to act in this way. The obligation is non-negotiable and
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signals a dominant-subordinate relationship. Thus although Satgas and Linmas are the 
security arms o f  independent parent organisations, neither are these groupings free from the 
obligation to deal with the police.
Perlindungan Masyarakat - Linmas
The antecedents o f  the present day Linmas are the Hansip {pertahanan sipil or civil defence 
units) o f  the army and the Kamra (keamanan rakyat or people’s security units) established 
by the police during the New Order period. ABRI developed Hansip and Kamra units as 
volunteer organisations to provide Polri and TNI with client civilian groupings which were 
capable o f  rapid mobilisation for security purposes.53 According to my informants, the 
Koramil was responsible for organising the Hansip units (who were dressed in olive drab 
khaki uniform) and the Polsek was responsible for the Kamra units (dressed in brown 
police issue uniforms). During the early post-1998 period, the Department o f  Defence 
dismantled both these organisations.56 Although my interviewees in the villages are unable 
to recall exact dates, some time between the 1999 national election and the Megawati 
administration in 2001, the old Hansip and Kamra units were renamed Linmas and placed
55 The most detailed description I have discovered for the Hansip/Kamra forces is in Lowry’s Armed Forces 
of Indonesia. Lowry provides a strategic overview  o f  the program but confuses Kamra, Hansip and 
em ergency services volunteers. At least in Yogyakarta these were all separate units during the N ew  Order 
period (and the emergency volunteers did not exist at all). Joshua Barker provides a different account, 
equating the Hansip in his Bandung case study with police controlled Satpam. It is likely that Hansip and 
Kamra elem ents were organised in a haphazard way during the N ew  Order period. At this point I merely note 
these differences in the literature and flag this topic as one for future research. See: Lowry, Armed Forces, 
111-112. Barker, ‘Territoriality in Bandung,’ 96.
56 This information was supplied to me by the police. In one o f  my early meetings with the Kamsa 
Detachment o f  Biro Binamitra in Polda DIY (who are responsible for overseeing the police engagem ent o f  
civil society at the provincial level), I asked about the existence o f  Kamra units. I was told that all the 
Kamra/Hansip/Pam swakarsa groups were dismantled during Wiranto’s time as Minister o f  D efence and 
Security.
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underneath the control o f  the village.57 Since that time the village governments have
• • • • • • administered Linmas units within my case study region.
To understand the operation o f  Linmas units in Yogyakarta, I selected three different 
villages in different parts o f  the region. The first o f  these was Desa Triharjo, Kecamatan 
Pandak, which is a poor, agrarian village in southern Bantul. The second o f  these was Desa 
Srimulyo, Kecamatan Piyungan in eastern Bantul, which is a peri-rural village, on the 
outskirts o f  the suburban fringe o f  Yogyakarta. The final village was Condong Catur, in the 
most highly urbanised and wealthy sub-district o f  the province: Depok. The activities o f  the 
Linmas units in each o f  these villages was virtually identical, with the only notable 
difference being that Condong Catur’s Linmas unit met on a more regular basis than the 
others for the purpose o f  performing village patrols. Presumably this was due to the fact 
that Condong Catur is wealthy enough to allocate a regular budget for its Linmas unit.59
The Linmas personnel are drawn from volunteers in each o f  the sub-administrative parts o f  
the village. In Triharjo, the Dukuh organises volunteers and forwards them to the village.60 
The same system applies in Sri Mulyo and in Condong Catur. In Triharjo there are around 
114 Linmas personnel, in Sri Mulyo there are a similar number while in Condong Catur, 
the Linmas unit has 275 personnel. While formally the Linmas unit is under the head o f  the 
village, the Linmas’ actual commander and the one who organises and directs the units is a
7 Interview, Marsudi Winoto, Kasubbag Pemerintahan, Desa Condong Catur, K ec.Depok, Kabupaten 
Sleman, 3 Novem ber 2008. Interview, Kasubbag Pemerintahan, Desa Srimulyo. Kec.Piyungan, Bantul, 
Suratman 20 October 2008. Interview, Kasubbag Pemerintahan, Kelurahan Triharjo, Kecamatan Pandak, 
Bantul, Sugimantoro and anggota Linmas Pak Trikamso (Dukuh Nlagran), 11 October 2008.
'8 I asked my informants in the villages whether they were aware o f  any Interior Ministry regulations or 
national government laws for the Linmas. N one o f  the informants knew o f  any. I have been able to find 
scattered regulations from the Ministry o f  the Interior concerning guides to the formation o f  Linmas units and 
their basic roles. My interviews lead me to doubt, however, whether the central government Linmas 
regulations have any effect at all at the micro level o f  the village. From what I have seen in my research, it 
seem s that the Linmas have evolved from the Hansip/Kamra units o f  the nineteen nineties and have becom e a 
feature o f  the contemporary village structure. According to regulations o f  the Ministry o f  the Interior, every 
kabupaten and kota should develop Linmas units as part o f  the basic services they provide to the community. I 
assum e, however, that drawing upon the rights granted to district governments under Peraturan Pemerintah 
N o.72/2005 , the districts in Yogyakarta have exercised their right to sub-contract this responsibility to the 
villages. See: Republik Indonesia: Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri N o .62 /2008 Standar Pelyananan Minimal 
di Bidang Pemerintahan Dalam Negri di Kabupaten/Kota, Lampiran: Target dan Panduan Operasional, II. B. 
Pemeliharaan Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Masyarakat The same law also mentions a very old Interior 
Minister decree as being the legal basis for all Linmas units: Surat Keputusan Wakil Menteri I Urusan 
Pertahanan Keamanan Nom or M I/72/1962, 29 April 1962.
59 These patrols happen around once every month. Interview, Kassubbag W inoto, Novem ber 2008.
60 In rural Bantul, the Dukuh is above the Dusun which is above the RT.
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senior village public servant, the head o f  the governmental sub-section (kepala sub-bagian 
pemerintahan).
All o f  the respondents describe the primary purpose o f  the Linmas is to secure local 
elections. The Linmas perform other security related tasks, like the guarding o f  community 
events, but this occurs on an infrequent basis. In the words o f  one Linmas commander:
Regarding its [the Linmas unit] role, i f  there is an event they are invited [to guard it] by 
the village. Mainly elections. The important thing is elections. When elections happen, 
the Linmas is always involved... [in response to the question o f  the interviewer: besides 
e lection s?]...if there are guests from above [i.e. visiting officials], [the village] always 
involves the Linmas. If there is a social event in the hamlets [dusun], [the village] 
involves the Linmas.61
The elections referred to here are national elections, when money from the central and the 
district governments is disbursed to fund the Linmas. At the time o f  my interviews in 2008,
9plans were already underway to ready the Linmas for the 2009 election campaign. This 
was the only time in five years that new uniforms were provided for the Linmas members
f i 'X  • • •  • • • • •in Bantul. During election periods command o f  election security operations is placed in 
the hands o f  the police.64 Outside o f  the election period the Linmas are occasionally 
involved in security for other local elections, like those for village head and district 
government and for safeguarding other events, like mass religious teachings {pengajian). 
Occasionally, I have witnessed Linmas members directing traffic, for example during 
public wakes. The involvement o f  the Linmas in such events is purely voluntary and 
unpaid. The fact that election times are the only periods when Linmas members are paid
61 Interview, Kassubbag Sugimartono, October 2008.
62 According to election security procedure every TPS (tempat pemungutan suara or voting booth) must have 
two Linmas guarding it, along with a number o f  other key places. To make up for the short fall between the 
numbers o f  core Linmas members from the non-election period and the demand during the election, the sub­
district governm ents -  which have a responsibility for channeling funds from the districts to the villages - 
must engage in a precipitous increase in members. In Kecamatan Depok, it was explained to me that the 
ordinary numbers o f  Linmas, 300 or so, would have to be (“mau tidak mau” - whether they wanted to or not) 
expanded to 1000 to meet election demand. Interview, Kepala Seksi Trantib Kecamatan Depok, Agus Santoso
4 June 2008.
Interview, Kassubbag Suratman, October 2008.
M The Ministry o f  the Interior and Mabes Polri have agreed on joint doctrine for security operations during 
the electoral campaigns for heads o f  districts and provinces. This agreement places the police in command o f  
operations when disturbances o f  the campaign are foreseen. Republik Indonesia, Peraturan Menteri Dalam  
Negeri, Pedoman Penyelenggaraan Ketertiban, Ketentraman dan Keamanan dalam Rangka Pemilihan Kepala 
Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah (2006), Bab V.
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probably explains their relative dormancy. Given that my interviewees nominate national 
election times, once every five years, as the only major period o f  Linmas activity, I 
conclude that Linmas are a comparatively marginal part o f  the local security network.63
Concerning their external relations, the Linmas units have contact and receive support from 
both the army66 and the police, but my informants consider the police to be the primary 
agency. When asking the Linmas coordinator in Condong Catur village about the contact 
his unit had with other agencies he ventured:
[the kecamatan is] active [in supporting his unit]... i f  we talk about the head o f  the 
kecamatan, [he] uses Pol.PP, if  it’s the Koramil they use the Babinsa, and the Polsek 
uses the Babinkamtibmas. The leading sector is the Babinkamtibmas.67
Suratman, one o f  my other interviewees, gave the following comment in response to my 
question about how his Linmas personnel communicate with the police: “ [they report] 
direct to Polri. You see, the task o f  the Linmas is to assist the police... thus they support the 
police. Linmas is behind the police.”68 What the second informant intended to convey with 
his last comment is that the Linmas perceive the police as being at the forefront o f  local 
security. From a position behind the police, the Linmas render their support. This statement 
reflects the sentiment o f  the first informant who described Polri as the “ leading sector” or 
the side with authority for handling security and public order. Thus, using the example o f  
the Linmas we see again that societal security bodies look to Polri as the primary source o f  
authority in local security management.
65 Interview, Kassubbag Suratman, October 2008. Kassubbag Sugimantoro, October 2008.
66 All o f  my informants in each o f  the v illages mention they are in contact with their local Koramil. But only 
one informant, the head o f  the Linmas unit in Condong Catur village, Sleman, claim s that his Linmas has any 
direct assistance from the TNI. Such assistance com es in the form o f  training (like parade ground drill) and 
patriotic education. In these village case studies therefore the military’s role in security affairs has been 
almost com pletely marginalised.
67 Interview, Kassubbag W inoto, Novem ber 2008.
68 Interview, Kassubbag Suratman, October 2008.
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Political Party Militia (Satgas) in Yogyakarta
The primary function o f  Satgas is to provide physical security at party events. During the 
period o f  my research not all political parties in Yogyakarta deployed Satgas units.69 Some, 
however, did. As such, the Satgas are potentially a part o f  the regional security network. In 
many ways, the Satgas bear similarities with the Linmas units o f  the village. Like Linmas, 
Satgas units are most active during election times. Like Linmas, Satgas units are composed 
o f  volunteers and are subordinate to a parent organisation. The Satgas have a more distant 
relationship with the police than the Linmas. While Satgas recognise the authority o f  the 
police, their primary allegiance is to their party hierarchy. Their contact with the police is 
often limited to professional dialogue. While the Satgas are autonomous, neither can they 
be described as equal to or independent from Polri. The Satgas, like other actors, see the 
police as a superior security agency and concede they must ultimately defer to police 
authority when securing party events.
The current status o f  the party Satgas marks a dramatic about-face between the present era 
and the politically motivated violence o f  the post-reformasi period. In the early transition 
era in Yogyakarta, violent political youth movements (laskar pemuda) played a dominant 
role in the criminal underworld. But the youth laskar were different from the party Satgas. 
Party Satgas were generally organised and hierarchically responsible to the party 
leaderships, youth laskar on the other hand were disorganised agglomerations o f  violent
70party sympathisers. Youth laskar and party Satgas formerly played a similar function. The 
Satgas and the youth movements were both used as vehicles for attracting mass followings 
to political parties. Satgas and youth laskar both gave the party leaderships a security tool 
which they could use to inflate their image and intimidate potential rivals.71 Nankyung Choi
• 79dubbed this system ‘security-cum-mobilization.’ As my research uncovers however this
69 For example, in response to telephone requests the provincial branch o f  the Islamist party, Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera revealed they did not have a party security unit in 2008.
70 Choi, ‘Local Party Politics’, 156
71 W ilson, ‘Changing Contours o f  Organized V io len ce’, 275.
72 Choi, Local Party Politics, 168.
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system failed to live up to its potential and was jettisoned many years prior to my research. 
1 explore this history below, in the section on the youth laskar. Although the Satgas and the 
youth laskar were two separate entities, their similar functions meant that Satgas have been 
tarred with the same brush as the more chaotic youth laskar. I therefore choose to separate 
these two groupings and review them in isolation. In this section I discuss the activities o f  
Satgas during the period o f  my research. Further below I explore the rise and demise o f  the 
political youth movements. Fundamentally, Yogyakarta’s Satgas o f  today show the shift in 
the political and security climate in Indonesia; their peaceful activities are an illustration the 
transition from the violent, chaotic years after reformasi to the orderly, stable security 
system o f  today.
To provide an overview o f  Satgas in Yogyakarta, I selected three different party security 
units. I decided to examine the Satgas o f  the two largest parliamentary parties based upon 
votes at the 2004 provincial parliamentary elections. This was Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
- Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party o f  Struggle or PDIP) and Golkar. The third 
case study was the Satgas o f  the small Islamic party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(United Development Party or PPP). Although PPP is barely represented in Yogyakarta’s 
provincial and district parliaments now, my knowledge o f  the former influence o f  PPP 
youth groups (discussed below) convinced me to review the current state o f  the PPP Satgas 
as well. O f  these three Satgas groups, the PDIP is probably the most active, largely because 
the party mobilises its Satgas outside election times and uses these units for recruitment. 
The common characteristic to all these units is that they fall under the firm control o f  their 
respective party leaderships.
Interviews with the Satgas o f  the PPP revealed an organisation that appeared to be in the 
autumn o f  its days. In the early post-1998 period the official Satgas o f  PPP was Paskam 
(Pasukan Keamanan). In her research on party politics in Yogyakarta in 2003, Nankyung 
Choi speculated that the PPP at that time was considering the dissolution o f  Paskam. By 
2008 it appears this decision had been executed. When I asked my sources in the PPP for an 
interview with the party’s Satgas I was referred to the head o f  AMK (Angkatan Muda
73 Choi, ‘Local Party Politics’, 184-186.
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Kabah or Kabah Youth Force) in Yogyakarta city, A.S. Purbadi.74 Apparently between the 
time o f  Choi’s research and 2008 AMK became the formal satgas o f  PPP. As A M K ’s name 
implies this was not its intended purpose, and perhaps subtly reflects the declining fortunes 
o f  the PPP. Hierarchically the AMK is situated in the Bagian Kepemudaan (youth wing) o f  
the PPP. The leader o f  each regional youth wing is responsible to the regional chairman o f  
the party above them; thus the AMK at the district level is responsible to the district chair, 
and the provincial AMK to the provincial chair. Purbadi was the commander o f  the Satgas 
in PPP’s biggest electoral base, Yogyakarta city.75 AM K in Yogyakarta city in 2008 had 
around sixty personnel, but the organisation was generally inactive. The last time that PPP 
o f  Yogyakarta city deployed AMK was for the 2006 mayoral elections, two years before 
my interview with Purbadi. One o f  the reasons for this, according to Purbadi was a lack o f  
money:
N ow  financial problems are fairly strong, whilst PPP doesn’t have a large source o f  
funds... thus my obsession is obstructed because o f  financial problems. Because every 
activity, minimal I have to spend Rp.5 million. I have to calculate for future activities 
[the 2009 elections] [for which] I need Rp.30 million... While political parties - their 
contributions aren’t too great... for becom ing a large organisation, w e ’re not ready.
Yet lack o f  funds only constitutes part o f  the reason why AMK chooses to remain quiet. In 
interviewing Purbadi, I also found an organisation that was haunted by the ghosts o f  PPP’s 
violent past.
The old ones [members o f  AMK], actually there are a lot who ask me when can we 
hold activities again. But I am still traumatised with the movement which [in former 
times] was uncontrolled. I am afraid if  [AMK] becomes large again, uncontrolled 
activities will happen again.
The political strategy o f  mobilizing mass, violent youth is discredited in the eyes o f  the 
party leadership in Yogyakarta. Party loyalists in the PPP must now attempt to overcome
74 The contact who supplied Purbadi’s details was a veteran youth activist o f  PPP and a PPP member o f  the 
Yogyakarta DPRD. This contact was emphatic that Purbadi was the leader o f  the PPP Satgas in Yogyakarta 
city. Purbadi how ever was unclear on his exact position within the organisation. He preferred to describe 
him self as the secretary general or facilitator o f  AM K but made it clear he was not the head o f  the youth 
section o f  PPP, the nominal chair o f  the Satgas. I assum e that Purbadi was the operational commander. 
Interview, Sekretaris Jenderal AM K A.S. Purbadi, 3 October 2008.
75 Interestingly, the hierarchy o f  Purbadi’s organisation was such that he had very little knowledge o f  the 
activities o f  AM K in any o f  the other districts or the province. I found this to be much the same with the other 
Satgas as well.
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the party’s reputation for violence inherited from the early transition period. Although the 
now defunct youth laskar were most responsible for the PPP’s poor image, AMK as the 
standard bearers o f  the PPP’s security today still suffer guilt by association. As such, the 
AMK leadership chooses to deactivate the Satgas outside election periods.
Regarding A M K ’s attitude to the police, the Satgas leadership believes it is necessary for 
them to involve Polri. The depth o f  this cooperation though, is limited to transmitting 
information:
Every training event, w e invite the police, state prosecutors, military for speaking... I 
want my colleagues to be able to understand the KUHP and its articles. We always 
coordinate with the police, because national security issues are dealt with by the police. 
Therefore, members o f  the police meet with us, and we discuss our programs.
Thus although AM K serves PPP, this Satgas does not see itself as free from the obligation 
to deal with the police. Polri’s responsibility for handling “national security problems” , 
including those associated with political security, situate the police in a position o f  
superiority over AMK. Although AMK does not feel obligated to do more than transmit 
information about its activities, this demand is a meaningful reminder o f  Polri’s authority 
within the sector.
PPP’s sometime enemy in Yogyakarta, the PDIP, also has a highly structured Satgas. Like
AMK, this Satgas has had to distance itself from the premanisme o f  the former youth
laskar. My information derives from two informants o f  the PDIP Satgas in the district o f
Sleman: these are the deputy chair o f  internal affairs (Kukuh), who coordinates Satgas units
for the whole district, and a Satgas commander in Kecamatan Depok (Kristi), the largest
PDIP Satgas detachment in Sleman. According to these informants, after PDIP’s 2006 Bali
Congress, the party moved to exercise greater control over its security units by integrating
them structurally within the party. Simultaneously, the PDIP also deconcentrated the Satgas 
•  1ft  •membership. Today in Yogyakarta the provincial and district branches o f  PDIP do not 
have their own security detachments. Instead Satgas members are organised and recruited
76 Interview, Wakil Sekretaris Internal PDIP Cabang Sleman K.T. M anggolo, 3 Novem ber 2008.
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in the kecamatan but are answerable to district PDIP boards.77 For every deployment or 
expenditure, the Satgas in the kecamatan must now seek the permission o f  the party 
kabupaten leadership (DPC).78 My interviewees drew great attention to this organisational 
reform and I assume that it marks a significant change within PDIP, putting local party 
leaders in a much stronger position to control the Satgas than in times past.
According to my interviewees the PDIP Satgas perform activities o f  two broad varieties. 
These are activities which support the party and activities to support the community for the 
purpose o f  enhancing the image o f  PDIP. During campaign periods the Satgas “secure” 
PDIP candidates as well as party masses. Outside o f  formal electoral campaign periods, 
PDIP Satgas are used to campaign (through holding rallies and the like) for even the lowest 
parts o f  the civilian administration, like elections for the heads o f  hamlets (Kepala Dusun). 
According to Kristi and Kukuh, the Satgas also guard churches and places o f  worship for 
religious minorities, usually during Christmas. The PDIP Satgas therefore take on an active 
role in furthering PDIP interests, either directly in PDIP campaigns or providing protection
• • • • 7Qservices to PDIP sympathisers in the community.
In performing these tasks, the PDIP Satgas have a strictly professional relationship with the 
police. This relationship, as with the AMK, is limited to the transmission o f  information. 
The PDIP Satgas feel obliged to provide the police with data about their leadership changes 
and party events. Occasionally, they request training from local police or army personnel 
(most frequently Brimob) for things like self-defence. This exchange happens on a fee for 
service basis. Otherwise the PDIP sees the police, much like AMK does, as a necessary 
partner. The police have responsibility for law enforcement and the PDIP satgas recognise 
this. Thus contact between the PDIP Satgas and the police is limited to obligatory 
communication and occasional training requests.
77 According to Kukuh: “considered from the perspective o f  structure, indeed [Satgas] are different from in 
the past. In the past, Satgas appeared separated and had their own authority for administering their role... 
without coordination with the party structure. A lso in providing their own budgets.” Interview, Kukuh, 
Novem ber 2008.
78 Interview, Bendahara Satgas PDIP Kecamatan Depok, Kristi Haryono, 26 Novem ber 2008.
79 Interview, Kristi, Novem ber 2008.
80 Interview, Kristi, Novem ber 2008.
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The Golkar party has an even simpler security system. Outside o f  election periods Golkar’s 
Satgas are deactivated. At the provincial level, the Golkar Satgas are organised under the 
party secretary. At the time o f  my interview with the DIY provincial party secretary, Golkar 
was preparing for the 2009 national elections and had prepared a security committee o f
O 1seventy five personnel. These personnel were an ad-hoc assemblage o f  karate experts and 
former Satgas members patched together specifically for the campaign. When asked why 
Golkar chooses to create only temporary party security units, the provincial secretary has a 
very reasonable answer: “because it will add a burden [he meant to the party’s budget, to 
have permanent groups].” When the Golkar party decides to hold a political event or rally it 
is standard procedure to report the activities to the police. According to the party secretary:
Usually we have good relations [with the police]. Every time we hold an activity, 
they’ve already given their mobile phone numbers which can be contacted. Thus, if  
there is information or consultation needed, we just telephone. For example, tomorrow, 
we will hold a meeting. I will report it to the Polda, the Polres and the Polsek. From the 
three o f  them, [police personnel] will com e for security. From our internal structure 
[the Golkar Satgas] will do the security physically [meaning the police will come, 
probably loitering around the vicinity o f  the event while the Golkar Satgas will do the 
visible security on the meeting prem ises].82
Thus, as with the AMK and PDIP, the Golkar Satgas as well feels obliged to maintain 
relations with police. These relations only concern the provision o f  information on party 
activities. Yet this obligation is real and marks the elevated normative status o f  the police.
Thus in summary, the Satgas today are security groups with limited powers and with the 
exception o f  the PDIP, are exclusively focused on party events. The Satgas, like the 
Linmas, are most active during election times and do not seek close relations with Polri. 
Within the security network the Satgas, like the Linmas, are autonomous actors answerable 
to their hierarchy, but they are hardly equal to Polri. The Satgas, like other actors, see the 
police as the superior security agency and concede they must ultimately defer to police 
authority when securing party events. This deference only constitutes the transmission o f  
information but this act is a necessary condition o f  Satgas operations. One o f  the reasons 
why this deference is so modest is because the conduct o f  recent elections in Yogyakarta
81 Partai Golkar Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Surat Keputusan N o .66/Golkar D IY /6/2008 tentang 
Badan Pengendali Pemenangan Pemilihan Umum 2009 (27 Juni 2008).
82 Interview, Sekretaris Golkar Propinsi DIY W .FX Soedardi, 10 Novem ber 2008.
290
has been free o f  substantial disturbances. Nevertheless, these organisations do not conceive 
o f  themselves as able to challenge or operate beyond the authority o f  the police.
Cold War Enemies: The Outer Ring o f  Groups with Hostile Relations to the Police
The Youth Groups (laskar pemuda) o f Political Parties During the Early Transition
Period
From a discussion o f  the centre ring o f  groups which are autonomous o f  the police but 
which respect police authority, we now turn to examine the outer ring o f  organisations 
which have hostile relations with Polri. In the following sections I will analyse two 
distinctive types o f  these groups, the former political youth gangs o f  the early reformasi 
period and contemporary Islamic vigilante movements. The violent youth laskar have 
disappeared. Yet to understand the present nature o f  police supremacy within the security 
network we must take a journey into Yogyakarta’s recent past, to look at the rise and 
demise o f  Yogyakarta’s violent political youth groups and their contribution to the 
professionalisation o f  the party Satgas.
Recalling my review o f  the literature above, there has been much discussion o f  the 
tendency for volunteer security groupings in Indonesia to be associated with violence, 
vigilantism and gangsterism. A prominent strand o f  thought in the literature views such 
groupings as an implicit challenge and a rival source o f  power to the state. My research 
serves to modify this proposition by demonstrating the ways in which volunteer security 
groups feel constrained or obliged to respect the powers o f  the state police. The example 
par-excellence o f  this is the story o f  politically-linked gangsterism in Yogyakarta.
83 I em ploy the term “politically linked” to describe the behaviour o f  the youth m ovem ents o f  parties in 
Yogyakarta. These organisations engaged in violence and intimidation, som etim es in support o f  their parties 
but often in their own interests. The term ‘politically linked’ im plies a connection with politics only insofar as 
these groups had a political identity which guided som e o f  their behaviour.
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In Yogyakarta the most powerful and dangerous volunteer security groups coalesced 
around political parties during the early period o f  reformasi. These organisations had a 
reputation for violence and quasi-gangsterism. As Nankyung Choi’s 2003 dissertation on 
post-New Order democratisation in Yogyakarta states, the Satgas and the youth movements 
were two different entities. The Satgas were functionaries o f  the party hierarchy and even 
during the early transition period were answerable to the party leadership. The youth 
movements on the other hand were loose affiliates o f  political parties, but not directly 
subordinated to them.84 Although Choi’s research treats the Satgas and the laskar pemuda 
as practically the same, Stein Kristiansen’s later work claims that the majority o f  the 
violence and premanisme in post-reformasi Yogyakarta was the work o f  the laskar 
pemuda*5 My research also support this view.86 Following on from the work o f  Choi and 
Kristiansen, my work shows how such gangsterism has disappeared in the years after 
2004.87
Violent political youth groups have a long lineage in Yogyakarta. Before and after the fall 
o f  the Suharto regime, Yogyakarta’s various political parties nurtured mass, violent youth 
gangs. While such movements fell apart in the decade after 1998, they did play a significant 
role as a node o f  security -  and more often as a node o f  insecurity -  during their period o f  
existence. The existing sources make clear that these youth movements were very 
significant actors, even to the point o f  being rivals to the formal authority o f  the state.
In the post-1998 period Yogyakarta had two main youth political movements - the Gerakan 
Pemuda Kabah (the Kabah Youth League or GPK) and the Barisan Shirotol Mustaqim (or 
BSM).88 GPK was affiliated with the Islamic party, PPP, while the BSM supported the 
secular-nationalist PDIP. Despite having a titular identity, it is more accurate to consider
84 Choi, Local Party Politics, 156.
85 Kristiansen, ‘V iolent Youth Groups in Indonesia,’ 128.
86 Interview, Ketua GPK Lilik, 8 September 2007. Interview, Komandan Operasi BSM, Mas Bintu 6 
Novem ber 2007.
87 In repeating the history o f  these organisasi pemuda, it should be acknowledged that there are w eaknesses in 
the data. M ost o f  my information is based on interviews with former members o f  these organisations. As with 
all oral histories, this data constitutes a recollection o f  interview ees’ m emories, filtered through their biases 
and information that has been forgotten. Secondly, while every effort has been made to corroborate 
information, often individual episodes cannot be verified by other w itnesses -  thus leaving us to assume the 
validity o f  interviewee accounts. W e can perhaps say that my analysis is the most accurate account o f  the rise 
and fall o f  these organisations according to their own former members.
88 Kristiansen, ‘V iolent Youth Groups in Indonesia,’ 128.
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these groups as a collection o f  autonomous gangs with only a semi-formal leadership. 
Although effectively autonomous, the greatest unifying force for these laskar was their 
identification with a political party. The historical roots o f  GPK and its PDI-P counterpart 
date back to the Suharto era, when the non-regime parties at that time -  the PDI and the 
PPP -  sought to create mass movements for both rallying votes at election time and to
O Qprotect their party events from the New Order apparatus. It is difficult to date precisely 
when and how this happened, but in the years after the Suharto government’s national 
operation to exterminate gangsters (known as Petrus) in 1983, the remaining criminal 
elements o f  Yogyakarta sought protection by coalescing in two main criminal gangs: the 
Muslim Joxzin which sought refuge in PPP strongholds and the non-Muslim gang Quzruh, 
which took refuge in areas loyal to the PDI. It seems that these gangs became feeder groups
• OQfor the later Satgas and youth gangs that would rise again during the nineteen nineties.
The political upheavals o f  the nineteen nineties created conditions for the expansion o f  
Yogyakarta’s violent youth gangs and for the consolidation o f  GPK as the largest o f  these 
groups.91 In her analysis o f  the politics o f  Yogyakarta in the post-Suharto era, Choi makes 
the argument that political parties at that time effectively entered into a deal with the laskar; 
parties would extend protection and political favours to these groups in exchange for the 
mass mobilisation o f  votes and violence when necessary.92 This political trade-off led to 
something o f  a divided set o f  loyalties in the ranks o f  the youth gangs. Some members o f  
the laskar joined primarily with the motivation to support their chosen parties. Others 
joined because they sought protection from the party system to further their illicit activities. 
In retrospect, political motives were more easily discernible on the GPK side where many
89 Interview, Ghodi Nurhamidi Wakil Sekretaris GPK (2006 - present), 29 September 2007. Interview, Ketua 
II BSM , Mas M ugi, 24 June 2008.
90 Choi, ‘Local Party Politics in Indonesia’, 169-171.
91 Follow ing divisions at the national level in the N ew  Order regime, the largest faction o f  the then PDI, the 
Megawati wing, did not com pete in the 1997 national elections. In Yogyakarta this had the consequence that 
the youth who had previously supported the PDI, switched allegiance and joined forces with the PPP to 
continue their protest against the Suharto government. The PPP leadership chose to continue its policy o f  
cultivating mass support and ‘safety in num bers’ and welcom ed the influx o f  nationalist-PDI street toughs, 
strong figures and others into the ranks o f  its laskar (Interview, Ketua GPK Kota Yogyakarta 2006 -  present, 
Harist, 26 September 2007). According to former GPK members this period o f  uncontrolled expansion sowed  
the seeds o f  the downfall o f  their m ovem ent (Interview, Ghodi, September 2007). That view , however, tends 
to displace the blame for what were in effect core problems with these political youth gangs -  weak 
organisation and poor leadership.
92 Choi, ‘Local Party Politics in Post-Soeharto Indonesia’, 168-169.
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strict Islamic laskar were motivated to perform acts o f  religious devotion, such as attacks 
on ‘places o f  sin’ like gambling parlours and brothels. As Stein Kristiansen points out, 
between these two types o f  laskar there was also a large floating mass o f  unemployed 
youths simply searching for belonging, economic opportunities and distractions from their
• O'!circumstances. These youth gravitated to the laskar pemuda in large numbers.
In 1997, at its peak, the PPP laskar almost certainly had many thousands, if  not tens o f  
thousands, o f  followers in Yogyakarta.94 After 1998, however, the multiparty environment 
o f  the reformasi period saw a dramatic decline in the numbers o f  the PPP laskar.93 The 
creation o f  new Islamic parties like PAN and the PKB and the resurrection o f  the PDI as 
the PDI-P poached many o f  the PPP’s former supporters. However, according to its 
members, the remaining PPP laskar continued to have a reputation as the toughest o f  these 
gangs. Kristiansen’s research supports this view. After 1999 GPK was still able to attract 
the largest number and the hardest thugs in Yogyakarta.96 Although the rise o f  the BSM in 
2000 gave GPK some competition, GPK still remained the greatest o f  the youth gangs.
Within the world o f  the gangs there were overlapping sets o f  interests within and between 
gangs which produced a complex array o f  disputes. GPK as the largest o f  the gangs enjoyed 
a privileged position in the illegal economy. For the preman and idle youth that affiliated 
with GPK, there was the prospect for some o f  them to gain employment through protecting 
tempat maksiat ( ‘places o f  sin’) and extortion. According to the former chairman o f  GPK, 
Muhammad Lutfi,97 in 2000-2001 around twenty five major brothels and gambling dens
93 Kristiansen, ‘V iolent Groups in Indonesia’, 111.
94 Numbers within the laskar are im possible to docum ent reliably and so 1 rely on informants for this 
information. Apparently laskar were only sporadically active. Many follow ers would turn up to a laskar rally 
but far fewer members would attend regular activities like religious education seminars or raids on tempat 
maksiat. According to one senior GPK member there were approximately forty five laskar in the w hole o f  
DIY in 1997, with a minimum membership o f  about fifty people per laskar (Interview, Harist, September 
2007). According to another informant there were about sixty laskar (Interview, Ghodi, September 2007). The 
largest o f  them in the Kabupaten o f  Slem an, Radatul Jihad, supposedly was able to raise 5 ,000 follow ers for 
an activity, though numbers were probably vastly exaggerated (Interview, Ketua GPK Sleman Wicak, 27  
September 2007).
93 Interview, Ghodi, September 2007. Interview, Harist, September 2007.
96 According to the first chairman o f  GPK, Muhammad Lutfi, there were about 3000 members o f  GPK in 
2001. Kristiansen supports this number. Interview, former Ketua GPK Muhammad Lutfi (2001 -  2006), 25 
June 2008. Kristiansen, ‘Youth Groups in Indonesia’, 129.
97 According to my sources, GPK was brought into existence formally in 2000-2001 out o f  the disorganised 
PPP affiliated laskar. Muhammad Lutfi inherited the position o f  Chairman when GPK’s first chair
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actively sought security personnel from Lutfi’s GPK; each o f  them paying between Rp.l 
million to 5 million every night.98 A smaller grouping o f  hard-line Islamist GPK continued 
to mount attacks on tempat maksiat, at times on the very places protected by G P K ’s 
gangster elements, though my sources estimate less than twenty percent o f  the organisation
participated in anti-maksiat violence.99 More common however was for different laskar
• • 100 affiliated with GPK to fight with one another over territory.
Beside the intra-GPK conflict, there was also rivalry engendered by G P K ’s support o f  PPP. 
In Yogyakarta, the PPP and the PDIP became vitriolic enemies during the reformasi period; 
quite ironically in fact because after 2001, the PPP and PDIP leaders joined forces to 
become Vice President and President in a coalition government. Partly to balance the power 
o f  the many GPK youth laskar, in 2001 militant PDIP sympathisers formed the Barisan 
Shirotol Mustaqim.101 As a result, BSM and GPK laskar fell into cycles o f  politically 
driven conflict caused by their allegiances to their host parties. Because BSM and GPK
would protect the political events o f  PDIP and PPP respectively, BSM and GPK would also
• • • • 102 become involved in firebombings, attacks and vandalism directed at each other.
Dr.Ahadam stepped down. Given the internal conflict between the Islamist and the preman parts o f  GPK, I 
take it that even though Lutfi was the putative chairman and had many follow ers in the organization, GPK did 
not function in a strict hierarchical fashion. Interview, Ketua GPK Wilayah Kota DIY, Harist 26 September 
2007.
1)8 This was G PK ’s share. Lutfi agreed to the proposition though that the nightly takings o f  the Yogyakarta 
gam bling industry in the early two thousands was probably more than a billion rupiah, but out o f  this “many 
sides” were paid, including the military and the police. Interview, former Chairman o f  GPK, Muhammad 
Lutfi 25 May 2008.
99 This estimate com es from Ghodi Nurhamidi. His twenty percent estimate was not intended to be scientific 
but to illustrate the corruption o f  GPK at that time. Ghodi is the current Deputy Secretary o f  GPK (2006 -). In 
the late nineties Ghodi established his own vigilante fundamentalist group, GAM . GAM  were PPP allies and 
joined actions with the Islamist laskar o f  GPK but chose not to join with GPK because it was morally 
comprom ised. Another senior Islamist GPK member, Harist, noted on many occasions his laskar prepared 
attacks on tempat maksiat only to have their raids spoiled by leaks beforehand. He says he only learned with 
tim e that the head o f  the organization, Lutfi, was the one who leaked the information. Interview, Harist, 
September 2007.
100 Interview, Ghodi, September 2007. Interview, Lutfi, May 2008. Interview, Harist, September 2007.
101 My information com es from tw o sources, Mas Bintu the s e lf  described field commander o f  the BSM and 
Mas M ugi, self-described Ketua II o f  BSM . Mugi disagrees with Bintu and says BSM  started in 2002. 
Interestingly, both claim that BSM was established with the knowledge and approval o f  the police. Although  
Bintu is Catholic and many o f  B SM ’s follow ers were non-M uslim s, an Islamic sounding name was chosen in 
order to prevent GPK from legitimating its struggle against the BSM by appealing to Islam. Interview, Mas 
Bintu, 6 Novem ber 2007 and Mas Mugi, 24 June 2008.
I(): Gauging the extent o f  the violence is difficult but in my interviews I did hear multiple references on both 
sides to individual episodes o f  violence where, for exam ple, PPP convoys were raided by BSM thugs, and 
GPK members firebombed PDIP ‘command posts (o ffices)’ and m iscellaneous stabbings and beatings.
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Although politically-motivated violence was one variant o f  the inter-laskar conflict, 
according to GPK informants it was more common for BSM-GPK conflict to involve 
individual laskar competing for territory.103 Therefore, both between the laskar and within 
GPK itself, there was extensive conflict.
Having mapped out the relations between the youth laskar, the story o f  how these 
organisations fell apart involves a combination o f  internal reforms and external pressure. 
The Yogyakarta police eventually played a secondary role in dismantling GPK, yet at the 
beginning o f  reformasi the police were afraid to take action against the group. Numerous 
interviewees, from the youth movements, the party leadership and from the police agree on 
this point. All o f  my GPK interviewees agree that, from the beginning o f  reformasi until 
2003 when the GPK laskar de-escalated their activities, the Yogyakarta police did not press 
a single case against one o f  their members -  though many were arrested. When asked why 
this was the case, my GPK informants provide two reasons: the first factor was the skill and 
influence o f  the (then) provincial PPP leader Dr. Fauzi Azahari who almost always 
negotiated the release o f  arrested GPK suspects.104 Secondly, GPK at that time was a mass 
movement, and the police were afraid GPK rank and file would riot if  one o f  their members 
was prosecuted. This factor immeasurably strengthened the negotiating powers o f  Dr. Fauzi 
and was the more important o f  the two factors.
Dr. Fauzi proposed that he had never failed to have any members o f  GPK released from 
police custody after he negotiated on their behalf and that he did indeed defend every 
person who professed allegiance to G PK .105 1 cross-checked Fauzi’s claims with
Interview, Ketua GPK Sleman Wicak, 27 September 2007. Interview, Mas Bintu, Novem ber 2007. Interview, 
Ghodi September 2007. Interview, Harist, September 2007.
103 Though Bintu and Mugi deny these claim s insofar that they claim the BSM  forbade their personnel from 
involvem ent in gangsterism. Interview, Ghodi, September 2007. Interview, Lutfi, May 2008. Interview, Bintu, 
Novem ber 2007. Interview, M ugi, May 2008.
104 It was said that Dr.Fauzi had a number o f  important strengths that intimidated the police. Firstly, Fauzi 
was a provincial leader and a powerful figure in the PPP. It cannot be forgotten that, after 2001, the vice  
president o f  Indonesia was h im self general chairman o f  the PPP, so the party had enhanced leverage in 
national politics. Secondly, the police recognised that Fauzi spoke on behalf o f  the GPK. The strength o f  GPK  
therefore added to Fauzi’s bargaining power with the police. Finally, Fauzi was not only a respected member 
o f  the Muslim umat him self, but also the son o f  AR Fahrudin, an influential Islamic scholar and important 
figure in Muhammadiyah. According to Ghodi: “from all o f  these strengths, the police would think a thousand 
times before they reject him .” Ghodi, Interview, 29 September 2007.
105 Interview, Former Chair o f  the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Yogyakarta (1997-2001), Dr.Fauzi Azahari,
11 October 2007
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Yogyakarta police detectives. Although this was by no means an easy task ,106 I did succeed 
in finding two senior (in experience but not rank) Indonesian detectives who could 
comment on this. One o f  these informants, Pak Chito, came from Polres Sleman and 
another, Pak Gusmiyadi, served in Poltabes, Yogyakarta city. These men claimed to have 
had fourteen and twenty seven years o f  continuous experience in their respective roles. I 
questioned both informants on their knowledge o f  case handling towards arrested GPK 
members during 2000 to 2004 and both men responded with the same answer: the police 
hierarchy in Yogyakarta had a policy that officers were to reprimand political youths but 
not to charge them. Pak Chito and Gusmayadi claimed that the reason why this policy was 
put in place was because the police leadership was afraid that arrests o f  GPK youths would 
lead to other GPK elements taking ‘anarchical actions’ in response.107 The police were 
apparently intimidated by the political youth gangs to such an extent that they were not able 
to take direct action against them.
Police impotence may have originally created space for the youth gangs to assert their 
power, but the police did not remain quiescent. With the passage o f  time, Polda DIY began 
to challenge the laskar and GPK in particular. According to the former head o f  GPK: 
“ [concerning relations between police and GPK] previously we clashed. Previously if  there 
were places which didn’t give us work, we took them from the police.” I put to him that 
other interviewees suggested GPK and the police at one time had a close relationship. Lutfi 
answered: “that was in the beginning. At the time o f  year 2000, police were still persuasive 
then. The police weren’t bold enough to arrest [GPK members]. Because at that point it was 
still early reformasi.” The key point to take away from Lutfi’s testimony is that in the early 
reformasi period the police did not challenge GPK. Although Lutfi did not elaborate, we 
could hypothesise that one simple reason was that the police were, after the separation from 
ABRI, much weaker in 1999-2000 than in subsequent years. As discussed in chapter one, 
the expansion o f  the Indonesian police force since 2000 has been quite startling. By 2002,
106 Polri m oves com m issioned officers around regularly, som etim es shifting personnel between roles within a 
year or less. This means that the most experienced police in any area are often the most junior ranking 
personnel (w ho, anecdotally, often are assigned the same role for many years). These informants are generally 
not well educated and have difficulty discussing issues outside their direct job experience. This became a 
major obstacle I struggled with in my research.
107 Interview, Chito, Anggota Satuan Reskrim Poltabes, 5 October 2007. Interview, Gusmiyadi, Anggota 
Satuan Reskrim Polres Sleman, 1 Novem ber 2007.
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Lutfi claimed the police had began a violent crack down on GPK. In response to a question 
about when the system o f  dividing protection money to the police, military, GPK, and other 
groups changed, Lutfi responded:
At the period when the Kapolda was Saleh Saaf [around 2002]. He was harsh towards 
GPK. But he was harsh because he received money from them [illegal casinos] as 
w ell...
I followed by questioning what caused the police to change their attitude towards 
GPK. Lutfi replied: “Because they felt disrupted [terganngu\. It should’ve been them 
that got all the money, but it was taken by us.” 108 This view was also supported by 
some o f  my Islamist informants in GPK:
Before, the police didn’t take a hardline with us. We were free to destroy tempat 
maksiat, because at that time the supremacy o f  law didn’t exist. Then there was a 
change o f  government [meaning M egawati’s time]. Then there was a policy o f  
upholding law. Then they [the police] took decisive action towards the laskar. 
Whoever took anarchical actions, did vigilantism would butt heads with the security 
apparatus. The places o f  sin weren’t bold enough to oppose us, the ones who opposed 
us were the police...
I asked the same informant how many times there were fights with the police:
Gee, hundreds o f  times. At the time Saleh Saaf came it was common. But he was pretty 
cruel [jahat] as well. He struck the laskar. In the end, he got money from the gambling 
industry.109
According to the testimony o f  y informants in the BSM, they also connected the demise o f  
GPK with improving effectiveness o f  the police:
Since the time o f  Kapolri Sutanto [who was appointed in 2005], gambling has been 
really forbidden. But what’s certain is what happens today, in the past didn’t happen. 
And with the firmness [ketegasan] o f  the Kapolri now, I and other parts o f  the 
community feel comfortable. Whenever in the past, there was a report from the 
community about gambling, the police only attempted to appease the community, 
that’s it. But now, although there’s still money paid, a case will be investigated. And 
the report must go to the [police] superiors... Like Gatot from GPK, he controlled the 
petrol station [with a wave o f  the hand indicating a local business]. Every month the 
petrol station, always had to give an allocation o f  money to Gatot. Then after an appeal
Interview, Lutfi, June 2008.
109 Interview, Ghodi, September 2007.
298
[from Polri], the petrol station was bold enough to report him. And Gatot was arrested 
by the apparatus. And imprisoned as w ell.110
On the other hand, former GPK Chairman Muhammed Lutfi stated that rather than 
attacking GPK directly, the police preferred instead to encourage G PK ’s gangland enemies. 
When I asked Lutfi whether there was a precise moment when relations between GPK and 
Polda DIY turned sour, Lutfi ventured:
Around June 2002. At the moment there was an incident, the PPP party was attacked at 
Pakualaman. At that time the police were behind the BSM. They encouraged the BSM  
to attack us... After that the BSM controlled all the tempat maksiat. 111
This account generally agrees with the information I received from my respondents in the 
BSM, who claim that the police did indeed give them moral support and turned a blind eye 
to the B SM ’s war with GPK. Although the BSM interviewees deny their personnel were
i  i  ogangsters in the form o f  GPK they do agree they had special assistance from the police.
In the words o f  the BSM field commander:
What I hoped is they [the police] know them selves that the BSM does not deviate [into 
immoral activities]. And indeed it is correct we stabbed people, but we stabbed people 
who were anarchists [his meaning is criminal deviants like GPK]. They [the police] 
saw this themselves in the field. Finally they felt untroubled in the field. And they felt 
assisted with the existence o f  the BSM...
I put it to Mas Bintu that because the BSM opposed GPK, the police therefore turned a 
blind eye to the violence o f  the BSM. He replied:
110 Interview, Mas Mugi, June 2008.
111 Interview, Lutfi, June 2008.
112 W hile Mas Bintu emphatically denies his group promoted gangsterism, he does concede the follow ing  
about the criminal backgrounds o f  som e o f  his group’s members:
I think those [preman who infiltrated BSM ] they are preman, automatically then, they are in 
econom ic need. I tried to push them into Papillon [a Yogyakarta nightclub] or disco outlets for 
security. But I put them there officially , through lobbying. And I also clarified about their 
background and the type o f  work requested. And one or two [o f Bintu’s people] would be put 
there. But when GPK saw that, they desired to do the same thing, but they used violence. Not 
through lobbying methods.
Interview, Mas Bintu, Novem ber 2007.
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Correct. There was much that was off the record, mainly towards my friends. In 
principle things occurred. But it was if  they [the police] didn’t know.
One final claim is that the police attempted to divide GPK by instigating disputes between
its rival factions. Some o f  the Islamists claim that Lutfi was bribed by the police to halt
• • 11^  activities in support o f  PPP. Lutfi himself claims that the police supported another
prominent Yogyakarta gangster, Gun Jack, to raise a rival faction o f  GPK laskar against the
members loyal to h im .114 These claims go back and forth and we cannot take them at face
value. What is apparent is that the police were initially intimidated by GPK and the political
leaders behind it. Rather than confronting GPK with the force o f  law they chose to play
rival gangster groups against one another. While GPK posed a problem for the police
insofar that the organisation was a lawless band o f  thugs which disrupted the peace, a
stronger motivating factor for the police to turn against GPK was probably competition in
the black economy. Although the police were an important nail in the coffin o f  the youth
laskar, Polda DIY however only played a secondary role in the demise o f  GPK.
Internal party politics was the greater factor in the end o f  GPK, as the PPP leadership 
reappraised its views o f  the political value o f  the movement. Two factors stand out as 
internal causes for the decline o f  GPK: the loss o f  Dr.Fauzi, followed closely by the new 
chairman o f  the Yogyakarta PPP, Syukri Fadoli, promulgating a policy o f ‘cooling down.’ 
In 2002, Fauzi ended a long running rift with the party’s chairman (Vice President Hamzah 
Haz) by resigning.115 According to the GPK interviewees, the effect o f  Fauzi’s resignation 
was tremendous. Without Fauzi the party lost its greatest asset in dealing with the police.116 
At the same time it had become apparent that the violent activities o f  the youth wing had 
become an electoral liability for the party. Voters had become tired with the constant 
violence o f  GPK. At the same time senior, more political GPK elements had become 
dissatisfied with the preman who - especially after 1997 - infiltrated the movement. Such 
preman were happy to seek the protection o f  the PPP and Fauzi when they faced opposition 
from the police but also engaged in ‘backing’ and protection activities which tarnished the 
PPP’s image.
113 Interview, Harist, 2007.
114 Interview, Lutfi, 2008.
115 Interview, Fauzi, October 2007.
116 Interview, Harist, September 2007. Interview, Ghodi, September 2007.
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Based upon both the advice o f  the GPK Islamist faction and the PPP’s own political 
interests the new provincial chair o f  the party, Syukri Fadoli, initiated a policy o f ‘cooling 
dow n’ or essentially discouraging his followers from engaging in violence, attacks on 
tempat maksiat and inter-laskar conflict. To underline the new policy, Syukri stopped
• 1 1 7  ^interceding with the police when GPK followers were arrested. With nothing left to gain 
from their links with GPK, the preman elements began to leave the organisation. By 2004-
110 #2006, the organisation had virtually abandoned violence. These leadership and policy 
changes constitute the two most important factors that led to the pacification o f  the GPK 
m ovement.119
Although as previous literature shows the political youth gangs were once influential actors 
in the security landscape o f  Yogyakarta, they have since fallen by the wayside. Their fate 
reminds us o f  the limitations o f  police power, particularly at the inception o f  police 
autonomy in 1999-2000. At this time the police were clearly loath to tackle mass 
movements which could draw on the protection o f  elites. However one could argue that in 
the early two thousands Polri was at its weakest at a time, conversely, when the youth 
laskar were at their strongest. In the crisis o f  reformasi, society was emboldened and state 
power was put on the back foot. Youth laskar drew strength from this permissive 
environment. Yet by the last years o f  the decade both the institutional weaknesses o f  Polri 
and Indonesia’s instability had both disappeared. The police o f  today are therefore much 
less likely to be intimidated by mass social movements than in the past. There is
117 Interview, Harist, September 2007. Interview, Ghodi, September 2007. Interview, Wicak, September 2007.
118 A s the GPK general secretary in Yogyakarta during 2007-2009 described it, GPK attempts to channel 
“80%” (or as he meant a clear majority) o f  their activities into party rallies, micro-financing and the like, 
w hile raids and ‘opposing sin’ only constitute 20% o f  their other activities. The chairman does not claim  that 
GPK has foresworn all violence toward unlslam ic behaviour, instead he suggests such activities are rare 
nowadays (and usually take place at certain holy times such as Ramadhan ). This information is probably true. 
Police intelligence say that they are not especially concerned with the activities o f  GPK, they focus most o f  
their attention on other hardline Islamist m ovem ents like MMI and FJI. Interview, General Secretary o f  GPK, 
Totot, 11 September, 2007. Interviews, head o f  Police Intelligence Unit Polres Sleman, 2007 and head o f  
Police Intelligence Unit Poltabes, 2007. Interview, Harist, September 2007, Interview, Ghodi, September 
2007.
119 With regard to the BSM, my interviewees did not elaborate in detail upon how the BSM ceased to operate. 
The interviewees claim that after GPK began to cease its violent activities, the BSM automatically lost its 
reason for existence: which previously had been balancing GPK. The B SM ’s leadership chose then to 
deactivate the organisation. I find the argument improbable but can only speculate that the same political 
calculations which were made by PPP, were also probably made by the PDIP leadership and the BSM was 
discouraged from operating. Interview, Mas Bintu, Novem ber 2007. Interview, Mas Mugi, June 2008.
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nevertheless evidence to show the police still continue be reluctant to tackle certain types o f  
vigilantism. In Yogyakarta, we see this in some o f  the police handling o f  Islamic 
fundamentalists which will be discussed in the next section.
The experience o f  the youth groups also cautions us to the danger o f  making an enemy o f  
an organisation as powerful as the police. Although the police were a secondary factor in 
the downfall o f  GPK, the asymmetric tactics o f  Polda DIY in mobilising G P K ’s enemies 
proved to be disastrous for the Islamic gangsters. This has been an important lesson for 
those who came to inherit the GPK legacy o f  Islamic vigilantism: the MMI, FJI, and GAM. 
These groups have learnt from the GPK experience. While not disavowing vigilantism they 
deliberately do not seek to make the police their enemies -  instead they seek to ally 
themselves with parts o f  the police apparatus.
Islamic Vigilante Groups
The death o f  the youth laskar movement was a significant development in the history o f  
Yogyakarta’s contemporary security network. The youth laskar were the strongest grouping 
which could be said to be rivals o f  the police. The only remaining set o f  actors in 
Yogyakarta which attempt to openly oppose police authority are a small number o f  Islamic 
vigilante groups. These groups are not large but the fact that they reserve the right to use 
violence in their crusade against irreligiosity directly challenges the rule o f  law and ipso 
facto , the police. We can legitimately argue whether these groups are vehicles o f  security or 
insecurity. Their employment o f  extra-legal violence suggests Islamic vigilantes are no 
better than criminals themselves. Yet, so they argue, much o f  their activities are focused on 
discouraging prostitution, illegal alcohol trading and (at one time) the gambling industry. 
These things are indeed illegal in Indonesia. Insofar that vigilantes oppose such activities, 
one could argue that they are indeed forces which enforce law and are therefore legitimate 
agents to be included in my research. I would suggest that it is best for this type o f  study to 
cast the net as widely as possible and include vigilantes in my research.
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The relationship o f  vigilantes with the police is tense and contradictory. Islamic vigilantes 
are the most independent o f  any o f  the security groupings I have researched. Their very 
existence and demonstrated will to use violence challenges Polri. However, these groups 
nevertheless show that they desire to engage the police. They consciously refrain from 
certain actions out o f  fear and respect for police authority. This situation reminds us o f  the 
need to take power relationships into consideration when making judgements about private 
violence in Indonesia. As I have argued above, studies o f  violence and society in Indonesia 
have tended to view preman and vigilante groups in isolation. I argue we need to see how 
these types o f  groupings adapt their behaviour towards other actors. My study suggests that, 
at least in Yogyakarta, these vigilantes are limited by the powers o f  the police. They do not 
feel autonomous enough to defy the police except in special circumstances. They too 
recognise police normative authority, seeking to access the powers o f  the police and are 
wary o f  making themselves open enemies o f  Polda DIY. These groups are not dependent 
on Polri, but neither do they see themselves as free to compete with the police.
In 2007-2009, Yogyakarta had three organisations which can be described as true Islamic 
vigilantes: the Gerakan Anti-Maksiat (GAM), the Front Jihad Indonesia (FJI) and the 
Majelis Mujahadin Indonesia (MMI). Each o f  these groups shares broadly the same 
philosophy and cooperates with one another but has its own history and leadership. One o f  
the defining characteristics o f  these volunteer groups is that they are loose coalitions o f  
individuals which are organisationally weak. They group around one or more charismatic 
leader (tokoh) but nevertheless have a very strong group identity. GAM is under the 
leadership o f  a young Islamist named Ghodi Nurhamidi. Ghodi, who is probably in his 
early thirties and prior to the 2008 economic downturn owned a silversmith firm, 
established GAM around 1998.120 GAM draws its membership from the networks which 
Ghodi has in his neighbourhood, Banguntapan, in northern Bantul/south-eastern
# 1 9 1Yogyakarta city that forms part o f  the Kotagede-Kauman stronghold o f  PPP. FJI is a
• 199splinter group o f  the Yogyakarta branch o f  the Front Pembela Islam (FPI). According to 
my sources, in 2006 the FPI in Jakarta invited the creation o f  an FPI branch in Yogyakarta 
to be led by a man called Bambang Tedi. Apparently Tedi was a former gangster and
120 Interview, Ghodi, September 2007.
121 Interview, Kepala Unit Sosial dan Budaya Sumarianto, Satuan Intelijen, Polres Bantul 28 August 2008.
122 For a discussion o f  the FPI see: W ilson, ‘Changing Contours o f  Organised V io len ce’, (2006).
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exploited the FPI brand (‘angkat nama FPI’) to return to gangsterism. In agreement with 
FPI head office in Jakarta, Hasby Lukman, another prominent Yogyakarta Islamist and co­
founder o f  GAM established FJI in April 2007. With the blessing o f  FPI Jakarta, Hasby 
took the FPI masses who had flocked to Tedi’s FPI in 2006. Hasby claimed to have an 
active membership o f  1500 followers, though this is probably highly exaggerated. FJI 
draws its members from different parts o f  Yogyakarta but is most active in Bantul.124 MMI, 
the hardline organisation affiliated with Abu Bakar Basyir until late 2008, limits its 
presence in Yogyakarta to a secretariat office. “ MMI stands out from GAM and FJI in that 
MMI possesses a clear organisational structure, whereas GAM and FJI are better described 
as gangs. My efforts to interview MMI leaders were unsuccessful but Ghodi, who claims to
be a close ally o f  MMI, does not estimate their numbers as being greater than 100 or so in
1 • • • Yogyakarta. Together the FJI, MMI and GAM make up Yogyakarta’s Islamic vigilante
front.
Having interviewed the leadership o f  GAM and FJI, and having spoken with some o f  their 
membership, police intelligence and with local NGO workers, I estimate these 
organisations collectively to be small but highly motivated. Although they are only 
sporadically active, their use o f  intimidation and occasional violence gives them a greater 
reputation than their actual resources deserve. I hypothesise that individually GAM, FJI and 
MMI consist o f  a core membership o f  probably several dozen members and radiate 
outwards to perhaps several hundred sympathisers. For any individual activity I estimate 
they are capable o f  fielding perhaps thirty to forty members combined.127 To describe what
123 Although the FPI in Yogyakarta still exists, according to the Islamists I interview, it has been disavow ed  
by FPI headquarters and consists only o f  the preman friends o f  Bambang Tedi. These people still continue to 
use the FPI trade name. FPI in Yogyakarta are apparently confined to Wates, a sub-district o f  Sleman. I tried 
to interview Tedi but did not succeed. Interview, Ghodi, September 2007; Interview with Hasby Lukman 
founder and former leader o f  FJI, 10 October 2007. Police intelligence confirms the gangster practices o f  the 
FPI in Yogyakarta and confirms that the leadership still exists and is a cause o f  concern for the police. 
Interview, Kassat Intelkam Poltabes, October 2007.
124 Interview, Kassat Intel Poltabes, October 2007. Interview, Hasby Lukman, October 2007.
125 ‘Abu Bakar Ba'asyir Tidak Hadiri Kongres M M I’, Antara, 9 August 2008. Available from: 
< http://www.antara.co.id/print/12 18287265>.
126 Through intermediaries I succeeded in making contact with MMI but was informed that for an interview  
with their office they would require a donation, which would cost $100 to be paid in American currency. I 
declined. For opinion on numbers o f  MMI: Interview, Ghodi, 16 July 2008.
127 I estimate this from a D V D that Ghodi played for me. This D V D  was produced under the name o f  the 
fictitious “Aliansi Penyelamatan Indonesia'’’ (the A lliance for the Salvation o f  Indonesia), which Ghodi and 
GAM  made up to distance them selves from the D V D ’s content. The DVD was com piled from footage taken
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these groups do we must first recognise that they are not permanently active and their 
operations are fairly irregular. In terms o f  their most dominant activity, GAM and FJI 
probably meet most often to perform Koranic studies {pengajian). ~ There tends to be a 
spike in their anti-maksiat raids during Ramadhan (ubiquitously termed “sweeping” in 
Indonesia). As described by Hasby:
As for [the number o f  their activities] per month, I haven’t ever calculated. But if  
during Ramadhan then it gets rather intensive. This Ramadahan w e’ve done it four 
times [conducted ‘sw eeping’ operations]... If outside Ramadhan, its not that we don’t 
operate, but more w e volunteer for those w ho’ve been struck by crises.129
Outside Ramadhan these groups tend to lie low, spread their ideology, observe immoral 
practices they deem to offend Islam and take selective action against them. My research 
o f  newspaper archives tend to suggest this view is correct, since little mention is made o f
17 1MMI or other hardline groups operating on a regular basis. These groups tend to be 
opportunistic. They have certain constant targets that they intimidate: illegal alcohol 
traders, prostitutes and at one time gambling premises. But these attacks are planned in 
advance and infrequent.132 Vigilantes also take irregular action against other targets, 
examples I have heard o f  include youth rave parties and Islamic cults.133
Because their most important concern is eliminating vice, vigilantes see the police as both 
an obstacle and a resource. Vigilante tactics attempt to provoke the police into acting
during October to Decem ber 2007 when hardliners around Indonesia staged combined attacks on the Islamic 
cult A1 Qiyadah Islamiyah. A s will be discussed later, MMI coordinated this activity in Yogyakarta with the 
cooperation o f  GAM  and FJI. G hodi’s D V D  showed in full (and som etim es disturbing) detail the chronology  
o f  events in Yogyakarta, starting with a raid on the Yogyakarta Al Qiyadah compound and the beating o f  the 
male residents there on 29 October 2007. At the end o f  this raid -  which concluded with the detention o f  the 
distraught Al Qiyadah follow ers at Polsek Gambing, Sleman -  the MMI-GAM-FJI follow ers held a 
parade/debriefing (gladi lapangan) on a nearby tennis court. They were addressed by the Komandan Laskar 
MMI, the putative leader o f  the raid. I judge that there were about thirty to forty participants in this action. If 
this single exam ple constitutes an ordinary show o f  force, w e can expect that these organisations are able to 
call on at least thirty to forty members for a single activity. I know o f  no copies publicly available o f  the DVD  
and Ghodi only granted me a private view ing, thus I make all o f  my claim s here from the notes I compiled  
after the event.
128 Interview, Kanit Sosial Budaya, Polres Bantul, August 2008.
129 Interview, Hasby, October 2007.
130 Interview, Head o f  Police Intelligence Poltabes, October 2007.
1 1 I conducted a review o f  the archives o f  two local Yogyakarta newspapers, Harian Bernas and Kedaulatan 
Rakyat. I collected daily entries for select months over the years 1998-2006. I found little reference to 
vigilante activities.
132 Interview, Hasby, October 2007.
133 Interview, Ghodi, July 2008.
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against vice. Occasionally the Islamists even confront the police for attempting to halt their 
activities, but the leaders o f  the vigilante groups are well aware o f  the danger o f  police 
retribution and they adapt their behaviour to anticipate Polri’s actions. O f  the two 
organisations I have researched, the FJI takes the most cynical attitude to the police. The 
former leader o f  the FJI, Hasby Lukman, describes them thus:
They [police] have become an obstruction to the stoppage o f  tempat maksiat. They 
arrest, but if  we want to enter then we are obstructed... the continuation o f  premanisme 
and tempat maksiat greatly involves the police. If we talk about [the problem posed by] 
preman, then it’s easy. Because if  the heart o f  a person is touched then they will 
become good. In fact, preman are good comrades [o f h is]... But police are cowards 
who take advantage o f  their rank and position...
I asked Hasby bluntly if FJI came into direct conflict with the police. He answered:
Yes. Quite often. Even [it’s the case] I am most vicious towards the police. But with 
the ordinary community, I’m not like that. If it’s the police then I’m brave to, because 
they extort ordinary folk [rakyat kecil].]34
Clearly there is not any love lost between FJI and the police. Yet the former leader o f  FJI 
clearly distinguishes between those police with whom he cooperates and those whom he 
dismisses as corrupt. Recalling the discussion in chapter four, unsurprisingly it is Polres 
Bantul that has the worst reputation for vice and corruption. Hasby claims that his 
organisation has often been involved in raids on businesses peddling vice which operate 
under the protection o f  Polres Bantul. I asked Hasby how many times his organisation 
fought police. He responded:
Often. Too often. N ow  its fairly often with Polres Bantul. If it’s Polres Sleman and 
Poltabes we don’t have any problems. They can operate side-by-side with us. If there is 
info [from his group] on illegal alcohol joints, they respond well. If [Polres] Bantul, its 
funny, we inform them there is a seller o f  illegal alcohol, but they say there isn’t one. 
A head o f  police intelligence, a university graduate, I say [to him] in a certain place 
there is [a seller o f  alcohol], my intelligence says there is and I carry the evidence, he 
says there isn’t. How is it possible? After we com e then there really isn’t ...[setelah kita 
datang, kita menjadi benar-benar tidak ada]
134 Interview, Lukman, October 2007.
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I asked Hasby whether he considered that all o f  Polres Bantul accepted bribes, and if 
relations between FJI and the police were so poor, was there any cooperation with FJI and 
Polda DIY at all. Hasby answered:
If they’re [Polres Bantul] honest then surely yes. But there isn’t a thief who is honest...
For the regions o f  the city, Sleman and Gunung Kidul there is [cooperation]. In Bantul 
there isn’t.
What we see therefore is that Hasby distinguishes between elements o f  the police, 
accepting some while rejecting others. The leader o f  FJI acknowledges the usefulness o f  
police who are cooperative while positioning his organisation as an opponent o f  those he 
deems crooked. Within the security network, FJI and its vigilantes therefore clearly stand 
apart as denying the normative supremacy o f  the police. Although FJI pursued a 
confrontational path with Polda DIY, Hasby’s example also demonstrates the dangers for 
vigilantes who choose to make an enemy o f  Polri.
Probably as a direct result o f  a police investigation, Hasby was sacked as the leader o f  the 
FJI in 2008. This episode goes some way to explaining Hasby’s vitriolic comments about 
Polres Bantul. At the time o f  my October 2007 interview Polres Bantul had finalised Hasby 
as a witness to a criminal incident that occurred during one o f  FJI’s anti-alcohol ‘sweeping’ 
operations. On 15 September 2007, six members o f  FJI were involved in a violent 
altercation when they forcibly confiscated alcohol from a restaurant in central Bantul. 
According to the police report, a copy o f  which Hasby displayed to me, six FJI members 
were accused o f  entering a restaurant without permission, damaging furniture and stealing 
Rp.500,000 from the owner. Hasby admitted that the raid occurred and conceded his 
followers may have engaged in property damage, but he vehemently denied claims o f  theft. 
Hasby was not himself charged in the incident but was called as a witness.
Polres Bantul’s move to make the FJI leader a witness hung an ominous cloud over the FJI 
leader; Hasby interpreted the move as a police tactic to put pressure on him to testify 
against his followers. What particularly disturbed Hasby about this incident was the one-
135 Interview, Lukman October 2007. Lukman drove me to an interview with one o f  the accused, who  
confirmed the essentials o f  the case. Interview with FJI Komandan Cabang Pandak, Warsito, 10 October 
2007.
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sidedness o f  police justice. The police did not attempt to punish the seller o f  illegal alcohol, 
whose bottles the FJI delivered to the police. Hasby argues that Polres Bantul’s actions 
devolved from the fact that they secretly protected the alcohol seller and received payments 
from him. It is entirely possible that the police case was an attempt to intimidate the FJI. 
Warsito, an FJI member charged in the incident, claimed that the Rp.500,000 theft was a 
police concoction.
Whatever the truth o f  the matter, if  the police case was an attempt to intimidate Hasby it 
failed. As I learned in 2008 the police dropped the case against FJI. Yet in a roundabout 
way, Polres Bantul did apparently score a victory from the case. They succeeded in 
pressuring the FJI to drop Hasby as its leader. In an April 2008 interview with me, Hasby
• 137 i •claimed to have resigned from FJI in the February o f  that year. According to another 
source, Ghodi o f  GAM, Hasby was actually sacked by FJI’s ruling council. While Ghodi 
directly refused to answer why Hasby was removed, throughout the same interview Ghodi 
consistently unfavourably compared the violent (keras) style o f  Hasby’s leadership to 
Hasby’s replacement, Gus Nuri, a man who Ghodi considered much more “proportional” . I 
speculate that FJI ’s ruling council probably decided that Hasby’s violent style o f  leadership 
caused too much controversy. As a result Hasby was dumped. In this example o f  a defeated 
vigilante leader we can see that vigilantes do indeed court danger when confronting the 
police. Hasby’s philosophy o f  confrontation with Polri stands out as an interesting 
juxtaposition with the attitude o f  the more cunning leader o f  GAM, Ghodi Nurhamidi.
Ghodi and GAM are (legitimately) cynical about the integrity o f  the police and about their 
commitment to fighting vice, but Ghodi does nevertheless believe that the most viable way 
for his organisation to operate is in partnership with Polri. In relating this philosophy, 
Ghodi describes his attitude by reviewing G A M ’s relations with other organisations:
GAM, MMI, and FJI are the three musketeer[s] . There are many which try to destroy 
us. We move separately, but our vision and mission is the same. Anti-corruption, anti- 
vice, and anti-liquor. Why don’t we operate together? It’s the same with GAM and the
lj6 Interview, Warsito, October 2007.
137 Interview, Lukman, 23 April 2008.
138 FJI apparently had its own governing councils, a dewan syuro and a dewan tanfidziah. Hasby described 
the dewan syuro as like a little MPR.
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police, we aren’t their minions, w e’re not their spies. But we are able to operate 
together because we have the same vision. That is upholding the law .139
Ghodi is a religious fanatic, but he is a pragmatic and clever one. He realises that G A M ’s 
activities are more effective when he seeks cooperation with or the blessing o f  the police. 
He is unafraid o f  taking vigilante action. But when Ghodi’s group does choose to act 
violently, it does so in a way that challenges the police without overturning their authority.
The example par excellence o f  the way in which vigilantes can challenge the police without 
overturning their authority, was the handling o f  the Al-Qiyadah Islamiyah cult in 2007. Al- 
Qiyadah is a nation-wide cult which maintains certain beliefs which many Muslims believe 
contradict the central tenets o f  Islam. In Yogyakarta the group had set up offices in Sleman 
and apparently gathered a following o f  over 900 converts. After months o f  preparation the 
MMI network began a coordinated, nationwide attack on Al-Qiyadah offices all over 
Indonesia, in Bogor, Surabaya and Yogyakarta on 29 October 2007.140
In Yogyakarta, MMI, FJI and GAM staged a combined raid, in the course o f  which four 
ordinary Al-Qiyadah followers were beaten in an attack that was given nationwide media 
coverage. On the back o f  their deft use o f  the media, the Islamic vigilantes who staged the 
raid publicly demanded that police act against Al-Qiyadah for ‘insulting Islam.’ The 
vigilantes threatened to continue ‘sweeping’ against Al-Qiyadah if the police failed to 
act.141 At this point, the police nationally and in Yogyakarta chose to extend protection to 
Al-Qiyadah’s followers while beginning an investigation into the cult’s leadership. This 
was extremely disappointing for the vigilantes, but during November they continued to 
press the police to charge Al-Qiyadah.142 Although the police investigation was ultimately 
dropped, Polda DIY did go to extraordinary lengths to appease the demands o f  the 
vigilantes. In an exceptional ceremony held in the mosque o f  the Polda’s headquarters in 
December 2007, 935 members o f  Al-Qiyadah in Yogyakarta participated in an event in
139 Interview, Ghodi, July 2007.
140 Interview, Ghodi, 5 Novem ber 2007. ‘Massa Gerebek Pengikut Al Qiyadah Al Islamiyah di Y ogya’, 
Detiknews.com, 28 October 2007. ‘Warga Robohkan Vila Al Q iyadah’, Antara, 30 October 2007. Available 
from: < http:/Avww.antara.co.id/view/?i=l 193740248& c=N A S& s=>.
141 Interview, Ghodi, Novem ber 2007. Also: ‘ 18 Anggota Al Qiyadah Datangi Polda DIY, Minta 
Perlindungan’, Detiknews.com, 1 Novem ber 2007.
142 Interview, Ghodi, Novem ber 2007.
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which they recanted their beliefs (bertobat) .I4j I am unaware precisely who instigated the 
ceremony, but I speculate a mixture o f  police pressure and fear o f  the vigilantes motivated 
Al-Qiyadah to agree to this event. The leader o f  Al-Qiyadah in Yogyakarta, under the 
watchful eye o f  the provincial police leadership and the Chairman o f  MUI, publicly 
renounced his beliefs and instructed his followers to revert to Islam.
By careful use o f  aggression, the Yogyakarta vigilantes achieved an extraordinary 
accommodation by the police. The vigilantes obtained what they wanted by defying the 
law. Yet their defiance o f  the KUHP was targeted and limited. It was limited to pressing the 
police to take action by making a high profile attack on Al-Qiyadah members, followed up 
with aggressive threats. Their tactics ultimately worked. This deliberate tactic o f  pressing 
the police rather than defying them, ultimately yielded far better results than the 
recklessness o f  FJI ’s Hasby Lukman.
To review then, Yogyakarta’s Islamist hardliners have an existential conflict with the 
police. On the one hand, unlike other security groupings, they certainly do not acknowledge 
dependence or an obligation to cooperate with the police. In fact, their claim to a right to 
use violence presents an explicit challenge to Polri. On the other hand, vigilante groups also 
seek to engage the police and seek their support. They respond to police pressure and take 
calculated actions which are designed to avert outright confrontation with the police. The 
vigilantes are the most autonomous security grouping in Yogyakarta but they do not see 
themselves in an independent position to compete with the police. As such, vigilantes 
arguably confirm the central place Polri has within the security network.
Conclusion
This chapter has continued the analysis begun in chapter five by reviewing the volunteer 
security groups in the security network in Yogyakarta. Today we can find a large number o f
143 My evidence for this ceremony is the DV D Ghodi played for me to which I referred in footnote 124. A lso  
see: ‘925 Anggota Al Qiyadah DIY Tobat M assal’, Detiknews.com, 23 Novem ber 2007.
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vibrant and active civilian security groups operating in the region. Although these security 
groupings service different parties or different security needs, or are constituted for 
different reasons, they all share two common features: all are volunteer, civilian 
organisations and police authority limits their autonomy. Each o f  these groups, arguably 
even Islamic vigilantes, recognise the supremacy o f  the police and feels very to slightly 
subordinate to Polri.
The analysis in this chapter has proceeded through Yogyakarta’s security network as 
through a mandala, with the police at the centre, and has traced the relationships o f  
different volunteer security groupings have with the police. In Yogyakarta there are an 
inner cluster o f  actors which have the least autonomy from Polri: the ronda and the FKPM. 
Like the providers o f  commercial security, Polri regulates and supervises these groups as its 
own ‘partners.’ The ronda are organised at the lowest level o f  society (the neighbourhood 
association) to execute night patrols. The FKPM are formed by Polri at the level o f  the 
village or in small commercial areas to provide a platform for mediating small-scale social 
disputes.
From this inner ring o f  dependent actors, there follows another layer o f  groups which lack a 
direct connection with the police: the protection units o f  the village, the Linmas, and the 
militias o f  the political parties, the Satgas. The Linmas are constituted by village 
governments and are intended to provide the village with personnel for attending to 
localised security problems. Resource constraints mean that most Linmas units are 
generally inactive outside election times. The political parties also employ their own units 
whose primary function is to provide physical security at party events. Two o f  my three 
case studies deactivate their security units outside election times and all three are under the 
firm control o f  their party leadership. Both Linmas and Satgas constitute groupings that 
have been established under the control o f  alternative bases o f  power other than the state 
security apparatus. Although the Linmas and the Satgas are loyal to different parent 
organisations, nevertheless these actors concede they must defer to police when discharging 
their functions.
My analysis o f  the Linmas and Satgas groups was followed by a discussion o f  the 
outermost ring o f  actors which have fractious relations with the police. In beginning this 
section o f  my chapter I introduced an important aspect to Yogyakarta’s recent past - the 
demise o f  the youth laskar. Although moribund today, the youth laskar successfully 
challenged state authority and dominated the criminal underworld in the early years o f  
reformasi. Yet the end o f  the youth laskar paved the way for the emergence o f  police 
dominance over the network by the mid-two thousands. The only remaining group which 
actively poses a challenge to police authority are a small cluster o f  Islamic vigilante groups. 
These organisations, the MMI, FJI and GAM, constitute a membership o f  several hundred 
between them and are devoted to opposing irreligious activities. The vigilante groups, as a 
matter o f  pragmatism seek police support and endeavour to avoid outright confrontation 
with Polda DIY. Arguably they cannot be described as competitors o f  the police and their 
behaviour indeed shows a degree o f  deference to Polri.
The analysis o f  this chapter makes three contributions to the argument o f  my dissertation. 
The relationships o f  the FKPM and ronda siskamling with the police demonstrate the 
continuation o f  a distinctive, Indonesian style o f  security in which the state police actively 
seek to regulate and supervise important units o f  private policing in civil society. The 
strategy today has been enhanced with the addition o f  the new FKPM groupings. 
Secondly, this chapter also illustrates the central position o f  the police within the security 
network. The special attributes o f  the police laid out by Crawford function to explain why 
Polri assumes a superior position within the network.144 Polri’s regulatory powers, 
perceptions o f  police authority and Polri’s unique powers o f  repressive force mean that 
other actors, be they ronda, FKPM, Linmas, Satgas, or even Islamic vigilantes, value, defer 
or seek to use the authority o f  the police.
The final contribution o f  this chapter is to question the way in which the Indonesian 
literature has analysed criminality. Arguably the contemporary literature has exaggerated 
the power o f  preman and private sources o f  violence. My research from Yogyakarta 
cautions us to view the power relationships between actors, rather than seeing the actions o f  
preman and vigilantes in isolation. Islamic vigilantes emerge as the only security group
144 Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-regulatory State’, 458-459.
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which in some way seeks to challenge police power in Yogyakarta. Yet even these groups 
clearly do not see themselves as capable o f  being capable o f  competing with Polri.
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Thesis Conclusion
This dissertation is written on a premise that it is not possible to fully understand the 
security sector until we understand the interagency relations taking place within it. Where 
this issue is taken up in studies o f  security in Indonesia, the hegemonic view is that 
relations between security institutions are hostile and complicated by unclear boundaries o f  
jurisdiction. To date, such an argument has been founded upon a narrow analysis that has 
only penetrated the macro-policy making level at the centre o f  government. One o f  the 
major motives o f  my research, therefore, has been to advance existing thinking on this topic 
by engaging with security practices at the regional level. The methodology chosen for this 
task has been to execute a local level case study o f  relations in the security sector in the 
province o f  Yogyakarta.
In undertaking this course o f  research, my thesis has been guided by the following 
questions: what organisations are involved in security management and what are their core 
tasks? Is there a precise division o f  labour or are there overlapping functions as the 
Indonesian literature suggests? What evidence is there for cooperation, conflict or hostility? 
Which behaviours predominate and why? Are there centres o f  power or groupings that are 
essential to the functioning o f  the network and if so why? Finally, does the composition o f  
the security network within the case study reveal anything distinctive about the practice o f  
security management in Indonesia?
To answer these questions in brief, many sources view interagency relationships in the 
Indonesian security sector as unclear and contested. My findings suggest this is not so. This 
thesis finds that relationships between security actors in the case study site o f  Yogyakarta 
are based on generally well defined boundaries o f  jurisdiction. The dominant form o f  
interaction is not hostility or competition but rather collaboration.
My dissertation has employed network security theory as the most adequate device to 
model security relations within my case study site. The literature on policing argues that
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law enforcement is a dynamic task, that involves not only uniformed state police but a 
plethora o f  state and civilian organisations. This framework aptly fits the situation in 
Indonesia where we find a range o f  central and regional government, commercial and 
civilian security organisations deploying within the internal security sector. However, in 
contrast to the findings o f  much o f  the literature on policing in the developed world, my 
research leads me to conclude the Indonesian police are at the centre o f  the security 
network in Yogyakarta; leading, backing and lending their authority to the activities o f  
other actors. The normative, legal and logistical superiority o f  the Indonesian police 
becomes the core reason why collaboration takes place within the network. Other security 
actors need access to the special powers o f  the police.
This conclusion is divided into four sections. In the first section I provide a brief review o f  
my core findings on the security network and the large number o f  organisations within it. 
Given the quantity o f  different actors which discharge security functions in Yogyakarta, it 
seems counter-intuitive to infer that one organisation emerges as the fulcrum upon which 
this network depends. Yet I conclude that Polri plays such a role. The second section lays 
out the reasons why Polri has a centralising function in the security network. The third 
section goes on to explain why cooperation has emerged as the dominant form o f  
interaction within the network. The final section explores the theoretical significance o f  
these findings.
The Plural Network o f  State and Civilian Organisations Involved in Providing Security
Chapters two, five and six serve to answer some o f  the exploratory questions in this 
dissertation about what organisations operate in Yogyakarta’s security network. We can 
divide this network into two conceptual halves: there is a cluster o f  organisations which are 
based within the state and a large non-state sector as well. Looking firstly at the state sector, 
we can disaggregate this part o f  the network again: there are numerous central government 
agencies which operate within the regions; these operate alongside many other law 
enforcement agencies which are responsible to regional government. An analysis o f  their
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roles, however, indicates that there is little duplication o f  functions between state security 
agencies.
When considering the central government security organisations in Yogyakarta, the largest 
and most organisationally complex is Polri. Although the police are a national body under 
the direct command o f  the president, Polri has a regional command system that reaches into 
the provinces, districts, sub-districts and even to the village. Polri’s seemingly innocuous 
job statement to ‘serve, guide and protect’ the Indonesian community and to uphold 
‘security and public order’ is an abbreviated summary o f  what is in fact a very complex 
mission. In practice, Polri guides society through its community police officers, secures 
transportation, provides direct security services to society through patrolling, guards vital 
objects, and responds to demonstrations and other disturbances. Polri investigates crime, 
collects intelligence and through the more strategic units available at provincial police 
offices, Polri manages high security threats, like counter-terrorism, inter-social conflict and 
trans-national crime. Without including any o f  the other evidence, based on Polri’s vast 
array o f  responsibilities alone, we can distinguish the Indonesian national police as a 
special institution. The depth and breadth o f  its powers make Polri the critical provider o f  
security at the regional level.
Territorial units o f  the Indonesian army are, like the police, deployed in a system which 
mirrors the civilian administration. As a consequence o f  military reform, however, the TNI 
has today been forbidden from conducting internal security activities without the direction 
o f  the central executive government. This type o f  intervention has generally taken the form 
o f  declared states o f  emergency and is rare. The last example was the state o f  military 
emergency declared in the province o f  Aceh, which ended in a peace accord in 2005. Thus, 
while the Indonesian military is still ubiquitously present at the regional level through the 
territorial command system, my research indicates that territorial army units are severely 
constrained in what they can officially perform. In Yogyakarta, the most important thing 
these units do is train for combat. Beyond training, territorial units are available to support 
the police in periodic joint operations. In such operations military personnel are seconded 
beneath the command o f  the police. Military units also support society through the ‘77V7 
masuk desa' program. From my observations o f  this program, territorial forces seem to
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operate at the behest o f  regional government as unpaid labour. The military is also highly 
active in intelligence gathering. Intelligence gathering marks the last substantive task the 
TNI can perform independently to support regional security. In the Yogyakarta case study 
the military is a powerless and idle part o f  the security network.
Beyond the police there are a number o f  different state law enforcement agencies which are 
responsible for policing sectorally specific laws. Some o f  these agencies operate at the 
regional level but remain hierarchically part o f  central government departments. Two 
examples included in this research are taxation inspectors o f  the Department o f  Finance and 
immigration officers o f  the Department o f  Law and Human Rights. Under the terms o f  
Indonesia’s decentralisation program, there are also agencies which fall under the 
hierarchical control o f  regional government but which enforce national laws. Two examples 
o f  this type o f  bureau are the Forestry Police and the Bureau o f  Transportation. These 
agencies have specially qualified bureaucrats, Penyidik Pegawai Negri Sipil (civil service 
investigators) who enforce the given laws o f  their sector. Decentralisation has also granted 
new law enforcement capabilities to provincial and district governments. These powers 
enable regional government to draft misdemeanour offences over infractions o f  local 
licensing and certain classes o f  vice. These ordinances are implemented by regional civil 
service police and PPNS.
Having analysed each o f  the state security actors in the Yogyakarta case study site, it is 
clear that we need to reassess the claims often expressed in the literature. Much o f  the 
scholarly literature on security in Indonesia assumes the security sector is shaped by 
overlapping jurisdictions between different agencies. To the contrary, I argue each o f  the 
government security organisations in Yogyakarta manages some aspect o f  security, but the 
jurisdictions are clear and uncontested. The core functions o f  these organisations are 
therefore very distinct.
Chapters five and six extended my analysis to non-government security groupings; the non­
state groupings can be further sub-divided into a commercial security sector and a volunteer 
sector. Chapter five reviewed commercial security. There are a mixture o f  large and small 
business enterprises in Yogyakarta which have an interest in maintaining physical security
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on their own premises. These enterprises tap into a growing security industry composed o f  
private security companies (BUJP) which supply specialised labour for security contracts 
and a floating mass o f  accredited security guards (Satpam). Chapter seven analysed the 
volunteer, civil society security organisations. In this area there are two ubiquitous grass 
roots organisations, directly supervised by Polri: the Indonesian neighbourhood watch or 
ronda siskamling and the village based community oriented policing forums (FKPM). 
Other volunteer security groupings operate at the local level and function as the arm o f  
larger organisations. One ubiquitous example is the security units o f  the village, the 
Linmas. Political party security taskforces (Satgas) are another feature o f  the local security 
landscape. Today the Satgas are mostly inactive outside election times. There is also a 
small community o f  Islamic vigilantes, which are periodically active in disrupting un- 
Islamic practices, like illegal alcohol trading. While the existence o f  such non-state security 
groupings would seemingly pose a risk o f  duplication with the functions o f  the police, as 
will be described in the next section, the non-government security groups acknowledge 
normative and legal superiority o f  the police within the network. They also acknowledge an 
obligation to cooperate with Polri.
Polri: the Centre o f  the Network
While security clearly involves a plurality o f  organisations, the paradoxical outcome is that 
far creating a security network that is diffuse, disorganised and decentralised, the network 
actually possesses a strong centre o f  gravity: the police. This outcome is entirely contrary to 
the accepted views in the literature on security in Indonesia. The literature observes that 
security sector reform after 1998 created two separate and arguably competing security 
bureaucracies, the military and the police. Decentralisation handed greater law enforcement 
capabilities to regional government. At the same time, authoritarian chains were lifted from 
Indonesian civil society and new groupings o f  preman and vigilantes rose to press their
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agendas on the local landscape.1 The logical consequence o f  this deconcentration o f  power 
should be competition and disorganisation. Yet the opposite has occurred. How is this 
possible? The previous section shows how little jurisdictions actually overlap. This 
situation is quite benign insofar that it removes the potential for competition over functional 
roles. Yet an absence o f  confusion about jurisdictional boundaries does not explain how 
Polri has become the centre o f  the network. This outcome has arisen because all non-police 
organisations believe they must cooperate with the police in the course o f  performing their 
duties. Three separate factors have created this situation.
The first factor derives from historical and structural reforms which have prevented the 
development o f  competitor organisations which could rival the influence o f  the police. In 
chapter one I described how military reforms ushered in during the transition period 
disempowered the Indonesian military. In the New Order, the Indonesian army dominated 
the police within ABRI. The army also maintained certain institutions like kopkamtib and 
the dewan sospol which enabled the army to play a strategic role in local security. Under 
societal pressure, the military dismantled this system in 1999 and made the hugely 
significant decision to separate Polri from ABRI. The Indonesian parliament extended these 
changes by making the TNI and Polri independent institutions. Although the Indonesian 
parliament did not explicitly define boundaries o f  authority between the two forces, the 
parliament did provide very powerful, normative directions that anointed the police as the 
primary institution in domestic security. The other major source o f  governmental authority 
in local security, regional government, is also similarly incapable o f  duplicating police 
functions. The decentralisation process in Indonesia has left regional government without 
substantial law enforcement powers. The inability o f  rival sources o f  security provision to 
develop, has left the Indonesian police as almost the exclusive provider o f  security at the 
regional level.
The second reason for the centrality o f  the Indonesian police is the continuation o f  Suharto 
era practices by Polri which enables it to supervise other nodes o f  security. Chapter four 
discussed non-police criminal investigators, the PPNS. These bureaucrats are forced by
1 Araf and Aliabas (ed.), TNI-Polri di Masa Perubahan Politik, (2008). Kristiansen and Trijono, ‘Local 
Government Reforms and Security System s in Indonesia’, (2005). W ilson, ‘Changing Contours o f  Organized 
V io len ce’, (2005).
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procedure to submit their investigations to the inspection o f  Polri detectives. This 
procedural requirement installs Polri above these other arms o f  state law enforcement. 
Chapters six and seven discussed how during the nineteen eighties and nineties, the police 
developed a strategy o f  regulating and supervising volunteer security organisations (Pam 
swakarsa). The intention behind this strategy was to place potentially rival centres o f  
policing beneath the supervision o f  the state. This practice continues today through the 
expanded Polmas arm o f  the police. Today, Polri also regulates and supervises the 
commercial security industry (Satpam and BUJP), ronda siskamling, and community 
oriented policing forums. Regulation and supervision is more intense over some o f  these 
elements than others. BUJP are tightly regulated while the ronda only obtain infrequent 
visits from sub-district Polmas officers. Nevertheless Polri has ambitious claims to 
supremacy over these groupings. The subjects o f  this system, the BUJP, Satpam, ronda and 
community policing forums reify the police position by accepting and valuing the terms o f  
their relationship with the police apparatus. The reason why they do so, links with the third 
element o f  police superiority I discuss below.
The third factor in explaining the superiority o f  Polri is the appeal o f  unique police powers 
to non-police security organisations. In the introduction, 1 referred to the research o f  Adam 
Crawford. In his work on security and regulation in the United Kingdom, Crawford argues 
that the state has certain unique assets when compared to other regulatory actors. Crawford 
postulates state powers are exceptional because of:
« ...  [the state’s] symbolic power and cultural authority;
• ... its legitimacy claims and public perceptions of its legitimacy;
• ... [the state’s position as a] distinctive (tactical) resource and source of information 
through which interests are pursued;
• ... its residual position as a back-up of last resort with regard to other forms 
of control.2
Similar unique properties o f  symbolic authority, repressive power, distinctive knowledge 
and emergency support make the Indonesian police especially attractive to other security 
entities. Most o f  the actors within the network actively seek out and value relations with the
2 Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State’, 459-458.
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Indonesian police because Polri’s capabilities bolster their own. Chapters three and four 
discussed how various arms o f  regional government - the regional executive leadership and 
operational agencies like the Public Order Bureaus, Forestry Police and Bureaus o f  
Transportation - seek access to Polri’s criminal investigative powers and repressive security 
powers. Chapter five discussed how most consumers o f  security seek to augment their own 
private security arrangements by paying for additional police services; in these 
arrangements the consumers seek access to police ‘fixers’, police intelligence, and police 
sourced training. Even for those consumers which do not pay for additional police services, 
these enterprises still value direct contact with police representatives and consider the 
police a critical source o f  emergency support.
The idea o f  emergency support also weighs heavily in the appeal o f  the police to many 
volunteer security groupings. From my interviews with participants in the ronda, 
community oriented policing forums, Linmas, and party Satgas, each o f  these entities 
values direct relations with police officers because each group sees the police as the only 
legitimate authority capable o f  managing security threats. Although threats are very rarely 
realised, these actors place a high value on the idea that the police can support them when a 
security problem arises. All o f  this must be placed within the Indonesian context, where 
there is not a history o f  a coordinated, ‘911’ emergency response system. As such, direct 
access to police officers is considered valuable. Even when considering Islamic vigilantes, 
these groups also regard relations with the police highly. Though vigilantes pose an 
existential threat to police authority, these groups do not seek direct conflict with the police. 
Rather these organisations seek to cultivate links with Polri to assist and legitimate their 
struggle against anti-Islamic practices. The appeal o f  the special properties o f  the police 
thus becomes an important factor in the elevation o f  Polri over the non-state providers o f  
security.
Collaboration: the Dominant Feature o f  Networked Relations
The dependence o f  non-police actors on Polri also determines the nature o f  relations within 
the network. Virtually all non-police groupings feel they need to acquire services from the
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police or feel obligated to obtain police permission to function. Ipso facto , cooperation 
becomes the dominant behaviour in interagency relations. The instruments and procedures 
for cooperation differ in individual relationships between the police and the other security 
actors.
Regional government emerges prominently in seeking and facilitating cooperation. 
Chapter three and four demonstrated that regional governments attempt to facilitate 
interagency security cooperation in three ways: maintaining interagency security forums, 
providing cross-institutional funding, and executing joint operations. Most interagency 
forums are a throwback to the Suharto era, like the Muspida, the Kominda and the 
Kediljapol. These groupings enable the regional leadership to meet, engage in dialogue, 
share intelligence, discuss mutual problems and plan joint security activities. Although at 
one time regional governments subsidised Polri and TNI units, today these practices are 
forbidden. Regional government can still financially support central government agencies 
but today this takes the form o f  subsidising the operational costs incurred by Polri and the 
TNI when they engage in joint operations with regional government. Various regional 
government bureaus with law enforcement capabilities also hold joint operations with the 
police. Transportation bureaucrats hold roadside traffic inspections together with Polri. 
Forestry Police hold anti-logging operations with Polri. Pol.PP often stage anti-vice 
operations, squatter demolitions and other activities together with the police.
One o f  the least expected findings o f  this research is that local TNI and police forces do not 
compete but do on occasion collaborate. Aside from TNI and Polri participation in regional 
government security forums, chapter four discussed the ability o f  police commanders to 
request the secondment o f  territorial forces to police operations. This system is termed 
‘bawah kendali operasi’ (underneath the operational control [of a leading sector]). These 
operations are rare and local military forces have, to the knowledge o f  my interviewees, 
never been employed in operations, but only deployed in readiness to support police 
operations. This system is not based upon modalities, or mutually agreed doctrine, but upon 
practices o f  Polri and TNI during the ABRI period. Arguably, it would be best were such a 
system articulated in formal procedure but it is clear that an agreed framework for 
achieving cooperation between police and military elements does exist in the field.
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Collaboration also defines the relations o f  non-state security groupings with Polri. 
Consumers o f  security (like shopping malls and hotels), ronda siskamling participants, and 
volunteers in the FKPM, all seek relations with Polri elements as a means o f  accessing 
police services. Linmas, party Satgas and private security companies feel obliged to operate 
with the permission o f  the police. Sometimes this obligation is very modest. Satgas for 
example only feel compelled to transmit information to Polri and coordinate with the police 
over security arrangements for party events. Nevertheless this obligation is unavoidable and 
is a necessary pre-condition for Satgas to operate. At the opposite extreme o f  the spectrum, 
commercial security companies are tightly regulated by the police. They must obtain police 
permission even to exist. Islamic vigilantes are an interesting exception. While they do not 
defer to the police, these groups also attempt to engage the police and involve Polri in their 
activities.
These patterns o f  cooperation reveal an important point about the role o f  Polri within the 
network. Polri is in high demand by other security organisations yet it is rare for the police 
to seek collaboration with them. The one exception is Polri’s policy o f  supervising Pam 
swakarsa. The police initiate these relationships, but the policy is an inheritance o f  the 
Suharto period. With this exception, the general disposition o f  the police towards 
cooperation is one o f  passivity. Polri’s assistance is in high demand yet the police do not 
attempt to exploit their superior status by steering or controlling other organisations. Even 
Polri’s attitude towards the activities o f  the Pam swakarsa is one o f  regulation and 
supervision from a distance. The internal activities o f  these groupings is an issue for their 
individual leaderships.
The ambivalence o f  the police towards initiating cooperation is itself a product o f  the power 
o f  the police within the network. As mentioned in chapter four, interagency relations is the 
topic o f  my dissertation. Yet the dominant concern for police leaders is the management o f  
Polri’s own vast responsibilities. Every day the Yogyakarta police mounts hundreds o f  
patrols, submit daily reports at every level o f  the hierarchy, investigates dozens o f  crimes 
and generate huge amounts o f  administrative work to support operational personnel. These 
activities are the dominant interest o f  police commanders. Cooperation within the network
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framework described in my dissertation is an additional task, and something o f  a sideshow 
for Polri commanders.
Given the fact that it is other security institutions which need Polri rather than Polri which 
needs them, the final question is why do the police support other security organisations at 
all? It is likely there are a combination o f  reasons. Part o f  the answer is that the security 
network operates to minimise disincentives to collaboration. Many forms o f  cooperation are 
not a substantial burden on police resources. In chapter four I discussed the principle o f  the 
‘user pays.’ There is an assumption that institutions which wish to call upon police powers 
compensate the police. Thus regional government and consumers o f  commercial security 
pay the police for their services. This argument does not, however, explicate the police 
strategy o f  supervising Pam swakarsa. Supervision o f  Pam swakarsa is an impost on police 
resources. In this case, it is probable that historical legacy has some influence on police 
strategy. Police regulation and supervision o f  Pam swakarsa groupings dates back to the 
Suharto era. This strategy has become so ingrained in the practice o f  policing that Polri 
continues this program today almost reflexively. Finally, professional responsibility 
dictates that the police reciprocate the desires o f  other agencies for security assistance. As a 
public institution Polri’s effectiveness is defined by how well the institution produces 
security and order. As discussed in chapter four, police commanders feel there is a certain 
responsibility on their part to cooperate with other institutions which play a role in the 
sector in order that the general goal, o f  a well-ordered, secure environment may be 
achieved.
Future Research Agendas
While this dissertation is not the final analysis on relations in the Indonesian security sector 
it does provide the literature with a revised view o f  the topic. The findings summarised 
above suggest that we should reconsider the conventional wisdom that relations between 
security actors (especially the military and police) are poor and contested. Although in 
chapter two I laid out the argument why Yogyakarta actually can be used to generalise
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conclusions about security trends in other parts o f  Indonesia, I accept critical readers may 
not be convinced by this proposition. Future research in other case study sites would 
therefore contribute much to testing my findings. There are two general points which 
emerge from this study which may serve to direct future research on security in Indonesia.
Firstly, when reviewing the security sector it is necessary to integrate an analysis o f  
relations between multiple security organisations. Previously there has been a strong 
tendency in the Indonesian literature to analyse preman or the military in isolation. To gain 
a reliable measure o f  the influence and role o f  these actors it is necessary to consider the 
interagency dynamic and how these groupings compare to and inter-relate with others in 
the security field.
Secondly, considering the future study o f  security sector reform in Indonesia, this research 
suggests the need to dramatically enhance analysis o f  the police. Polri has been under­
represented in scholarly research o f  the security sector in Indonesia. With the military 
reforms o f  1998-2000, however, responsibility for domestic security has passed from the 
defence portfolio to the police. Indonesia’s contemporary system o f  security management 
now prioritises most internal security problems as issues o f  policing. Scholars o f  Indonesia 
therefore arguably need to reconceptualise how we view security in Indonesia, and utilise 
theory from studies o f  policing. This research fundamentally then justifies a dramatic 
enhancement o f  the academic attention devoted to the police.
The hegemonic position o f  Polri within the case study o f  Yogyakarta also calls into 
question some o f  the assumptions o f  the literature on gangsterism in Indonesia. In the early 
reform period the Indonesian state experienced a substantial crisis, one o f  the symptoms o f  
this was the rise o f  non-state dependent criminal or quasi-criminal gangs. Arguably the 
mood o f  these times propelled the work o f  Ian Wilson, Loren Ryter, Stein Kristiansen and 
others who documented the influence o f  gangsters and other non-state forces within 
society.3 Yet as Ramage and MacIntyre have argued, it has become increasingly clear that 
Indonesia has weathered this period o f  crisis and re-emerged as a stable, orderly,
3 W ilson, ‘Changing Contours o f  Organized V io len ce’, (2006). Ryter, ‘Pemuda Pancasila’, in: Violence and 
the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, (2001). Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia’, (2003).
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democracy.4 The ability o f  the police in Yogyakarta to dominate non-state security 
groupings supports this conclusion. Arguably, therefore, scholars o f  Indonesia should begin 
to revisit concepts o f  the strong state and the extent to which the Indonesia o f  contemporary 
times fits this model.
Finally, for comparative studies o f  networked security the analysis o f  this dissertation leads 
us to reassess the role o f  police. As discussed in the introduction, the majority o f  policing 
scholars prefer to emphasise the diminution o f  police authority within security networks. 
Arguably there has been a tendency to prioritise the quantitative breadth and complexity o f  
networks at the expense o f  qualitative analysis o f  the relationships within.3 As Crawford 
argued and I have extended, the police possess unique assets which no other actor 
duplicates. These assets define the police as a special, centralising force within security 
networks. Greater consideration should arguably be given to the relationships within 
networks and the potentially significant role played by police.
1 MacIntyre and Ramage, ‘Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country’, (2008).
5 Loader and Walker, ‘Policing as a Public G ood’, 10. Dupont, ‘Security in the A ge o f  N etw orks’, 77-78. 
Also: Kempa and Johnston, ‘The developm ent o f  inclusive plural policing in Britain’, (2005), Johnston and 
Shearing, Governing Security, (2003). W ood and Shearing, Imagining Security, (2007). Loader, ‘Plural
Policing and Democratic G overnance’, (2000).
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Sleman. Submission by Wakil Kapolres Ayi Supardan (September 2006). (Sleman 
District Police. Issues concerning materials for Sleman District regional heads ’ 
coordination meeting. Submission by Deputy Head o f Sleman District Police Ayi 
Supardan)
Polres Sleman. Rencana Kegiatan “Ops Ketupat Progo -  2007” No.Pol.: B/15/X/Bag Ops. 
(Sleman District Police. “Ops Ketupat Progo -  2007” Workplan)
Polres Sleman. Satuan Reskrim. Struktur Organisasi (2007). (Sleman District Police. 
Reskrim Unit. Organisational Structure)
Polres Sleman. Rencana Kerja Polres Sleman dan Jajarannya (January 2007). (Sleman 
District Police. Sleman District Police and its apparatus ’ workplan)
Polres Sleman. Jumlah DSPP -  RIIL (August 2007). (Sleman District Police. The numbers 
o f DSPP -  RIIL)
Polres Sleman. Bagian Binamitra. Daftar Pos Kamling (September 2007). (Sleman District 
Police. Partner Management Section. List o f  Neighbourhood Watch Posts)
Yogyakarta Regional Government
Provincial Government of Yogyakarta (Pemerintah Propinsi DIY)
Pemerintah Propinsi DIY. Permasalahan Hukum Propinsi DIY 2006. (Provincial 
Government o f  Yogyakarta. Legal issues in Yogyakarta Province in 2006)
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Bureau of Forestry and Plantations (Dinas Kehutanan dan 
Perkebunan)
Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan. Rencana Operasi Perlindungan dan Pengamanan Hutan 
(2006?). (Bureau o f Forestry and Plantation. Forest Protection and Security 
Operational Plan)
Bureau of Public Order (Dinas Ketertiban)
Dinas Ketertiban. Perda-Perda Propinsi DIY (February 2008). (Bureau o f Public Order. 
Yogyakarta Province ’s regional regulations)
Municipality of Yogyakarta City (Kota Yogyakarta)
Kota Yogyakarta. Hasil Rapat Muspida (14 October 2002). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta 
City. Muspida Meeting Minutes)
Kota Yogyakarta. Tambahan Bahan Rapat Muspida. Radiogram Mendagri No.XXX
3000/SJ TGL.19 MARET 2003 (March 2003). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta City. 
Additional materials fo r the Muspida meeting. Radiogram o f the Interior Minister)
Kota Yogyakarta. Bahan Rapat Muspida (31 March 2003). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta 
City. Muspida meeting materials)
Kota Yogyakarta. Hasil Rapat Muspida (3 April 2003). (Municipality o f Yogyakarta City. 
Muspida meeting minutes)
Kota Yogyakarta. Notulen Rapat Persiapan Muspida. Sekretariat Muspida (17 January, 
2004). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta City. Minutes o f  the Muspida preparatory 
meeting. Muspida Secretariat)
Kota Yogyakarta. Notulen Rapat Persiapan Muspida. Sekretariat Muspida (27 January 
2004). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta City. Minutes o f the Muspida preparatory 
meeting. Muspida Secretariat)
Kota Yogyakarta. Rapat Koordinasi Sekretariat Muspida (30 January 2004). (Municipality 
o f Yogyakarta City. Muspida Secretariat Coordination Meeting)
Kota Yogyakarta. Rapat Koordinasi Sekretariat Muspida (25 February 2004). (Municipality 
o f Yogyakarta City. Muspida Secretariat Coordination Meeting)
Kota Yogyakarta. Notulen Rapat Muspida (March 17 2004). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta 
City. Muspida Meeting Minutes)
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Kota Yogyakarta. Notulen Rapat Muspida (2 April 2004). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta 
City. Muspida Meeting Minutes)
Kota Yogyakarta. Rapat Koordinasi Sekretariat Muspida (5 May 2004). (Municipality o f  
Yogyakarta City. Muspida Secretariat Coordination Meeting)
Kota Yogyakarta. Notulen Rapat Muspid (6 May 2004). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta City. 
Muspida Meeting Minutes)
Kota Yogyakarta. Sekretariat Muspida. Notulen Rapat Persiapan Muspida. (15 May 2004). 
(Municipality o f Yogyakarta City. Muspida Secretariat Coordination Meeting 
Minutes)
Kota Yogyakarta. Rapat Koordinasi Sekretariat Muspida (29 May 2004). (Municipality o f  
Yogyakarta City. Muspida Secretariat Coordination Meeting
Kota Yogyakarta. Rapat Koordinasi Sekretariat Muspida (7 June 2004). (Municipality o f  
Yogyakarta City. Muspida Secretariat Coordination Meeting)
Kota Yogyakarta. Rapat Koordinasi Sekretariat Muspida (23 June 2004). (Municipality o f  
Yogyakarta City. Muspida Secretariat Coordination Meeting)
Kota Yogyakarta. Hasil Rapat Muspida (14 July 2004). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta City. 
Muspida Meeting Results)
Kota Yogyakarta. Hasil Rapat Muspida (9 August 2004). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta City. 
Muspida Meeting Results)
Kota Yogyakarta. Hasil Rapat Muspida (19 May 2005). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta City. 
Muspida Meeting Results)
Kota Yogyakarta. Hasil Rapat Muspida (30 June 2005). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta City. 
Muspida Meeting Results)
Kota Yogyakarta. Hasil Rapat Muspida (30 August 2005). (Municipality o f Yogyakarta 
City. Muspida Meeting Results)
Kota Yogyakarta. Hasil Rapat Muspida (28 November 2005). (Municipality o f  Yogyakarta 
City. Muspida Meeting Results)
Bureau of Public Order (Dinas Ketertiban)
Dinas Ketertiban. Hasil Kegiatan Penegakan [sic] Perda Kota Yogyakarta Tahun 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006. (Bureau o f  Public Order. Upholding Yogyakarta City 
Perda Activities Result fo r the years o f2003, 2004, 2005, 2006)
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Dinas Ketertiban. Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah Tahun 2006. (Bureau 
o f Public Order. Government institutions ’ work performance accountability report 
year 2006)
Dinas Ketertiban. Menyelenggarakan Pengamanan Pilkada 2006 (December 2006).
(Bureau o f Public Order. Implementing security measures for the 2006 Pilkada)
Seksi Pengendalian Operasi: Rencana Kegiatan Pengendalian Operasi (2007). (Operations 
Control Section: Activitives Plan for Controling Operations)
Dinas Ketertiban. Daftar Isi Peraturan Daerah Kota Yogyakarta yang Mengandung Sanksi 
Pidana (undated but collected April 2008). (Bureau o f  Public Order. Table o f  
Contents o f Yogyakarta City Regional Regulations containing criminal sanctions)
Dinas Ketertiban. Daftar Peraturan yang Mengandung Sanksi (2008?). (Bureau o f  Public 
Order. List o f regulations which have sanctions)
Legal Section (Bagian Hukum)
Bagian Hukum. Rekapitulasi Hasil Operasi Terpadu PPNS Kota Yogyakarta: Bulan April 
1998 S.D. Maret 1999 Tahun Anggaran 1998/1999. (Legal Section. Review o f  
Yogyakarta City PPNS Joint Operation: April 1998 -  March 1999, Fiscal Year 
1998/1999)
Bagian Hukum. Rekapitulasi Hasil Operasi Terpadu PPNS Kota Yogyakarta: Bulan April 
1990 S.D. Maret 2000 Tahun Anggaran 1999/2000. (Legal Section. Review o f  
Yogyakarta City PPNS Joint Operation: April 1999 -  March 2000, Fiscal Year 
1999/2000)
Office of National Unity, Youth and Sport (Kantor Kesatuan 
Bangsa, Pemuda dan Olahraga)
Kantor Kesatuan Bangsa, Pemuda dan Olahraga. Laporan Hasil Rapat Kominda (8 August
2007). (Office o f  National Unity, Youth and Sport. Report on Kominda Meeting 
Results)
District of  Sleman (Kabupaten Sleman)
Kabupaten Sleman. Materi Rapat Persiapan Rakorpimda / Muspida (29 June 2006).
(District o f Sleman. Rakorpimda /  Muspida Preparatory Meeting Materials)
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Kabupaten Sleman. Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah (Rakorda) (4 July 2006). 
(District o f  Sleman. Regional Heads Coordination Meeting Minutes)
Kabupaten Sleman. Memo: Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah (19 September 2006). 
(District o f  Sleman. Memo: Regional Heads Coordination Meeting)
Kabupaten Sleman. Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah (18 November 2006). 
(District o f  Sleman. Regional Heads Coordination Meeting Minutes)
Kabupaten Sleman. Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah (22 December 2006). 
(District o f  Sleman. Regional Heads Coordination Meeting Minutes)
Kabupaten Sleman. Hasil Rakorpim (19 February 2007). (District o f  Sleman. Rakorpim 
Result)
Kabupaten Sleman. Resume Rakorda Kabupaten Sleman (4 July 2007). (District o f  Sleman. 
Sleman District Rakorda Meeting Minutes)
Bureau of Public Order (Dinas Ketertiban)
Dinas Ketertiban. Uraian Tugas Personil Tahun 2007. (Bureau o f  Public Order.
Dinas Ketertiban. Rencana Kerja Tahunan 2007. (Bureau o f Public Order. 2007 Yearly 
Workplan)
Dinas Ketertiban. Rekap Laporan Pelanggaran Perda Seksi Penegakan Perda Kantor Satuan 
Pol.PP (10 October 2008). (Bureau o f Public Order. Review o f Perda Violation 
Perda Upholding Section, Office o f  Civil Service Police Unit)
District o f Bantul (Kabupaten Bantul)
Kabupaten Bantul. Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul (28 January 2005). (District o f  
Bantul. Bantul Muspida Meeting Minutes)
Kabupaten Bantul. Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul (17 November 2003). (District o f  
Bantul. Bantul Muspida Meeting Minutes)
Kabupaten Bantul. Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul (30 December 2003). (District o f  
Bantul. Bantul Muspida Meeting Minutes)
Kabupaten Bantul. Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul (20 January 2004). (District o f  
Bantul. Bantul Muspida Meeting Minutes)
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Kabupaten Bantul. Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul (25 January 2005). {District o f  
Bantul. Bantul Muspida Meeting Minutes)
Kabupaten Bantul. Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul (26 February 2005). (District o f  
Bantul. Bantul Muspida Meeting Minutes)
Kabupaten Bantul. Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul (28 July 2005). (District o f  Bantul. 
Bantul Muspida Meeting Minutes)
Kabupaten Bantul. Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul (23 August, 2005). (District o f  
Bantul. Bantul Muspida Meeting Minutes)
Office of Public Order (Dinas Ketertiban)
Dinas Ketertiban. Daftar Perda Yang Menjadi Dasar Hukum Dalam Penegakan Peraturan 
Daerah Seksi Gakda Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja (2007). (Office o f  Public Order. 
List o f Perda which are the reference in upholding regional regulations Gakda 
Section o f Civil Service Police Unit)
Dinas Ketertiban. Ringkasan Dokumen Pelaksanaan Perubahan Anggaran Satuan Kerja
Perangkat Daerah -  Kantor Satpol PP (September 2007). (Office o f  Public Order. 
Summary o f the implementation o f budget change o f the regional apparatus work 
unit -  office o f civil service police unit)
Dinas Ketertiban. Jadwal Kegiatan Operasional Seksi Penegakan Perda (2008). (Office o f  
Public Order. Operational Activities Schedule o f Perda Upholding Section)
Non-government/Private Sector
Commercial Security
Assosiasi M anager Security Indonesia (AMSI)
AMSI. Daftar Anggota AMSI Daerah Instimewa Yogyakarta (June 2007?). (Indonesian 
Security Managers Association. Members list o f  AMSI in Yogyakarta Province)
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Consumers
SKKK UGM. Grafik Kejadian di Kampus UGM (2008?). (Charts o f  Events in UGM 
Campus)
Suppliers
PT. Garda Total Security. Struktur Organisasi (2007?). (Organisational Structure)
PT. Garuda Merah. Struktur Organisasi (2008?). (Organisational Structure)
Volunteer Security Groups
Forum Kemitraan Polisi dan Masyarakat
FKPM Lempuyangan. Daftar Anggota (as at June 2008). (Members List)
FKPM Lempuyangan. Buku Kejadian FKPM. (FKPMLogbook)
FKPM Jlagran RW03. Buku Laporan Kejadian Polmas RW03. (Polmas RW03 events 
logbook)
Party Satgas
Partai Golkar Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. Surat Keputusan No.66/Golkar
DIY/6/2008 tentang Badan Pengendali Pemenangan Pemilihan Umum 2009 (27 
June 2008). (Golkar Party o f  Yogyakarta Province. Decision on the Control Board 
o f the 2009 General Election Winning Team)
Agreements and Memoranda o f Understanding
Kepolisian Kota Besar Yogyakarta and Pemerintah Kotamadya Yogyakarta. Perjanjian 
Kerjasama Antara Pemerintah Kota dan Kepolisian Kota Besar tentang 
Pengamanan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (22 April 2006). (Yogyakarta City Police
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and Municipality o f  Yogyakarta City. Agreement between Yogyakarta City Police 
and Municipality o f Yogyakarta City about securing District Head Election)
Surat Keputusan Bersama (SKB) between Pertamina and POLRI. Kesepakatan Bersama 
Penyelenggaraan Pengamanan di Lingkungan Usaha Minyak dan Gas Bumi 
Negara dan Penertiban Penyalahgunaan, <http://www.pertamina.com/index.php? 
Itemid=33&id=l423&option=com content&task=view>. Accessed: 7 November 
2009. (Joint ruling between Pertamina and Polri. Concensus on the security 
measures implementation in national oil and gas business and action against 
violations)
Kesepakatan Bersama antara Badan Pertanahan Nasional Republik Indonesia dengan 
Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia: 3-SKB-BPN RI-2007 / No. Pol. : 
B/576/III/2007 tentang Penanganan Masalah Pertanahan. <http://aansetva. 
files.wordpress.com/20Q9/01/skb 03 2007.pdf>. Accessed: 7 November 2009. 
(Joint ruling between National Land Board and the Indonesian National Police 
concerning the management o f land problems)
Keputusan Bersama Gubernur Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta and Kepala Kepolisian Daerah 
Istimewa Yogyakarta tentang Kerjasama Penyelenggaraan Ketenteraman dan 
Ketertiban Umum serta Pemeliharaan Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat di 
Wilayah Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (6 July 2007). (Joint ruling 
between Yogyakarta Governor and the Yogyakarta Province Police Chief about 
cooperations fo r the safety and public order and the maintenance o f  security and 
public order for the people in Yogyakarta Province)
Kesepakataan Bersama Menteri Dalam Negri dan Kepala Kepolisian tentang Kerjasama
Pembinaan dan Penyelenggaraan Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Masyarakat (17 July 
2002). (Joint ruling between Interior Minister and Police Head about 
cooperations for the management and implementation o f efforts to ensure the 
community ’s safety and public order)
Interviews
National Government
Ministry of Finance
Sigit. Kepala Kantor Pajak Daerah Yogyakarta (Head o f  Yogyakarta Region Tax Office). 27 
June 2008.
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Ministry o f  Justice and Human Rights
Prinono, Eko. Kepala Seksi Pengawasan dan Penindakan. Kantor Imigrasi Yogyakarta
(Head o f Monitoring and Sanction Section. Yogyakarta Imigration Office). 1 July 
2008.
Military and Defence
Sudarsono, Juwono (Prof.). Former Minister o f  Defence. 27 May 2008
Widjojo, Agus, (Lt.Gen. ret.). Former Head o f  Staff, Territorial Forces. 29 April 2008.
Korem 072 (Yogyakarta)/Kodam IV Diponegoro
Military Police Sergeant (name withheld). 21 September 2007.
(Group Interview)
Suwarno (May.), Kasi Intelijen (Head o f  Intelligence Section). Jawa Heru (May.), Kasi 
Teritorial (Head o f Territorial Section). Nurodin (May.), Kasi Operasi (Head o f  
Operation Section). 30 June 2008.
National Police
Anonymous source from police headquarters. 5 September 2008.
Daradjatun, Adang. Former Deputy C hief o f  Police. 12 September 2008.
Muhammad, Farouk, (Maj.Gen.ret.). Former Head o f  Department o f  Defence Working 
Group on Police Separation. 10 September 2008.
Senior officer. Mabes Polri Legal Division. 29 May 2008. 18 November 2008.
Yogyakarta Provincial Police (Polisi Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta, Polda DIY)
Anonymous source. Kamsa Detachment (Detachment Unit). November 2007.
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Arifin, Zainal (AKBP). Kepala Pusat Pengendalian Operasi (Head o f Operation Control 
Centre). 6 November 2008.
Nurdjana, I.G.M (Kombes). Kepala Biro Perencanaan dan Pengembangan (H eadof 
Planning and Development Bureau). 28 August 2007.
Sunaryono (Kombes.). Wakil Kapolda DIY (Deputy Head o f  Yogyakarta Province 
Regional Police). 24 July 2007.
Yogyakarta City Police (Polisi Kota Besar Yogyakarta, Poltabes)
Anonymous police interviewee. 2 July 2008.
Arifin, Zainal (AKBP). Kepala Bagian Operasi Poltabes (Head o f  Operation Section,
Yogyakarta City Police). 12 August 2007. 24 October 2007. 25 November 2007. 
14 April 2008.
Chito. Anggota Satuan Reskrim (Member o f  Reskrim Unit). 5 October 2007.
Haryadi, Sigit (AKP). Kapolsek Danurejan (Danurejan Sector Police Head). 3 July 2008.
“Juwono” (Not his real name). Kepala Polsek (Head o f Sector Police). 2 July 2008.
Nugroho, Y.Tarwoco. Kepala Unit Ekonomi, Satuan Intelijen-Keamanan (H eadof 
Economy Unit, Intelligence-Security Unit). 27 November 2008.
Purnomo (AKP). Kepala Polsek Gedong Tengan (Head o f Gedong Tengan Sector Police). 
3 June 2008.
“ Slamet” (Not his real name). Kepala Polsek (Head o f Sector Police). 14 July 2008.
Traspoetra, Andy (Kompol). Kepala Satuan Narkoba (Head o f Narcotics Unit). 25 
September 2007.
Wahayu (Kompol). Kepala Satuan Intelijen-Keamanan (Head o f  Intelligence-Security 
Unit). 1 October 2007.
Sleman District Police (Polisi Resor Sleman, Polres Sleman)
Alamsyah, Dede (AKBP). Wakil Kepala Polres Sleman (Deputy Head o f Sleman District 
Police). 5 September 2007.
Kristiono (AKBP). Kepala Bagian Operasi Polres Sleman (Head o f  Sleman District Police 
Operation Unit). November 1 2007.
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Gultom, A.T.S. Kepala Unit Reserse Kriminal, Polsek Depok Barat {Head o f  Criminal 
Reserse Unit, Depok Barat Sector Police). 19 May 2008.
Gusmiyadi. Anggota Satuan Reskrim {Member o f Reskrim Unit). 1 November 2007.
Hadi, Yuswo (Kompol). Kepala Satuan Intelijen-Kemanan {Head o f  Intelligence-Security 
Unit). 2 October 2007.
(Group Interview)
Supriyanto, Agus and Yunus Supriyono. Anggota Unit Intelijen, Polsek Tempel 
{Intelligence Unit members, Tempel Polsek). 13 November 2008.
Bantul District Police (Polisi Resort Bantul, Polres Bantul)
Sumarianto. Kepala Unit Sosial dan Budaya, Satuan Intelijen {Head o f  Social and Culture 
Unit, Intelligence Unit). 28 August 2008.
(Group Interview)
Munadi and Enik. Police officers, Bagian Binamitra {Partner Management Division). 27 
August 2008.
Jamingan (BRIPKA) and Sujito (BRIPDA). Polmas officers, Polsek Piyungan {Community 
Police officers, Piyungan Polsek). 30 August 2008
Sarjono (AIPTU) and Subiantoro (AIPTU). Polmas officers, Polsek Pandak (Community 
Police officers, Pandak Polsek). 9 October 2008.
Yogyakarta Regional Government
Provincial Government of Yogyakarta 
Cooperation Branch (Biro Kerjasama)
Sudardi. Asisten Kepala Biro (Assistant to Branch Head). 21 September 2007.
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Forestry Bureau (Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan)
Basuki, Tri. Kepala Seksi Pengamanan (Head o f Security Section). 28 June 2008.
Legal Branch (Biro Hukum)
Nugroho, R. Senior Civil Servant. 29 October 2007
Narcotics Bureau (Badan Narkoba Propinsi)
Priyatno, Aryoko. Kepala Badan Narkotika Propinsi DIY (Head o f  Provincial Narcotics 
Bureau). 24 October 2008.
Bureau o f Public Order (Dinas Ketertiban)
Prasetyo, Nugroho. Kepala Bagian Pol.PP (Head o f  Civil Service Police Division). 26 May 
2008.
Soesino, Gunder. Kepala Bagian Penegakan Perda (Head o f Perda Upholding Division). 26 
May 2008.
Municipality of Yogyakarta City
Administration Section (Bagian Tata Usaha)
Kepala Bagian (Head o f Administration Section). 12 May 2008.
Legal Section (Bagian Hukum)
Harris, Basuki. Kepala Bagian Hukum (Head o f Legal Section). 21 September 2007.
Municipal Narcotic Agency (Badan Narkotika Kota)
Sekretaris Badan Narkotika Kota (Secretary o f Municipal Narcotics Agency). 26 July 2007.
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Bureau o f  Public Order (Dinas Ketertiban)
Arfo. Senior Penyidik Pegawai Negeri Sipil (Civil Servant Senior Investigator). 16 April 
2008. 19 April 2008.
Former Kepala Seksi Intelijen (Former Head o f Intelligence Section). 19 April 2008. 29 
October 2007.
Hartana, Norwidi. Kepala Seksi Pengendalian Operasi (Head o f Operation Control
Division) and former Kepala (Mantri) Kesatuan Polisi Pamong Praja Kecamatan 
(former Head o f  Sub-district’s Civil Service Police Unit). 14 June 2007. 29 July
2007. 22 September 2007. 23 October 2007. 9 April 2008. 25 November 2008.
Irfan, Susilo. Kepala Bagian PPNS (Head o f  PPNS Division). 13 May 2007
Murtihardjo. Kepala Bagian Tata Usaha (Head o f  Administration Section), and former
Kepala (Mantri) Kesatuan Polisi Pamong Praja Kecamatan (former Head o f  Civil 
Service Police Unit o f  the Sub-district). 16 April 2008.
Senior member o f  Seksi Penegakkan Perda (Perda Upholding Division). 16 April 2008.
Supriyono. Kepala Dinas Ketertiban (Head o f Public Order Bureau). 5 June 2007.
Yohannes, Ari N. Kepala Seksi Pengamanan, Bagian Ketertiban dan Ketentraman (Head o f  
Security Section, Division o f  Order and Safety). 31 August 2007.
Bureau o f Transportation (Dinas Perhubungan)
Moeljanto, M. Kepala Bagian Teknik Sarana dan Prasarana (Head o f Technical Division o f  
Tools and Infrastructure). 30 October 2008.
(Group Interview)
Udin, Kepala Seksi Pengendalian Operasi (Head o f Operation Control Section).
M.Moeljanto, Kepala Bagian Teknik Sarana dan Prasarana (Head o f  Tools and 
Infrastructure Technical Division). 1 November 2008.
District of Sleman
Subiyanto, Ibnu. Bupati Sleman (Head o f Sleman District). 10 June 2008
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Sutrisno, lr. District Secretary o f  the District o f  Sleman. 30 July 2007.
Bureau of Housing, Infrastructure and Transport (Dinas 
Pemukiman, Prasarana dan Perhubungan)
Fatoni, Sulton. Kepala Seksi Lalu Lintas (Head o f  Traffic Section). 10 November 2008.
Legal Section (Bagian Hukum)
(Group Interview)
Hermanan Edi, Kepala Sub-Bagian Bantuan Hukum (Head o f  Legal Aid Sub-Division). 
Heru Djoko, Kepala Sub-bagian Dokumentasi (Head o f Documentation Sub- 
Division). 2 August 2007.
Bureau of Public Order (Dinas Ketertiban)
Marhaendarto, Joko. Kepala Seksi Penegakkan Perda (Head o f  Perda Upholding Unit). 2 
August 2007.
Dinas Tourism (Dinas Pariwisata)
Trisno, Heri S. Kepala Seksi Perijinan (Head o f  Clearance Section). 28 September 2007.
Kecamatan Depok (Sub-district of Depok)
Supardal. Camat Depok (Head o f Depok Sub-district). 4 June 2008.
Santoso, Agus. Kepala Seksi Trantib (HeadofTrantib Section). 4 June 2008.
Desa Condong Catur (Condong Catur Village)
Winoto, Marsudi. Kepala Sub-Bagian Pemerintahan, Desa Condong Catur, Kecamatan 
Depok, Kabupaten Sleman (Head o f Governance Sub-division, Condong Catur 
Village, Depok Sub-district, Sleman District). 3 November 2008.
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District o f  Bantul
Sudarto, Gendut. Sekretaris Daerah Bantul (Regional Secretary o f  Bantul District). 9 
October 2007.
Office of Public Order (Kantor Ketertiban)
Kandiawan, R.M. Kepala Kantor Pol.PP and former Kepala (Mantri) Kesatuan Polisi
Pamong Praja Kecamatan (Head o f  Civil Service Police Office and former Head o f  
Sub-district Civil Service Police Unit). 29 October 2007. 10 April 2008. 8 October 
2008.
(Group Interview)
Jadi Bayu Broto, Kepala Seksi Pengamanan (Head o f  Security Section). Wahyu Priyanto, 
Kepala Seksi Penegakkan Perda (Head o f  Perda Upholding Section). 7 November 
2008.
Legal Section (Bagian Hukum)
Sutinah R. Civil Servant, Seksi Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Section). 29 October 2007.
Desa Srimulyo (Srimulyo village)
Suratman. Kepala Sub-Bagian Pemerintahan, Desa Srimulyo. Kecamatan Piyungan, Bantul 
(Head o f Governance Sub-division, Srimulyo Village, Piyungan Sub-district, 
Bantul District). 20 October 2008.
Kelurahan Triharjo (Triharjo village)
Sugimantoro. Kepala Sub-Bagian Pemerintahan, Kelurahan Triharjo, Kecamatan Pandak, 
Bantul (Head o f Governance Sub-division, Triharjo Village, Pandak Sub-district, 
Bantul District). 11 October 2008.
Trikamso. Anggota Linmas (Dukuh Nlagran) (A Linmas member from Nlagran Sub­
village). 11 October 2008.
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Civil Society/Non-government Interviews
Media
Hariardi. Senior criminal affairs journalist for Yogyakarta daily newspaper Kedaulatan 
Rakyat. 25 June 2008.
Taufik, Ibnu. Crime Reporter for the Yogyakarta daily newspaper Radar Yogya. 2 May 
2008.
Windawaran, Puguh. Freelance Yogyakarta journalist. 21 May 2007.
NGO Activists
Setiotomo, Kusno. Senior Journalist and Chairman o f  Policewatch Yogyakarta. 10 June 
2008.
Zuhdan, Muh. Convenor o f  the Community Oriented Policing program, Pusham UII. 9 
May 2008.
Criminal Underworld
Gemblek. Mentor o f  Gun Jack and senior gangster. 19 July 2007.
“Gun Jack.” Former boss gangster. 19 July 2007.
Commercial Security Industry 
Assosiasi M anager Security Indonesia (Cabang Yogyakarta)
(Group Interview)
Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Treasurer o f  the Yogyakarta branch o f  the Asosiasi 
Manager Security Indonesia. 24 June 2008.
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Consumers
Achmad, Dinia. Duty Manager, Apartement Sejahtera. 22 November 2008.
Budiono. Deputy Head o f  Human Resources for PT. Yogya Indah Sejahtera (Amplas 
Management). 17 May 2008.
Subroto, Gatot. Head o f  Security, Hotel Grand Mercure. 22 August 2008.
Suharyono, Edy. Training manager, Hotel Inna Garuda. 1 July 2008.
Suwandi, R.Deda. Kepala Satuan Keamanan dan Keselamatan Kampus (SKKK) UGM 
(Head o f UGM Campus Security and Safety Unit). 27 October 2008.
(Group Interview)
Sasanadi, Hadiwijaya, Operations and IT manager, and Susanto, Hendro, H.R.D manager, 
Mall Malioboro. 16 June 2008.
Suppliers
Security Companies (Badan Jasa Usaha Pengamanan)
Habib. Employee from the accounting desk, PT. Garuda Merah. 5 October 2007.
Nugroho, Bayu. Direktur Utama, PT. Garuda Merah. 29 October 2008.
Parjiyanto. Operations Manager, PT. Garuda Merah. 5 October 2007.
(Group Interview)
Sugiyanto, ISS Security Superintendent and Head o f  Security. Prabowo, ISS Security 
Supervisor and Deputy Security Chief. 17 May 2008.
Parjiyanto, Operations Manager. Nuning, Executive Secretary. 2 October 2007.
Widodo, Seti and Atus Nurwijanarko. Directors, PT. Garuda Merah. 5 N ovem ber 2007. 14 
April 2008.
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Private Security Guards (Satpam)
Budiono. Head o f  Security o f  Apartemen Sejahtera. 18 June 2008.
Pamuji, Rinto (Brig.). Assistant Police for Inna Garuda. 18 June 2008.6 
(Group interviews)
Marsito, Komandan Sektor Timur SKKK UGM (East Sector Commander o f SKKK  UGM) 
and Wahayudi, Satpam (Security Guard). 28 October 2008.
Suzaidan, Wasirudin and Marjono. Satpam (Security Guards) Mall Malioboro. 23 October 
2008.
Volunteer Security Groups
Ronda Siskamling
Suparno and Sugianto, RT.14 and Ismail RT.12, RW03, Kelurahan Pringgokusuman, Sub­
district o f  Gedongtengen, City o f  Yogyakarta. 10 October 2008.
Samarin, RT05-06 (and unnamed colleagues), RW03 and Suhardi RT04, RW07, Sidokarto 
Village, Godean Sub-district, Sleman District. 11 October 2008.
Suparno, Kepala Dusun Gesikan IV (RT 05-07) (Head o f  Sub-village Gesikan IV). Bantul 
District. 10 October 2008.
(Group Interview)
Syahbudin, Atus, Ketua Senkom DIY/former Ketua RT (Head o f Yogyakarta Province 
Senkom/former head o f Neighbourhood Unit), and Sungkono, Ketua Senkom 
Bantul/Ketua RT (Head o f  Bantul Senkom/head o f Neighbourhood Unit) 10 May
2008.
Forum Kemitraan Polisi Masyarakat
Noviriyanto, Tri. Wakil Ketua II (Deputy HeadII), FKPM Stasiun Lempuyangan (FKPM  
Lempuyangan Station). 20 October 2008.
6 N .B . The role o f  this person makes it difficult to categorise him in the bibliography. He is a police officer 
but serves as a security consultant to Hotel Inna Garuda as part o f  a fee-for-service agreement between the 
hotel and his police superiors. I arbitrarily list him as a security guard but his background is more com plex.
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Haryanto, Ketua FKPM Stasiun Lempuyangan (Head o f  FKPM Lempuyangan Station), and 
Heri, Wakil Ketua (Deputy Head). 17 June 2008.
Sutiono, Ketua FKPM Jlagran RW03 (H eadof FKPMJlagran RW.03), and Setiyana, 
Sekretaris FKPM Jlagran RW03 (Secretary o f  FKPM Jlagran RW.03). 17 June
2008. 8 July 2008.
(Group Interview)
Political Parties
Azahari, Fauzi. Chair o f  the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Yogyakarta (1997-2001). 11 
October 2007.
Party Satgas and Party Youth Movements
Harist. GPK Leader, City Branch. 26 September 2007.
Haryono, Kristi. Bendahara Satgas PDIP Kecamatan Depok, Sleman (Treasurer, PDIP 
Depok Sub-district, Sleman Working Unit). 26 November 2008.
Lilik. Head o f  GPK, PPP (2006-2011). 8 September 2007.
Lutfi, Muhammad. Head o f  GPK, PPP (2001 -2 0 0 6 ) .  25 June 2008.
Manggolo, K.T. (Kukuh). Wakil Sekretaris Internal PDIP Cabang Sleman (PDIP Sleman 
Branch ’s Deputy Secretary). 3 November 2008.
“ Mas Bintu.” Komandan Operasi BSM (BSM Operational Commander). 6 November 
2007.
“Mas Mugi.” Ketua II BSM (BSMHeadII). 24 June 2008.
Purbadi, A.S. Sekretaris Jenderal Angkatan Pemuda Kabah, PPP (General Secretary o f  
PPP ’s Kabah Youth Group). 3 October 2008.
Soedardi, W.FX. Sekretaris Golkar Propinsi DIY (Secretary o f Golkar Yogyakarta 
Province). 10 Novem ber 2008.
Totot. Sekretaris Jenderal GPK (General Secretary o f GPK). 11 September, 2007
Wicak. Ketua GPK Sleman (Head o f Sleman GPK). 27 September 2007.
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Islamic Vigilantes
Lukman, Hasby. (Former) Head o f  Front Jihad Indonesia. 10 October 2007. 16 July 2008.
Nurhamidi, Ghodi. Ketua Gerakan Anti-Maksiat (Anti-Vice Movement Leader) also served 
as Deputy Secretary o f  GPK (2006 - 2011). 29 September 2007. 5 November 
2007. 23 April 2008.
Warsito. Commander o f  FJI Pandak Branch. 10 October 2007.
Notes o f Field Observation
Conflict Resolution Seminar held by Centre for Security and Conflict Studies (Universitas 
Gajah Mada) for Polda DIY. 18-22 May 2007.
Combined Anti-Prostitution Operation between Dinas Ketertiban, City o f  Yogyakarta and 
police o f  Poltabes Kota Yogyakarta. 25 July 2007.
Snap inspections by Seksi Penegakkan Perda, Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta (Perda 
Upholding Section, Public Order Bureau o f Yogyakarta City). 4 July 2007.
Combined Community Guidance Meeting Field Observation, between Dinas Ketertiban 
(Public Order Bureau), City o f  Yogyakarta and police o f  Poltabes Kota 
Yogyakarta. 5 August 2007.
Activities at Police Posts established for ‘Operasi Ketupat Progo (3-220ctober 2007)’: 
Station Tugu, 10 October 2007. Plaza Ambarukmo 16 October 2007.
Websites
Menteri Dalam Negeri, Website: ‘Penjelasan Dirjen BAKD Mengenai Belanja Bantuan 
Kepada Instansi Vertikal yang Bersumber dari A PB D ’, 23 February 2006. 
(Interior Minister’s Website: ‘The explanation o f Dir.Gen. BAKD about budget 
assistance deriving from APBD to vertical institutions’) Accessed 15 December 
2007.
Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Propinsi, DIY Yogyakarta: Data Luas Hutan Negara 
Berdasarkan Fungsi Hutan Per Kabupaten di Propinsi DIY (Bureau o f  Forestry 
and Plantation, Yogyakarta Province: Data o f  State Forest based on the forests ’
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functions per districts in Yogyakarta Province). < http://www.dishutbun. pemda- 
diy.go.id/v9/?page=kelolahutan >. Accessed 28 October 2009.
Kabupaten Sleman, Website. Profil Kecamatan Depok (Sleman District, Website. The 
profile o f  Depok Sub-district). < http://www.slemankab.go.id/ 
hal=detail kecamatan.php&kecamatan=Depok.>. Accessed 31 August 2009.
Kejaksaan Agung, Website. Jaksa Agung Muda Intelijen (Attorney General Office,
Website. Intelligence Junior Attorney General), < http://www.kejaksaan.go.id/ 
unit kejaksaan.php?idu=22>. Accessed 30 July 2009.
Polda DIY Website (Yogyakarta Provincial Police Website).
<http://www.jogja.polri.go.id/index.php?menu=profile &sub=struktur>. Accessed: 
30 October 2009.
Universitas Gajah Mada Website: “Figures.” <http://www.ugm,ac.id/eng/ 
content.php?page=0&displav::=6>. Accessed 11 August 2009.
Yogyakarta City, Website. Press Release: ‘Kapolda DIY Diminta hentikan Pekat’
(Demands for Head o f Yogyakarta Provincial Police to stop Pekat) (21 October 
2004). Available from: < http://upik.iogia.go.id/news/ 
index.cfm?berita id= 211020040846 02&x=2>. Accessed 30 July 2009.
Newspapers
Antara, 30 October 2007 - 9 August 2008. 
Detik.com, February 2004 - 9 April 2009. 
Euronews, 8 July 2009.
Harian Bernas, 1998-2006.
Harian Terbit, 1 July 1995.
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Pikiran Rakyat, 29 August 2005.
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Tribun Timur, February 2009 - August 2006. 
Vivanews, 30 January 2009.
Worldfocus.com, 8 July 2009.
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Annex A:
Territorial Structure o f the Indonesian Military
National Cabinet Panglima TNI - Commander o f  the Military
Province
Panglima Komando Daerah Militer or 
Pangdam*
(Military Region Commander)
Komandan Komando Resort Militer or 
Danrem **
(Military Resort Commander)
District
Komandan Komando Distrik Militer or 
Dandim 
(Military District Commander)
Sub-district
Komandan Komando Rayon Militer or 
Danramil 
(Military Sub-District Commander)
Village
Bintara Pembina Desa or 
Babinsa *** 
(Non-commissioned Officer for Village 
Development)
Adapted from Lowry, Armed Forces o f Indonesia,p. 60.
* a Kodam may cover one large province (for example Kodam V for East Java) or several 
small provinces (Kodam IX which covers Bali, West and East Nusa Tenggara)
** a Korem may covers a cluster o f  districts (such as Korem 072 Yogyakarta which 
includes the five districts o f  Yogyakarta province and five neighbouring districts in Central 
Java province
*** A Babinsa may be responsible for more than one village
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Historical Regulations on Support o f Defence 
Forces to the Police
Annex B:
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74 
Decrees VI and VII o f the People ’s Consultative 
Assembly on the Police and Indonesian Military
Annex C:
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Annex D:
Search Results from Australian Libraries 
Database : Survey o f the literature on the 
Indonesian Military versus the Police
Australian Library Collections - Results 982
Searching: military, Indonesia, by subject (any year, any language)
Australian Library Collections - Results 345
Searching: police, Indonesia, by subject (any year, any language)
N .B . This search however draws up a large number o f  historical documents. A more precise search exam ines 
the important period after the fall o f  the N ew  Order.
Australian Library Collections - Results 370
Searching: military, Indonesia, by subject (year greater than 1998), any language 
Australian Library Collections - Results 235
Searching: police, Indonesia, by subject (year greater than 1998), any language
N .B . Even so, this search yields a large number o f  primary source, Indonesian government documents. The 
inclusion o f  these sources undermines the purpose o f  surveying the academ ic literature. Many o f  the more 
critical, scholarly sources are written by foreign observers in English. Arbitrarily therefore, i f  w e limit the 
search to only English sources, w e find the follow ing results:
Australian Library Collections - Results 128
Searching: Indonesia, military, by subject (year greater than 1998), English sources only 
Australian Library Collections - Results 39
Searching: Indonesia, police, by subject (year greater than 1998), English sources only
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Annex E:
Comparative Crime Figures for Indonesia
“Risk o f  Citizen becoming a victim o f  crime (Per 100.000 citizens) According to Regional Police Commands (based on reported incidents 
o f  crime) 2003 — 2005 [I.E. the reported rate o f crimes per 100,000 people]”
Province 2003 2004 2005
Total
2003-2006
Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam 66 45 53 164
Sumatera Utara 154 183 220 557
Sumatera Barat 132 122 163 417
Riau 146 149 193 488
Jambi 68 75 84 227
Sumatera
Selatan 95 107 125 327
Bengkulu 73 68 69 210
Ranking based on three year 
average
1 Sulawesi Utara 1306
2 DKI Jakarta 896
3 Gorontalo 840
4 Papua 638
5 Sumatera Utara 557
6 Sulawesi Tengah 553
7 Kalimantan Timur 519
378
Lampung 51 63 58 172 8 Bal i 501 
Bangka 
Belitung 11-1* 1 J.I 114 342 9 Riau 488 
Kepulauan Riau 159 159 159 477 10 Kepulauan Riau 477 
OKI Jakarta 228 321 347 896 11 Sumatera Barat 417 
Jawa Barat 48 55 62 165 12 Kalimantan Tengah 394 
Jawa Tengah 36 38 37 111 13 Sulawesi Selatan 380 
DI Yo!!Vakarta 65 75 108 248 14 Bangka Belitung 342 
Jawa Timur 74 72 86 232 15 Nusa Tenggara Timur 333 
Ban ten 32 19 45 96 16 Sumatera Selatan 327 
Bali 139 174 188 50 1 17 Kalimantan Selatan 307 
Nusa Tenggara 
Ba rat 84 89 113 286 18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 286 
379 
Nusa Tenggara 
Timur 104 93 136 333 19 Kalimantan Barat 274 
Kalimantan 
Ba rat 49 89 136 274 20 DI Yo2')'akarta 248 
Kalimantan 
Tengah 118 119 157 394 21 Jawa Timur 232 
Kalimantan 
Se Iatan 111 109 87 307 22 Maluku 229 
Kal imantan 
Timur 157 160 202 519 23 Jam bi 227 
Sulawesi Utara 407 410 489 1306 24 Sulawesi Tenggara 216 
Sulawesi 
Tengah 178 149 226 553 25 Bengkulu 210 
Sulawesi 
Se Iatan 94 127 159 380 26 Lampung 172 
Sulawesi 
Tenggara 72 108 36 216 27 Jawa Barat 165 
Gorontalo Y80 256 304 840 28 Nan!!!!roe Aceh Darussalam 164 
Maluku 81 83 65 229 29 Maluku Utara 144 
380 
30 Jawa Tengah 111
31 Banten 96
Maluku Utara 48 48 48 144
Papua 170 219 249 638
Source: http://\vw w .bps.go.id /sector/hansos/index.htm l [taken from N ational Police Headquarters; accessed  June 2008] 
* italicisation indicates where an entry w as not recorded, instead a proxy average was calculated.
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Annex F: Maps
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Diagram o f Poltabes Yogyakarta
Annex G:
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KEPOLISIAN NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA 
DAERAH ISTIMEWA YOGYAKARTA 
KOTA BESAR YOGYAKARTA
KEPUTUSAN______ KAPOLRI
NO. POL. : KEP / 7 I I I  2005 
TANGGAL : 31 JANUARI 2005
STRUKTUR ORGANISASI POLTABES YOGYAKARTA
SPK1
SPK 2
SPK 3
KAPOLTABES
WAKA
BAG OPS BAG BINAMITRA
-  SUBBAG BINOPS
SUBBAG WATTAH
-  SUBBAG BIMMAS
SUBBAG KERMA
UR TELEMATIKA UNIT P 3 D
SAT INTELKAM SAT RESKRIM SAT NARKOBA
- UR BINOPS - UR BINOPS
- UR YAN MIN
UNIT OPSNAL
-  UR BINOPS
UR IDEN - UNIT BINLUH
UNIT OPSNAL
BAG MIN
r '
SUBBAG REN SUBBAG LOG
SUBBAG PERS SUBBAG LAT
UR DOKKES TAUD BENSAT
SAT SAMAPTA SAT PAM OBSUS SAT LANTAS
UR BINOPS
UNIT PATROLI
DALMAS
UR BINOPS - UR BINOPS -
UNIT DIKYS -
UNIT LAKA -
UNIT PATROLI -
UNIT REGIDNT
SAT PAM WST
UR BINOPS -
UNIT OPSNAL J
SEK GM SEK NG SEKWB SEK KR SEK MJ SEK MG SEK UH SEK KG SEK PA SEKGK SEK DN SEK GT SEK IT SEK TR
D IA G R A M  KEY:
K A P O L T A B E S/W A K A  : Leadership
BAGOPS: Operational Planning Section
BAG BINAM ITRA: Caring for [Police] Partners Section
BAG MIN: Administration
UR TELEMATIKA: Communications Support
UNIT P3D: Provosts
UR DOKKES: Medical Support Section
TAUD: Secretariat
BENSAT: ?
SATINTELKAM : Intelligence Unit
SATKRIM: Detective Unit
SA T N A R K O B A : Narcotics Investigation Unit
SA T SA M A PTA : Patrol Police Unit
SA T PA M O B SU S: Strategic/Vital Objects Protection Unit
SAT LA N TA S: Traffic Police Unit
SATPA M W ST: Tourist Police Unit
BOTTOM OF DIAGRAM : Sub-district police precincts subordinate to Poltabes
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